University of Tabriz Journal of Philosophical Investigations 2251-7960 17 43 2023 07 23 Illusionism on Mind Problem Illusionism on Mind Problem 364 383 14966 10.22034/jpiut.2022.51469.3202 FA Siamak Abdollahi Corresponding Author, PH.D in Philosophy at Tehran University and Research Fellow at Department of Philosophy, University of Religions and Denominations, Qom, Iran. Mansour Nasiri Associate Professor of Philosophy Department, Farabi Campus of Tehran University, Iran Journal Article 2022 05 08 Nowadays, theories of the philosophy of mind, are divided into illusionist and non-illusionist. In relation to the Mind Problem (<em>MP</em>), Illusionism of Soul (<em>IS</em>) considers soul and all of the unphysical-mental events (like immaterial personal identity, non-physical consciousness and freewill, non-metaphysical morality, etc.) as an illusion and believes that science will completely explain them in the future. The authors have seen IS in neurophilosophy and Daniel Dennett's Center of Narrative Gravity (<em>CNG</em>). This essay is devoted to explaining IS and the two views on MP, and finally to comparatively comparing them. In this library research paper, we found that the two theories are common in physicalist-evolutionist basics that cause to consider mental events as an illusion and reject dualism; and they are different in eliminativism. we conclude that the mind-brain identity, which is the most important basic of illusionism, has many consequences; for example, the transformation of man into a machine, the unification of man with other animals, and certain ideas about a philosophical zombie. Nowadays, theories of the philosophy of mind, are divided into illusionist and non-illusionist. In relation to the Mind Problem (<em>MP</em>), Illusionism of Soul (<em>IS</em>) considers soul and all of the unphysical-mental events (like immaterial personal identity, non-physical consciousness and freewill, non-metaphysical morality, etc.) as an illusion and believes that science will completely explain them in the future. The authors have seen IS in neurophilosophy and Daniel Dennett's Center of Narrative Gravity (<em>CNG</em>). This essay is devoted to explaining IS and the two views on MP, and finally to comparatively comparing them. In this library research paper, we found that the two theories are common in physicalist-evolutionist basics that cause to consider mental events as an illusion and reject dualism; and they are different in eliminativism. we conclude that the mind-brain identity, which is the most important basic of illusionism, has many consequences; for example, the transformation of man into a machine, the unification of man with other animals, and certain ideas about a philosophical zombie. https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_14966_58c326eb8a24ba81f97fd1cbe45cd67c.pdf