University of Tabriz Journal of Philosophical Investigations 2251-7960 13 27 2019 08 23 Herder and the Emergence of Philosophy of Culture Herder and the Emergence of Philosophy of Culture 1 22 9242 10.22034/jpiut.2019.28555.2055 FA Mohammad Mehdi Ardebili Assistant Professor, Institute for humanities and cultural studies (IHCS) Journal Article 2018 07 24 Though thinking about culture returns to ancient Greece, "culture" as understood today is a modern concept influenced more by the speculations of the German thinkers of the 18th and 19th centuries than ancient Greek thinkers. Despite the ideas of Rousseau, Diderot, Voltaire, Vico, Leibniz, and others, it can be shown that Johann Gottfried von Herder (1764-1803) was the first thinker that provided a metaphysical and philosophical grounding for culture. He portrayed the human being as essentially a cultural being. However, Herder does not have an independent book or treatise specifically about the "philosophy of culture" or even the meaning of culture. Consequently, the present paper tries to analyze how Herder's "philosophy of culture" implicitly emerges from his vast oeuvre by extracting his diverse and diffuse discussions about language, man, history, politics and culture; and, finally, its impact on the subsequent thinkers of this field, especially Hegel. Accordingly, this paper, regardless of its short introduction, has three main parts: First, the theoretical foundations of Herder's thoughts and his sources of inspiration; Second, Herder’s philosophy of culture, extracted from a variety of his works and focusing on his critiques of Enlightenment; and third, examining Herder's influence on subsequent thinkers, focusing on the evolution of the concept of culture. Though thinking about culture returns to ancient Greece, "culture" as understood today is a modern concept influenced more by the speculations of the German thinkers of the 18th and 19th centuries than ancient Greek thinkers. Despite the ideas of Rousseau, Diderot, Voltaire, Vico, Leibniz, and others, it can be shown that Johann Gottfried von Herder (1764-1803) was the first thinker that provided a metaphysical and philosophical grounding for culture. He portrayed the human being as essentially a cultural being. However, Herder does not have an independent book or treatise specifically about the "philosophy of culture" or even the meaning of culture. Consequently, the present paper tries to analyze how Herder's "philosophy of culture" implicitly emerges from his vast oeuvre by extracting his diverse and diffuse discussions about language, man, history, politics and culture; and, finally, its impact on the subsequent thinkers of this field, especially Hegel. Accordingly, this paper, regardless of its short introduction, has three main parts: First, the theoretical foundations of Herder's thoughts and his sources of inspiration; Second, Herder’s philosophy of culture, extracted from a variety of his works and focusing on his critiques of Enlightenment; and third, examining Herder's influence on subsequent thinkers, focusing on the evolution of the concept of culture.

https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_9242_921328d0df3391cf0bb97726a82f0275.pdf

University of Tabriz Journal of Philosophical Investigations 2251-7960 13 27 2019 08 23 The Decline of Subjectivism and Emergence of Perspectivism in Nietzsche's Thought The Decline of Subjectivism and Emergence of Perspectivism in Nietzsche's Thought 23 49 9249 10.22034/jpiut.2019.33954.2341 FA Aminallah Arjang PhD Student of philosophy, University of Tabriz Journal Article 2019 06 09 In this article, we have tried to show that subjectivism has emerged out of the ethics; it is intended to redeem the human from the fate of Gods and take him to autonomy. By Socrates, subjectivism as a war against the Gods starts with eliminating Dionysius and the dominance of Apollo. Plato develops subjectivism by resourcing to the Socratic equation of virtue and knowledge, and by declaring that knowledge just is of existent; but, inevitably, he admits a god who is single and transcendental. Subjectivism culminates in Neo-Platonist by transcending the being by God; but because of its alienation from the body, they have nothing to say but admitting embodying God, to acquire knowledge from the body. Descartes displaced subject with God; the rational element of body redeem as an extension. But the Cartesian subject is suspending between self-enslavement and the necessity of nature; Kant subjects the nature to the laws of understanding and redeems the subject by constructing him out of its autonomous style. He proposes the teleological aspect of the world, to ensure the freedom of subject in mechanical nature. Even though subjectivism culminates in Kant, but body, as the suppressed thing called noumenon to get lost from the outset: and Nietzsche’s philosophy as the voice of this suppressed body, reduces the first and the second Critique to the third Critique and, thereby, denies the subjectivism which denies body and adopts the body-based perspectivism. In this article, we have tried to show that subjectivism has emerged out of the ethics; it is intended to redeem the human from the fate of Gods and take him to autonomy. By Socrates, subjectivism as a war against the Gods starts with eliminating Dionysius and the dominance of Apollo. Plato develops subjectivism by resourcing to the Socratic equation of virtue and knowledge, and by declaring that knowledge just is of existent; but, inevitably, he admits a god who is single and transcendental. Subjectivism culminates in Neo-Platonist by transcending the being by God; but because of its alienation from the body, they have nothing to say but admitting embodying God, to acquire knowledge from the body. Descartes displaced subject with God; the rational element of body redeem as an extension. But the Cartesian subject is suspending between self-enslavement and the necessity of nature; Kant subjects the nature to the laws of understanding and redeems the subject by constructing him out of its autonomous style. He proposes the teleological aspect of the world, to ensure the freedom of subject in mechanical nature. Even though subjectivism culminates in Kant, but body, as the suppressed thing called noumenon to get lost from the outset: and Nietzsche’s philosophy as the voice of this suppressed body, reduces the first and the second Critique to the third Critique and, thereby, denies the subjectivism which denies body and adopts the body-based perspectivism.

https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_9249_79986a14f01ab9253ec8e69d781429ed.pdf

University of Tabriz Journal of Philosophical Investigations 2251-7960 13 27 2019 08 23 Negative attitude on Transcendental Ego in Kant Negative attitude on Transcendental Ego in Kant 51 70 9244 10.22034/jpiut.2019.29716.2130 FA Masoud Omid Associate Professor of Philosophy, University of Tabriz, Behzad Hassanpoor Ph.D. Candidate of Philosophy, University of Tabriz Journal Article 2018 10 09 Transcendental ego is not only one of the essential elements in Kant’s philosophical system, but also is the supreme principle in it. One way of deliberating the Problem of Transcendental is to investigate and analyze it from the negative point of view because a negative approach to some problems is an appropriate guide to the affirmative approach. In this article, first, we have compared the transcendental ego with the other cases such as metaphysical ego, empirical ego, mystical ego, physiological ego, and pragmatic ego. In this comparison, we showed that the transcendental ego is not similar to them. Second, we have pointed to some negative characteristics of transcendental ego as follows: 1- Transcendental ego is not an empirical subject. 2- It is not a concept. 3- It is not a representation. 4- It is not intuition. 5- It is not a category. 6- It has not any content. It lacks an ontological aspect. Transcendental ego is not only one of the essential elements in Kant’s philosophical system, but also is the supreme principle in it. One way of deliberating the Problem of Transcendental is to investigate and analyze it from the negative point of view because a negative approach to some problems is an appropriate guide to the affirmative approach. In this article, first, we have compared the transcendental ego with the other cases such as metaphysical ego, empirical ego, mystical ego, physiological ego, and pragmatic ego. In this comparison, we showed that the transcendental ego is not similar to them. Second, we have pointed to some negative characteristics of transcendental ego as follows: 1- Transcendental ego is not an empirical subject. 2- It is not a concept. 3- It is not a representation. 4- It is not intuition. 5- It is not a category. 6- It has not any content. It lacks an ontological aspect.

https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_9244_a7f273087e1f547dde04d1cc3a8fae5f.pdf

University of Tabriz Journal of Philosophical Investigations 2251-7960 13 27 2019 08 23 A Study of the Possibility of a Science Associated with a Specific Worldview A Study of the Possibility of a Science Associated with a Specific Worldview 71 94 9239 10.22034/jpiut.2019.27618.2029 FA Mostafa Taqavi Assistant Professor, Sharif University of Technology Journal Article 2018 06 12 There are two main sections in this paper. First, we will show that some of the chief 20th-century theories of science either have failed to demonstrate that value judgments do not influence the context of consolidation and determination of science or have accepted the role of value judgments in the context of consolidation and determination of science and theorized accordingly. For this purpose, the ideas of logical positivists, Willard Quine, Karl Popper, Thomas Kuhn, Imre Lakatos, Paul Feyerabend, and Roy Bhaskar on science are briefly reviewed. Finally, the validity of the following statement will be explored: if ‘science is influenced by cognitive-normative foundations of A’ then ‘the science based on cognitive-normative foundations of, say, B is possible.’ Subsequently, the following question will be contemplated: is pluralism in Cognitive-normative foundations accepted methodologically? In this way, the final section includes ratification of the possibility of science associated with a particular worldview and goes on to explain the issues important in the argument in favor of such science. There are two main sections in this paper. First, we will show that some of the chief 20th-century theories of science either have failed to demonstrate that value judgments do not influence the context of consolidation and determination of science or have accepted the role of value judgments in the context of consolidation and determination of science and theorized accordingly. For this purpose, the ideas of logical positivists, Willard Quine, Karl Popper, Thomas Kuhn, Imre Lakatos, Paul Feyerabend, and Roy Bhaskar on science are briefly reviewed. Finally, the validity of the following statement will be explored: if ‘science is influenced by cognitive-normative foundations of A’ then ‘the science based on cognitive-normative foundations of, say, B is possible.’ Subsequently, the following question will be contemplated: is pluralism in Cognitive-normative foundations accepted methodologically? In this way, the final section includes ratification of the possibility of science associated with a particular worldview and goes on to explain the issues important in the argument in favor of such science.

https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_9239_6b1a9f36f0c751c365518973b4efc1be.pdf

University of Tabriz Journal of Philosophical Investigations 2251-7960 13 27 2019 08 23 The Revival of Sacred Essence of Nature, the Solution to Environmental Crisis The Revival of Sacred Essence of Nature, the Solution to Environmental Crisis 95 116 8791 10.22034/jpiut.2019.32351.2268 FA Farshad Tohidnia Ph.D. student in Department of Religious Philosophy, Isfahan (Khorasgan) Branch, Islamic Azad University, Isfahan, Iran Alireza Jalali Assistant Professor of religions and mysticism, Payam Noor University, ,Iran, Seyed Hosein Vaezi Associate Professor of Islamic Mysticism, Isfahan (Khorasgan) Branch, Islamic Azad University, Isfahan, Iran Journal Article 2019 03 05 Environmental degradation has become one of the biggest challenges of the contemporary world because of the bad consequences of mankind and it is nothing more important for the survival of the whole system of nature, including man. The first crisis started in the west, followed by modernity to the east at a global level. In Nasr's belief, this is a gradual nature. Scholars have developed solutions to solve the environmental crisis, often from environmental engineering. Without denying these solutions, he does not know the scientific method by itself as a problem solver, as it is believed that empirical science itself is responsible for this crisis. His post approach can be saved from these problems only by restoring the divine knowledge of nature. Some Muslim thinkers, however, have traditionally seen the tradition of use in contemporary times, believing that the Islamic tradition is a rich resource to explain the philosophy of science. The present study using descriptive-analytical method has been used to collect library data and this view is presented. The purpose of this study is to investigate the crisis in this research; however, the ethical principles on nature are strengthened and the need of a modern human to create a spiritual connection with nature is met. Accordingly, the theory can serve as a - valued solution. Environmental degradation has become one of the biggest challenges of the contemporary world because of the bad consequences of mankind and it is nothing more important for the survival of the whole system of nature, including man. The first crisis started in the west, followed by modernity to the east at a global level. In Nasr's belief, this is a gradual nature. Scholars have developed solutions to solve the environmental crisis, often from environmental engineering. Without denying these solutions, he does not know the scientific method by itself as a problem solver, as it is believed that empirical science itself is responsible for this crisis. His post approach can be saved from these problems only by restoring the divine knowledge of nature. Some Muslim thinkers, however, have traditionally seen the tradition of use in contemporary times, believing that the Islamic tradition is a rich resource to explain the philosophy of science. The present study using descriptive-analytical method has been used to collect library data and this view is presented. The purpose of this study is to investigate the crisis in this research; however, the ethical principles on nature are strengthened and the need of a modern human to create a spiritual connection with nature is met. Accordingly, the theory can serve as a - valued solution.

https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_8791_eb02dad91fe39e3143e7e62169b45701.pdf

University of Tabriz Journal of Philosophical Investigations 2251-7960 13 27 2019 08 23 Beauty and its Relation to Goodness in Thomas Aquinas’s Philosophical System Beauty and its Relation to Goodness in Thomas Aquinas’s Philosophical System 117 138 9247 10.22034/jpiut.2019.34040.2343 FA Morteza Shajari Professor of Philosophy, University of Tabriz Hasan Fathi Associate professor of Philosophy, University of Tabriz Zahra Gozali PhD student of philosophy, University of Tabriz Journal Article 2019 06 14 Beauty is a metaphysical concept in Thomas. Such an attitude about beauty necessarily will relate it to the other philosophical concepts. It can be said that the understanding of beauty – which separated from Good- is impossible in the Hellenistic and middle ages thoughts- which are a kind of metaphysical one - because Beauty and Good are often enumerated as the objective properties of Beings in these thoughts. Thomas as other predecessors accepts the same idea about Beauty too and connects it with the Being. So we can enumerate beauty as one of the Transcendentals; one of which necessarily connect with Goodness; because the Transcendentals not only have connected with the Being but also with each other. Beauty, in Aquinas' philosophy, is an objective property and at the same time has connected with apprehension and with the soul too. Because of this, the appetitive power of the soul will owe the beauty by the mediation of the intelligence. Beauty is a metaphysical concept in Thomas. Such an attitude about beauty necessarily will relate it to the other philosophical concepts. It can be said that the understanding of beauty – which separated from Good- is impossible in the Hellenistic and middle ages thoughts- which are a kind of metaphysical one - because Beauty and Good are often enumerated as the objective properties of Beings in these thoughts. Thomas as other predecessors accepts the same idea about Beauty too and connects it with the Being. So we can enumerate beauty as one of the Transcendentals; one of which necessarily connect with Goodness; because the Transcendentals not only have connected with the Being but also with each other. Beauty, in Aquinas' philosophy, is an objective property and at the same time has connected with apprehension and with the soul too. Because of this, the appetitive power of the soul will owe the beauty by the mediation of the intelligence.

https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_9247_4195a2b5f810749fb3a1b5cb4af976aa.pdf

University of Tabriz Journal of Philosophical Investigations 2251-7960 13 27 2019 08 23 Phenomenology of Depression of Cancer-Improved Patients and Reaching to Philosophy - therapy as a caring approach Phenomenology of Depression of Cancer-Improved Patients and Reaching to Philosophy - therapy as a caring approach 139 158 9243 10.22034/jpiut.2019.29534.2118 FA Behnaz Sadeghzadeh Oskouei Assistant Professor, Tabriz University of Medical Sciences Mahmoud Sufiani 1. Assistant Professor of Philosophy, Tabriz University Esmat Mehrabi Assistant Professor, Tabriz University of Medical Sciences Journal Article 2018 09 29 Cancer is one of the leading causes of death in the world. The characteristics of resistance to treatment and its rapid progress are the high mortality rate reasons. Patients who have been diagnosed with the disease are losing their self-awareness, which itself has a negative effect on the treatment process. However, it seems that such patients need to be considered on depressive disorders even after complete treatment of cancer. After receiving the bad news of cancer; patient, his/her family, be anxious. They initiate the patient's support until the end of the treatment period, without attention to such sudden support's adverse effects. The aim of the present study is to survey of cancer treatment and care's phenomenological and descriptive situations of the philosophy of medicine and psychology point of view. Post- disease disorder has a fundamental relationship with this fundamental situation. Cancer is one of the leading causes of death in the world. The characteristics of resistance to treatment and its rapid progress are the high mortality rate reasons. Patients who have been diagnosed with the disease are losing their self-awareness, which itself has a negative effect on the treatment process. However, it seems that such patients need to be considered on depressive disorders even after complete treatment of cancer. After receiving the bad news of cancer; patient, his/her family, be anxious. They initiate the patient's support until the end of the treatment period, without attention to such sudden support's adverse effects. The aim of the present study is to survey of cancer treatment and care's phenomenological and descriptive situations of the philosophy of medicine and psychology point of view. Post- disease disorder has a fundamental relationship with this fundamental situation.

https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_9243_46e56083993d74b084374847f1647dcc.pdf

University of Tabriz Journal of Philosophical Investigations 2251-7960 13 27 2019 08 23 Existentialism and Physicalism Existentialism and Physicalism 159 185 9245 10.22034/jpiut.2019.30667.2178 FA Bijan Abdolkarimi Associate Professor, Department of Philosophy, Islamic Azad University (North Tehran Branch), Tehran- Iran Journal Article 2018 12 02 This article is about the dispute between existentialism and physicalism concerning the in/authenticity of the human being's thought and freedom. It deals with the impossibility of reducing human thought, practice, choice, and decision to their physical, biological, brain-based or neurological aspects. In other words, the way of thinking which can be called naturalism, materialism, or physicalism based on different criteria (from seventeenth-century until twentieth century) tries to interpret human existence (“soul” in the mythological language of Plato, “transcendental imagination” in Kant’s philosophy, “existence” in Kierkegaard’s thought and existentialism and “Dasein” in Heidegger’s view) as a product of physical, natural or material processes and does not regard human freedom of choice as authentic (or irreducible) but as a secondary product of biological natural phenomena. This article claims that the main matter of the dispute is not specifically determined in the debate between physicalism or reductionism on the one hand and the philosophers believing in existence or Dasein on the other hand. This vagueness has caused the discussion about the theoretical challenge not to undergo a smooth path. In order to make clear the exact parameters of the central matter of dispute, I try to challenge the fundamentals of physicalism. This article is about the dispute between existentialism and physicalism concerning the in/authenticity of the human being's thought and freedom. It deals with the impossibility of reducing human thought, practice, choice, and decision to their physical, biological, brain-based or neurological aspects. In other words, the way of thinking which can be called naturalism, materialism, or physicalism based on different criteria (from seventeenth-century until twentieth century) tries to interpret human existence (“soul” in the mythological language of Plato, “transcendental imagination” in Kant’s philosophy, “existence” in Kierkegaard’s thought and existentialism and “Dasein” in Heidegger’s view) as a product of physical, natural or material processes and does not regard human freedom of choice as authentic (or irreducible) but as a secondary product of biological natural phenomena. This article claims that the main matter of the dispute is not specifically determined in the debate between physicalism or reductionism on the one hand and the philosophers believing in existence or Dasein on the other hand. This vagueness has caused the discussion about the theoretical challenge not to undergo a smooth path. In order to make clear the exact parameters of the central matter of dispute, I try to challenge the fundamentals of physicalism.

https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_9245_6c84f21bb006a847833906df69057690.pdf

University of Tabriz Journal of Philosophical Investigations 2251-7960 13 27 2019 08 23 The Problem of Truth in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason The Problem of Truth in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason 187 212 9241 10.22034/jpiut.2019.34948.2367 FA Mohammad Reza Abdollahnejad Associate Professor of Philosophy, University of Tabriz Khadije Gholizadeh PhD. Candidate of Philosophy, University of Tabriz Journal Article 2019 07 30 The absence of a separate entry or section on “truth” in the Critique of Pure Reason, the presence of some ambiguous, complicated and problematic-interpretable expressions and utterances in some parts of that work, and the formation of some extreme contradictory interpretations concerning these utterances on the part of some of Kant’s commentators, are the most important obstacles encountered by contemporary Kantian scholars in presenting a unitary, coherent and transparent view of Kant’s theory of truth. Hence, the question about the nature of truth in Critique of Pure Reason has become a fundamental problem among Kantian scholars. The present paper, without undue adhering to one of the two extreme common interpretations on Kant’s theory of truth (which one of them has considered Kant to be advocate of traditional correspondence theory of truth and the other has taken him as the founder of coherence theory of truth), and only by analyzing Kant’s new conception of “judgment” as an epistemic (and not logical) relation between representations emphasizes this important point that the general structure of Critique of Pure Reason requires that the traditional correspondence theory of truth not be entirely abandoned and not completely preserved in its traditional form. In other words, by revising and completing the traditional correspondence theory of truth, the Critique established the foundations of a new conception of truth that can be called “transcendental correspondence theory of truth”. According to this new conception, truth is a condition without which a judgment or cognition cannot correspond with its object and consequently cannot have objective validity; The constituent representations of a judgment could become true knowledge or objective empirical judgment only when they are synthesized in accordance with possible experience (i.e. universal a priori rules or principles of experience). The absence of a separate entry or section on “truth” in the Critique of Pure Reason, the presence of some ambiguous, complicated and problematic-interpretable expressions and utterances in some parts of that work, and the formation of some extreme contradictory interpretations concerning these utterances on the part of some of Kant’s commentators, are the most important obstacles encountered by contemporary Kantian scholars in presenting a unitary, coherent and transparent view of Kant’s theory of truth. Hence, the question about the nature of truth in Critique of Pure Reason has become a fundamental problem among Kantian scholars. The present paper, without undue adhering to one of the two extreme common interpretations on Kant’s theory of truth (which one of them has considered Kant to be advocate of traditional correspondence theory of truth and the other has taken him as the founder of coherence theory of truth), and only by analyzing Kant’s new conception of “judgment” as an epistemic (and not logical) relation between representations emphasizes this important point that the general structure of Critique of Pure Reason requires that the traditional correspondence theory of truth not be entirely abandoned and not completely preserved in its traditional form. In other words, by revising and completing the traditional correspondence theory of truth, the Critique established the foundations of a new conception of truth that can be called “transcendental correspondence theory of truth”. According to this new conception, truth is a condition without which a judgment or cognition cannot correspond with its object and consequently cannot have objective validity; The constituent representations of a judgment could become true knowledge or objective empirical judgment only when they are synthesized in accordance with possible experience (i.e. universal a priori rules or principles of experience).

https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_9241_cd1519d041f15c2b3e2b9b18075e54a9.pdf

University of Tabriz Journal of Philosophical Investigations 2251-7960 13 27 2019 08 23 A Critical Study of the Contemporary Approaches to the Contradiction of Avicenna's View Concerning the Moral Judgments A Critical Study of the Contemporary Approaches to the Contradiction of Avicenna's View Concerning the Moral Judgments 213 230 8914 10.22034/jpiut.2019.32842.2288 FA Ali Alamolhoda associate professor of Payam-e Noor University Journal Article 2019 04 13 One of the most famous criticisms for Avicenna's criticizers is about his opinion for the general acceptance of ethical propositions. On the other hand, he emphasizes that they are intelligible. They say that if they are generally accepted by persons, so they will be relative and conventional. But based on the principle of peripatetic philosophy his opinion will be a self-contradiction. Some contemporary Muslim thinkers emphasis that general acceptance of them in his view has belonged to the logical status of them. And the intelligibility of them has belonged to the epistemological position of them. But in this essay, it will be shown that the epistemological situation of the ethical proposition has a necessary relation to the logical position of them. On the other hand, if they will be intelligible so they can't be relativistic, but they were achieved from the social convention. So the sharp conflict could be recognized in Avicenna's ethical opinions. One of the most famous criticisms for Avicenna's criticizers is about his opinion for the general acceptance of ethical propositions. On the other hand, he emphasizes that they are intelligible. They say that if they are generally accepted by persons, so they will be relative and conventional. But based on the principle of peripatetic philosophy his opinion will be a self-contradiction. Some contemporary Muslim thinkers emphasis that general acceptance of them in his view has belonged to the logical status of them. And the intelligibility of them has belonged to the epistemological position of them. But in this essay, it will be shown that the epistemological situation of the ethical proposition has a necessary relation to the logical position of them. On the other hand, if they will be intelligible so they can't be relativistic, but they were achieved from the social convention. So the sharp conflict could be recognized in Avicenna's ethical opinions.

https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_8914_460fcbf851ebd4fdf64756cd1fb3c9e3.pdf

University of Tabriz Journal of Philosophical Investigations 2251-7960 13 27 2019 08 23 Roman Ingarden on Ontology of Fictional Objects Roman Ingarden on Ontology of Fictional Objects 231 254 9248 10.22034/jpiut.2019.33909.2338 FA Vahid Gholamipour Fard PhD. Candidate of Philosophy, University of Tabriz Journal Article 2019 06 08 Fictional objects like “Hamlet” or “Rostam” pose many problems for Logicians and thinkers theorizing about perception. The problem lies in the fact that, on the one hand, we think and speak about these objects and, on the other hand, we can’t find them in our world. Two groups are theorizing this issue. Proponents of the first group think that there are not any fictional object; they are just words. The others find these objects indispensable and they work on the ontology of them. The latter thinkers offer different views on the ‘mode of being’ of fictional objects. But these two groups have faced some problems. However, Roman Ingarden sees the main problem in ignoring one of the possible modes of being. He shows that fictional objects are “purely intentional objects” depending first and foremost on conscious acts and also on some physical or ideal object. In this paper, we offer the ideas of the above-mentioned groups and then propose Ingarden’s views. Fictional objects like “Hamlet” or “Rostam” pose many problems for Logicians and thinkers theorizing about perception. The problem lies in the fact that, on the one hand, we think and speak about these objects and, on the other hand, we can’t find them in our world. Two groups are theorizing this issue. Proponents of the first group think that there are not any fictional object; they are just words. The others find these objects indispensable and they work on the ontology of them. The latter thinkers offer different views on the ‘mode of being’ of fictional objects. But these two groups have faced some problems. However, Roman Ingarden sees the main problem in ignoring one of the possible modes of being. He shows that fictional objects are “purely intentional objects” depending first and foremost on conscious acts and also on some physical or ideal object. In this paper, we offer the ideas of the above-mentioned groups and then propose Ingarden’s views.

https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_9248_070257f06f86aecbae50a792e453c87c.pdf

University of Tabriz Journal of Philosophical Investigations 2251-7960 13 27 2019 08 23 Proposing the Idea of Corpopolitics Based of Kristeva’s Thoughts Proposing the Idea of Corpopolitics Based of Kristeva’s Thoughts 255 272 8030 10.22034/jpiut.2019.8030 FA Hassan Fatzade 1. Associate Professor of philosophy, University of Zanjan Marzieh Darabi MA, Islamic Azad University, North Tehran Branch Journal Article 2018 04 14 By separating the semiotic and the symbolic, Kristeva seeks to bring the semiotic chora back to the realm of politics. Chora includes the libidinal force belonging to the mother-child relationship, which at the same time that it has propagated the components of the symbolic realm, has always been suppressed. Kristeva regards this repression as the basis of all the repressions and wants to restrain the authority by returning to this suppressed affair. Here, the repressed affair itself does not return, but it should be backed up by profound psychoanalysis. Kristeva calls this a revolt and thus revealing the deep relationship between macropolitics and micropolitics by giving a political character to it. We will introduce this psychoanalytic understanding of the political affair as corpopolitics. As we will show, corpopolitics seeks to prevent matricide, and this is the most original political act; because, according to us, matricide is the root of all violence and repression. So we shall propose a new reading of Kristeva’s political thoughts. By separating the semiotic and the symbolic, Kristeva seeks to bring the semiotic chora back to the realm of politics. Chora includes the libidinal force belonging to the mother-child relationship, which at the same time that it has propagated the components of the symbolic realm, has always been suppressed. Kristeva regards this repression as the basis of all the repressions and wants to restrain the authority by returning to this suppressed affair. Here, the repressed affair itself does not return, but it should be backed up by profound psychoanalysis. Kristeva calls this a revolt and thus revealing the deep relationship between macropolitics and micropolitics by giving a political character to it. We will introduce this psychoanalytic understanding of the political affair as corpopolitics. As we will show, corpopolitics seeks to prevent matricide, and this is the most original political act; because, according to us, matricide is the root of all violence and repression. So we shall propose a new reading of Kristeva’s political thoughts.

https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_8030_b174b4875eacc53d08e9f6d4c69dad1f.pdf

University of Tabriz Journal of Philosophical Investigations 2251-7960 13 27 2019 08 23 Relation between Exclusivism and Criteria of Rationality of Religious Traditions Dialogue Relation between Exclusivism and Criteria of Rationality of Religious Traditions Dialogue 273 292 8915 10.22034/jpiut.2019.33101.2305 FA Qodratollah Qorbani Associate Professor of Philosophy, Kharazmi University, Tehran, Iran Journal Article 2019 04 28 One of the logical requirements of welcoming to rational dialogue between religious traditions is, at least, avoiding of exclusivism towards own religious tradition. Since the logical requirement regarding confronting with other religions’ facts and realities is to desacralize own religious teachings, accept the possibility of some realities in other religious traditions and some mistakes in our religious tradition. Religious exclusivism, but, is as the most significant obstacle concerning such rational impetuously action. Because the crucial religious presupposition of exclusivism is restricting of truthness and salvation in our religious tradition, and other religious tradition were/are deviated from them. Such thinking has trained its followers needless to recognize rationally other religions and independence of listening to their realities and has persuaded its believers to invite others, as unbelievers, to own religion through using some software methods, like religious missionaries or hardware methods like sacred war. So religious exclusivist has no ear to listen and no eye to see other religions realities. Hence, based on religious exclusivism, logical and rational dialogue between religious traditions is impossible. The strategy for exiting of this crises is leaving exclusivism and to desacralize of our religious teachings and welcoming to some truths that maybe exist in other religions, as well as our religious tradition. One of the logical requirements of welcoming to rational dialogue between religious traditions is, at least, avoiding of exclusivism towards own religious tradition. Since the logical requirement regarding confronting with other religions’ facts and realities is to desacralize own religious teachings, accept the possibility of some realities in other religious traditions and some mistakes in our religious tradition. Religious exclusivism, but, is as the most significant obstacle concerning such rational impetuously action. Because the crucial religious presupposition of exclusivism is restricting of truthness and salvation in our religious tradition, and other religious tradition were/are deviated from them. Such thinking has trained its followers needless to recognize rationally other religions and independence of listening to their realities and has persuaded its believers to invite others, as unbelievers, to own religion through using some software methods, like religious missionaries or hardware methods like sacred war. So religious exclusivist has no ear to listen and no eye to see other religions realities. Hence, based on religious exclusivism, logical and rational dialogue between religious traditions is impossible. The strategy for exiting of this crises is leaving exclusivism and to desacralize of our religious teachings and welcoming to some truths that maybe exist in other religions, as well as our religious tradition.

https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_8915_3168371355d1dea013ef018ff3db6883.pdf

University of Tabriz Journal of Philosophical Investigations 2251-7960 13 27 2019 08 23 Early Wittgenstein’s View on Goodness, Happiness, and Acceptance of the World Early Wittgenstein’s View on Goodness, Happiness, and Acceptance of the World 293 314 8789 10.22034/jpiut.2019.31820.2230 FA Reza Mosmer استادیار گروه فلسفه ذهن، مؤسسه آموزش عالی علوم شناختی (پژوهشکده علوم شناختی) Journal Article 2019 01 29 Ethics was the major issue in Wittgenstein’s writings from 1916 to the time of publication of the Tractatus Logico-philosophicus. He explicates the notion of “good” in terms of “happiness” and the latter as “accepting the world as it is.” Nonetheless, this reductionistic philosophical program could not get off the ground unless there is a pretty clear conception of the notion of “accepting the world.” In this paper, I shall explore two alternative accounts of this concept. According to the first account, which I dub “the actual world hypothesis,” Wittgenstein had meant accepting the actual world by the term “being good.” The alternative account, “the substance of the world hypothesis,” suggests accepting the substance of the world as the best reading of the Tractatus. Morris and Graver have endorsed the actual world hypothesis, as opposed to the substance of the world hypothesis. In this paper I try to show that they fail to provide good arguments for the former and against the latter. Additionally, I use ideas from McGuinness to illustrate “accepting the substance of the world” in a way that it avoids Graver’s objections. I argue that acceptance of the world ought to be interpreted as “accepting the fact that the world exists.” Finally, I shall point out that despite of his insight about the acceptance of the world, McGuinness misrepresents the relation between accepting the actual world and accepting its substance. Ethics was the major issue in Wittgenstein’s writings from 1916 to the time of publication of the Tractatus Logico-philosophicus. He explicates the notion of “good” in terms of “happiness” and the latter as “accepting the world as it is.” Nonetheless, this reductionistic philosophical program could not get off the ground unless there is a pretty clear conception of the notion of “accepting the world.” In this paper, I shall explore two alternative accounts of this concept. According to the first account, which I dub “the actual world hypothesis,” Wittgenstein had meant accepting the actual world by the term “being good.” The alternative account, “the substance of the world hypothesis,” suggests accepting the substance of the world as the best reading of the Tractatus. Morris and Graver have endorsed the actual world hypothesis, as opposed to the substance of the world hypothesis. In this paper I try to show that they fail to provide good arguments for the former and against the latter. Additionally, I use ideas from McGuinness to illustrate “accepting the substance of the world” in a way that it avoids Graver’s objections. I argue that acceptance of the world ought to be interpreted as “accepting the fact that the world exists.” Finally, I shall point out that despite of his insight about the acceptance of the world, McGuinness misrepresents the relation between accepting the actual world and accepting its substance.

https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_8789_c00b51c440d516a8c2c0138154347c71.pdf

University of Tabriz Journal of Philosophical Investigations 2251-7960 13 27 2019 08 23 Complexity and Causal explanation Complexity and Causal explanation 315 333 9246 10.22034/jpiut.2019.32299.2260 FA Mortaza Mardiha Associate Professor of philosophy, Allameh Tabatabei University Journal Article 2019 03 02 The scientific explanation is usually defined as finding the cause. For some reasons, this has been a subject of doubt, however, it seems that, both in common sense as well as in philosophical approach, the mainstream still support the very Idea of explanation something as introducing its cause. But cause searching and cause finding are not so easy tasks. This Article is for corroborating the idea according to which the essential tension in scientific research is derived from the practical difficulty of distinguishing a complex netting of causes, not from the theoretical disfunction of causality. Multiplicity, variety, interaction, and dynamism of causes and factors intervening in a causal process constitute oftentimes a perplexing netting in which it is difficult, sometimes practically impossible, to distinguish, dissociate, evaluate, and calculate vectors effective on final resultant and explain or predict the output or the effect the process in question has. Not paying enough attention to it leads mistakenly to doubt about causality itself. The problem is pragmatic, not paradigmatic. The scientific explanation is usually defined as finding the cause. For some reasons, this has been a subject of doubt, however, it seems that, both in common sense as well as in philosophical approach, the mainstream still support the very Idea of explanation something as introducing its cause. But cause searching and cause finding are not so easy tasks. This Article is for corroborating the idea according to which the essential tension in scientific research is derived from the practical difficulty of distinguishing a complex netting of causes, not from the theoretical disfunction of causality. Multiplicity, variety, interaction, and dynamism of causes and factors intervening in a causal process constitute oftentimes a perplexing netting in which it is difficult, sometimes practically impossible, to distinguish, dissociate, evaluate, and calculate vectors effective on final resultant and explain or predict the output or the effect the process in question has. Not paying enough attention to it leads mistakenly to doubt about causality itself. The problem is pragmatic, not paradigmatic.

https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_9246_97419400dbd7debc15d1d1326a4d2e56.pdf

University of Tabriz Journal of Philosophical Investigations 2251-7960 13 27 2019 08 23 The Relationship between Sublimity and Morality in Kant's Pre-critical Thought (regarding observations... and remarks...) The Relationship between Sublimity and Morality in Kant's Pre-critical Thought (regarding observations... and remarks...) 335 352 9240 10.22034/jpiut.2019.28311.2046 FA Fateme Mehrzad Sadaghiani PhD Student of philosophy, Islamic Azad University, Science and Research Branch of Tehran, Tehran, Iran Masoud Olia Associate Professor, Tehran University of Art Journal Article 2018 07 10 This essay is going to show that the relationship between sublimity and morality in Kant’s precritical thinking doesn’t have a systematic philosophical form. The reason can be sought out in these two things: first, aesthetic feeling and moral feeling haven’t been distinguished clearly and have been defined in terms of each other. Second, morality is grounded in feeling, not pure practical reason and its a priori principle. In Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime, Kant invites human beings to ground moral principles on general affection. Although these principles are universal, they are not speculative rules and every human being should find them in his bosom. These are the feeling of beauty and dignity of human nature. In Remarks in the Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime, Kant’s thinking about morality changes in the way that can be regarded as the basis of his thought in critical period. However, he still believes that moral feeling is a kind of feeling of pleasure and displeasure to which we are not passive, but we are active because of possessing moral freedom. This essay is going to show that the relationship between sublimity and morality in Kant’s precritical thinking doesn’t have a systematic philosophical form. The reason can be sought out in these two things: first, aesthetic feeling and moral feeling haven’t been distinguished clearly and have been defined in terms of each other. Second, morality is grounded in feeling, not pure practical reason and its a priori principle. In Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime, Kant invites human beings to ground moral principles on general affection. Although these principles are universal, they are not speculative rules and every human being should find them in his bosom. These are the feeling of beauty and dignity of human nature. In Remarks in the Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime, Kant’s thinking about morality changes in the way that can be regarded as the basis of his thought in critical period. However, he still believes that moral feeling is a kind of feeling of pleasure and displeasure to which we are not passive, but we are active because of possessing moral freedom.

https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_9240_3328051d435b336308d596e9c7e06755.pdf

University of Tabriz Journal of Philosophical Investigations 2251-7960 13 27 2019 08 23 A Comparative Study of the Octet Vertices in Sina’s Philosophy and Sadra’s Wisdom A Comparative Study of the Octet Vertices in Sina’s Philosophy and Sadra’s Wisdom 353 373 8651 10.22034/jpiut.2019.25829.1967 FA Abdollah Nasry Professor of philosophy, Allameh Tabataba'I University Seyed Mokhtar Mousavi PhD Student of Islamic Philosophy and Theology, Allameh Tabataba'I University Journal Article 2018 02 10 Ibn Sina’s philosophy after Farabi's philosophy, with accurate search of opinions of the ancient Greek scholars, is the basis of Islamic philosophy and one of the basic foundations of the transcendental wisdom. The relation between the philosophy of Sina and Sadra is still susceptible and requires numerous thematic studies. In this research, opinions of Ibn Sina and Sadra have been studied comparatively and analytically with regard to octet vertices. Among octet vertices, there is an emphasized on the importance of four subjects: "Definition of Philosophy", "Fundamentals and Problems of Philosophy", "The Position of Philosophy among the other Sciences", and "The Benefit and Place of Philosophy". The views of these two philosophers on the octet vertices of philosophy are largely in line and compatible, although there are some disagreements. Though the topics of octet vertices are regarded as an entrance to philosophy and some kind of looking from the outside into philosophy so they are second degree knowledge, in many cases, Sadra had viewpoint about Ibn Sina’s opinions and mainly criticized and analyzed it from the Sina’s viewpoint. And in spite of the supreme power of Sina’s philosophy, he has sometimes been forced to use transcendental wisdom because of its conceptual failure; therefore, it can be said that not only in the entrance of philosophy, but also in philosophical opinions, if the prophetic power of Sina’s philosophy is combined with the conceptual richness of transcendental wisdom, we will have a more powerful and effective philosophical heritage for the contemporary philosophical dialogue. Ibn Sina’s philosophy after Farabi's philosophy, with accurate search of opinions of the ancient Greek scholars, is the basis of Islamic philosophy and one of the basic foundations of the transcendental wisdom. The relation between the philosophy of Sina and Sadra is still susceptible and requires numerous thematic studies. In this research, opinions of Ibn Sina and Sadra have been studied comparatively and analytically with regard to octet vertices. Among octet vertices, there is an emphasized on the importance of four subjects: "Definition of Philosophy", "Fundamentals and Problems of Philosophy", "The Position of Philosophy among the other Sciences", and "The Benefit and Place of Philosophy". The views of these two philosophers on the octet vertices of philosophy are largely in line and compatible, although there are some disagreements. Though the topics of octet vertices are regarded as an entrance to philosophy and some kind of looking from the outside into philosophy so they are second degree knowledge, in many cases, Sadra had viewpoint about Ibn Sina’s opinions and mainly criticized and analyzed it from the Sina’s viewpoint. And in spite of the supreme power of Sina’s philosophy, he has sometimes been forced to use transcendental wisdom because of its conceptual failure; therefore, it can be said that not only in the entrance of philosophy, but also in philosophical opinions, if the prophetic power of Sina’s philosophy is combined with the conceptual richness of transcendental wisdom, we will have a more powerful and effective philosophical heritage for the contemporary philosophical dialogue.

https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_8651_04ce1c249a1dacad52529ba8e538f223.pdf

University of Tabriz Journal of Philosophical Investigations 2251-7960 13 27 2019 08 23 Temporality in Heidegger’s Early Thought Temporality in Heidegger’s Early Thought 375 397 8383 10.22034/jpiut.2019.8383 FA Ehsan Nazari Ph.D. student of philosophy, Imam Khomeini International University Seyed Masoud Sayf Associate Professor of Philosophy, Imam Khomeini International University. Mohammadhasan Heidari -Assistant Professor at Imam Khomeini International University Ali Naghi Baghershahi Associate Professor at Imam Khomeini International University Journal Article 2018 07 23 For the establishment of the fundamental ontology, early Heidegger disregards the vulgar understanding of time and analyzes temporality. He believes that the vulgar understanding of time is the degeneration of the world-time, and the world-time itself is the degeneration of temporality. In Being and Time, Heidegger interprets temporality as the ontological sense of care. Here, this three-part phrase is relied on to interpret temporality in the thought of Heidegger. The ontological counteracts the ontic. The ontic investigation is one that considers the entity present-at-hand and determined. But the ontological investigation focuses on the how-being of an entity that is always anticipating itself by projecting itself upon its possibilities. The sense is not what is revealed at the end of the understanding act; but is what wherein the understandability of something maintains itself, namely, the condition for the possibility of understandability of a thing. Care implies what gives totality and unity to the structural aspects of Dasein. Care, which is the sense of Dasein’s being, is constituted through three items including existence, facticity, and fallenness. Temporality is the ontological sense of care; namely, the condition for the possibility of its understandability. Heidegger analyzes authentic existence to explain this word. The ontological structure of authentic existence is the anticipatory resoluteness towards death. The resolute existence that anticipates to death shows itself in the three ecstasies futurity, having-been, and making-present. Each of these three ecstasies is respectively the sense of one of the items of care. Hence, temporality in its unity is the ontological sense of care. For the establishment of the fundamental ontology, early Heidegger disregards the vulgar understanding of time and analyzes temporality. He believes that the vulgar understanding of time is the degeneration of the world-time, and the world-time itself is the degeneration of temporality. In Being and Time, Heidegger interprets temporality as the ontological sense of care. Here, this three-part phrase is relied on to interpret temporality in the thought of Heidegger. The ontological counteracts the ontic. The ontic investigation is one that considers the entity present-at-hand and determined. But the ontological investigation focuses on the how-being of an entity that is always anticipating itself by projecting itself upon its possibilities. The sense is not what is revealed at the end of the understanding act; but is what wherein the understandability of something maintains itself, namely, the condition for the possibility of understandability of a thing. Care implies what gives totality and unity to the structural aspects of Dasein. Care, which is the sense of Dasein’s being, is constituted through three items including existence, facticity, and fallenness. Temporality is the ontological sense of care; namely, the condition for the possibility of its understandability. Heidegger analyzes authentic existence to explain this word. The ontological structure of authentic existence is the anticipatory resoluteness towards death. The resolute existence that anticipates to death shows itself in the three ecstasies futurity, having-been, and making-present. Each of these three ecstasies is respectively the sense of one of the items of care. Hence, temporality in its unity is the ontological sense of care.

https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_8383_e63b29aa40e46807aea72bc582ef1400.pdf