University of Tabriz Journal of Philosophical Investigations 2251-7960 19 52 2025 11 22 Partiality and Kantian Moral Theory Partiality and Kantian Moral Theory 385 404 20049 10.22034/jpiut.2025.66807.4070 FA Seyyed-Ali Asghari Assistant Professor, Institute for Humanities and Cultural Studies, Tehran, Iran. Journal Article 2025 04 16 We have, among our moral concerns, both impartiality concerns and partiality concerns. Accordingly, any moral theory, including impartial theories, should somehow reconcile the two concerns. The basic question of this article is whether “valuing all persons equally” can be reconciled with “valuing partial motives and reasons and particular persons (deep partiality)”. This article aims to find, analyze, and explain an answer that the impartialist Kantian moral theory can provide to that question, as the theory faces important obstacles in reconciling impartiality and partiality. One obstacle is its emphasis on the “motive of duty,” which is in conflict with “partial motives”. The other is its emphasis on the value of humanity in persons, which appears to conflict with the value of particular persons, whereas in partiality we value particular persons, that is, for the sake of their individual features. In general, I have concluded that the defender of Kantian theory can explain the value of partial reasons or motives and the value of particular individuals in two steps. The first is that Kant believes that, in addition to the motive of duty, humans, based on their humanity and rational nature, have a special kind of value called “dignity”; therefore, we ought to revere humans. The second is to contemplate the “capacity to set ends,” an important feature of humanity and rational nature. Revering a person in situations where we have a personal relationship with someone requires our attention to the ends which we know he has, otherwise we have not revered his capacity to set his ends. The method has been to search, or rather to extract “implicit” ideas and concepts related to the issue of “partiality” from the Kantian moral theory. That is because “explicit” concerns of this theory –put forward during the modern era with its universalist viewpoint—were primarily “impartialist.” We have, among our moral concerns, both impartiality concerns and partiality concerns. Accordingly, any moral theory, including impartial theories, should somehow reconcile the two concerns. The basic question of this article is whether “valuing all persons equally” can be reconciled with “valuing partial motives and reasons and particular persons (deep partiality)”. This article aims to find, analyze, and explain an answer that the impartialist Kantian moral theory can provide to that question, as the theory faces important obstacles in reconciling impartiality and partiality. One obstacle is its emphasis on the “motive of duty,” which is in conflict with “partial motives”. The other is its emphasis on the value of humanity in persons, which appears to conflict with the value of particular persons, whereas in partiality we value particular persons, that is, for the sake of their individual features. In general, I have concluded that the defender of Kantian theory can explain the value of partial reasons or motives and the value of particular individuals in two steps. The first is that Kant believes that, in addition to the motive of duty, humans, based on their humanity and rational nature, have a special kind of value called “dignity”; therefore, we ought to revere humans. The second is to contemplate the “capacity to set ends,” an important feature of humanity and rational nature. Revering a person in situations where we have a personal relationship with someone requires our attention to the ends which we know he has, otherwise we have not revered his capacity to set his ends. The method has been to search, or rather to extract “implicit” ideas and concepts related to the issue of “partiality” from the Kantian moral theory. That is because “explicit” concerns of this theory –put forward during the modern era with its universalist viewpoint—were primarily “impartialist.” https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_20049_1f339e05061052097152b324e3a7b552.pdf