On the Entanglement of Universals-Theory and Christian Faith in the Modern Theological Discourse of Karl Barth

Hiroshi Tone

PhD Candidate, Faculty of Theology, Doshisha University, Kyoto, - Japan

Abstract

The philosophical investigations into universals was entangled with the combination of a certain Christian faith and Ontology, especially in ancient and medieval times. That is, God’s creative activity provided us with the ontological presumption which enabled universals to be predicated, be perceived and be thought about. Times then have changed, and “the modern turn” in Philosophy tends to resolve universals into concepts or linguistic phenomenon, which resulted that its certain Christian ontology no longer dominates the discourse on universals. On the contrary to this philosophical tendency, modern theological discussions try to learn the development of philosophical investigations into universals, and to tackle the theological problems provoked by the modern natural science. Especially Karl Barth’s use of Universals-theory would obtain the assessment of “revolution in content” in the Church history, which, in previous studies, was yet entangled with the ambiguous word “…in motion…” and with the unclear argument “…understand true human nature from the nature of this one particular man Jesus Christ…” The present article will attempt to clarify this Barth’s practical use of Universals-theory by referring to philosophical arguments, then proving Barth’s intention and the difficulty of his complicated argument that Jesus Christ was one exemplar and in the same time was also the model, which is inconsistent with the basis of Universals-theory. It resulted that this Barth’s attempt will provide us with the possibility today of Universals-theory especially in the field of Religion.

Key words: Universals-Theory, Christian Faith, human nature, Karl Barth,

* Received date: 2018/09/28  Accepted date: 2018/10/10
** Email: bo.ludo.1031@gmail.com
Introduction

The philosophical investigations into universals was entangled with the combination of a certain Christian faith and Ontology, especially in ancient and medieval times. Bella and Schmalz (2017, p. 2) in the introduction of their latest book simply pointed out that Augustine Christianized later Platonist accounts of universals, and they only concisely mentioned “…the proper interpretation of Augustine’s views was a matter of considerable controversy during the medieval period and after…” (Bella and Schmalz, 2017, p. 2). Wolterstorff (1970, p. 263) has however already explained its aspect in detail: God’s creative activity provided us with the ontological presumption which enabled universals to be predicated, be perceived, and be thought about.

Wolterstorff (1970) in his book On Universals: An Essay in Ontology said: “For it has been said of Universals that they ought to function as paradigms for all human and divine thought and action. And it has been said of universals that they do function as exemplars for God’s creative activity.” (p. 263). Wolterstorff (1970) next introduced such views about Universals by Plato, Augustine and Aquinas, and he criticized its ontological presumption of God’s creative activity, from the linguistic-philosophical perspective: “Predicables are not all brought into being or existence by God. Nor is it even the case that all those not brought into being or existence by God are ones of which God is an exemplification.” (p. 296). Wolterstorff (1970, p. 292) then explained such Predicables by giving an example of the property of the proposition as being either true or false.

This Wolterstorff (1970)’s argument about rejecting the ontological and quasi-theological presumption would obtain consent in the modern philosophical discourse on Universals. Bella and Schmalz (2017) could illustrate its reason: “The modern turn made it impossible simply to continue to debate the status of universals in scholastic terms. With the emergence of the mechanical philosophy, for instance, one could no longer speak of universals as immanent in sensible objects, at least insofar as those universals were convinced in terms of Aristotelian hylomorphism.” (p. 4). That is, the modern turn in philosophy provided us with the new idea that “…the direct objects of our knowledge are ideas that are sharply distinguished from features of external objects…” (p. 5), which resulted the tendency of resolving universals into concepts or linguistic phenomenon. That means also that the traditional combination of a certain Christian faith and Ontology was getting more and more difficult to accept. Recent books on modern discourses of Universals-theory, for example The Problem of Universals in Early Modern Philosophy and The Problem of Universals in Contemporary Philosophy have not yet paid the attention to this aspect of
Universals-theory, in which only researchers on ancient and medieval philosophy might have an interest.

However, looking from a different angle, we could observe that modern theological discussions received the development of Universals-theory in the modern philosophy, and tried to create the new ontological presumption for universals, in the case of facing the problems provoked by the modern natural science. It is here worth noting that, especially, Barth’s practical use of Universals-theory contributed to “…‘revolutionary in content’…” (Thompson, 1978, p. 74)6 in the Church history. This also means that Barth’s practical use of Universals-theory could provide us with the ethical basis for Christian faith. It can be seen from this point that there still here, especially in the field of Religion, could remain the possibility today of the wide coverage of Universals-theory which includes not only linguistic phenomenon but also ontological and practical paradigms.

The present study thus will attempt to explain comprehensively such Barth’s practical use of Universals-theory in the modern theological discourse which the theological researchers have often dismissed, then proving its wide coverage of Universals-theory which recent philosophical studies on Universals are liable to neglect. The first chapter will introduce the background of Barth’s argument in his book Church Dogmatics (IV/2)7, explaining the doubt evoked by the evolutionary hypothesis, and outlining the Pope’s famous response, the encyclical Humani generis (1950), to its doubt. I will next illustrate the point at issue of Barth’s argument by introducing the difficulty of understanding human nature from the perspective of the particular man Jesus Christ, not generally. The second chapter will discuss Barth’s complicated three arguments: the first is by using the concept of “a man”, the second is by using the idea of “a man”, and the third is by using the term of “the humanum”. Barth’s arguments, however were often fragmented and intricate, which followed that I will refer to philosophical books and articles on Universals, for the purpose of making clear the point at issue of Barth’s arguments.

The Background and the Point at Issue

Barth in its prologue mentioned the nature of Church Dogmatics (IV/2): “The content of this book might well be regarded as an attempted Evangelical answer to the Marian dogma of Romanism – both old and new.” (p. VI)8. Barth next indicated the main point of his censure on the Roman Catholic doctrine about Mary: “The fact that the man Jesus is the whole basis and power and guarantee of our exaltation means that there can be no place for any other in this function, not even for the mother of Jesus.” (p. VII)9. Taking both this nature of Church Dogmatics (IV/2) and Barth’s critique on Mariology into consideration, it becomes light that Barth’s
almost all argument in this book could be understood as the response to such Roman Catholic doctrine. And Barth’s mention “…to the Marian dogma of Romanism – both old and new” leads us to presume that Barth took care of the trend of the Roman Catholic Church around 1955, when Barth’s *Church Dogmatics* (IV/2) was published.

The discussion turns to this recent movement of the Roman Catholic Church in the early 1950’s. Pelikan (1989) in the fifth volume of his great work *The Christian Tradition: A History of the Development of Doctrine* explained that Pope Pius XII issued the encyclical, *Humani generis*, in 1950 and dealt with the crisis of Mariology provoked by the evolutionary hypothesis.

The evolutionary hypothesis evoked the doubt on the idea of common origin of the human race and the doctrine of original sin, as Pelikan (1989) illustrated: “…the nineteenth-century Christian responses to evolutionism, which sometimes tended to make the authority and inspiration of Scripture the primary question when the origin of spaces and even the descent of man were at issue, finally located the fundamental threat here in the doctrine of the fall and of original sin.” (p. 207-208). These doubts on the traditional Christian doctrine urged Pope Pius XII to protect its doctrine from these doubts, and to vindicate it as an infallible doctrine, which resulted that Pope Pius XII issued the encyclical, *Humani generis*, in 1950, that is: “The authoritative twentieth-century responses, the encyclical, *Humani generis* of 1950, rejected “polygeism,” the suggestion that “‘Adam’ signifies some sort of multitude of first parents,”…” (p. 208).

Considering this movement of the Roman Catholic Church around 1950, we can summarize its background following: the evolutionary hypothesis made it difficult to give the ground for the entity of the human race, namely the natural kind, which led us to, theologically, doubt the transition of original sin to all humans. It is here worth noting Pelikan (1989)’s comment that this doubt on the doctrine of original sin put also the negative influence upon Mariology: “For the “magisterium” of the Roman Catholic Church, one of the major corollary dangers in any view that seemed to negate the Augustinian doctrine of original sin was the threat that thereby the entire structure of the church’s doctrine of Mary would be undercut.” (p. 208). As Pelikan (1987) explained an official dogma of 1854 by Pope Pius IX “…the most blessed Virgin Mary in the first instant of her conception was…preserved immune from all the stain of original guilt” (p. 208), the Roman Catholic Church have reached an agreement of Mary’s exceptional human position irrelevant to sin, which was based both on the idea of the entity of human kind and on the transition of original sin to its human kind.
We shall look back to the background of Barth’s argument in *Church Dogmatics* (IV/2) published in 1955. It can be seen from Barth’s mention “…to the Marian dogma of Romanism – both old and new” in his prologue, that Barth could be conscious of the Roman Catholic Church’s movement, namely its movement from the negative impact of the evolutionary hypothesis on the ground of human kind and the doctrine of original sin and Mariology, to the encyclical of 1950 by Pope Pius XII. This background leads us to presume that the main point of Barth’s argument in *Church Dogmatics* (IV/2) was indeed to criticize the infallible presumption of the entity of human kind which was the basis of the doctrine of sin and Mary, and to argue an alternative for the basis of the entity of human.

Concerning this Barth’s main point, previous theological researches have discussed it as “…’revolutionary in content’…” (Thompson, 1978, p. 74) in the Church history. Thompson (1978) highlighted it:

> He leaves the traditional path ‘which was to try to establish generally what human nature is, and on this basis to interpret the human nature of Jesus Christ in particular’. Barth’s approach is a complete reversal of this ancient tradition and is ‘revolutionary in content’. We can only understand true human nature from the nature of this one particular man Jesus Christ as the Word and revelation of God… (p. 74)

Thompson (1978) here made use of the contrast between “…the traditional path…” and “…a complete reversal of this ancient tradition…” On the one hand, this traditional way was understood as “…to try generally what human nature is…” which yet Thompson (1978) did not exactly explain its “…to try generally…” That is, its citation did not show the ground for arguing what human nature is, for example a definition or a predication or a denotation. On the other hand, Barth’s new way meant “…understand true human nature from the nature of this one particular man Jesus Christ…” It is worth here noting that the way to understand the nature only from the particular example seemed to be peculiar and, sometimes, illogical. The problem thus lies in the fact that Thompson (1978) has not further clarified the ground to generalize Jesus’s particular nature to all other humans.

The discussion will turn to other research on Barth’s epoch-making argument. McCormack (2004) explained it in the different angle from Thompson (1978):

> …for Karl Barth, >essence< is not something that is fixed and immovable in itself, a metaphysical substructure or >substance<
that guarantees to God or the human Jesus identity with Himself. To repeat: >essence< exists nowhere – neither in eternity nor in time – in abstraction from the concrete material >determination< which makes it to be what it is. Moreover, both the >essence< of God and the >essence< of the human can be placed in >in motion<, for both are actualized in the history of Jesus Christ. (pp. 350-351)

McCormack (2004) clearly paraphrased “…the traditional path…” (Thompson, 1978, p. 74) as “…in abstraction from the concrete material >determination< which makes it to be what it is.” And McCormack (2004) then illustrated Barth’s alternative that “…the >essence< of the human can be placed in >in motion<…” The point to be noted here is McCormack (2004)’s contrast between “…something that is fixed and immovable in itself…” and “…>in motion<…” However, this contrast between two options puzzled us, in that the phenomenon of human nature in motion was not easy to understand from the perspective of Universals-theory. Anyway, it can be seen from this McCormack (2004)’s suggestion that the key word for understanding Barth’s new and peculiar argument was “…>in motion<…” for which McCormack (2004) yet did not provide a sufficient explanation.

The present study will attempt to clarify Barth’s complicated alternative which still remained obscure in previous researches. In order to do so, I discovered one appropriate part (=SS 64. 2) of Church Dogmatics (IV/2) in which Barth discussed his alternative in comparison with the traditional ways, as Thompson (1978, p. 74) and McCormack (2004, pp. 350-351) pointed out: Barth rejected the traditional ways based on “…the idea and the concept of “a man”…” (p. 51) (= “…die Anchauung und der Begriff von ein Mensch…”), and Barth selected his alternative of using the peculiar word “…the humanum…” (p. 51) (= “…das Menschliche…”). It should yet be noted here that Barth’s argument was often fragmentary and intricate, which needs the re-construction for the purpose of making clearer Barth’s point at issue. The second chapter thus will illustrate each way of Barth’s argument by referring to philosophical books and articles on Universals-theory.

Barth’s Practical Use of Universals-Theory
The First Case of Using the Concept “a man”

As Thompson (1974, p. 74) indicated Barth’s method to argue the human nature from the single person Jesus Christ, Barth’s starting point of consideration was to examine how Jesus Christ was said simply to be human. First of all, Barth examined the case of using the concept “a man” (= der Begriff von ein Mensch).
Falls Jesus Christ was conceived by the concept “a man”, Barth explained this case:

...one of many...who was and is also this one man as opposed to all other men. (p. 51)\(^{13}\)

It can be seen from this citation that this case showed the distinction between Jesus Christ as the object conceived by the concept and all other humans as distributive. It is worth noting that Barth explained this Jesus Christ as “…this one…” (= “…dieser eine…”), namely the countable object. Strawson (1959) illustrated this principle: “A sortal universal supplies a principle for distinguishing and counting individual particulars which it collects.” (p. 168)\(^{14}\). This illustration leads us to understand that this Jesus Christ is the individual particular which could be counted in comparison with all other humans as distributive.

Barth then followed this hypothesis and mentioned the relation between this Jesus Christ and his existence as God’s son:

...the Son of God, surrendering His own existence as such, had changed Himself into this man, and was therefore no longer the Son of God and by nature God in the human nature assumed by Him, in Jesus Christ, existing as man...

(p. 51)\(^{15}\)

Barth here insisted that, if Jesus Christ were the object conceived the concept, this object would be irrelevant to his existence as God’s son. Barth did not add the further explanation to it, and we thus shall complement to Barth’s presupposition and its reason in our own way.

According to the classical theory, Aristotle has already pointed out that the countable object has quantity and continuity: “...we further denote something as one in one method, insofar it has quantity and continuity...” (b 11-13)\(^{16}\). It should be here noted that this countable and substantive object enabled to be conceived as having its nature, for example a man etc. This basic logic leads us to think that the perception of Jesus Christ though the concept “a man” was depended upon the countable object which had quantity and continuity. Taking this point into account, it is reasonable that Barth rejected the supposition that “…nature God…” (= “…<Gott von Art>...”) was dependent on its countable object, which led Barth to express that “…the Son of God, surrendering His own existence as such, had changed Himself into this man...”

Barth finally negated this first case by using *Reductio ad absurdum*. That is, if the proposition that Jesus Christ was conceived by the concept “a man” were truth, Barth would doubt:
...what would happen to all other men side by side with the one man who is the Son of God in one or other of these curious senses? (p. 51)

Barth’s examination on this first case here reached a negative conclusion. We could namely paraphrase Barth’s doubt in our terminology that Jesus Christ as the countable object which had quantity and continuity could only relate to some others, not all humans.

The Second Case of Using the Idea “a man”
The discussion will turn to the second case of using the idea “a man” (= die Anschauung von ein Mensch). According to Barth’s argument, falls Jesus Christ was understood by the idea “a man”, Jesus Christ was said to be following:

...one of many who existed and was actual with all his fellow-men in a human being and essence and nature and kind as opposed to other creatures... (p. 51)

The passage “…with all his fellow-men...” (= “…mit allen seinesgleichen zusammen...”) provided us with the evidence that Jesus Christ was compared with all other humans as collective. And the combination of this passage with the other passage “…as opposed to other creatures...” (= “…im Unterschied zu anderen Geschöpfen...”) leads us to think that, in this case, Jesus Christ belonged to the specie of human, namely Jesus Christ was one kind of the specie of human.

Barth then followed this hypothesis and illustrated the relation between the existence of one kind of the specie and his existence as God’s son:

...He did not exist as One, but in a duality, as the Son of God maintaining His own existence, and somewhere and somehow alongside as this individual man. (p. 51)

It can be seen from this citation that the understanding of Jesus Christ as one kind of the specie led Barth to argue that Jesus Christ existed in the “…in a duality...” (= “…doppelt...”), namely Jesus Christ existed as “…this individual human...” (= “…dieser einzelne Menschen...”) and, in another way, as God’s son. However, this is all Barth explained, which did not enable us to sufficiently understand the keyword of “duality”. We shall therefore get the support of philosophical terms and resolve Barth’s ambiguous statement.
Wolterstorff (1970) counted such specie of human as one of “…nonpredicable universals…” (p. 65) with other examples. Wolterstorff (1970) further explained such universals, as “It is common practice, among philosophers of modern and contemporary times…” (p. 65): such universals are “…those entities which are capable of recurrence, or repetition in space-time…” (p. 65) or, in another way, “…exemplifications…” (p. 65). The discussion will turn to Barth’s ambiguous statement. Taking Wolterstorff (1970)’s explanation into consideration, it becomes clear that Jesus Christ as one kind of the specie could be also understood as a single example of the human kind in a certain space-time. It is worth noting that this presumption is consistent with Barth’s passage “…and somewhere and somehow alongside as this individual man…” (= “…nun eben irgendwo und irgendwie daneben auch als dieser einzelne Menschen existierte...”). And this presumption will contribute to the interpretation of Barth’s ambiguous word “duality”. That is, Jesus Christ as a single example of the specie existed in a certain space-time and, in an irrelevant way to this, existed as God’s son. This examination would be reasonable, in that the existence as God’s son could never be included in exemplifications of the species of human. Namely, Barth’s ambiguous word “duality” meant the irrellevancy between the specie of human and the existence of God’s son.

Barth finally rejected this second case by using *Reductio ad absurdum*. That is, if the proposition that Jesus Christ was understood by the idea “a man” were truth, Barth would doubt following:

What significance could His existence, with its special determination, have for theirs? (p. 51)

The answer to this Barth’s question could be explained in our terminology: the relation of Jesus Christ as one kind of the specie of human to all other humans was only exemplification, which was irrelevant to the existence of God’s son. Barth therefore cast doubt on its relationship of the human kind irrelevant to the existence of God’s son.

**The Third Case of Using the Term “the humanum”**

Barth rejected two cases and then presented an alternative. Barth discussed this third case with a peculiar term “the humanum” instead of “a man”, and we shall call this third case as the case of using the term “the humanum”.

Barth put his emphasis upon the contrast of the third case to these first two cases:

What God the Son assumed into unity with Himself and His divine being was and is - in a specific individual form elected
194 / Philosophical Investigations, Vol. 12/ No. 24/ fall 2018

and prepared for this purpose - not merely “a man” but the humanum... (p. 51)²²

We could partly paraphrase it in our philosophical terms. That is, Jesus Christ was neither the countable object nor one example of the specie in a certain space-time. Our main concern, therefore is to examine the meaning of Barth’s term “the humanum”.

It should here be noted that Barth kept away from using the sortal and general term “a man”, then selecting the term “the humanum” (= “das Menschliche”) which was derived from the German adjective “menschlich”. Let’s then consider Kahn (1973)’s note on the abstract term: “...an abstract noun as one which is syntactically (and in many cases also morphologically) derived by nominalization of a verb, an adjective, or an elementary noun in predicate position.” (p. 77)²³. This Kahn (1973)’s note leads us to understand Barth’s term “the humanum” (= “das Menschliche”) as the abstract term. Concerning the abstract noun and its reference, Moreland (2005, p. 10) explained that the abstract term refers the abstract particular, not a single indivisible quality numerically the same in each thing²⁴. The important point here is that its abstract particular is not itself a complex of more basic entities including various elements for example its bare particular, its coordinate quality, and its relation like space and time (Moreland, 2005, p. 13) which is the basis for the relation of exemplification (Moreland, 2005, p. 10). It leads us to understand that this Barth’s usage of the abstract term “the humanum” (= “das Menschliche”) was consistent with Barth’s concern that Jesus Christ was neither the countable object nor one example of the specie in a certain space-time.

Moreover, it is worth noting that Barth often used the term “the humanum” (= “das Menschliche”) with the term “form” (= “die Gestalt”): “But in this form it is that which is human in all men.” (p. 51)²⁵. This English translation “…that which is human...” was derived from the original text “…das Menschliche…” At any rate, the point to be noted here is that Barth did not employ the traditional and conventional term “body” or “flesh”, but Barth selected the term “form”. This Barth’s usage could be illustrated from the perspective of Barth’s argument of the contrast between these first two cases and the third case. That is, Barth’s concern that Jesus Christ was neither the countable object nor a single example of the human race in a certain space-time, is not consistent with the terms “body” and “flesh” which imply the material condition.

However, the problem seems to lie in this Barth’s third case of using the abstract term “the humanum” with the term “form”. That is, as Moreland (2005, p. 10) illustrated, Jesus Christ as the abstract particular only resembles each other abstract particulars referred by the term “the
humanum” in the same class. That means that, as Moreland (2005, p. 10) explained, there is nothing outside its class that exactly resembles each member in its class. On the other hand, Barth himself mentioned that Jesus Christ was identical with all other humans in its nature,[26] which seems to us to be inconsistent with the relation of the only resemblance between Jesus Christ and all other humans in the above case of using the abstract term “the humanum”.

The discussion will thus turn to Barth’s argument of the relation between Jesus Christ and all other humans. Barth explained its relation:

Because it is our being and essence, our nature and kind, which the Son of God willed to realize and has in fact realized in this one concrete possibility of human existence determined and elected and prepared by Him, His existence as a human existence, as this one man, has a direct relevance for all other men...signifies the promise of the basic alteration and determination of what we all are as men. (p. 52)[27]

It can be seen from this citation, especially Barth’s passage “…the promise of the basic alteration and determination of what we all are as men...” that Jesus Christ as the ontological cause was related to all other humans. That is, what is human for all human was depended upon Jesus Christ, theologically as the result of God’s predestination,[28] although Jesus Christ was also human. Nevertheless, this Barth’s argument could not avoid facing two problems.

First of all, Barth appears to be resigned to denote Jesus Christ as the abstract particular like the simple entity, and he explained Jesus Christ as one exemplification in a certain space-time which Barth yet rejected before, as we have discussed. This Barth’s contradiction could be understood from the point of his ambiguous usage of the term: “…His existence as a human existence, as this one man...” (= “…seine Existenz als menschliche, seine Existenz als dieser eine Mensch...”). That is, Barth used the term “the humanum” together with the phrase “this one man”, which leads us to presume that Jesus Christ was also the countable object or one example of the specie in a certain space-time. This Barth’ contradiction also could be found in another passage: “In Jesus Christ it is not merely one man, but the humanum of all men, which is posited and exalted as such to unity with God.” (p. 52)[29] It becomes therefore light that, considering the relation between Jesus Christ and all other humans, Barth was a little confused with the usage of “a man” and its result, although Barth sufficiently noticed the problem of the usage of its term, as we have observed. It resulted that Barth
seemed to presuppose the relation between Jesus Christ and all other humans which is consistent with the usage of the term “a man”, while Barth’s essential argument about using the term “the humanum” instead of the term “a man” proved its relation only as a resemblance.

The second problem of Barth’s above argument is that Barth could not keep away from having the trouble with the basis of Universals-theory. That is, Barth’s argument leads us to think that Jesus Christ was one exemplar and in the same time was also the ontological direct cause as an independent being, which is inconsistent with the foundation of Universals-theory that one exemplar can be never understood as the model in the same time. The point to be noted here is that Barth did not further clarify this inconsistency, and rather Barth made this inconsistency unclear, but theologically clear as the exaltation, by using the relation between possibility and realization: “…the Son of God willed to realize and has in fact realized in this one concrete possibility of human existence determined and elected and prepared by Him…” Barth further brought the ethical perspective into this relation between possibility and realization into the inconsistency with Universals-theory, and Barth altogether illustrated the relation between Jesus Christ as the model and all other humans as its possibilities: “…it is created with a view to this, and has in it its meaning and telos, and is only true human essence by it and in it.” (p. 127)

In addition, this second problem of Barth’s argument was overlapped with his first one. Namely, Barth identified the abstract particular denoted by the abstract term “the humanum”, with the concrete possibility of the existence of a man: “But in this form it is that which is human in all men. It is the concrete possibility of the existence of a man…” (p. 52). It should be noted here that the abstract particular as a simple entity denoted by the abstract term is not inconsistent with the perspective of the possibility. It becomes therefore clear that Barth might have become conscious of the inconsistency with the basis of Universals-theory, and Barth could contrive to resolve its inconsistency by changing the relation between model and exemplar into the relation between realization and possibility.

Conclusion
We have come to the conclusion of the examination of Karl Barth’s practical use of Universals-theory as the revolution in theology. Barth’s peculiar way to understand the human nature from the particular man, as Thompson (1978, p. 74) fragmentarily indicated, meant that Jesus Christ was one exemplar and in the same time was also the ontological direct cause as an independent being. This Barth’s argument however is inconsistent with the foundation of Universals-theory that one exemplar can be never understood as the model in the same time. Barth yet, then contrived to
resolve its inconsistency by changing the relation between model and exemplar into the ethical relation between realization and possibility, which will contribute to the understanding of the keyword “…>in motion<…” which McCormack (2004, p. 351) insufficiently mentioned.

Concerning the way how Jesus Christ was said to be human, Barth used the abstract term “the humanum” with the term “form”: Jesus Christ referred by the abstract term was the abstract particular which is not itself a complex of more basic entities including various elements including its bare particular, its coordinate quality and its relation like space and time. This argument is consistent with Barth’s concern that that Jesus Christ was neither the countable object nor a single example of the human race in a certain space-time. It should be here noted that, looking from a different angle, Barth’s argument of using the abstract term “the humanum” constituted the radical response to the Roman Catholic Church’s Mariology, the basis of the encyclical Humani generis (1950). The reason is that Jesus Christ referred by its abstract term as the concrete possibility was not the material object which Maria gave birth to, this means that Maria was difficult to be understood as the only contributor to the incarnation. On the other hand, this Barth’s argument did not simply presuppose genealogical entity of human, which could contribute to avoiding doubts evoked by the evolutionary hypothesis. Taking these results into consideration, it is reasonable that this Barth’s practical use of Universals-theory is called the revolution in theology.

Our conclusion further gave us the fact that modern theological discussions try to learn the development of philosophical investigations into Universals, and to create the new combination of a certain Christian faith and Ontology, although this attempt no longer dominates the modern philosophical discourse. The important point here is that this attempt should not be understood as an old-fashioned way. The attempt related to a Christian faith indeed could make less contribution to the further philosophical investigations into Universals, but its attempt taught us the wide possibility of Universal-theory, including practical philosophy and Ontology, which recent philosophical studies on Universals are liable to neglect. We can observe the fact that discourses on Universals have been discussed since antiquity, and these discourses are deeply entangled with the human ability of thinking, from which various themes of science could be derived. Barth’s practical use of Universals-theory, including themes of not only theology but also ethics and biology proved us such wide and essential coverage of Universals-theory especially in the field of Religion.
Notes:
1. I would like to express my sincere thanks to Prof. em. Dr. Peter Schultheiss, University of Zurich, for giving me the wonderful lecture “Allgemeines - Generelles - Abstraktes” in 2011 which was the basis of my present study.
8. See the original text: “Man könnte den Inhalt dieses Buches wohl als den Versuch einer evangelischen Beantwortung des (alten and neuen) römischen Mariendogmas verstehen.” (Barth, 1955, p. VI).
9. See the original text: “...der Mensch Jesus der Grund, die ganze Kraft und die ganze Gewähr unserer Erhebung ist, darum kann ein anderer Mensch, kann auch Jesu Mutter in dieser Funktion keinen Raum neben ihm haben.” (Barth, 1955, p. VII).
13. See the original text: “…Einer von den Vielen...im Unterschied zu allen anderen Menschen nun eben als dieser eine Mensch existierte und wirklich wäre.” (Barth, 1955, p. 51.).
15. See the original text: “…Gottes Sohn sich, seine eigene Existenz als solche preisgebend, in diesen einen Menschen verwandelt hätte und also in der von ihm angenommenen menschlichen Art, in Jesus Christ, als Menschen existierend, der Sohn Gottes und <Gott von Art> doch wohl nicht mehr wäre…” (Barth, 1955, p. 51.).
17. See the original text: “…wo bleiben neben diesem einem Menschen, der in diesem oder jenem kuriosen Sinn der Sohn Gottes wäre, alle anderen?” (Barth, 1955, p. 51.).
18. See the original text: “…Einer von Vielen...mit allen seinesgleichen zusammen im Unterschied zu anderen Geschöpfen in menschlicher Art und Natur, in menschlichem Sein und Wesen…” (Barth, 1955, p. 51.).
19. See the original text: “…Jesus Christus nicht als Einer, sondern doppelt, als Sohn Gottes in Behauptung von dessen eigener Existenz und nun eben irgendwo und irgendwie daneben auch als dieser einzelle Menschen existierte…” (Barth, 1955, p. 51.).
21. See the original text: “Was könnte seine Existenz in dieser ihrer Sonderbestimmung für die ihrige zu bedeuten haben?” (Barth, 1955, p. 51.).
22. See the original text: “…Das, was Gott der Sohn in die Einheit mit sich selbst und sein göttliches Sein aufnahm, das war und ist - in einer bestimmten, dazu von ihm erwählten und zubereiteten individuellen Gestalt - nicht <ein Mensch>, sonder das Menschliche…” (Barth, 1955, p. 51.).
25. See the original text: “…aber in dieser Gestalt das Menschliche aller Menschen…” (Barth, 1955, p. 52.).
26. For example, Barth mentioned “…the humanum, the being and essence, the nature and kind, which is that of all men, which characterizes them all as men…” (See the original text: “…das Menschliche: das jenige Sein und Wesen, diejenige Art und Natur, die die aller Menschen ist, die sie alle als Menschen auszeichnet…” (Barth, 1955, p. 51.).
27. See the original text: “Weil es unser Sein und Wesen, unsere Art und Natur ist, die der Sohn Gottes in dieser einen von ihm bestimmten, erwählten und zubereiteten konkreten Möglichkeit menschlicher Existenz verwirklichen wollte und verwirklichte hat, darum geht seine Existenz als menschliche, seine Existenz als dieser eine Mensch unmittelbar alle Menschen an, bedeutet...die Verheissung der grundlegenden Veränderung und Bestimmung dessen, was wir alle als Menschen sind.” (Barth, 1955, p. 52.).
28. Barth mentioned “…He, the true Man, is the One, whose existence necessarily touches that of all other men, as the decision which is made concerning them, as that which determines them inwardly and from the standpoint of their being as men, in whom and for whom they too are elect.” (See the original text: “Er, dieser wahre Mensch, ist der Eine, dessen Existenz die aller anderen Menschen notwendig angeht, in der auch über sie entschieden, durch die sie als seine Mitmenschen innerlich, von ihrem Sein als Menschen her bestimmt, in welchem und für welchen auch sie erwählt.” (Barth, 1955, p. 38.).)
29. See the original text: “In Jesus Christus ist nicht nur ein Mensch, ist vielmehr das Menschliche aller Menschen als solches in die Einheit mit Gott versetzt und erhoben.” (Barth, 1955, p. 52.).
Barth mentioned “It means the history of the placing of the humanity common to Him and us on a higher level, on which it becomes and is completely unlike ours even in its complete likeness – distinct from ours, not only in degree but in principle, not only quantitatively but qualitatively.” (See the original text: “<<Erhöhung>> menint die Geschichte der Versetzung der ihm und uns gemeinsamen Menschenlichkeit auf eine obere Ebene, auf der sie in ihrer ganzen Gleichheit mit der unsrigen dieser auch ganz ungleich wird und ist: nicht bloss graduell, sondern prinzipiell, und nicht bloß quantitativ, sondern qualitativ von der unsrigen verschieden.” (Barth, 1955, p. 29.).)

31. See the original text: “Dass es im Blick auf diese geschaffen ist und also in dieser seinen Sinn und sein Telos hat, dass es erst durch sie und in ihr wahres menschliches Wesen wirld, ist eine Sache für sich.” (Barth, 1955, p. 127.).

32. See the original text: “…in dieser Gestalt das Menschliche in aller Menschen: die konkreten Möglichkeit der Existenz eines Menschen...” (Barth, 1955, p. 52.).

References:


