University of Tabriz Journal of Philosophical Investigations 2251-7960 13 26 2019 05 22 On Reality of Events in the Philosophy of Time; An Examination of the Notion of Relative Reality in 20th-Century Debate about Inconsistency of Dynamic Models and Special Theory of Relativity On Reality of Events in the Philosophy of Time; An Examination of the Notion of Relative Reality in 20th-Century Debate about Inconsistency of Dynamic Models and Special Theory of Relativity 53 82 8024 10.22034/jpiut.2019.8024 FA Hassan Amiriara Ph.D., Philosophy of Science, Iranian Institute of Philosophy, Journal Article 2017 11 01 There are two main camps in 20th-century philosophy of time: A-theorists who believe in the dynamic model of reality, and B-theorists who maintain a static model of reality. After the publication of Putnam’s influential article, “time and physical geometry” (1967), the implications of the Special Theory of Relativity became serious in metaphysical discussions about temporal reality. Some philosophers argued that this theory contradicts the dynamic model and implies the ontology of the static model, namely, the objective reality of the present, past and future events. In response, some advocates of the dynamic model argued that there can be dynamic models in relativistic setting, though they are different, radically, from old theories of dynamic reality. In this paper, first, I shall discuss how special relativity contradicts the traditional dynamic model and, then, how new dynamic models imply a relative concept of reality, in contrast to its old absolute concept and, so, why these strategies are very unintuitive. Finally, I shall argue that this radical conceptual shift about reality is, not only unintuitive, but unwarranted and, in some sense, inconsistent as well. There are two main camps in 20th-century philosophy of time: A-theorists who believe in the dynamic model of reality, and B-theorists who maintain a static model of reality. After the publication of Putnam’s influential article, “time and physical geometry” (1967), the implications of the Special Theory of Relativity became serious in metaphysical discussions about temporal reality. Some philosophers argued that this theory contradicts the dynamic model and implies the ontology of the static model, namely, the objective reality of the present, past and future events. In response, some advocates of the dynamic model argued that there can be dynamic models in relativistic setting, though they are different, radically, from old theories of dynamic reality. In this paper, first, I shall discuss how special relativity contradicts the traditional dynamic model and, then, how new dynamic models imply a relative concept of reality, in contrast to its old absolute concept and, so, why these strategies are very unintuitive. Finally, I shall argue that this radical conceptual shift about reality is, not only unintuitive, but unwarranted and, in some sense, inconsistent as well. https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_8024_5d1d7e6c7fdd4c4103daaa6768af961d.pdf