دانشگاه تبریز
مجله پژوهش های فلسفی
2251-7960
2423-4419
6
11
2012
12
21
How DoesStrawson Unify Epistemology, Ontology and Logic
1
14
FA
محمدرضا
عبدالله نژاد
Abdollahnejad@tabriz
استادیار گروه فلسفه، دانشگاه تبریز
mraphd@yahoo.com
Strawson’s conception of analysis as a ‘connective linguistic analysis’ makes it possible for him to achieve an indefinitely large range of ideas or concepts among them are certain numbers of fundamental, general and pervasive concepts or concept-types which not only are <em>pre-theoretical</em> or <em>ahistorical</em>, but also together constitute <em>a structural framework</em> only within whichlogic, ontology and epistemology is possible. He takes it as a foundation for this conclusion that logic, ontology and epistemology are three aspects of one unified enquiry (or trio)and strengthensit by this assertion thatwe can understand this unity through considering the fundamental operation of our language. In this paper, after tracing the line of development of Strawson’s philosophical idea of the trio and specifying the fundamental operation of our language (or the common thread which makes this unity possible), we stipulate that it is by means of ‘connective linguistic analysis’ that Strawsonwas able to unify epistemology, ontology and logic.
Strawson,logic,Epistemology,Ontology,Trio,connective linguistic Analysis
https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_72.html
https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_72_9aa9348078d42c81c87f42bf8318b74d.pdf
دانشگاه تبریز
مجله پژوهش های فلسفی
2251-7960
2423-4419
6
11
2012
12
21
Gilles Deleuze: Beyond Peirce’s Semiotics
1
37
FA
گلناز
منطقی فسایی
دانشجوی دکتری فلسفه هنر، دانشگاه آزاد اسلامی، واحد علوم وتحقیقات تهران
موسی
اکرمی
دانشیار گروه فلسفه علم دانشگاه آزاد اسلامی، واحدعلوم وتحقیقات تهران
musa.akrami@gmail.com
This paper studies the role of the semiotic discussions of Charles Sanders Peirce, the American philosopher and mathematician, in the formation of Deleuze’s first leading book on cinema, <em>Cinema 1:</em><em> the Movement-Image</em>,in whichthe author surpasses Peirce’s semiotics. We will show how Deleuze creates a new form of signs in his second leading book on cinema, <em>Cinema 2: the Time-Image</em>. Deleuze had tried to couplethe patterns of Peirce’s semiotics in his first book with the philosophical discussions on different epochs of the classical cinema. In his second book, he tried to surpass Peirce’s semiotics, proposing patterns of new semiotics concerning modern cinema by modeling on Peirce’s semiotics. This paper attempts to propose the Peircian signs in <em>Cinema 1: the Movement-Image </em>and Deleuze’s modeling on the signs in <em>Cinema 2: the Time-Image, </em>showing that such asurpassing for Deleuze is the key point of under-standing philosophy. It helps him to reach his particular semiotics based on both Peirce semiotics and Bergson’s philosophy of time, while being completely different from them: noosign.
Categories,Chronosign,Hyalosign,Mnemosign,Onirosign,Audio-visual sign,Noosign
https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_73.html
https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_73_3997742f7a068f8bbf5fa075d174d855.pdf
دانشگاه تبریز
مجله پژوهش های فلسفی
2251-7960
2423-4419
6
11
2012
12
21
Assaying Vandevelde’s Approach to Gadamer
39
52
FA
علیرضا
آزادی
استادیار گروه فلسفه دانشگاه تبریز
i@tabrizu.ac.ir
<br /><br /> <br />The purpose of this paper is to look at four important aspects of Vandevelde’s criticisms of Gadamer. First is his position on Gadamer’s claim that his hermeneutics is a “philosophical hermeneutics” and not a methodology. Second is Vandevelde’s view of interpretation as necessarily going back to the author’s intention, and the status of the “mental state” of the author. Is it relevant to interpretation? Is it really accessible? Gadamer, because of his roots in Heidegger, offers a hermeneutics altogether free of intentionality. Third, while Vandevelde sees interpretation as an act of man, Gadamer sees understanding as an event that happens to the interpreter in which he or she participates. Finally, we shall consider the fundamentally different views of language in the two thinkers and the effect of this on their two views of interpretation. In this we find the basis for the many contrasts between the approaches of Vandevelde and Gadamer to interpretation] <br />
: Gadamer,Vandevelde,Author’s Intention,Understanding as an act or event,language
https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_74.html
https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_74_2d405c1fae1d2bb914cd786592a86d1c.pdf
دانشگاه تبریز
مجله پژوهش های فلسفی
2251-7960
2423-4419
6
11
2012
12
21
Gadamer’s Ambivalence toward the Enlightenment Project
53
81
FA
رابرت
داستال
استاد فلسفه، کالج برین مایر، پنسیلوانیا
rdostal@brynmawr.edu
This essay explores Gadamer’s ambivalent relationship with modernity. Gadamer is a prominent critic of the Enlightenment project. His criticisms are both theoretical and practical. Theoretically, representationalism is at the center of modern epistemology for Gadamer. Practically, Gadamer sees the demotion of prudence (<em>phronesis</em>) as fundamental to the “bad” Enlightenment. Gadamer’s attempt to revive an appreciation of rhetoric is a way to the join the theoretical and practical dimensions of speech and life. The central representative philosopher of the Enlightenment for Gadamer is Kant. The antithetical thinker is Aristotle. Gadamer would have his Kant and his Aristotle too. The tension between these is at the heart of Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics.
Gadamer,enlightenment,Modernity,Philosophical Herme-neutics,understanding,language
https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_75.html
https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_75_b07a1062001ea2abb9762c70609f3ac0.pdf
دانشگاه تبریز
مجله پژوهش های فلسفی
2251-7960
2423-4419
6
11
2012
12
21
A comparative Survey on the Stages of Philosophical Training in Plato’s Allegory of Cave, in the Four Mystical Journeys, and in Mulla Sadra’s al-Asfar
81
94
FA
حسن
فتحی
0000-0001-5275-6297
دانشیار گروه فلسفه دانشگاه تبریز
hfathi42@yahoo.com
At the beginning of his <em>magnum opus</em> <em>al-Hekmat al-Muta’aleiat fi al-Asfar al-Aqliiat</em>, Mulla Sadra says that he has nominated and arranged his book according to “the four journeys” of the Mystics. What he and the Mystics say on these journeys reminds those familiar with Greek philosophy of Plato’s <em>Phaedrus </em>and <em>Republic </em>(Journey of souls onto sky and the Allegory of Cave, respectively). In spite of his promise at the beginning of his book, Mulla Sadra has not completely succeeded in arranging a<em>l-Asfar</em> according to the four journeys of the Mystics, especially the fourth journey. In this paper, at first, we have a glance at Plato’s method of philosophical training, his allegory of Cave and some positions on Mulla Sadra’s four journeys; then we explain that in this respect the correspondence between Plato and the mystics are more than that found between him and Mulla Sadra.
: Plato,Mulla Sadra,The four journeys,The allegory of Cave,Mysticism,Transcendent Wisdom
https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_76.html
https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_76_f6c3c3ac02052abcac6d67fe80acd64e.pdf
دانشگاه تبریز
مجله پژوهش های فلسفی
2251-7960
2423-4419
6
11
2012
12
21
Leibniz’s Monads and Mulla Sadra’s Hierarchy of Being: A Comparative Study
95
108
FA
علی
فتح طاهری
0000-0002-1960-2840
استادیار گروه فلسفه، دانشگاه بین المللی امام خمینی
fathtaheri@yahoo.com
Mulla Sadra and Leibniz, the two philosophers from the East and the West, belong to two different worlds. Though they were unaware of the ideas of each other, their philosophical systems share certain common points that are comparable. Monads constitute the basis of Leibniz's thought and he refers to their features in his various works. On the other side, Mulla Sadra's philosophy is also based on being and he tries to deal with its reality in his philosophy. Though Leibniz's monads are many and Mulla Sadra's being is one, they use certain terms for monads and being which are very close to each other and are comparable from different points of view. Leibniz’s monads, while being many, are one as well. Similarly, Mulla Sadra's philoso-phy also enjoys multiplicity in unity. Leibniz's monads enjoy perception and Mulla Sadra's being likewise coexists with knowledge.This paper is an attempt to study being in Mulla Sadra's thought and monad in Leibniz's philosophy, and pinpoints the basic common grounds in these two philoso-phers.
Multiplicity in unity,perception,Apperception,monad
https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_77.html
https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_77_c2b19d8ff93ecb954e070387605569a6.pdf
دانشگاه تبریز
مجله پژوهش های فلسفی
2251-7960
2423-4419
6
11
2012
12
21
Islamic Ethics and Intrinsic Value of Human Being
109
119
FA
عبدالرزاق
حسامی فر
0000-0002-9350-9951
دانشیار گروه فلسفه، دانشگاه بین المللی امام خمینی قزوین
ahesamifar@hum.ikiu.ac.ir
One of the most important debates in Islamic ethics is the place of humanethics and its priority or posteriority in relation to the jurisprudence which deals with acts of worship. Given the diverse approaches towards Islam, there are different ideas on thisproblem. Some Muslims overlook human principles in the name of religion in their approach to Islam. Some others try to interpret Islam in such a way as not to contradict the principles of human ethics. In spite of some Muslim scholars’ view on the priority of jurisprudence over the ethics, this articleis a try, by appealing to certain Islamic evidence, atshowing thepriorityof ethicsover the jurisprudence and insisting on the importance and even the dominance of human ethics and intrinsic value of human beingin Islamic ethics. And it will conclude that according to the Islamic teachings, one can eitherhavehuman dignity and at the same time not bea Muslim,or bea Muslimand at the same time lack human dignity. So, neithersuperficial Islam necessarily leads tohonor nor does not being a Muslim repudiate honor, and what is emphasized in Islam is that human dignity is included in Islam and a real Muslim tries to earn it.
ethics,Religious ethics,Human ethics,Islamic Ethics,Religiosity,Irreligious ethics,Human dignity
https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_78.html
https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_78_6abba4b1dbbcadeeab0deca68fda6819.pdf
دانشگاه تبریز
مجله پژوهش های فلسفی
2251-7960
2423-4419
6
11
2012
12
21
Elan vital chez Bergson
121
128
FA
محمود
نوالی
استاد گروه فلسفه دانشگاه تبریز
richy1354@yahoo.com
La Philosphie de Bergson vise la vie spirituelle, le spiritualisme, la joie, l’appétit et le changement perpétuel de la réalité. En conséquence las trios notions de la durée, de la mémoire et de l’élan vital constituent la réalité de la vie dans son cheminement et dans son progrès. L’ensemble de ces notions fondamentales décèle la contenu de la vie, et dégage la réalité de ses rigidités de l’automatisme. Or, élan vital, ou élan original est à la base de tous les mouvements d’ordre matériel ou spirituel du monde.
: ELan vital,mouvement,Changement,Succession,Vie et continuité
https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_79.html
https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_79_0f6f354462fd29a2b1f751ca211da4c9.pdf
دانشگاه تبریز
مجله پژوهش های فلسفی
2251-7960
2423-4419
6
11
2012
12
21
An Aesthetics of Nature
Consequences of Merleau-Ponty’s embodied ontology
129
137
FA
مارک
وان دن
استاد فلسفه دانشگاه لیبرال بروکسل، بلژیک
faclw@vub.ac.be
In his courses on <em>Nature</em>, the French phenomenologist Maurice Merleau-Ponty clearly does not agree with Kant's antropocentrism. In particular the Kantian notion of the disinterestedness of aesthetic perception is untenable in an aesthetics of nature which is inspired by Merleau-Ponty's thought. Nature and human embodiment are seen as separated in this Kantian tradition.
In Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology on the contrary, we can find the idea of the chiasm of the body-subject and the world: an artist perceives objects and is perceived by them. So, there is no distance, no gap between them. This means that Merleau-Ponty leaves a generally accepted tradition of thought. With its time-honored origins in the work of Plato, the tradition starts from the opposition between what is assumed real and what is considered imaginary, namely the object itself and its representation. Art then, is the manifestation of an idea, and, while the idea had to express a unity, art itself cannot reach beyond the limiting diversity of manifestations. In Merleau-Ponty this ‘divided’ thinking is evaded by an 'embodied thinking', in which the body is the interaction of sight and movement. For him, the body is the ‘axe’ of our world.
Maurice Merleau-Ponty,Phenomenology,nature,Aesthetics of nature,Embodied thinking
https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_80.html
https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_80_8d3e3cca1bc9f51139551f4bbd8eca76.pdf