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<Journal>
				<PublisherName>University of Tabriz</PublisherName>
				<JournalTitle>Journal of Philosophical Investigations</JournalTitle>
				<Issn>2251-7960</Issn>
				<Volume>6</Volume>
				<Issue>10</Issue>
				<PubDate PubStatus="epublish">
					<Year>2012</Year>
					<Month>08</Month>
					<Day>22</Day>
				</PubDate>
			</Journal>
<ArticleTitle>Empiricism and the Challenge of Analytics</ArticleTitle>
<VernacularTitle>Empiricism and the Challenge of Analytics</VernacularTitle>
			<FirstPage>139</FirstPage>
			<LastPage>158</LastPage>
			<ELocationID EIdType="pii">129</ELocationID>
			
			
			<Language>FA</Language>
<AuthorList>
<Author>
					<FirstName>Reza</FirstName>
					<LastName>Sadeghi</LastName>
<Affiliation></Affiliation>

</Author>
</AuthorList>
				<PublicationType>Journal Article</PublicationType>
			<History>
				<PubDate PubStatus="received">
					<Year>2011</Year>
					<Month>11</Month>
					<Day>23</Day>
				</PubDate>
			</History>
		<Abstract>Although in the last decades positivistic view about analytic-synthetic distinction has encountered serious challenges, but the main results of this distinction such as antirealism in the mathematic an logic and the distinction of value-fact has been remained in the contemporary philosophy of science. this article at first will consider the main problems of empiricists in accounting the epistemic place of analytics and then will argue that Quinean approach is success in showing the problems of positivism but   has embraced the conventionalism in physic which is in contrast with any serious scientific research. Reexamining the aristotlian realism in the logic and mathematic is the final position of this article.     </Abstract>
			<OtherAbstract Language="FA">Although in the last decades positivistic view about analytic-synthetic distinction has encountered serious challenges, but the main results of this distinction such as antirealism in the mathematic an logic and the distinction of value-fact has been remained in the contemporary philosophy of science. this article at first will consider the main problems of empiricists in accounting the epistemic place of analytics and then will argue that Quinean approach is success in showing the problems of positivism but   has embraced the conventionalism in physic which is in contrast with any serious scientific research. Reexamining the aristotlian realism in the logic and mathematic is the final position of this article.     </OtherAbstract>
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