The possibility of the prejudicative in the substantialism of Mulla Sadrā’s "Kitab al-Masha'ir"*

Maria-Roxana Bischin**
PhD Researcher in Philosophy -University of Bucharest- Romania

Abstract
Due to the movements in European thought from the 16th-17th centuries that have generated enough controversy around the ideas of 'natural philosophy' and 'experimental philosophy', I think it would be appropriate to focus our attention on the evolution of the idea of 'substantialism' in 'transcendental philosophy' from the Islamic philosophy. Mulla Sadrā was the most important philosopher and he established a truly hermeneutics on the idea of the 'Being'. Due to the new fields of research into the prejudicative hermeneutics, I can say that I will follow in this paper to manage this idea. I will follow the similarities between the Kitab written by Mulla Sadrā and the European idea of 'natural philosophy', I will show some similarities between the "Kitabal-Masha'ir" and "Treatise on Heavens of Kant", and I will bring those perspectives into a hermeneutical field of interpretation.

Keywords: Mulla Sadrā, the ‘penetration’ of Being, natural substantialism, neo-aristotelism, ‘natural philosophy’, Islamic hermeneutics, pre-judicative.

* Received date: 2018/8/29 Accepted date: 2018/10/16
** E-mail: mariaartspy16@yahoo.com
Introduction for a hermeneutical-transcendental circle of interpretation of the ‘Being’

The Kitab al-Mashaʾir is divided in eight parts named “Penetrations” which in their turn are divided in “Testimonials”. In parallel, in the European modern thought, Immanuel Kant wrote a Treatise on Heavens based on the newtonian principles. The ideas of Sadrā are very close to the European early modern thought and modern thought too. Due to the fact, that exists a common vision about the transcendent alism and the corruption (Peters, 2007) of the universe, in Aristotle, Kant and Veracruz writings, we need to understand the term not as something imoral, illegal, but as something synonymous with the destruction of the Universe” (Ibid, 225-224), as saying with a scenery of an apocatastasis. If we unify the visions of the two continents, we get a philosophical system similar to a ‘natural-transcendental’ substantialism.

From another perspetive, we have the book Kitab al-Mashaʾir. Libro de las penetraciones metafísicas, written by Mulla Sadrā, who was a shia philosopher and whose ideas were appropriate to the continental-European philosophy of 16th century. If we unify the visions of the two, we get a philosophical system similar to a natural substantialism.

Starting with these premises about Kitab al Mashaʾir, we can say that we have two appropriate visions on the natural substantialism coexistent in the philosophy of the 16th-17th centuries (the pre-kantian European vision, the Hispanic vision of the Alonso de la Veracruz) and the vision of the Islamic system. I think this should be a starting point of view about the variety of the visions on substantialism theory before the Kantian moment into the mondial philosophy. I will try to show how this similarities, from two different continents, bring us closer to the major idea on the ‘philosophy of nature’ and closer to the possibility of a pre-judicial hermeneutics in shia thought of 17th century.

First of all, we must say that in 16th-17th Century we talk about a rich period in Iran (Safavid Empire), which is fill of artistic, architectural and philosophical achivements. Due to the fact, that the arabs were an important part for the history of the Spain during the Middle Ages and continuing in early modern times, and due to the scientific works of the arabs, the relationships between the European culture and Islamic culture is indestructible. For this reason, Mulla Sadrā is close not only to the idea of the possibility of a metaphysic in Being, but tot the idea of a substantialism. I will point how this substantialism had a major role in Islamic philosophy at the beginnings of 17th Century. His Kitab can be considered a code-boke for the hermeneutic-metaphysical system of the Being. It starts with the words “En el nombre de Dios, el Compasivo, el Misericordioso”, which are very similar to the first line from Koran: “(1) Alif. Mam. Mim” (The Holy
The possibility of the prejudicative in … /173

Qur’ān, 2004: 1). Even if Heidegger said that the Being is profoundly correlated in an ontological plane and passes into the linguistic one; I will keep myself away of a formal logique, because I will insist on the similarities between the Sadrā’s hermeneutics and some aspects of the ‘naturalizing philosophy’ in modern European times, and I will finish with a possibility to establish a pre-judicial hermeneutics in Sadrā’s Kitab.

Starting with the premise that, “if something is a substance in the external reality, the mental form must be a substance as well” (Rahman, 1975: 216). Francis Bacon noted about the structure of mental imagination as well: “Man are to be admonished that they do not withdraw credit from the operations by Transmission of Spirits and Force of Imagination” (Bacon, 901 experiment, 1670: 198). Bacon was talking in his 10th Centurie about the “emission of the spirits and the imaterial virtues of the spirits”. The universal configuration of the world, according to Bacon, may exist due to the “the Primitive Nature of Matter and the seeds of things” (Ibid, 907th experiment: 200).

According to cite from Bacon, we have a reason to investigate the similarities with the European philosophy. I think the substantialism preserved into Being becomes part of the substantialism of thinking the ‘Being’. But, there is a judge, behind on the judge, which the hermeneuts named ‘pre-judicative’. I think is very important to follow the role of the pre-judicative in Sadrā system of thinking in his book Kitab.

The thinking process includes my judge, my experience on visual and unseen things, and the perception of the external world. Mulla Sadrā noted that we must somehow unify the reality of the Being with the existence of the Being, as saying the ‘Worldliness of the Worlds’ (Heidegger, 1996: 59) with the experience of the Being. I think Sadrā also practices in his transcendental-hermeneutical system an intersubjectivism.

In the global context transcendentalism in philosphy, we have some representative writers from the 16th-17th centuries in Mexico as Alonso de la Veracruz, Ledesma, and Arguto. The author Gallegos Rocafull says that the writings are combined the “ascetic discourse with the mistical discourse” (Rocafull, 1974: 198). I think we can talk in Sadrā’s writing about a mystical transcendentalism and Islamic asceticism, containing ideas from the Hispanic-European thought too. I think this combination between two different types of discourses, is very predominant in philosophical thinking in these centuries. The Koran is the principal factor in designing the collective imaginary thinking in the Islamic world, and into the physical thinking of the world too.

Sadrā composed his works in the Safavid period of Iran. He was sustained in his studies by other representative philosopher, as Mir Damad. He laid the foundations of the thinking about the essence and the unseen
things, and we can say that can be considered a pre-phenomenologist of the judicative. Influenced by Koran, he tried to naturalize his work Kitab and to find the explanations for the unseen things in their metaphysical system. He also wrote an argument, *The logical Proof of God*, (Rahman, 1975: 127) as an argument for the God’s existence:

> The argument for contingency states that a contingent exist by itself, since contingency means hanging in the balance between existence and non-existence - and therefore, needs a cause which should tilt this balance towards existence. But these series of causes cannot regress ad infinitum and so we must reach a cause which exists by itself and does not need another cause. Sadra has two criticism to make at this argument. The first is that it not proceed from and it is not based upon existence as reality, but existence as a concept (mafhūm): The concept “existence” is inspected and analyzed into two kinds, viz., contingent and necessary. (...) Sadra’s second and more basic criticism is that the causal argument simply brings in God to terminate the infinitive regress and that, therefore, the value of this argument to prove God’s existence is inferential and indirect the best. (Rahman, 1975: 127)

Şadrā had tried to maintain a theological, philosophical and hermeneutical formation as a thinker. For these reasons, we can say that a hermeneutical of existence involves multiple perspectives of detecting unseen things. But I will try to maintain my analysis focused on *Kitab*, in which we can detect some metaphors with reference to the ‘Being’, and the unseen things.

2. **Similarities with the Kantian work Treatise on the Heavens. The anticipations of the transcendental-substantialism in Islamic thought**

First of all, the well-known *Hikmat al Muta‘ayy al-‘aqlīyya al-arba‘a* [The Transcendent Theosophy in the Four Journeys of the Intellect] of Sadrā is the start of the hermeneutics in Sadrā’s system of thinking. In the Kantian system, there is a unity between the physical universe and the principles that are governing the universe:

> Nonetheless, it is clear that Kant’s account in the Universal Natural History and Theory of the Heavens is an extremely ambitious project, one that clearly made a genuine contribution to natural philosophy. For providing an account of the formation of the entire known physical universe that is at once comprehensive, systematic, and unified while still being based on accepted physical principles. (Kant, 2008: 183)

This kind of unity of the universe we had encountered in the Veracruz system too, in the “Speculatio Sexta” which begins the *Secundi Libri Physicorum* (or the Second Part of the *Physica Speculatio*). We observe the first premise
of the substantialism where he says that the nature is touched by the matter: "contingint tamen ex materia superfluitate", the matter results as a genesis between which "was not intention, and neither which were not defect" (Veracruz 1569, 92). According to Kant, even the creation is laid under the sign of the ‘becoming’:

Now, if creation is therefore infinite as regards spaces, or really has been since the beginning at least with respect to matter, but is prepared to become so according to the form or development, the space of the universe will be enlivened with worlds without number and without end. (Ibid, line I: 310: 264)

This multi-spatiality on the existence of the universe, is necessary to set up the ‘Worldliness of the World’ (Heidegger, 1996: 59) and the role of space in building the ‘Becoming’. The “worlds without number and without end” are something which compresses even the time and give to it a temporal substantiality (If we can say). Accordingly to an ontical perspective, this substantiality of time and timing in the pre-conditions of the ‘becoming’ is something which, creates the possibility of a Being ad infinitum. It is a process which will never end: "However, if one considers that nature and the eternal laws that are prescribed to substances for their interaction, are not a principle independent and necessary without God˝ (Kant 2008, line I: 333, 281) God is the ‘Becoming’ of the Being.

Despite the natural unseen things, Sadrā “believes in vertical threefold worlds, consisting on the sense world”, imaginal and Ideal world: “The imagination and mental perception in Sadrā's theory is correlated in the field of the shia epistemology, accordingly to the observation of the Kamal”(Kamal, 2006: 111). The same unity of the universe which exists in Sadrā’s system, we have in Kant Treatise on Heaven, where is specified that “coexistence that makes space in that it combines substances by reciprocal dependences, or, to put it more accurately, attraction is precisely that universal relationship that unites the parts of nature in one space” (Kant op. cit., line I:308, 262) The attraction is a universal law valuable for the dependences between the parts of the space and between the nature and world itself. That means that the parts of the substance can be attracted by the universal substance. Another a priori intuition which is part of the possibility of the judicative, is the time. Kant reffers to the idea of eternity in the following way:

Eternity is insufficient to grasp the manifestations of the highest being unless it is related to the infinity of space. It is true that the formation, the shape, the beauty and perfection are relationships...
of the building blocks and of the substances that constitute the material of the universe. (Ibid, 263)

Of course, Sadrā has its own way to see the eternity after a shia system of thinking. He mention that “the souls have an existence which is anterior in the world of the bodies” (Sadrā 2004: 79); as we can observe, Sadrā’s philosophical thought is inserted with some platonian ideas. Beginning with the silogistical affirmation that ‘the spirits exists in an anteriority form’, we made a judge on spirits. But the spirits were separated by Sadrā by the external world. There is a substance in the anteriority which preceeds the body-existence. The transposiotionality of this substance between soul and body is ‘something’ which works in intentionality. Sadrā made what the hermeneut-philosophers maded too: he connected the soul with the language, because into the linguistic plane we start whith ‘something’ which is necessary to ‘become’. This permanence in a continuity, will show us that the possibility of the existence of God is true, as the becoming of Dasein is true, too. Due to my personal observations, I can not maintain myself apart form the Heidegger’s writings. If we put together the ideas from Sadrā with the ideas from Being and Time, the transcendental-hermeneutic circle of senses is opened, in a good sense, to a more varied interpretations: “The sense of the words is that the soul is in Orden del Altísimo and its word ‘being’ is the same Orden del Altísimo which is median with the things that are brought to existence” (Ibid, 80).

3. Substance and substantialism. A reconfiguration of the ‘naturality’ of the Universe at Sadrā
Sadrā start talking about the inteligible segundo: the accidentality, the humanity, and the substatality. Why he considered that the substatality has a major role into the inteligibles? I think because of the reason that substance can unify the cuase with their premises, and because de substanialism of the Worldliness of the world of Heidegger is part of the human substantialism and institutes the individual as a living substancia in motion into the Universe: “diré que la representación mental de una cosa, de manera absoluta, equivale a la actualización de su concepto en el alma de manera que concuerde con lo que hay en la realidad concreta” (Ibid, 14). The substance is correlated to the quid, being is always the being of a being. The totality of being can, with respect to its variation domain(Heidegger, 1996:7).

But, given the existence of the accidents, as saying the accidentality and the imanence into the subject, an entity which is brought in its universal quiddities, the sama thing will happen with the substance.² (Sadrā, 2004: 27)
The concrete reality of the World can be a substance too; the substance can be, as Heideger said, “experienced as a pure thing and transporting together with what was signified to the same region of being of objective presence. The coincidence (accidents) is not considered an identification of hitherto isolated things, but rather the sign has not yet become free for which it is a sign” (Heidegger 1996: 76).

Sadrā says that “if the existence existed in the concrete realities without being a substance, it would be a quality, for the reason that can not be applied on the definition of the quality”. Furthermore, the substance is a universal quiddity which is the reality into the exterior existence and which is not becoming a subject. The quality is a universal quiddity. “The reality of the quiddity is conditioned by not accepting the division and neither the connections” (Sadrā, 2004: 37-36). Just as the first matter possesses the potentiality of the formal and other substances, the same potentiality is being updated into the act for the matter (Ibid, 45). In “Quinta Testimonio”, Sadrā says:

Substance into the substance and accident into the accident. Its relation with the Altísimo is as the relation with the sun of the sensible light and the diffuse flame on celestials bodies and earthly. (Ibid, 58)

Sadrā tries to show the difference between substance as essence and substance as matter. (Ibid, 60-59). Sadrā talks about “differentiated substances and separately substances / substancias diferenciadas y sustancias separadas” (Ibid, 61-60). Sadrā advertise us, that once opened the hermenutic-transcendental circle, we have a difficult situation:

This type of argumentation is applicable to the other perceptions: ilusions, iamges, and sensations, due to the sensible substance in us with a sensible form which makes it the essence, and not due to the something exterior in the mental representation, as the sky, the earth and other material realities which existence are not perceptible. Reflect and dedicate to them the whole reflection of your attention, because it is about a problem difficult to understand. (Ibid, 71)

The naturality as substance which flows into the body is a natural principle for the existence of the substance: “The principle is given for the evidence of the Naturality. In this case, it is a substantial form which flows into the body”. The difference between things and essence comes from the motion of the substance: “Due to the virtue of the essences and transubstancial movements, it will ask for the existence to transform for them” (Ibid, 84-83). In this case we are situated in front of a transubstancial identity, which is not neither emenent, neither immanent.
In his *Physicae Speculatione*, fray Alonso de la Veracruz considered natural events with a Renaissance approach, excelling the medieval conception where the world was separated in supra-moonly and under-moonly (*t.a.*), artificial and natural, natural and violent. Aristotelian natural conception considered instead the equation (Barrañón, 2000: 4). Sadrā says:

> It is demonstrated and verified that what is called the established object it is not in reality a separated identity from the identity of the cause which makes it to exist. It is not possible for the intelect to refer to a referential median presence, as an effect of identity which is separated from the identity of which it makes it to exist, in such manner that exists in the intelect two independent identities for the intelectual reference, one which is emmanent and other which is immanent. (Sadrā 2004: 72-71)

This dualism between “the emmanent identity and immanent identity” makes notable the difference between the emmanent substance and immanent substance of the Being.

> If the existence is not a real entity and it would be an abstract entity, as saying if it would be verbal, the existence of black colors it would be its own blakness, and not its imanence into the body. (Ibid, 27)

We can propose in here the necessary idea of a pre-judicative, borrowed from the current phenomenology, because there is something despite of the reality that is judge. The judge despite the judge, is the pre-judicative. The other, the judicative, can unify the ontical plane with the linguistic plane, and this means that the becoming is a process in progress. That is why the verbalization of the existence is possible, the verbalization of the God (Allah) is possible. This verbalization/predication makes the Being to be permanent and it related the Being to the present time.

> All doctrine, as already stated, is essentially the distinction between the Real and the apparent, the Absolute and relative, or substance and accidents. Its cardinal teaching is that only Allah is absolutely Real and consequently that this world in which man lives is contingent. Between God, who transcends even Being and whose first determination is Pure Being, and this world, which is farthest away from It, there are located a number of other worlds each standing hierarchically above the other in the scale of universal existence. (Nasr, 2000: 132)

Furthermore, we have a beautiful vision about how the world has its own life. It is a predominant idea that the world was born by the process of breathing (“pneuma”, in Greek thinking). Even more, the breathe is related to compassion, which is very important. This is the moral side of the Islamic
The possibility of the prejudicative in …/179

thinking in 17th century. The world was brought into being by the ‘Breath of the Compassionate’ (‘nafas al-rāl‘miin’) so that its ultimate substance is the ‘Breath’, which, in the human state, is connected intimately with speech and also prayer (Ibid, 138). Moreover, I think we can deduce from the expression of the ‘ultimate substance’ as breathe, a sublime metaphor of European Agathon. The breath process is not only a human state of existence, but a state of mind connected with the Being. And if it is connected to the Being, then it is connected with the substance of the Being. I think this breathe acts in intentionality, the breathe is a dynamic process which works in the becoming of the Being and in the becoming on its ultimate substance, as saying the essence. That is the reason that I said that despite of the metaphorical natural thinking of the philosopher, we have a multitude of senses related to the substance. We can go until that point that we can affirm that Being is made from breathe (air), which induces us the true about the natural things from nature and the Being. The breathe is something which contributes to the process of becoming. The breathe can not be hidden as the becoming phenomenon (as Heidegger said), and because it can not be hidden, we are in front of the situation in which the natural philosophy meets ‘the phenomenology’. The physical science as different from mathematics (de la Veracruz 1569/2018: 67). We say that the motions of intelligence are substances, and there is no substance after the Intelligence, that does not proceed, from the activity of Intelligence (Jambet, 2006: 207). The activity of judge is what produces the activity of the reason (Intelligence). Jambet says that “substance and negativity are mutually exclusive” (Ibid, 202).

Firstly, the substance originate from a fundamental motion, the fundamental motion of itself. The eduction of potentiality to act, which Avicenna said is motion affecting substance, becomes a motion of substance, substantial motion (haraka jawariyah) or essential motion (harak dhātīyah). (Ibid, 197)

Differentiating between the essential motion and substantial motion, is appropriate to Heidegger phenomenological heideggerian technique when he had differentiated between the origin and the essence of the origine of the work of art. I think we can think the essential motion as a part of the motion of the pneuma, the motion of the breathe which implies the motion of the Being in two planes the ontical plane and the transcendental plane. I think we can propose a unity between these planes, the soul is perceived in here as part of the naturalism of the World, but also as part of the naturalism of the Being. Muhammad Kamal says that “Sadrā’s own devotion to sound arguments coupled with his final recourse to mystical intuition makes this aparent contradiction understandable in the text of the philosopher” (Kamal 2006: 285). The impressions collected from nature are being used in
constructing the ‘mystical intuition’. In other way of thinking, Veracruz said that we are situated “ad detur infinitu actu natural” “around the infinite nature of the natural act” (Veracruz, 1569: 107) The ‘naturality’ of the acts tends to be mathematized in the phenomenological methods.

4. The pre-judicative circle of intuitive experience in thinking the ‘Being’ of Sadrā

I said that is necessary in the pre-judicial hermeneutics to talk about the experience, but moreover about the apperception, because at least the apperception will unify the judge with thought things.

In direct self-experience, however, soul is only given, as pure existence, and since existence has no genus, it is not given in experience either as a substance or a non-substance. Direct intuitive experience is the only way for Sadrā, to know reality for discursive inferential reasoning can only know essence in an adequate manner (bi’l-iktināh). (Rahman, 1975: 200)

Due to the observation of Fazlur Rahman, we can observe a differentiating method between substance and non-substance, which the same thing is practiced by the meontological field of the pre-judicative. The pre-judicative will think on the affirmation on the existence of the substance using an affirmative predication as The non-substance exists. We do as Sadrā have done, we set up a negative subject to have an affirmative predication, to have the idea of the ‘non-substance’. The ‘non-substance’ in the context of the Kitab, can be the non-whole of the Universe, the ‘non-heaven’ of Kant, all these non-entities are instituting something into the world. That is the scope of the meontological hermeneutics: to find the senses of the non-entities doing part from the transcendental world of nature and the transcendental world of the Universe itself. It is an additional reason to classify the Sadrā’s system of thinking in a hermeneutica-transcendental circle. The entity which Sadrā calls ‘Altísima’, it can be the Dasein, or “Dasein understands itself and being in the terms of the world” (Heidegger, 1996: 19). In the system of thinking of Sadrā, the imanence was understood in the term of the Universe, that is why we were talking across this paper about the ‘natural-substantialism’ in transcendental thinking of islamic period. The pre-judicative form sets up the idea of the non-substance, as saying a predicate with infinite determinations. The idea of the ‘non-substance’ is described by Aristotle:

Now 'unqualified' means either (i) the primary predication within each Category, or (ii) the universal, i.e. the all-comprehensive, predication. Hence, if unqualified not-being means the negation of the being, in the sense of the primary term of the Category in
Is the substance a presupposed substance? And is the presupposed substance the non-substance? I think it is, due to the affirmation that despite the production of a substance exists a non-substance in motion, which is the immanent substance about was talking Sadrā. This is a new reason to think that we are in the middle of a hermeneutic-transcendental circle of understanding ‘what is substance’. Obviously, exists a substance which governates the whole Universe, the matter, but separately exists another substance (which is called non-substance for the reason of a pre-judicial hermeneutics) to find ‘how’ is the immanent substance. The immanent things are the unseen things, as saying the essence of the things. We need to introduce an objectivation on essence, to avoid the transcendental objectivism.

The judicative is “the support of passing the senses from the judgement to the reason” (Cernica, 2013: 151), or from the judgement to the ‘Inteligentia’ (Allah/ God). In our context, the senses are passing from the judgement on substance to the reason of substance. The reason says that substance exists with the purpose to exists the real things through a form, the judge says that behind the things can exists other unseen things. The unseen things are forming part from the meontology plane. As we can talk about a non-Being, then we can talk about non-substance, not with the purpose to destruction of the substance, but to the purpose to reach the imanence into a hermeneutical field of understatement. The logician must distinguish between relativism and absolutism of the thing, but a hermeneut must see even the possibilities of the becoming of the non-existence. The Death is the existential time which we livrate to death from our inner experience, is something which makes part of me-ón/ non-Being, but with roots in the early-modern transcendentalism manner on seeing the things. An hermeneut does not looking for precisely answer, he looks for the answers which brings us closer to the essence.

Reasoning on substantialism in Sadrā’s work, it means that we are in middle of an intentionality of thinking the substance itself. The recovery of the non-substance is part of understanding the substance itself. Sadrā said
that the “existencia carece de definicion”/ “the existence is lack of definition”, not by chance. Is true that some terms as ‘Being’, existence, or substance, we can not define them in totality and neither we can hold the whole true about them, because “the quiddity is the most hidden in the things” (Sadrā, 2004: 13).

Sadrā talks much about “the light of the Lights”, as a “universal quiddity” of the things. He uses a lots of metaphors in linguistic plane, which mean that we are in front of a symbolic discourse for establishing the becoming of the Being. The metaphors as the ‘light of the Lights’, or the ‘Altisima existence’ (which means the God), or the ‘penetration’ on Being, means that he always tries to disseminate between the seen things and unseen things. He tries to advertise us, that “you will learn from the meaning of these words that the existence, in its own way, is an individual entity, individualized by nature” (Ibid, 15). This is a very important aspect, because the nature is conditionating the existence as an individuality or the individuality preceeds the existence itself. The quiddity needs to be unified with the most higher levels of existence. (Ibid, 18-17)

The existence has a concrete form delivered to the exterior world, and it implies the constructing of the real world; on the other hand, the existence has an interior part which is correlated with the essences of the things and the quiddities. Instead, what is unknown, it has no denomination. Sadrā also observed that a singular entity unifies itself with the quiddity, and that it means that it unifies itself with the universal whole. In this case, Sadrā says that “nobody establishes a difference between the existence of the susbtance and the existence of the accident” (Ibid, 28-27).

5. Conclusions
In his Kitab, Mussa Sadrā dedicated to the mysticism of the Being some remarks. He perceives the Being as a substantialism into the celestial spheres. His cosmological existencialism becomes a ‘Being’ substantialism, perceiving “the penetration of the Being” as a substantial change and transformation in motion. In “Speculatio Sexta, Segunda libri”, by Veracruz, the transformation in motion was perceived as potentia in materia (Veracruz 1569: 46).

Due to these existing similarities, I have demonstrated that the early-modern substantialism is similar to the Sadrā’s substantialism, even if the perspective on the nature of the soul is different on both philosophers. The substantialism is the common point which makes the existence of a pre-phenomenology in the writings of Veracruz and of Sadrā as well. Exists also a phenomenological hermeneutics, and a transcendental hermeneutics in Sadrā system. Concluding, the perspective on the soul-substantialism and natural-substantialism of the Universe is a common vision in mondial philosphy of the 16th and 17th centuries.
Notes:
* Some of the translations from Spanish, Latin, and Romanian to English are mine.
1. The original text is: “Pero, siendo la existencia de los accidentes, es decir la accidentalidad y la inmanencia de estos en sus sujetos, una entidad que se sobreaña de a sus quiddidades universales respectivas, lo mismo ocurrirá con la substancia”, p.27.
2. Ibid., 58. Original text in Spanish: “Substancia en la substancia y Accidente en el accidente. Su relación con el Altísimo es como la relación con el sol de la luz sensible y del resplandor difuso sobre los cuerpos celestiales y terrenales”. In “Cuarto Testimonio” he formulated the syntagma “substancia en la substancia y accidente en el accidente/ Substancinto into the substance and accident into the accident”, p.56.

References


