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<ArticleSet>
<Article>
<Journal>
				<PublisherName>University of Tabriz</PublisherName>
				<JournalTitle>Journal of Philosophical Investigations</JournalTitle>
				<Issn>2251-7960</Issn>
				<Volume>9</Volume>
				<Issue>17</Issue>
				<PubDate PubStatus="epublish">
					<Year>2016</Year>
					<Month>02</Month>
					<Day>20</Day>
				</PubDate>
			</Journal>
<ArticleTitle>Place goes wrong in treating mind-brain relationship: Clarifying why identity theory is neither reasonable nor a mere scientific problem in disguise</ArticleTitle>
<VernacularTitle>Place goes wrong in treating mind-brain relationship: Clarifying why identity theory is neither reasonable nor a mere scientific problem in disguise</VernacularTitle>
			<FirstPage>173</FirstPage>
			<LastPage>202</LastPage>
			<ELocationID EIdType="pii">14816</ELocationID>
			
			
			<Language>FA</Language>
<AuthorList>
<Author>
					<FirstName>Mahdi</FirstName>
					<LastName>Soleimani Khormuji</LastName>
<Affiliation>PhD Candidate in Philosophy, Imam Khomeini International University, Qazvin, Iran</Affiliation>

</Author>
</AuthorList>
				<PublicationType>Journal Article</PublicationType>
			<History>
				<PubDate PubStatus="received">
					<Year>2014</Year>
					<Month>05</Month>
					<Day>10</Day>
				</PubDate>
			</History>
		<Abstract>U. T. Place claims that philosophical problems concerning the true nature of mind-brain relationship will be disappeared or settled in favor of materialism, especially type identity theory of mind. He takes above claim as a reasonable scientific hypothesis. I shall argue why it is not as he claims. At the first, to pave the way for refutation, I will briefly clarify Place&#039;s approach to subject in hand; although the rest of paper will be also contained more details about his position. Then, I will reduce his position into four theses and try to prove that the main claim of type identity theory is neither reasonable nor a mere scientific problem in disguise. I think that we ought to take type identity theory, at most, just as a hypothesis approximately displays the function of mind-brain relationship but tells us nothing justifiably about its true nature.</Abstract>
			<OtherAbstract Language="FA">U. T. Place claims that philosophical problems concerning the true nature of mind-brain relationship will be disappeared or settled in favor of materialism, especially type identity theory of mind. He takes above claim as a reasonable scientific hypothesis. I shall argue why it is not as he claims. At the first, to pave the way for refutation, I will briefly clarify Place&#039;s approach to subject in hand; although the rest of paper will be also contained more details about his position. Then, I will reduce his position into four theses and try to prove that the main claim of type identity theory is neither reasonable nor a mere scientific problem in disguise. I think that we ought to take type identity theory, at most, just as a hypothesis approximately displays the function of mind-brain relationship but tells us nothing justifiably about its true nature.</OtherAbstract>
		<ObjectList>
			<Object Type="keyword">
			<Param Name="value">mind</Param>
			</Object>
			<Object Type="keyword">
			<Param Name="value">brain</Param>
			</Object>
			<Object Type="keyword">
			<Param Name="value">identity</Param>
			</Object>
			<Object Type="keyword">
			<Param Name="value">analytic and synthetic</Param>
			</Object>
			<Object Type="keyword">
			<Param Name="value">a posteriori necessity</Param>
			</Object>
			<Object Type="keyword">
			<Param Name="value">internalism</Param>
			</Object>
			<Object Type="keyword">
			<Param Name="value">externalism</Param>
			</Object>
		</ObjectList>
<ArchiveCopySource DocType="pdf">https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_14816_08d9d65626e539a6556c824f51532cf4.pdf</ArchiveCopySource>
</Article>
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