University of Tabriz
Journal of Philosophical Investigations
2251-7960
2423-4419
3
210
2009
08
23
Symblic Language in Paul Tilieh
1
26
FA
mohammad
elkhani
دانشیار گروه فلسفه دانشگاه شهید بهشتی
seyyed mehdi
mir hashemi esfahlan
فوق لیسانس فلسفه از دانشگاه شهید بهشتی
Paul Tillich (1886-1965) is a German-American Christian theologian<br />who suggests that language of religion is symbolic; it means that the<br />realm of the religion is full of religious symbols. These symbols have<br />properties which empower them to express the religious believes and<br />purposes. One of the symbols properties is representation; i.c. similar<br />to signs. they refer to something beyond. But symbols (unlike signs<br />which are arbitrary and conventional things) are grown from the<br />collective unconscious, and participate in transcendent power and<br />concept of the symbolic object.<br />The religious symbols appear in different forms such as objects,<br />persons and natural events, and only their capacity for religious<br />situation gives them symbolic meaning. Therefore, to affirm the<br />original of religious symbols in referring to the Transcendent. They<br />must be negated in finite meaning.
Paul Tillich,symbolic language,religious symbols,affirmation and negation,representation,Participation
https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_2891.html
https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_2891_8a05e65140b815b4db03b4dfa672f78b.pdf
University of Tabriz
Journal of Philosophical Investigations
2251-7960
2423-4419
3
210
2009
08
23
The necessity of Self-Evident Perceptions in Islamic
Philosophy and their Criterion
27
46
FA
Mansour
Emanpour
دانشیار فلسفه اسلامی، دانشگاه شهید مدنی آذربایجان
hekmat935@gmail.com
The question of self-evident perceptions (both concepts and<br />judgments) is among the important and effective subjects in Islamic<br />philosophy that nowadays can be put forward as "epistemology". This<br />question, in spite of its great importance and unique role in Islamic<br />philosophers' epistemology, has not been discussed in detail by them.<br />And as a result of ambiguities lied behind the criterion by which the<br />self- evident perceptions can be distinguished from theoretical ones,<br />once in a while the former may be misplaced by the latter and<br />questioned, or the latter misplaced by the former and taken as<br />axiomatic.<br />The present paper, on the one hand, tries to explain the significance<br />of self-evident perceptions in Islamic philosophy, and to present and<br />assess the differentiae between them and theoretical ones, on the<br />other. The task is undertaken by the author as follow. Firstly, he seeks<br />to show that the self-evident data are the essence of all apodictic<br />knowledge, so that no certain and indubitable cognition can be<br />acquired without them. Secondly, the most principal criterion by<br />which self- evident data can be distinguished from the other ones,<br />among the many criteria cited in the works by Islamic thinkers, is the<br />simplicity as to concepts and the necessary, immediate rational<br />affirmability with no need to any other judgment or reasoning as to<br />judgments.
the self-evident perception,Epistemology,concepts,judgments,perception,knowledge
https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_2892.html
https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_2892_44501c6eb017ecb81cd923782ca607dd.pdf
University of Tabriz
Journal of Philosophical Investigations
2251-7960
2423-4419
3
210
2009
08
23
An Explanation of three New Moral Approaches to
"Demandingness of Morality" and an Analysis and a
Critique of Moderate Moral Approach
47
73
FA
shirzad
payk herfhe
دانشجوی دکتری فلسفه دانشگاه علامه طباطبایی
"Demandingness of morality" is a new issue in moral philosophy,<br />which, in spite of its antecedents, has seriously and independently<br />been put forward only in the latest decades of the 20th century. This<br />concept is often evaluated in terms of three elements: pervasiveness,<br />overridingness, and stringency. There are also three general<br />approaches toward it: extremist morality, moderate morality, and<br />minimalist morality. This paper, based on these elements, analyzes<br />"demandingness of morality" based on these three elements, and<br />describes the main points of the three approaches. Since moderate<br />morality is very close to our ordinary or everyday morality, this paper,<br />in its explanation, analysis and critique, tries to show that what one<br />recognizes as morality in this era might be much more lax than the<br />real demands of morality. Our ordinary moderate morality faces up to<br />some serious challenges, and if it does not answer them, the claim to<br />innocence and moral behavior in this era will crumble.
demandingness of morality,pervasiveness,overridingness,stringency,extremist morality,moderate morality,minimalist
morality,harm
*- P
https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_2893.html
https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_2893_06fe3858cb22c1f193b8f0c3f442fad4.pdf
University of Tabriz
Journal of Philosophical Investigations
2251-7960
2423-4419
3
210
2009
08
23
The Epistemological and Idealistic Aspects of Schopenhauer's philosophy
75
92
FA
Mohammad javad
Safian
استادیار گروه فلسفه دانشگاه اصفهان
javadsafian777@gmail.com
Abdollah
Amini
دانشجوی دکتری فلسفه غرب دانشگاه اصفهان
As far as Schopenhauer’s philosophy sees the world as representation,<br />and deals with the way of knowing and the relation between subject and<br />object, it is consistent with the Kant’s philosophy and epistemology.<br />Both Schopenhauer’s Dissertation and the first part of his famous work<br />The Word as Will and Representation reflect the Kantian epistemology.<br />Schopenhauer himself has admitted that his philosophy is based on the<br />Kant’s philosophy. In epistemology. he accepts the Kant’s Copernician<br />revolution. Even though the epistemology aspect of his philosophy (The<br />world as representation) is based on the Kant’s philosophy, But he<br />never likes thoroughly to follow Kant's philosophy. Uniting the<br />causality with the matter, reducing the twelve categories of<br />understanding to one category, considering time, space and causality as<br />the forms of the principle of sufficient reason, etc. are his innovative<br />cases versus Kantian view. Then it can be said that, he intended to go<br />beyond the Kant’s philosophy. On the other hand, Schopenhauer’s<br />philosophy is idealistic. He considers the object as the representation of<br />the subject. But the idealistic aspect of his philosophy is considered only<br />in the structure of the world as representation rather as will. In other<br />words, idealism contains only the phenomenal aspect of the world.<br />This paper tries to illustrate the epistemological and idealistic status<br />of Schopenhauer’s philosophy from the perspective of Kant’s<br />theoretical philosophy.
The principle of sufficient reason,Idealism,The world as representation,The world as will,Epistemology,Subject,object
https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_2894.html
https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_2894_a947acbf5db5c12f6fa9a0b739a73f3f.pdf
University of Tabriz
Journal of Philosophical Investigations
2251-7960
2423-4419
3
210
2009
08
23
A Vew on Strawson’s "Descriptive Metaphysics
93
117
FA
Mohammad reza
Abdollah nejad
استادیار گروه فلسفه دانشگاه تبریز
The present paper has been made up of three main parts. First part<br />begins with a question on which the whole structure of the paper has<br />been based. The question is that "whether Strawson,s Descriptive<br />Metaphysics is a doctrine or not?." It seems that some difficulties in<br />correct understanding of Descriptive Metaphysics and the quality of<br />its relation to Revisionary Metaphysics arise when we consider<br />Descriptive Metaphysics as a doctrine.<br />Investigation about this problem goes on with the question that<br />"how does Descriptive Metaphysics describe our general conceptual<br />structures and their interconnexion?." In the second part, we show that<br />Strawson describes them via connective linguistic analysis. Therefore,<br />we "through determining the nature of Strawson,s analytical approach<br />and charting it,s relation to the question "how does analysis require<br />metaphysics?".attempt to bring an evidence in order to prove our<br />claim that "Descriptive Metaphysics is not a doctrine, but it is an<br />analytical approach to proposed metaphysical problemes and doctrines<br />in every epoch and society<br />Drawing the conclusion and proving the above – mentioned claim<br />in the third part, we refer to some questions and ambiguities which<br />may be distract our claim. The most important of them is the question<br />that "if Descriptive Metaphysics is not a doctrine, why Strawson<br />makes inquiry into structural elements and their interconnexion?."<br />Ultimately, we complete our claim by answering that question.
descriptive metaphysics,revisionary metaphysics,connective linguistic Analysis,The Analogy of grammer,pre –
theoretical notions
https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_2895.html
https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_2895_e53e8318f06780b264b0f921f02ab901.pdf
University of Tabriz
Journal of Philosophical Investigations
2251-7960
2423-4419
3
210
2009
08
23
The Scope of Moore's Ethical Intuitionism
119
130
FA
Ali Akbar
Abdolabadi
استادیار فلسفه در دانشگاه تربیت معلم آذربایجان
abdolabadi85@yahoo.com
One of the most fundamental questions about G. E. Moore's ethical<br />intuitionism relates to its scope. Does Moore's ethical intuitionism<br />only relate to the value - ethical terms and the ethical judgments or<br />propositions containing them, or beside those terms and judgments or<br />propositions, it relate to the obligatory ethical terms and the ethical<br />judgments or propositions containing them? In this paper, we will try<br />to show, by an analytic - critical method, that contrary to some of<br />Moore's interpreters/critics, the scope of Moore's ethical intuitionism<br />never includes the obligatory ethical terms and the ethical judgments<br />or propositions containing them, but confines to the value - ethical<br />terms and the ethical judgments or propositions containing them. At<br />the same time, we will try to show that among the value - ethical<br />terms and the ethical judgments or propositions containing them, only<br />the adjective “Good” and the ethical judgments or propositions<br />containing the predicate “Good” are the objects of Moore's ethical<br />intuitionism.
the scope of moore's ethical intuitionism,the adjective
“Good”,the ethical judgments or propositions containing the predicate
“Good”,the obligatory ethical terms,Intuition,self - evidence,necessary truth
https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_2896.html
https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_2896_74a2806b46158e1ad604039614989da8.pdf
University of Tabriz
Journal of Philosophical Investigations
2251-7960
2423-4419
3
210
2009
08
23
A Survay on Aristotle,s Report and Criticism of
Plato,s Theory of Communism
131
148
FA
Hasan
Fathi
0000-0001-5275-6297
دانشیار گروه فلسفه دانشگاه تبریز
hfathi42@yahoo.com
Hakimeh
PurEsmaeeli Najafabadi
دانش آموخته ی کارشناسی ارشد گروه فلسفه دانشگاه تبریز
In this paper, after some introductory notes on “communism” and on<br />the relation between Aristotle and Plato (in section 1), we proceed to<br />narrate briefly Aristotle’s report (section 2), and his criticism (in<br />sections 3 and 4), of the theory of family and wealth communism in<br />Plato’s philosophy. Then, we try to have a glance on this theory as it<br />has proposed by Plato in his Republic (section 5). At the end, we<br />endeavor, on the core of Plato’s message, to assessing Aristotle’s<br />report and criticism of the theory (section 6). In the last section, while<br />we accept Aristotle’s words in an special level, we try to clear Plato of<br />Aristotelian accusations.
https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_2897.html
https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_2897_f857213baa954b39a45e65efb5f04b2a.pdf