University of Tabriz Journal of Philosophical Investigations 2251-7960 Articles in Press 2026 06 02 The Body as the Substrate of Cognition: A Feasibility Study of “Embodied Cognition” in Al-Farabi’s Philosophical System The Body as the Substrate of Cognition: A Feasibility Study of “Embodied Cognition” in Al-Farabi’s Philosophical System 21663 10.22034/jpiut.2026.71767.4457 FA Mahdi Monazzah Assistant Professor, Faculty of Theology and Islamic Sciences, University of Tabriz Mohammad Mahdavi Associate Professor, Department of Islamic Theology, University of Tabriz, Tabriz, Iran Mohammad Azimi Assistant Professor, Department of Islamic Theology, University of Tabriz, Tabriz, Iran Journal Article 2026 03 18 This article aims to assess the feasibility of an “embodied cognition” reading of Al-Farabi’s thought, drawing on the foundations of second generation cognitive sciences. The main question is whether the role of the body in the cognitive process from Al-Farabi’s perspective can be reinterpreted within the framework of contemporary theories of embodied cognition. The research method is analytical comparative, and the findings show that by defining the soul as the “first perfection” and the “form” of the body, and the body as the “matter” and “instrument” of the soul, Al-Farabi establishes an existential relationship between the two. In his philosophical system, the body plays the role of a necessary condition, an active instrument, and primary matter throughout all stages of cognition – from sensory and imaginative perception to practical and theoretical intellect. The influence of bodily health on the quality of perception, the dependence of the intellect on sensory data, and the role of repeating bodily actions in the formation of moral habits are among the confirmations of this reading. However, this reading is of the “weak embodied cognition” type, because the soul is ultimately capable of transcending bodily attachments and connecting with the Active Intellect. Furthermore, among the fourfold 4E approaches, Al-Farabi’s view is most closely related to “embodiment” in the specific sense and “situated cognition,” and distances itself from the radical extended view and extreme enactivism. The conclusion is that Al-Farabi’s thought offers considerable potential for interdisciplinary dialogue between Islamic philosophy and contemporary cognitive sciences. This article aims to assess the feasibility of an “embodied cognition” reading of Al-Farabi’s thought, drawing on the foundations of second generation cognitive sciences. The main question is whether the role of the body in the cognitive process from Al-Farabi’s perspective can be reinterpreted within the framework of contemporary theories of embodied cognition. The research method is analytical comparative, and the findings show that by defining the soul as the “first perfection” and the “form” of the body, and the body as the “matter” and “instrument” of the soul, Al-Farabi establishes an existential relationship between the two. In his philosophical system, the body plays the role of a necessary condition, an active instrument, and primary matter throughout all stages of cognition – from sensory and imaginative perception to practical and theoretical intellect. The influence of bodily health on the quality of perception, the dependence of the intellect on sensory data, and the role of repeating bodily actions in the formation of moral habits are among the confirmations of this reading. However, this reading is of the “weak embodied cognition” type, because the soul is ultimately capable of transcending bodily attachments and connecting with the Active Intellect. Furthermore, among the fourfold 4E approaches, Al-Farabi’s view is most closely related to “embodiment” in the specific sense and “situated cognition,” and distances itself from the radical extended view and extreme enactivism. The conclusion is that Al-Farabi’s thought offers considerable potential for interdisciplinary dialogue between Islamic philosophy and contemporary cognitive sciences.