University of Tabriz Journal of Philosophical Investigations 2251-7960 11 20 2017 08 23 Intentionality and Representation in the dialogue between Dreyfus and Searle Intentionality and Representation in the dialogue between Dreyfus and Searle 91 115 15761 FA Mohamad Hossein Mohamad Ali Khalaj PhD Candidate of Philosophy,, Shahid Beheshti University, Tehran, Iran Ata Heshmati MA. in Philosophy of Science , Sharif University of Technology, Tehran, Iran Journal Article 2015 09 09 Dialogue between Dreyfus, as the biggest American commenter of Heidegger and Merleau-ponty, and Searle, as one of the biggest analytic philosophers, started at the seventies. According to Searle, phenomenology is superficially and blind and has systematic errors. Additionally, in his view the concept of non-representational intention as center of Dreyfus’s phenomenology is inconsistent. But, in our opinion, Dreyfus introduces a consistent concept of non-representational intention, and proposes that Searle does not have a correct understanding of phenomenology. Dreyfus differentiates (draws distinction) between two interpretations of Searle: Searle as phenomenologist and Searle as analytic (analytical) philosopher. Dreyfus believes Searle’s approach as a phenomenologist is wrong because ignores non-representational intention; He also critics/refuses Searle’s approach as analytic philosopher since this approach accepts a causality for an abstract structure. However, we believe Dreyfus (himself) fails to go beyond the subject-object dualism. Moreover, introducing non-representational intention is not enough for rejecting Descartes dualism. Dialogue between Dreyfus, as the biggest American commenter of Heidegger and Merleau-ponty, and Searle, as one of the biggest analytic philosophers, started at the seventies. According to Searle, phenomenology is superficially and blind and has systematic errors. Additionally, in his view the concept of non-representational intention as center of Dreyfus’s phenomenology is inconsistent. But, in our opinion, Dreyfus introduces a consistent concept of non-representational intention, and proposes that Searle does not have a correct understanding of phenomenology. Dreyfus differentiates (draws distinction) between two interpretations of Searle: Searle as phenomenologist and Searle as analytic (analytical) philosopher. Dreyfus believes Searle’s approach as a phenomenologist is wrong because ignores non-representational intention; He also critics/refuses Searle’s approach as analytic philosopher since this approach accepts a causality for an abstract structure. However, we believe Dreyfus (himself) fails to go beyond the subject-object dualism. Moreover, introducing non-representational intention is not enough for rejecting Descartes dualism.