University of Tabriz Journal of Philosophical Investigations 2251-7960 19 52 2025 11 22 A Critique of Applying Wittgenstein's Epistemic Insights to Ethics A Critique of Applying Wittgenstein's Epistemic Insights to Ethics 141 160 20245 10.22034/jpiut.2024.63906.3890 FA Minoo Hojjat Assistant Professor, Department of Philosophy, Iranian Institute of Philosophy, Tehran, Iran Journal Article 2024 10 08 Although Wittgenstein, especially in his later philosophy, did not explicitly discuss ethics, his method of philosophizing holds particular significance and gives hope that some of his insights may be applied in that domain as well. Some philosophers, referring to On Certainty, have argued that there are moral certainties that function analogously to the epistemic certainties Wittgenstein discusses. I aim to show that, although moral propositions may serve a similar structural role, they differ in several crucial respects from the certainties Wittgenstein examined: There are multiple moral language-games, each grounded in different certainties; these certainties themselves rest upon epistemic ones; yet, unlike epistemic certainties, the basic certainties of moral language-games are not embedded in our instinctive actions. Moreover, the propositions expressing them are typically general statements- often ambiguous or allowing exceptions. Clarifying their meaning or specifying the conditions of exception opens the door to divergent interpretations and ensuing disagreements. Finally, unlike epistemic certainties, there are alternatives to acting in accordance with moral certainties. All these considerations point to a significant difference between moral certainties and the kind of certainty Wittgenstein discusses. Although Wittgenstein, especially in his later philosophy, did not explicitly discuss ethics, his method of philosophizing holds particular significance and gives hope that some of his insights may be applied in that domain as well. Some philosophers, referring to On Certainty, have argued that there are moral certainties that function analogously to the epistemic certainties Wittgenstein discusses. I aim to show that, although moral propositions may serve a similar structural role, they differ in several crucial respects from the certainties Wittgenstein examined: There are multiple moral language-games, each grounded in different certainties; these certainties themselves rest upon epistemic ones; yet, unlike epistemic certainties, the basic certainties of moral language-games are not embedded in our instinctive actions. Moreover, the propositions expressing them are typically general statements- often ambiguous or allowing exceptions. Clarifying their meaning or specifying the conditions of exception opens the door to divergent interpretations and ensuing disagreements. Finally, unlike epistemic certainties, there are alternatives to acting in accordance with moral certainties. All these considerations point to a significant difference between moral certainties and the kind of certainty Wittgenstein discusses. https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_20245_0f17922aefdfcf66163eff2fd920a448.pdf