University of Tabriz
Journal of Philosophical Investigations
2251-7960
2423-4419
8
14
2014
05
22
Illumination and Intuition on Plato
1
26
FA
Maryam
Soltani Kouhanestani
PhD Candidate of Philosophy, University of Tabriz, Tabriz, Iran.
m.soltani.philosophy@gmail.com
Majid
Sadremajles
0000-0003-4048-3273
Assistant Professor of Philosophy, University of Tabriz , Tabriz, Iran.
sadremajles@tabrizu.ac.ir
The being of intuitive knowledge and it’s meaning have been conflicted between plato’s interpreters in the all times. some of them haven’t accepted such knowledge at all and those who accepted that, are in disagreement between being rational or mystic such a knowledge. <br /><br /><br /><br />This paper is attempt to present that knowledge on plato’s view is not only intellectual argument and the higher than it there is a intellectual vision; because on the one hand, for plato intellectual perception of things means perception of common characters of them which they represent in the form of judgments and propositions. On the other hand, if everything is explained in the form of intellectual explanation by the Ideas and explanation of the Ideas themselves is by the agent and final cause of the Good, hence there will not be such an explanation about the Good; because It is a Good and Beautiful in itself. Then Its knowledge is higher than intellectual perception in the form of conceptual and general judgments. Its knowledge is direct and a vision that can not express in the form ofproposition.<br /><br /><br /><br />this intuition although is a sudden and short knowledge; but according to plato,it is stable and definite and it’s based on dialectical process. We can not say and write anything about its object; but we can only experience it with the help of leader and by direct illumination. It belongs to philosopher, not anybody; .
Plato,knowledge,Intuition,the Good,Vision,Dialectic,Recollection
https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_14738.html
https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_14738_45a301d9f0376f0f564a68b1dab9e294.pdf
University of Tabriz
Journal of Philosophical Investigations
2251-7960
2423-4419
8
14
2014
05
22
Proclus' Elaboration of Platonic Remarks on the Problem of Evils and their Relation to Divine Providence and Efficiency
27
48
FA
Reza
Koorang Beheshti
PhD Candidate of Philosophy, University of Isfahan
rz.kbeheshti@gmail.com
Saeed
Binaye Motlagh
Associate Professor of Philosophy Department, University of Isfahan
said_binayemotlagh@yahoo.fr
Ali
Karbaasizadeh
Associate Professor of Philosophy Department, University of Isfahan
karbasi@ltr.ui.ac.ir
Although there is not a fully developed theory of evil in Plato, some various remarks are interspersed throughout his dialogues which provided the main materials for subsequent Platonists to elaborate a systematic doctrine of evil. Proclus is the most distinguished philosopher of the later Neoplatonism whose view became authoritative within the School and thus is most representative of the Neoplatonic doctrine of evil. By a critical assessment of the antecedent theories of evil, Proclus attempts to give a monistic interpretation of Platonic remarks on the problem of evil. According to his explanation, the higher degrees and principles of Being are only and purely good and are not the causes of evils but the good things for all things alone. Evils, however, exist necessarily but only among particular beings in a relative, parasitic, accidental way and dependent upon the good. The parasitic accidental existence of evil does not have a real efficient cause. It arises due to an asymmetry between the activities of the several faculties or powers of a complex particular being. Moreover, the existence of evil is so mixed with and dependent upon the good that despite its opposition to the good, contributes, in its own manner, to the fulfillment of goodness of the whole Universe, being thus reconcilable with Divine Providence and Efficiency.
Evil,Parasitic accidental existence,Divine providence,Divine efficiency,Proclus
https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_14760.html
https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_14760_c5c04a06f895d6576cb565c71e726145.pdf
University of Tabriz
Journal of Philosophical Investigations
2251-7960
2423-4419
8
14
2014
05
22
Hegel, Heidegger and the Problem of Time
49
69
FA
Mohammad Mahdi
Ardebili
0000-0002-0233-7091
PhD Candidate of Philosophy, University of Tabriz
m.m.ardebili@gmail.com
Alireza
Azadi
0000-0002-4268-5322
Assistant Professor of Philosophy Department, University of Tabriz
ym21287@gmail.com
The stance of history in Metaphysics has never been as elevated as it is after Hegel, although Hegel was not the first to bring the issue of ‘history’ into the arena of philosophy. Hegel entered ‘history’ into the ‘substance’ and the world, holding that ‘substance’ is an essentially historical phenomenon, while History is nothing but the manifestation of the world’s spirit. Almost a hundred years after Hegel, another philosopher emerged who, in one sense, revived the notion of ‘history’ and its relationship with the Being. He altered Husserl’s non-historical phenomenology (notwithstanding his final writings) into a historical phenomenology and believed in a historical essence for Da-sein which, according to him, is the only way to deal with the truth of Being. The points of convergence and divergence between Hegel and Heidegger on history and historicity have by far been the subject of a hot dispute. But the root of all these discussions, i.e. the two thinker’s approach to the concept of ‘time’ is often taken for granted. The present article tends to provide an approximate account of Hegel and Heidegger's approaches to the concept of ‘time’. Then, referring to Heidegger's critique of Hegel (especially Hegel's conception of time) in the final chapter of Being and Time, this paper equally attempts to acquit Hegel of these criticisms, and even turn some of these critiques back to Heidegger's philosophy.
Time,Da-sein,Being and Time,Phenomenology of Spirit
https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_14770.html
https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_14770_076026e2507157766ce01e74034995a0.pdf
University of Tabriz
Journal of Philosophical Investigations
2251-7960
2423-4419
8
14
2014
05
22
The Method of Heidegger’s research in “Being and Time”
71
92
FA
Hossein
Tarighatpour
PhD Candidate of Philosophy, University of Gom.
tarighat@cc.iut.ac.ir
Mohammad Javad
Safian
0000-0001-7049-3953
Associate Professor of Philosophy Department, University of Isfahan.
mjsafian@gmail.com
Martin Heidegger chooses Being as his subject matter for his philosophy and believes that it has been neglected throughout the history of thinking . So he calls attention to it .The basis of his thought, he believes is to regard Being and to question it .Therefore he begins his job by men’s special being (Dasein) , for it is he who questions Being and this is one his essential characteristics . His method introduced as “hermeneutic phenomenology” differs completely from resoning method of mysticism and also the transcendental phenomenology of Husserl . In this method the relation of man(Dasein) has been analyzed with regard to his structures and his special mode of his being . In fact he approaches being by the analysis of its meaning . His method can be used in islamic philosophy and mysticism.
Heidegger’s method,Phenomen,Phenomenology,hermeneutices,Dasein,to question Being
https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_14755.html
https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_14755_b5a6e8c83d4a19b65bf1d370c4139cde.pdf
University of Tabriz
Journal of Philosophical Investigations
2251-7960
2423-4419
8
14
2014
05
22
Later Wittgenstein on Doubt and Certainty
93
112
FA
Mohammad Sadegh
Zahedi
Assistant Professor of Philosophy Department, Imam Khomeini International University, Qazvin, Iran
mszahedi@gmail.com
Khadijeh
Asli Beigi
M.A, of Philosophy Department, Imam Khomeini International University, Qazvin, Iran
khadijeaslibage@gmail.com
Later Wittgenstein, by making a distinction between knowledge and certainty, gives a new approach to criticize skepticism. According to him, certainty is prior to doubt and knowledge. He believes that certainty is something different from knowledge on which based in practice and not in belief and knowledge. According to later Wittgenstein, certainty is the primary form of language game which does not need to be justified. He believes that there are some propositions which could not be said that we know them and could not be doubted. He calls them, “hinge propositions” and maintains that our world- picture is made by those propositions. These propositions are the foundation of our language games and researches. Wittgenstein believes that although these are certain propositions, but it does not follow that they are incorrigible and correspond to reality. This kind of certainty is based on our attitudes towards reality.
"Later Wittgenstein","certainty","knowledge","Justification","Skepticism"
https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_14757.html
https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_14757_8769c1700318534caf9eaacab28aae00.pdf
University of Tabriz
Journal of Philosophical Investigations
2251-7960
2423-4419
8
14
2014
05
22
The Internal Inconsistency of the Late Wittgenstein’s Viewpoint
113
130
FA
Abdolrahim
Fatemi
Faculty Member. Payam Noor University
karimdoust_sh@yahoo.com
In spite of all Wittgenstein’s efforts in making the internal consistency of his late viewpoint, a precise survey shows that it suffers from some inconsistencies. One of the cases of the internal and external inconsistencies, according to the interpretation of Cavell and Kripke, is the skeptic reading of the late Wittgenstein’s view point. Wittgenstein believes that skepticism has clearly no meaning. According to him a skeptic should not principally try to express his/her skepticism through language. If you are not certain of any fact, you cannot be certain of the meaning of your words either. Doubting everything is no more a doubt. Besides, Wittgenstein’s viewpoint is itself an approach to skepticism. Here, I am going to give an analysis of this inconsistency. Giving an alternative realistic reading, it shows that how this internal inconsistency is manifest. The essay is going then to deal with the concept of "forms of life", one of the fundamental concepts used by Wittgenstein. In this case, the internal inconsistency of Wittgenstein’s philosophy of language will be shown as well.
internal in cousistency,wittgenestein,Forms of life,cavell,Kripke
https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_14771.html
https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_14771_30b1691feeeb7b985bc9180a85a18b51.pdf
University of Tabriz
Journal of Philosophical Investigations
2251-7960
2423-4419
8
14
2014
08
23
Islamic Ethics and the Doctrine of the Mean
131
147
FA
Hossein
Atrak
دانشیار گروه فلسفه دانشگاه زنجان
atrakhossein@gmail.com
<span>Originally introduced by Plato and Aristotle, the doctrine of the mean is the most prevalent theory of ethics among Islamic scholars. According to this doctrine, every virtue or excellence of character lies in the observance of the mean, whereas vices are the excess or deficiency of the soul in his functions. Islamic scholars have been influenced by the doctrine, but they have also developed and re-conceptualized it in innovative ways. Kindi, Miskawayh, Avicenna, Raghib Isfahani, Nasir al-Din Tusi, and others are among the Islamic contributors to the subject. Some of their contributions are as follows: bringing together Aristotle's doctrine of the mean with Plato's psychology, dividing virtues into four higher geniuses, dividing vices into eight higher geniuses, setting various kinds of vices and virtues under these higher geniuses, adding the criteria of quality to Aristotle's quantitative evaluation of excess and deficiency, dividing various conceptualizations of justice, adding religious and mystical virtues into the existing list of virtues, and proposing a comprehensive model for curing diseases of the soul.</span>
Islamic Ethics,Doctrine of Mean,Faculties of soul,Virtues,Vices
https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_2201.html
https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_2201_3c2395b2412405904d83902a653c0976.pdf
University of Tabriz
Journal of Philosophical Investigations
2251-7960
2423-4419
8
14
2014
05
22
Formalism in Kantian Ethics from Schelerian Viewpoint
149
163
FA
Alireza
Hassanpoor
Assistant Professor of Philosophy Department, University of Ilam
a.hasanpour@ilam.ac.ir
The aim of this paper is examining the issue that whether Kant's ethical thought, as Scheler has claimed, is formalistic. Here, after explaining the meaning of forlmalism and history of this kind of critique of Kant, we try to show his formalistic view in ethics, through considering some of basic concepts of his ethical thought, such as absolute good, duty, categorical imperative and autonomy of the will. It has been said that Kant's focusing on universal form of moral law and neglecting material aspects, contents, objects and ends of the actions mean his formalism in ethics. Furthermore, it has been mentioned the relationship between formalism and teleology in Kant' ethics and it has been said that according to some commentators through regarding human being as the end itself, he somewhat modifies his formalistic view; but since his teleology cannot be interpreted as in usual sense, which is a form of consequentialism, his ethical thinking remains formalistic. Finally, we explain Scheler's approach to Kant's ethics and their similarities and differences. Scheler agrees with Kant that the foundation of morality must be universal, unconditional and a priori, and that morality or immorality of action cannot depend on its consequence; but he disagrees with Kant's conclusion that the material contents of the moral experience plays no role in morality or immorality of action. Indeed, this disagreement depends on the difference between Scheler's phenomenological approach and Kant's rationalism in ethics.
Ethical Formalism,Kant,Scheler,ethics,Phenomenology
https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_14754.html
https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_14754_2588bfee42a895b0a90b4342092dd8d6.pdf
University of Tabriz
Journal of Philosophical Investigations
2251-7960
2423-4419
8
14
2014
05
22
Ethical Responsibility in Emmanuel Levinas's Thought; the Other-Driven Passivity of the I
165
182
FA
Alireza
Sayad Mansour
PhD Candidate of Philosophy, University of Tehran
sayadmansour@wrc.ir
Hamid
Talebzadeh
Associate Professor of Philosophy Department, University of Tehran
talebzade@ut.ac.ir
Emmanuel Levinas, adopting his peculiar phenomenological approach, views the I's responsibility for the Other as the sole foundation of being ethical, and summons humanity to be aware of its infinite, immediate responsibility. Ethical responsibility can be understood here as every I's receptivity and solicitude towards the Other or those whose presence makes the I's transcendence possible.Responsibility accurately implies the I's passivity from the Other's demand and address. Unlike the subject which exists within Western philosophical tradition, Levinas's ethical subject is not active, automatized and hegemonic! The hegemonic I has always striven to subjugate the Other under a universal, rational totality. Hence, there arises a struggle between the familiar and the non-familiar. To resolve the strong node of this hostility for Levinas is to have the I innately passivatized of the Other. He holds that the passive response to the Other's demand constitutes the sensitivity of human existence.The I's ethical responsibility for the Other discloses a subject's passive structure that has always recognized itself through the profound, active consciousness.<br /><br />In this paper, Levinas's path to gloss a novel ethical subject by exploiting some unique metaphors like "substitution" and "hostage" –which imply the exaggerative aspect of passivity-, will be sketched out.
Emmanuel Levinas,Ethical responsibility,Hostage,passivity,Substitution
https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_14781.html
https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_14781_2981bbd665c53b2d6661be0df50dd357.pdf
University of Tabriz
Journal of Philosophical Investigations
2251-7960
2423-4419
8
14
2014
08
23
Virtue Based Epistemology and the Problem of Justification
183
193
FA
Saed
Hafkhar noghani
دکتری فلسفه دانشگاه آزاد اسلامی تهران
Reza
Akbari
0000-0002-5231-7849
Professor of Philosophy, Imam Sadegh University
rezaa.akbari@gmail.com
Jahanger
Masoodi
دانشیار گروه فلسفه دانشگاه فردوسی مشهد
ja_masoodi@yahoo.com
One of the most important issues in contemporary epistemology is eliminating justification or replacing it by another factor in the structure of knowledge. The main problem in Virtue based epistemology that suggested by Ernes Sosa is the definition of knowledge structure. In this approach, the innovation of a new concept of the third factor in the structure of knowledge and replacing it with the justification is done in three stages. These stages are; criticizing and eliminating justification in its internalist meaning, removing externalist problems and innovating apt belief instead of justified belief. Intellectual virtue and epistemic perspective are two key concepts that provide essential situation for this replacement.
Intellectual Virtue,Epistemic Perspective,Apt Belief,Adroit Belief,Virtue Reliabilism
https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_2206.html
https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_2206_0e997f6773184e073c93bf9bbe045601.pdf
University of Tabriz
Journal of Philosophical Investigations
2251-7960
2423-4419
8
14
2014
08
23
The Problem of Calculation in Utilitarianism: Censure of J.J.C.Smart
195
216
FA
Sahar
Kavandi
دانشیار گروه فلسفه دانشگاه زنجان
drskavandi@znu.ac.ir
Mohsen
Jahed
استادیار گروه فلسفه دانشگاه زنجان
Mohammad Hossein
Arshadi bidgoli
کارشناسی ارشد فلسفه اخلاق دانشگاه زنجان
<span>Ethics is divided into three realms: Meta-ethics, normative ethics, and applied ethics. Utilitarianism is one of the most significant views in normative ethics, which acts as a true criterion to judge on human deeds in terms of loss and benefits of their consequences. In other words, utilitarianism judges on the amount of happiness for all the ones who have been influenced by that act. Utilitarianism itself is divided into two groups: act-utilitarianism, and rule-utilitarianism. The former concentrates on the amount of goodness or happiness that an act creates in a particular situation and the latter considers the amount of goodness or happiness which results from a principle or rule. J.J.C. Smart is a pragmatist, and an advocate of act-utilitarianism. In this essay we have attempted to investigate some of the problems put forward on the problem of calculating the consequences of acts, then we explain the accepted principles by utilitarianists, and finally Smart’s responses to those problems. Instead of calculating the consequences as a response to these criticisms, Smart talks about comparison of two "Total Situation”, and by doing so he ignores the problem. In order to respond to all the criticisms on the calculation of utilitarianism, Smart, by differentiating between two types of evaluating and calculating consequences of an act and evaluating and calculating possible acts, attempts to appeal to the "Ripples on a Pond Model" and to the "Rules of Thumb" for cases which he is obliged to appeal to rules.</span>
Smart,utilitarianism,Act,Rule,Total Situation,Rules of Thumb
https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_2207.html
https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_2207_07bb464036f5504304f0b35d4c1281cd.pdf