University of Tabriz Journal of Philosophical Investigations 2251-7960 19 52 2025 11 22 Language and the Conscious Psyche: Auditory Language as an Answer to the Difficult Problem of David Chalmers Language and the Conscious Psyche: Auditory Language as an Answer to the Difficult Problem of David Chalmers 1 18 20196 10.22034/jpiut.2025.67957.4145 FA Alireza Farnam MD, Professor of Psychiatry Department, Tabriz University of Medical Sciences; Kharazmi Research Center, University of Tabriz, Tabriz, Iran Journal Article 2025 07 02 The topic under review, formulated by David Chalmers, addresses a fundamental question: How can brain processes, such as the movements of electrons and chemicals, be translated into mental and conscious experiences, such as emotions, visualizations, and thoughts? Focusing on the role of language—especially inner language—this article suggests that language, as a mediating mechanism, plays a fundamental role in linking the material processes of the brain with psychological experiences through its influence on memory and arousal. Based on linguistic, neurological, and evolutionary evidence, it is argued that language can provide a possible mechanism for the emergence of mental qualities through sensory synchronization, conceptualization of sensory input before conscious processing, memory organization, continuous narrative formation, and influence on arousal. All of these events occur in memory, and memory is both a platform for the emergence and continuation of language and, over the course of evolution, has become capable of retrieving images and information from memory. On the other hand, by influencing internal arousal, language has been able to create a mood appropriate to the images extracted from memory, thus leading to the formation of qualia. This article emphasizes that human language has gradually developed from an interpersonal communication tool to an internal language within an individual (according to Vygotsky) over several hundred thousand years of uninterrupted evolution, and has not stopped at this stage and it is relevant to all human psychological functions, including perception and the description of mental images. The topic under review, formulated by David Chalmers, addresses a fundamental question: How can brain processes, such as the movements of electrons and chemicals, be translated into mental and conscious experiences, such as emotions, visualizations, and thoughts? Focusing on the role of language—especially inner language—this article suggests that language, as a mediating mechanism, plays a fundamental role in linking the material processes of the brain with psychological experiences through its influence on memory and arousal. Based on linguistic, neurological, and evolutionary evidence, it is argued that language can provide a possible mechanism for the emergence of mental qualities through sensory synchronization, conceptualization of sensory input before conscious processing, memory organization, continuous narrative formation, and influence on arousal. All of these events occur in memory, and memory is both a platform for the emergence and continuation of language and, over the course of evolution, has become capable of retrieving images and information from memory. On the other hand, by influencing internal arousal, language has been able to create a mood appropriate to the images extracted from memory, thus leading to the formation of qualia. This article emphasizes that human language has gradually developed from an interpersonal communication tool to an internal language within an individual (according to Vygotsky) over several hundred thousand years of uninterrupted evolution, and has not stopped at this stage and it is relevant to all human psychological functions, including perception and the description of mental images. https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_20196_d6b97d1081db1029a89c0d4a565a7c1d.pdf

University of Tabriz Journal of Philosophical Investigations 2251-7960 19 52 2025 11 22 Human Identity in the Fourth Revolution: A Comparative Reading of Heidegger’s Dasein and Floridi’s Inforg Human Identity in the Fourth Revolution: A Comparative Reading of Heidegger’s Dasein and Floridi’s Inforg 19 40 20562 10.22034/jpiut.2025.69287.4209 FA Maryam Soltani Kouhanestani Associate Professor, Department of Philosophy, University of Mohaghegh Ardabili (uma), Ardabil, Iran Camellia Talei Bafghei PhD in Philosophy of Art, Ardabil Branch, Islamic Azad University, Ardabil, Iran Journal Article 2025 09 23 The Fourth Revolution, driven by data, has transformed not only the tools of human life, but also the very foundations of human identity. This article, drawing upon the anthropological dimensions of two distinct theoretical frameworks—Heidegger’s existential analytic and Floridi’s philosophy of information—argues that neither is sufficient on its own to provide a comprehensive account of human identity in the digital world. The analysis proceeds through three main axes: first, the horizon of identity, contrasting “world” as the field of meaning with the “infosphere” as an informational ecosystem; second, being-with, juxtaposing Heidegger’s Mitsein with human coexistence alongside artificial agents; and third, temporality, comparing existential temporality with the dynamism of data. The study shows that Floridi’s notion of the inforg is powerful in accounting for the ecological and networked layers of identity, yet it fails to account for the horizon of meaning and temporality. Conversely, Heidegger’s Dasein can elucidate these fundamental dimensions but remains silent before the computational and networked complexities of the digital age. The outcome of this analysis is a proposed “two-layered” model of identity in the digital world that moves beyond data-driven reductionism and the limitations of classical existentialism, without claiming to provide a complete explanation. The Fourth Revolution, driven by data, has transformed not only the tools of human life, but also the very foundations of human identity. This article, drawing upon the anthropological dimensions of two distinct theoretical frameworks—Heidegger’s existential analytic and Floridi’s philosophy of information—argues that neither is sufficient on its own to provide a comprehensive account of human identity in the digital world. The analysis proceeds through three main axes: first, the horizon of identity, contrasting “world” as the field of meaning with the “infosphere” as an informational ecosystem; second, being-with, juxtaposing Heidegger’s Mitsein with human coexistence alongside artificial agents; and third, temporality, comparing existential temporality with the dynamism of data. The study shows that Floridi’s notion of the inforg is powerful in accounting for the ecological and networked layers of identity, yet it fails to account for the horizon of meaning and temporality. Conversely, Heidegger’s Dasein can elucidate these fundamental dimensions but remains silent before the computational and networked complexities of the digital age. The outcome of this analysis is a proposed “two-layered” model of identity in the digital world that moves beyond data-driven reductionism and the limitations of classical existentialism, without claiming to provide a complete explanation. https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_20562_302782e078fb9c414ead897c9331d4b6.pdf

University of Tabriz Journal of Philosophical Investigations 2251-7960 19 52 2025 11 22 Hermeneutic Phenomenology and Ideology: A Critical Re-reading of Ricoeur Hermeneutic Phenomenology and Ideology: A Critical Re-reading of Ricoeur 41 58 20450 10.22034/jpiut.2025.68903.4173 FA Rahmatollah Mahmoodi Department of Philosophy and Logics Education, Farhangian University, P.O. Box 14665-889, Tehran, Iran. Journal Article 2025 08 30 This article offers a critical re-examination of ideology within the thought of Paul Ricoeur. It demonstrates how Ricoeur, by transcending Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology and engaging with the hermeneutics of Heidegger and Gadamer, alongside Freudian psychoanalysis, develops a hybrid and innovative approach. This framework allows for an understanding of ideology not merely as false consciousness or cognitive error, but as a cultural, historical, and linguistic narrative. The research aims, on one hand, to critique the Marxist reductionism in conceptualizing ideology, which confines it solely to the distortion of reality and the reproduction of power relations. On the other hand, this paper elucidates the positive functions of ideology in social cohesion, the continuity of collective identity, and historical self-understanding. Employing a descriptive-analytical methodology, the study gathers and analyzes data based on Ricoeur’s works and reputable philosophical sources. The findings indicate that hermeneutic phenomenology, by emphasizing language, narrative, the unconscious, and history, provides a comprehensive framework for the simultaneous understanding and critique of ideology, enabling a constructive yet critical engagement with this concept that moves beyond prevalent reductionisms to address its inherent complexities. This paper utilizes Ricoeur’s insights to challenge the traditional conception of ideology, presenting an innovative approach to its analysis. This article offers a critical re-examination of ideology within the thought of Paul Ricoeur. It demonstrates how Ricoeur, by transcending Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology and engaging with the hermeneutics of Heidegger and Gadamer, alongside Freudian psychoanalysis, develops a hybrid and innovative approach. This framework allows for an understanding of ideology not merely as false consciousness or cognitive error, but as a cultural, historical, and linguistic narrative. The research aims, on one hand, to critique the Marxist reductionism in conceptualizing ideology, which confines it solely to the distortion of reality and the reproduction of power relations. On the other hand, this paper elucidates the positive functions of ideology in social cohesion, the continuity of collective identity, and historical self-understanding. Employing a descriptive-analytical methodology, the study gathers and analyzes data based on Ricoeur’s works and reputable philosophical sources. The findings indicate that hermeneutic phenomenology, by emphasizing language, narrative, the unconscious, and history, provides a comprehensive framework for the simultaneous understanding and critique of ideology, enabling a constructive yet critical engagement with this concept that moves beyond prevalent reductionisms to address its inherent complexities. This paper utilizes Ricoeur’s insights to challenge the traditional conception of ideology, presenting an innovative approach to its analysis. https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_20450_bebf2168e04abb1d21bb334a21d03ce2.pdf

University of Tabriz Journal of Philosophical Investigations 2251-7960 19 52 2025 11 22 Heidegger's Version of Humanism and his Critique of it Heidegger's Version of Humanism and his Critique of it 59 76 19881 10.22034/jpiut.2025.66925.4079 FA Seyyed Masoud Zamani Assistant Professor of Western Philosophy Department, Iranian Institute of Philosophy, Tehran, Iran Journal Article 2025 04 22 The question concerning humanism ask we from Martin Heidegger, who has that about a famous Text: Biref über den Humanismus. The Text contains a historical version that about, that is important for our Iranian, because it can help to overcoming of our misunderstandings of Humanism. Anyway, both Heidegger's historical version and critique must be understood as parts of his philosophy. After a general preface about Humanism and an introduction to the importance of Heidegger's discussion on it, the first part represents his historical version, that which is not much different from the common understanding of the western popular intellectuals. Heidegger in his historical discussion stress its Romano-Greek essence, which emerges in Italian humanism of 14-15^th century, in German second Humanism in 19th century and metaphysics of Marx, Christianity, Husserl and Sartre. The second part briefly describes Heidegger's critique of Humanism, which is based on his totally special understanding of metaphysics. The main pillar of Heidegger's historical-philosophical critique on metaphysics is heir based on the common understanding of human Being in it: "man is animal rational". Humanism and metaphysics need at the same time each other necessarily. The question concerning humanism ask we from Martin Heidegger, who has that about a famous Text: Biref über den Humanismus. The Text contains a historical version that about, that is important for our Iranian, because it can help to overcoming of our misunderstandings of Humanism. Anyway, both Heidegger's historical version and critique must be understood as parts of his philosophy. After a general preface about Humanism and an introduction to the importance of Heidegger's discussion on it, the first part represents his historical version, that which is not much different from the common understanding of the western popular intellectuals. Heidegger in his historical discussion stress its Romano-Greek essence, which emerges in Italian humanism of 14-15^th century, in German second Humanism in 19th century and metaphysics of Marx, Christianity, Husserl and Sartre. The second part briefly describes Heidegger's critique of Humanism, which is based on his totally special understanding of metaphysics. The main pillar of Heidegger's historical-philosophical critique on metaphysics is heir based on the common understanding of human Being in it: "man is animal rational". Humanism and metaphysics need at the same time each other necessarily. https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_19881_3642990486c8aef2366f238caa20cdae.pdf

University of Tabriz Journal of Philosophical Investigations 2251-7960 19 52 2025 11 22 Rereading Suhrawardi's Theory of the Heavens; A Response to the Dominance of Nature and Fatalism over Human Relations Rereading Suhrawardi's Theory of the Heavens; A Response to the Dominance of Nature and Fatalism over Human Relations 77 96 19980 10.22034/jpiut.2025.66973.4084 FA Mostafa Abedi-Jigheh Ph.D. in Philosophy, University of Tabriz, Tabriz, Iran Mohsen Bagherzadeh-Meshkibaf Assistant Professor, Department of Philosophy, University of Kurdistan, Sanandaj, Iran. Journal Article 2025 04 26 Some schools of thought and philosophy have explained human relations and the realm of politics under nature and the celestial system. In this idea, by presenting a completely passive understanding of man's position in existence and against nature, human affairs, especially the political realm, have become possible with the logic of fatalism and natural and celestial conditions. In contrast, some philosophers, especially Suhrawardi, have opposed the above idea and have tried to present an active and creative image of man in the system of nature, not only to give independence to the realm of politics against nature, but also to repair and develop the relations of the system of nature with the logic of the realm of politics. In this article, the author tries to address Suhrawardi's position on this matter using a descriptive-analytical method. For this purpose, first, Suhrawardi's description of the initial state in which celestial nature and the dominance of destiny are fundamental features is presented. An attempt is made to draw practical conclusions in the realm of politics using Suhrawardi's theoretical description of how the powerful man is realized, and his theoretical revolution regarding the independence of the realm of politics from nature and the celestial system, and also, above that, to determine the realm of politics as a platform for existential developments in the world of nature and celestial natures, is made.  Some schools of thought and philosophy have explained human relations and the realm of politics under nature and the celestial system. In this idea, by presenting a completely passive understanding of man's position in existence and against nature, human affairs, especially the political realm, have become possible with the logic of fatalism and natural and celestial conditions. In contrast, some philosophers, especially Suhrawardi, have opposed the above idea and have tried to present an active and creative image of man in the system of nature, not only to give independence to the realm of politics against nature, but also to repair and develop the relations of the system of nature with the logic of the realm of politics. In this article, the author tries to address Suhrawardi's position on this matter using a descriptive-analytical method. For this purpose, first, Suhrawardi's description of the initial state in which celestial nature and the dominance of destiny are fundamental features is presented. An attempt is made to draw practical conclusions in the realm of politics using Suhrawardi's theoretical description of how the powerful man is realized, and his theoretical revolution regarding the independence of the realm of politics from nature and the celestial system, and also, above that, to determine the realm of politics as a platform for existential developments in the world of nature and celestial natures, is made.  https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_19980_d34edc8ddaa792210771780e7a5615af.pdf

University of Tabriz Journal of Philosophical Investigations 2251-7960 19 52 2025 11 22 The Relationship between Lines and Geometric Forms in Creating Metaphysical Understanding Based on Hegel's Ideas The Relationship between Lines and Geometric Forms in Creating Metaphysical Understanding Based on Hegel's Ideas 97 118 20436 10.22034/jpiut.2025.68512.4162 FA Ahmad Heidari Associate Professor, Department of Art and Architecture, Birjand Branch, Islamic Azad University, Birjand, Iran Journal Article 2025 08 05 The natural or artificial environment consists of a series of lines, forms and volumes that create a feeling and mentality in humans that is felt with the five senses and sometimes leads to a specific metaphysical understanding of the environment; for example, sometimes a frightening environment is perceived and sometimes a relaxing one. There is a hidden geometry in nature, some of whose mathematical laws and Euclidean and non-Euclidean geometry have been identified today. Hegel is one of the philosophers who is considered an idealist and strongly believed in the role of the soul in a work of art. Hence, Hegel's thought is somehow related to the soul of the work and geometry. This research seeks to answer the question of what is the relationship between art and geometry, what role do geometric laws play in the metaphysical perception of space, and what effect do Hegel's thoughts and ideas have on expressing the spirit of phenomena in geometric form? The present research mainly deals with the topic of Hegel's ideas about the history of art and the importance of the geometric method along with the dialectical method for the perception and recognition of phenomena. Hegel considers art to be the same as beauty; because it deals with the spirit. In his opinion, the object has negativity within itself; with the destruction of the object, desire reappears. Desire is the emergence of negativity; a topic that later in the twentieth century, Žižek and Lacan have used in detail. The natural or artificial environment consists of a series of lines, forms and volumes that create a feeling and mentality in humans that is felt with the five senses and sometimes leads to a specific metaphysical understanding of the environment; for example, sometimes a frightening environment is perceived and sometimes a relaxing one. There is a hidden geometry in nature, some of whose mathematical laws and Euclidean and non-Euclidean geometry have been identified today. Hegel is one of the philosophers who is considered an idealist and strongly believed in the role of the soul in a work of art. Hence, Hegel's thought is somehow related to the soul of the work and geometry. This research seeks to answer the question of what is the relationship between art and geometry, what role do geometric laws play in the metaphysical perception of space, and what effect do Hegel's thoughts and ideas have on expressing the spirit of phenomena in geometric form? The present research mainly deals with the topic of Hegel's ideas about the history of art and the importance of the geometric method along with the dialectical method for the perception and recognition of phenomena. Hegel considers art to be the same as beauty; because it deals with the spirit. In his opinion, the object has negativity within itself; with the destruction of the object, desire reappears. Desire is the emergence of negativity; a topic that later in the twentieth century, Žižek and Lacan have used in detail. https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_20436_497e8253d5f44ae0c129f78e9b741a79.pdf

University of Tabriz Journal of Philosophical Investigations 2251-7960 19 52 2025 11 22 A Reappraisal of Particular Justice: Aquinas’s Interpretation and Evaluation of Aristotelian Justice A Reappraisal of Particular Justice: Aquinas’s Interpretation and Evaluation of Aristotelian Justice 119 140 20531 10.22034/jpiut.2025.68573.4163 FA Maryam Ardeshir Larijani Assistant Professor, Department of Philosophy, University of Qom, Qom, Iran Abdollah Abedifar Ph.D. in the Philosophy of Ethics, University of Qom, Qom, Iran Journal Article 2025 08 10 Particular justice is a virtue that governs our relationships and interactions with members of society, and unlike general justice, it directs us not toward the common good, but toward the good of neighbors, colleagues, and other individuals with whom we are in constant contact. Thomas Aquinas introduces two types of particular justice: distributive justice and commutative justice. Commutative justice is also divided into two parts: corrective (remedial) justice and reciprocal (proportional) justice. Distributive justice addresses the fair distribution of collective goods and responsibilities, such as honors and merits. This justice ensures that these resources and duties are distributed equitably among individuals. In contrast, commutative justice focuses on ensuring fairness in buying and selling, business, and criminal and penal matters. Both types of justice (distributive and commutative) are realized when equality among individuals is preserved; that is, each person receives their right or their debt is fulfilled. Aquinas regards political rulers as the primary agents for achieving distributive justice and believes that distributive justice forms the foundation of commutative justice and holds priority over it. Particular justice is a virtue that governs our relationships and interactions with members of society, and unlike general justice, it directs us not toward the common good, but toward the good of neighbors, colleagues, and other individuals with whom we are in constant contact. Thomas Aquinas introduces two types of particular justice: distributive justice and commutative justice. Commutative justice is also divided into two parts: corrective (remedial) justice and reciprocal (proportional) justice. Distributive justice addresses the fair distribution of collective goods and responsibilities, such as honors and merits. This justice ensures that these resources and duties are distributed equitably among individuals. In contrast, commutative justice focuses on ensuring fairness in buying and selling, business, and criminal and penal matters. Both types of justice (distributive and commutative) are realized when equality among individuals is preserved; that is, each person receives their right or their debt is fulfilled. Aquinas regards political rulers as the primary agents for achieving distributive justice and believes that distributive justice forms the foundation of commutative justice and holds priority over it. https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_20531_8d505cd85822a70d51e39a78abb6669c.pdf

University of Tabriz Journal of Philosophical Investigations 2251-7960 19 52 2025 11 22 A Critique of Applying Wittgenstein's Epistemic Insights to Ethics A Critique of Applying Wittgenstein's Epistemic Insights to Ethics 141 160 20245 10.22034/jpiut.2024.63906.3890 FA Minoo Hojjat Assistant Professor, Department of Philosophy, Iranian Institute of Philosophy, Tehran, Iran Journal Article 2024 10 08 Although Wittgenstein, especially in his later philosophy, did not explicitly discuss ethics, his method of philosophizing holds particular significance and gives hope that some of his insights may be applied in that domain as well. Some philosophers, referring to On Certainty, have argued that there are moral certainties that function analogously to the epistemic certainties Wittgenstein discusses. I aim to show that, although moral propositions may serve a similar structural role, they differ in several crucial respects from the certainties Wittgenstein examined: There are multiple moral language-games, each grounded in different certainties; these certainties themselves rest upon epistemic ones; yet, unlike epistemic certainties, the basic certainties of moral language-games are not embedded in our instinctive actions. Moreover, the propositions expressing them are typically general statements- often ambiguous or allowing exceptions. Clarifying their meaning or specifying the conditions of exception opens the door to divergent interpretations and ensuing disagreements. Finally, unlike epistemic certainties, there are alternatives to acting in accordance with moral certainties. All these considerations point to a significant difference between moral certainties and the kind of certainty Wittgenstein discusses. Although Wittgenstein, especially in his later philosophy, did not explicitly discuss ethics, his method of philosophizing holds particular significance and gives hope that some of his insights may be applied in that domain as well. Some philosophers, referring to On Certainty, have argued that there are moral certainties that function analogously to the epistemic certainties Wittgenstein discusses. I aim to show that, although moral propositions may serve a similar structural role, they differ in several crucial respects from the certainties Wittgenstein examined: There are multiple moral language-games, each grounded in different certainties; these certainties themselves rest upon epistemic ones; yet, unlike epistemic certainties, the basic certainties of moral language-games are not embedded in our instinctive actions. Moreover, the propositions expressing them are typically general statements- often ambiguous or allowing exceptions. Clarifying their meaning or specifying the conditions of exception opens the door to divergent interpretations and ensuing disagreements. Finally, unlike epistemic certainties, there are alternatives to acting in accordance with moral certainties. All these considerations point to a significant difference between moral certainties and the kind of certainty Wittgenstein discusses. https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_20245_0f17922aefdfcf66163eff2fd920a448.pdf

University of Tabriz Journal of Philosophical Investigations 2251-7960 19 52 2025 11 22 The Distinction between a ‘Mental State’ and ‘Our Belief about It’ in the Thought of Armstrong and Shoemaker The Distinction between a ‘Mental State’ and ‘Our Belief about It’ in the Thought of Armstrong and Shoemaker 161 178 20198 10.22034/jpiut.2025.65889.4003 FA Seyyed Mostafa Hosseini Ph.D. Candidate of Modern Philosophy, University of Tabriz, Tabriz, Iran Mahmoud Sufiani Assistant Professor of Philosophy Department, University of Tabriz, Tabriz, Iran Muhammad Asghari Professor of Philosophy, University of Tabriz, , Tabriz, Iran Journal Article 2025 02 15 Introspection is a method of accessing the contents of the mind. The nature of this access can be categorized into two main perspectives: the first group relates to explanations that consider introspection to be similar to perception, with the difference that the direction of the gaze is inward, not outward. For this reason, they are also known as “inner sense” explanations. The second group are explanations that consider introspection to be a kind of direct acquaintance and understanding of mental states. Believers in the second group, unlike the first group, rule out the possibility of error in introspection. David Armstrong belongs to the first group and Sidney Shoemaker to the second. Although Armstrong's claim is not without its flaws and sometimes even contradicts common intuition, it seems that the challenges facing Shoemaker are much deeper. The most important challenge for him is that his arguments - even assuming apparent clarity and solidity - are ultimately based on first-person testimony rather than objective facts, and therefore are much more difficult, if not impossible, to prove. Our goal in this article is to formulate the opposition between these two ideas in an analytical-critical manner and to criticize them as much as possible, and to show that the problem of introspection cannot be solved in the realm of the mind. Introspection is a method of accessing the contents of the mind. The nature of this access can be categorized into two main perspectives: the first group relates to explanations that consider introspection to be similar to perception, with the difference that the direction of the gaze is inward, not outward. For this reason, they are also known as “inner sense” explanations. The second group are explanations that consider introspection to be a kind of direct acquaintance and understanding of mental states. Believers in the second group, unlike the first group, rule out the possibility of error in introspection. David Armstrong belongs to the first group and Sidney Shoemaker to the second. Although Armstrong's claim is not without its flaws and sometimes even contradicts common intuition, it seems that the challenges facing Shoemaker are much deeper. The most important challenge for him is that his arguments - even assuming apparent clarity and solidity - are ultimately based on first-person testimony rather than objective facts, and therefore are much more difficult, if not impossible, to prove. Our goal in this article is to formulate the opposition between these two ideas in an analytical-critical manner and to criticize them as much as possible, and to show that the problem of introspection cannot be solved in the realm of the mind. https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_20198_de593d37bc67466ee018821d5edb1602.pdf

University of Tabriz Journal of Philosophical Investigations 2251-7960 19 52 2025 11 22 Incidental Perception: In Avicenna Incidental Perception: In Avicenna 179 196 20367 10.22034/jpiut.2025.66306.4031 FA Seyyed Mahmoud Yousof-Sani Associate Professor of Avicenna Studies Group, Iranian Institute of Philosophy, Tehran, Iran Journal Article 2025 03 09 The external and internal cognitive powers of animals each have their own specific perceptions. But sometimes, along with the specific object of each cognitive power, other perceived things that have not been directly perceived by any of the cognitive powers at the moment of perceiving a specific object are also comprehended. Avicenna referred to this type of perceptions, especially when they are of the kind of sensible objects, as "incidental sensible" and regarded the faculty that perceives them as the faculty of estimation. Since the faculty of estimation perceives "intentions” which are in opposition to entities known as "forms," which are exclusively perceived by external senses, the question arises as to how the estimation, which perceives intentions, can comprehend external perceptions if incidental perceptions are of the same kind as sensible, and incidental sensible are indeed forms. The answer is that the position of a perceptual object in terms of form or intention is not an absolute position, but is determined by the relationships and ratios established between the perceived and the perceiver in a specific perceptual act. And for this reason, Avicenna defined intentions not by the characteristic of being non-sensory, but by the feature of "not being perceived through external senses." The external and internal cognitive powers of animals each have their own specific perceptions. But sometimes, along with the specific object of each cognitive power, other perceived things that have not been directly perceived by any of the cognitive powers at the moment of perceiving a specific object are also comprehended. Avicenna referred to this type of perceptions, especially when they are of the kind of sensible objects, as "incidental sensible" and regarded the faculty that perceives them as the faculty of estimation. Since the faculty of estimation perceives "intentions” which are in opposition to entities known as "forms," which are exclusively perceived by external senses, the question arises as to how the estimation, which perceives intentions, can comprehend external perceptions if incidental perceptions are of the same kind as sensible, and incidental sensible are indeed forms. The answer is that the position of a perceptual object in terms of form or intention is not an absolute position, but is determined by the relationships and ratios established between the perceived and the perceiver in a specific perceptual act. And for this reason, Avicenna defined intentions not by the characteristic of being non-sensory, but by the feature of "not being perceived through external senses." https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_20367_95e4c46fe8f16a5b10c79fc316481eb0.pdf

University of Tabriz Journal of Philosophical Investigations 2251-7960 19 52 2025 11 22 The Role of Theory of Subjectivity in Herder’s Twofold Naturalism The Role of Theory of Subjectivity in Herder’s Twofold Naturalism 197 214 19467 10.22034/jpiut.2025.63972.3896 FA Bardiya Heidari Ph.D. Candidate of Modern Western Philosophy, Shahid Beheshti University, Tehran, Iran. Morteza Nouri Assistant Professor, Department of Philosophy, Shahid Beheshti University, Tehran, Iran Journal Article 2024 10 13 This essay seeks to establish that theory of subjectivity can play a foundational role in philosophical naturalism, provided that subjectivity is treated immanently. In this regard, here, Johann Gottfried Herder’s naturalistic project is explored as a possible source for an immanent formulation of subjectivity. It is explained that Herder's naturalism unfolds in two aspects: methodological and ontological. These two aspects seem to be inconsistent, as the former, which is based on a kind of linguistic turn, is anti-foundational, while the latter considers sensuality as foundation. It is argued that this inconsistency is resolved through the theory of subjectivity. To prove this, the interdependent relationship between Herder's theory of subjectivity and the ontological aspect of his naturalism is elucidated. According to him, on the one hand, subjectivity is not explained in terms of the clarity of consciousness but in terms of the obscurity of Being, and on the other hand, Being itself is conceptual. Moreover, because Being is conceived in conformity with the perceptual limitations of the finite subject, the conceptual articulation of Being is necessarily through language. Thus, the methodological or linguistic aspect of Herder's thought is integrated into his philosophical program as an indispensable component of it. This essay seeks to establish that theory of subjectivity can play a foundational role in philosophical naturalism, provided that subjectivity is treated immanently. In this regard, here, Johann Gottfried Herder’s naturalistic project is explored as a possible source for an immanent formulation of subjectivity. It is explained that Herder's naturalism unfolds in two aspects: methodological and ontological. These two aspects seem to be inconsistent, as the former, which is based on a kind of linguistic turn, is anti-foundational, while the latter considers sensuality as foundation. It is argued that this inconsistency is resolved through the theory of subjectivity. To prove this, the interdependent relationship between Herder's theory of subjectivity and the ontological aspect of his naturalism is elucidated. According to him, on the one hand, subjectivity is not explained in terms of the clarity of consciousness but in terms of the obscurity of Being, and on the other hand, Being itself is conceptual. Moreover, because Being is conceived in conformity with the perceptual limitations of the finite subject, the conceptual articulation of Being is necessarily through language. Thus, the methodological or linguistic aspect of Herder's thought is integrated into his philosophical program as an indispensable component of it. https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_19467_c266cdb0940437109d7a618b1b678437.pdf

University of Tabriz Journal of Philosophical Investigations 2251-7960 19 52 2025 11 22 Transition from Classical Cognition to 4E Cognition: A Study of Theoretical Developments in the Third Revolution of Cognitive Sciences Transition from Classical Cognition to 4E Cognition: A Study of Theoretical Developments in the Third Revolution of Cognitive Sciences 215 240 20838 10.22034/jpiut.2025.69426.4239 FA Tayyebeh Gholami Postdoctoral Researcher, Department of Philosophy of Science, Sharif University of Technology, Tehran, Iran Hassan Hosseini-Sarvari Professor, Department of Philosophy of Science, Sharif University of Technology, Tehran, Iran Journal Article 2025 10 01 The present study examines the theoretical developments in contemporary cognitive science, a field that has undergone three major revolutions since the mid-20th century. The main research question is how the transition from classical cognitivism to the novel 4E approaches has reshaped our understanding of the mind and cognition. Using an analytical-descriptive method based on a review of theoretical sources, the study traces the evolution from classical cognitivism to the 4E perspective. The findings indicate that classical cognitivism, with its reliance on computational representation and symbolic processing, faces limitations in explaining the interactions between mind, body, and environment. In contrast, the 4E approach—comprising embodied, embedded, enacted, and extended components—views cognition as a dynamic, situated, and environmentally interactive process, highlighting the role of the body, tools, and environmental context in organizing cognitive processes. Finally, the results suggest that integrating classical views with the 4E perspective can guide future research toward a more comprehensive, realistic, and interdisciplinary framework, although methodological and operational challenges remain. The present study examines the theoretical developments in contemporary cognitive science, a field that has undergone three major revolutions since the mid-20th century. The main research question is how the transition from classical cognitivism to the novel 4E approaches has reshaped our understanding of the mind and cognition. Using an analytical-descriptive method based on a review of theoretical sources, the study traces the evolution from classical cognitivism to the 4E perspective. The findings indicate that classical cognitivism, with its reliance on computational representation and symbolic processing, faces limitations in explaining the interactions between mind, body, and environment. In contrast, the 4E approach—comprising embodied, embedded, enacted, and extended components—views cognition as a dynamic, situated, and environmentally interactive process, highlighting the role of the body, tools, and environmental context in organizing cognitive processes. Finally, the results suggest that integrating classical views with the 4E perspective can guide future research toward a more comprehensive, realistic, and interdisciplinary framework, although methodological and operational challenges remain. https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_20838_27003e2451418ab1ad1aa6b7e9332403.pdf

University of Tabriz Journal of Philosophical Investigations 2251-7960 19 52 2025 11 22 Kant’s Categories of Practical Reason and the World of Video Games: A Reflection on the Relationship between Moral Lawfulness and Causality in the Decision-Making Systems of Interactive Narratives Kant’s Categories of Practical Reason and the World of Video Games: A Reflection on the Relationship between Moral Lawfulness and Causality in the Decision-Making Systems of Interactive Narratives 241 258 19833 10.22034/jpiut.2025.66994.4088 FA Ali Razizadeh Assistant Professor of Department of Media Arts, IRIB University, Qom, Iran Journal Article 2025 04 29 <strong>Objective</strong>: This study adopts a philosophical and interdisciplinary approach to examine the relationship between the fundamental categories of Kantian practical reason such as the good will, duty, autonomy, and moral lawfulness and the decision-making structures within digital interactive narratives. The main question is whether these categories, which constitute the foundation of moral agency in Kantian ethics, can be meaningfully realized in environments where causality is not natural but rather artificially constructed and programmed.<br /><strong>Methods</strong>: Using an analytical-interpretive method and a comparative reading of philosophical concepts, the research explores the relation of these concepts to choice-based digital structures. Special attention is given to situations where decisions are made not out of inclination or consequences, but from a commitment to respect for the moral principle.<br /><strong>Results</strong>: The findings indicate that although the full realization of practical reason in digital structures faces significant limitations due to predesigned frameworks and restricted freedom, these environments offer opportunities for the internalization, exercise, and critical reflection on moral concepts. Interactive narratives create structured scenarios that invite players to confront experiences of duty-bound decision-making.<br /><strong>Conclusions</strong>: Video games, therefore, are not spaces where Kantian practical reason is fully actualized; rather, they provide platforms for rethinking the relationship between reason, freedom, and morality in artificial worlds. Such interactive experiences open new avenues for contemplating moral agency under redefined conditions of causality and action. <strong>Objective</strong>: This study adopts a philosophical and interdisciplinary approach to examine the relationship between the fundamental categories of Kantian practical reason such as the good will, duty, autonomy, and moral lawfulness and the decision-making structures within digital interactive narratives. The main question is whether these categories, which constitute the foundation of moral agency in Kantian ethics, can be meaningfully realized in environments where causality is not natural but rather artificially constructed and programmed.<br /><strong>Methods</strong>: Using an analytical-interpretive method and a comparative reading of philosophical concepts, the research explores the relation of these concepts to choice-based digital structures. Special attention is given to situations where decisions are made not out of inclination or consequences, but from a commitment to respect for the moral principle.<br /><strong>Results</strong>: The findings indicate that although the full realization of practical reason in digital structures faces significant limitations due to predesigned frameworks and restricted freedom, these environments offer opportunities for the internalization, exercise, and critical reflection on moral concepts. Interactive narratives create structured scenarios that invite players to confront experiences of duty-bound decision-making.<br /><strong>Conclusions</strong>: Video games, therefore, are not spaces where Kantian practical reason is fully actualized; rather, they provide platforms for rethinking the relationship between reason, freedom, and morality in artificial worlds. Such interactive experiences open new avenues for contemplating moral agency under redefined conditions of causality and action. https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_19833_a54dfea4e6fc84de18abd1340f789396.pdf

University of Tabriz Journal of Philosophical Investigations 2251-7960 19 52 2025 11 22 The Moral Status of Artificial Intelligence from the Perspective of the Easy and Hard Problem of Consciousness The Moral Status of Artificial Intelligence from the Perspective of the Easy and Hard Problem of Consciousness 259 280 19765 10.22034/jpiut.2025.66103.4022 FA Saeid Karimi Ph.D. Candidate of Moral Philosophy, University of Religions and Denominations, Qom, Iran Morteza Tabatabaie Assistant Professor of Department of Moral Philosphy, University of Religions and Denomenations, Qom, Iran. Journal Article 2025 02 28 Consciousness is one of the most fundamental yet complex issues in the philosophy of mind. Philosophers such as David Chalmers, by proposing the “hard problem of consciousness,” have distinguished between phenomenal consciousness and psychological consciousness. Ned Block has further refined this distinction by formulating it in terms of phenomenal consciousness and access consciousness. On the other hand, John Searle, by differentiating between the first-person and third-person perspectives, and Thomas Nagel, by emphasizing the subjective character of experience, have analyzed this duality from different angles. Although these classifications appear diverse, they all point to the fundamental distinction between inner experience and behavioral or cognitive capacities. The present article, focusing on this essential distinction, examines the question of whether artificial intelligence can possess phenomenal consciousness or merely exhibits psychological consciousness. Answering this question has significant philosophical and ethical implications, as phenomenal consciousness is directly linked to experiences of pain, pleasure, and suffering, and is considered a foundation for many moral rights. This study, adopting a descriptive-analytical approach, argues that the distinction between types of consciousness can serve as a basis for determining different degrees of moral status. For instance, beings endowed with access consciousness but lacking phenomenal experience may be entitled to functional autonomy, yet not to the right not to suffer. In contrast, infants and animals, due to their inner experience, are deemed deserving of the right not to suffer, even if they lack advanced cognitive abilities. Consciousness is one of the most fundamental yet complex issues in the philosophy of mind. Philosophers such as David Chalmers, by proposing the “hard problem of consciousness,” have distinguished between phenomenal consciousness and psychological consciousness. Ned Block has further refined this distinction by formulating it in terms of phenomenal consciousness and access consciousness. On the other hand, John Searle, by differentiating between the first-person and third-person perspectives, and Thomas Nagel, by emphasizing the subjective character of experience, have analyzed this duality from different angles. Although these classifications appear diverse, they all point to the fundamental distinction between inner experience and behavioral or cognitive capacities. The present article, focusing on this essential distinction, examines the question of whether artificial intelligence can possess phenomenal consciousness or merely exhibits psychological consciousness. Answering this question has significant philosophical and ethical implications, as phenomenal consciousness is directly linked to experiences of pain, pleasure, and suffering, and is considered a foundation for many moral rights. This study, adopting a descriptive-analytical approach, argues that the distinction between types of consciousness can serve as a basis for determining different degrees of moral status. For instance, beings endowed with access consciousness but lacking phenomenal experience may be entitled to functional autonomy, yet not to the right not to suffer. In contrast, infants and animals, due to their inner experience, are deemed deserving of the right not to suffer, even if they lack advanced cognitive abilities. https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_19765_52ffbccfa54f361bf96d9394e9a647e3.pdf

University of Tabriz Journal of Philosophical Investigations 2251-7960 19 52 2025 11 22 Pragmatism, the Ethics of Artificial Intelligence and Sociotechnical Systems Pragmatism, the Ethics of Artificial Intelligence and Sociotechnical Systems 281 300 20046 10.22034/jpiut.2025.66643.4060 FA Mohammad-Ali Ashouri-Kisomi Ph.D. in Philosophy, Allameh Tabataba'i University, Tehran, Iran Maryam Parvizi Ph.D. in Comparative Philosophy and Research Expert, Allameh Tabataba'i University, Tehran, Iran. Seyyed-Mohammad-Hassan Momeni Assistant Professor of Theology and Islamic Studies Department, Allameh Tabataba'i University, Tehran, Iran Journal Article 2025 04 11 This paper investigates the ethical evaluation of artificial intelligence (AI) through the sociotechnical systems approach, with a particular emphasis on the insights of pragmatist philosophers. In recent years, the sociotechnical perspective has gained attention among AI ethics researchers. However, this approach has been interpreted and discussed in various ways, which can be broadly categorized into three main narratives. This paper introduces and critically examines all three, with a primary focus on the pragmatist narrative. Given the increasing relevance and relative novelty of this approach, a thorough evaluation is necessary to understand its potential and limitations. To this end, the study adopts an analytical-critical methodology to assess the framework and propose constructive solutions. Our analysis indicates that the pragmatist narrative of the sociotechnical systems approach emphasizes the real-world functioning of AI and its societal impacts. It seeks to identify the diverse social, technical, and institutional factors that contribute to ethical and societal outcomes. One of the central challenges of this approach lies in the inherent complexity of sociotechnical systems and the multitude of interacting elements they encompass. In response to this challenge, the paper draws on the work of pragmatist philosophers to propose interdisciplinary inquiry as an appropriate and effective method for studying sociotechnical systems. The findings suggest that, despite the complexity involved, this approach offers a viable path for comprehensively analyzing and ethically assessing AI technologies within their broader social contexts. This paper investigates the ethical evaluation of artificial intelligence (AI) through the sociotechnical systems approach, with a particular emphasis on the insights of pragmatist philosophers. In recent years, the sociotechnical perspective has gained attention among AI ethics researchers. However, this approach has been interpreted and discussed in various ways, which can be broadly categorized into three main narratives. This paper introduces and critically examines all three, with a primary focus on the pragmatist narrative. Given the increasing relevance and relative novelty of this approach, a thorough evaluation is necessary to understand its potential and limitations. To this end, the study adopts an analytical-critical methodology to assess the framework and propose constructive solutions. Our analysis indicates that the pragmatist narrative of the sociotechnical systems approach emphasizes the real-world functioning of AI and its societal impacts. It seeks to identify the diverse social, technical, and institutional factors that contribute to ethical and societal outcomes. One of the central challenges of this approach lies in the inherent complexity of sociotechnical systems and the multitude of interacting elements they encompass. In response to this challenge, the paper draws on the work of pragmatist philosophers to propose interdisciplinary inquiry as an appropriate and effective method for studying sociotechnical systems. The findings suggest that, despite the complexity involved, this approach offers a viable path for comprehensively analyzing and ethically assessing AI technologies within their broader social contexts. https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_20046_1029030fcd9c03ca1a45cae4b1733f50.pdf

University of Tabriz Journal of Philosophical Investigations 2251-7960 19 52 2025 11 22 Rethinking the Role of the Teacher: From Architect of Education to Realistic Collaboration with Artificial Intelligence Rethinking the Role of the Teacher: From Architect of Education to Realistic Collaboration with Artificial Intelligence 301 320 20178 10.22034/jpiut.2025.67502.4119 FA Saeid Zarghami-Hamrah Associate Professor, Department of Philosophy of Education, Kharazmi University, Tehran, Iran. Hamid Ahmadi-Hedayat Assistant Professor, Department of Educational Sciences, Farhangian University, Tehran, Iran 0000-0003-0814-5696 Journal Article 2025 05 25 The purpose of this study is to re-examine the role of the teacher, tracing its evolution from an "architect of instruction" to a "realistic collaborator" with AI. To achieve this objective, the research employs a philosophical approach and a qualitative meta-analysis methodology. The findings indicate that generative AI—with its capacity to synthesize vast data, generate content, and deliver personalized, interactive curricula—fundamentally transforms the teacher's conventional authority. Drawing on relevant evidence, this paper frames this transformation in terms of three distinct crises: 1) a crisis in the teacher's role as the custodian of knowledge representation, 2) a crisis in curriculum architecture, and 3) a crisis in the facilitation of learning. These transformations simultaneously present new horizons for enhancing educational quality while also threatening to destabilize the teacher's position in the educational landscape. The second part of the paper critiques the "technical facilitator" model of teaching and proposes arguments for restoring the teacher's diminished professional legitimacy. In conclusion, it is argued that today's educators, freed from former technical duties like lesson planning and knowledge representation through their collaboration with generative AI, can now focus on cultivating learners' skills in self-awareness, self-actualization, and social-emotional development. Furthermore, a new role for the teacher emerges as a "critical coach," tasked with evaluating the biased outputs of AI. The purpose of this study is to re-examine the role of the teacher, tracing its evolution from an "architect of instruction" to a "realistic collaborator" with AI. To achieve this objective, the research employs a philosophical approach and a qualitative meta-analysis methodology. The findings indicate that generative AI—with its capacity to synthesize vast data, generate content, and deliver personalized, interactive curricula—fundamentally transforms the teacher's conventional authority. Drawing on relevant evidence, this paper frames this transformation in terms of three distinct crises: 1) a crisis in the teacher's role as the custodian of knowledge representation, 2) a crisis in curriculum architecture, and 3) a crisis in the facilitation of learning. These transformations simultaneously present new horizons for enhancing educational quality while also threatening to destabilize the teacher's position in the educational landscape. The second part of the paper critiques the "technical facilitator" model of teaching and proposes arguments for restoring the teacher's diminished professional legitimacy. In conclusion, it is argued that today's educators, freed from former technical duties like lesson planning and knowledge representation through their collaboration with generative AI, can now focus on cultivating learners' skills in self-awareness, self-actualization, and social-emotional development. Furthermore, a new role for the teacher emerges as a "critical coach," tasked with evaluating the biased outputs of AI. https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_20178_e1d49c200b576c386c832405e415131a.pdf

University of Tabriz Journal of Philosophical Investigations 2251-7960 19 52 2025 11 22 Technology and Education, Re-imagining Autonomy through the Lens of PostPhenomenology Technology and Education, Re-imagining Autonomy through the Lens of PostPhenomenology 321 344 20133 10.22034/jpiut.2025.64142.3903 FA Jalal Karimian Ph.D. in Philosophy of Education, University of Tehran. Tehran, Iran Narges-Sadat Sajjadieh Associate Professor of Philosophy of Education, University of Tehran. Tehran, Iran Journal Article 2024 10 26 Autonomy stands as a core goal of modern education. An autonomous person is unconstrained by external barriers and, in essence, owns their thoughts and actions authentically. However, the individualistic focus of the liberal tradition falls short in fully grappling with autonomy's complexities. We must confront the theoretical and practical threats that technology poses to it. Postphenomenology provides a valuable lens for this inquiry. In this study, we use conceptual analysis to align key themes of autonomy with postphenomenological theory. From this view, technologies are not foreign entities but integral co-inhabitants of human existence; thus, humans can never achieve complete independence from them. Yet, if technology's concealed intentionalities remain unexamined and unaddressed, they risk eroding both human autonomy and educational practices. This research's core proposal is to rethink autonomy within the entangled human-technology relationships of the contemporary world. Amid intelligent, pervasive technologies, autonomy emerges anew as a spectrum of opportunities for self-realization and self-assessment. To realize this, we need frameworks that promote innovative ways of coexisting with technology. Key strategies include redefining technological habits in education, building technological literacy and self-cultivation routines, and shaping the spatial-temporal environments of children and adolescents—all informed by a postphenomenological grasp of human-technology dynamics. Autonomy stands as a core goal of modern education. An autonomous person is unconstrained by external barriers and, in essence, owns their thoughts and actions authentically. However, the individualistic focus of the liberal tradition falls short in fully grappling with autonomy's complexities. We must confront the theoretical and practical threats that technology poses to it. Postphenomenology provides a valuable lens for this inquiry. In this study, we use conceptual analysis to align key themes of autonomy with postphenomenological theory. From this view, technologies are not foreign entities but integral co-inhabitants of human existence; thus, humans can never achieve complete independence from them. Yet, if technology's concealed intentionalities remain unexamined and unaddressed, they risk eroding both human autonomy and educational practices. This research's core proposal is to rethink autonomy within the entangled human-technology relationships of the contemporary world. Amid intelligent, pervasive technologies, autonomy emerges anew as a spectrum of opportunities for self-realization and self-assessment. To realize this, we need frameworks that promote innovative ways of coexisting with technology. Key strategies include redefining technological habits in education, building technological literacy and self-cultivation routines, and shaping the spatial-temporal environments of children and adolescents—all informed by a postphenomenological grasp of human-technology dynamics. https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_20133_4fd0b89d648935493070d73e44351e8b.pdf

University of Tabriz Journal of Philosophical Investigations 2251-7960 19 52 2025 11 22 Kant’s Critical Analysis of the Story of Abraham and the Near Sacrifice of Isaac Kant’s Critical Analysis of the Story of Abraham and the Near Sacrifice of Isaac 345 364 20148 10.22034/jpiut.2025.68208.4152 FA Hamidreza Mahboobi-Arani Associate professor of philosophy, wisdom and logic Department, Tarbiat Modares University, Tehran, Iran Journal Article 2025 07 17 This article explains Kant’s critical analysis of the religious story of the Binding of Isaac in Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason (2001) and The Conflict of the Faculties (1798). From Kant’s perspective, a command to sacrifice one’s child—if it conflicts with the moral law—cannot originate from a divine source. In this critique, Kant’s concern extends beyond theology; he seeks to defend the authority of practical reason and moral conscience against any purported divine command that contradicts them. In his view, the uncritical and morally unreflective acceptance of religious imperatives leads to blind obedience and the erosion of individual moral responsibility within society. The article argues that Kant’s interpretation of the Abrahamic narrative forms part of his broader project of transforming religion into a rational, ethics-centered domain, free from superstition and the coercive authority of external institutions. By emphasizing conscience as a duty, Kant maintains that religion is justifiable only insofar as it remains subordinate to practical reason. Accordingly, the figure of Abraham portrayed in this religious tale is not to be admired uncritically; rather, it calls for a skeptical and morally vigilant reading of the narrative itself. The article thus underscores Kant’s deep commitment to moral autonomy as the foundation of both individual virtue and social order. This article explains Kant’s critical analysis of the religious story of the Binding of Isaac in Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason (2001) and The Conflict of the Faculties (1798). From Kant’s perspective, a command to sacrifice one’s child—if it conflicts with the moral law—cannot originate from a divine source. In this critique, Kant’s concern extends beyond theology; he seeks to defend the authority of practical reason and moral conscience against any purported divine command that contradicts them. In his view, the uncritical and morally unreflective acceptance of religious imperatives leads to blind obedience and the erosion of individual moral responsibility within society. The article argues that Kant’s interpretation of the Abrahamic narrative forms part of his broader project of transforming religion into a rational, ethics-centered domain, free from superstition and the coercive authority of external institutions. By emphasizing conscience as a duty, Kant maintains that religion is justifiable only insofar as it remains subordinate to practical reason. Accordingly, the figure of Abraham portrayed in this religious tale is not to be admired uncritically; rather, it calls for a skeptical and morally vigilant reading of the narrative itself. The article thus underscores Kant’s deep commitment to moral autonomy as the foundation of both individual virtue and social order. https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_20148_884ecf46f8150ea4cb63a158daf5d769.pdf

University of Tabriz Journal of Philosophical Investigations 2251-7960 19 52 2025 11 22 The Critique of Paul Guyer's Interpretation of the Deduction of Aesthetic Judgments in Kant's Aesthetics The Critique of Paul Guyer's Interpretation of the Deduction of Aesthetic Judgments in Kant's Aesthetics 365 384 19950 10.22034/jpiut.2025.66621.4053 FA Davoud Mirzaei Assistant Professor, Department of Philosophy of Art, Bu-Ali Sina University, Hamedan, Iran Journal Article 2025 04 04 Paul Guyer is one of the most prominent commentators of Kant's works, whose opinions have always been respected by Kant scholars. He offers a unique interpretation of Kant's doctrine of aesthetic deduction, which has prompted thought-provoking critiques. This interpretation is known as the "epistemic-non-normative interpretation," which relies on a statement by Kant in §32: "to say 'this rose is beautiful' is equivalent to saying that the claim [particular] satisfies everyone"; this interpretation argues that the inference of aesthetic judgment must be an argument sufficient for "attributing" specific feelings to others under specific conditions, ultimately claiming that Kant's own analysis necessitates addressing details, which could lead to the failure of his deduction. Accordingly, the present study has sought to answer these two questions: 1. What are Guyer's reasons for proposing the epistemic-non-normative interpretation of Kant's Deduction? 2. Does he succeed in explaining Kant's Deduction? Therefore, this study aims to explore the intricacies of this interpretation and the reasons behind its proposal, and then to examine its success or failure in accounting for Kantian inference. It seems that this interpretation, by overlooking the responsibilities Kant himself assigned to deduction, ultimately cannot adequately interpret Kant's deduction in the Critique of Judgment. The methodology of this research is descriptive-analytical based on library data.  Paul Guyer is one of the most prominent commentators of Kant's works, whose opinions have always been respected by Kant scholars. He offers a unique interpretation of Kant's doctrine of aesthetic deduction, which has prompted thought-provoking critiques. This interpretation is known as the "epistemic-non-normative interpretation," which relies on a statement by Kant in §32: "to say 'this rose is beautiful' is equivalent to saying that the claim [particular] satisfies everyone"; this interpretation argues that the inference of aesthetic judgment must be an argument sufficient for "attributing" specific feelings to others under specific conditions, ultimately claiming that Kant's own analysis necessitates addressing details, which could lead to the failure of his deduction. Accordingly, the present study has sought to answer these two questions: 1. What are Guyer's reasons for proposing the epistemic-non-normative interpretation of Kant's Deduction? 2. Does he succeed in explaining Kant's Deduction? Therefore, this study aims to explore the intricacies of this interpretation and the reasons behind its proposal, and then to examine its success or failure in accounting for Kantian inference. It seems that this interpretation, by overlooking the responsibilities Kant himself assigned to deduction, ultimately cannot adequately interpret Kant's deduction in the Critique of Judgment. The methodology of this research is descriptive-analytical based on library data.  https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_19950_a40ab628a642e362fbb6b174dba6d314.pdf

University of Tabriz Journal of Philosophical Investigations 2251-7960 19 52 2025 11 22 Partiality and Kantian Moral Theory Partiality and Kantian Moral Theory 385 404 20049 10.22034/jpiut.2025.66807.4070 FA Seyyed-Ali Asghari Assistant Professor, Institute for Humanities and Cultural Studies, Tehran, Iran. Journal Article 2025 04 16 We have, among our moral concerns, both impartiality concerns and partiality concerns. Accordingly, any moral theory, including impartial theories, should somehow reconcile the two concerns. The basic question of this article is whether “valuing all persons equally” can be reconciled with “valuing partial motives and reasons and particular persons (deep partiality)”. This article aims to find, analyze, and explain an answer that the impartialist Kantian moral theory can provide to that question, as the theory faces important obstacles in reconciling impartiality and partiality. One obstacle is its emphasis on the “motive of duty,” which is in conflict with “partial motives”. The other is its emphasis on the value of humanity in persons, which appears to conflict with the value of particular persons, whereas in partiality we value particular persons, that is, for the sake of their individual features. In general, I have concluded that the defender of Kantian theory can explain the value of partial reasons or motives and the value of particular individuals in two steps. The first is that Kant believes that, in addition to the motive of duty, humans, based on their humanity and rational nature, have a special kind of value called “dignity”; therefore, we ought to revere humans. The second is to contemplate the “capacity to set ends,” an important feature of humanity and rational nature. Revering a person in situations where we have a personal relationship with someone requires our attention to the ends which we know he has, otherwise we have not revered his capacity to set his ends. The method has been to search, or rather to extract “implicit” ideas and concepts related to the issue of “partiality” from the Kantian moral theory. That is because “explicit” concerns of this theory –put forward during the modern era with its universalist viewpoint—were primarily “impartialist.” We have, among our moral concerns, both impartiality concerns and partiality concerns. Accordingly, any moral theory, including impartial theories, should somehow reconcile the two concerns. The basic question of this article is whether “valuing all persons equally” can be reconciled with “valuing partial motives and reasons and particular persons (deep partiality)”. This article aims to find, analyze, and explain an answer that the impartialist Kantian moral theory can provide to that question, as the theory faces important obstacles in reconciling impartiality and partiality. One obstacle is its emphasis on the “motive of duty,” which is in conflict with “partial motives”. The other is its emphasis on the value of humanity in persons, which appears to conflict with the value of particular persons, whereas in partiality we value particular persons, that is, for the sake of their individual features. In general, I have concluded that the defender of Kantian theory can explain the value of partial reasons or motives and the value of particular individuals in two steps. The first is that Kant believes that, in addition to the motive of duty, humans, based on their humanity and rational nature, have a special kind of value called “dignity”; therefore, we ought to revere humans. The second is to contemplate the “capacity to set ends,” an important feature of humanity and rational nature. Revering a person in situations where we have a personal relationship with someone requires our attention to the ends which we know he has, otherwise we have not revered his capacity to set his ends. The method has been to search, or rather to extract “implicit” ideas and concepts related to the issue of “partiality” from the Kantian moral theory. That is because “explicit” concerns of this theory –put forward during the modern era with its universalist viewpoint—were primarily “impartialist.” https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_20049_1f339e05061052097152b324e3a7b552.pdf

University of Tabriz Journal of Philosophical Investigations 2251-7960 19 52 2025 11 22 Implementing Artificial Intelligence in Iranian Teacher Education: Tools and Challenges Implementing Artificial Intelligence in Iranian Teacher Education: Tools and Challenges 405 428 20670 10.22034/jpiut.2025.69864.4284 FA Asadollah Khadivi Associate Professor, Department of Educational Administration, Farhangian University, Tehran, Iran Sohrab Yazdani Assistant Professor, Department of Educational Administration, Farhangian University, Tehran, Iran Journal Article 2025 10 25 The present study aimed to implement artificial intelligence in teacher education in Iran: tools and challenges. This study is a qualitative narrative scoping review in terms of its applied purpose and approach. The research field of study included empirical research, theoretical articles, surveys, case studies and researchers lived experiences and field evidence from 2020 to 2025 that significantly addressed artificial intelligence and teacher education. The statistical sample was selected purposively based on their relevance to the study objectives and questions and artificial intelligence in teacher education. Thematic analysis was used to analyze the data.The findings show that the tools of artificial intelligence applications in teacher education include intelligent tutoring systems, automated assessment and feedback systems, virtual and augmented reality, artificial intelligence-based learning and training analytics, personalized and adaptive learning systems, virtual teaching assistants, data analysis, and management decision support. The major challenges of using artificial intelligence in teacher education include ethical challenges and personal, educational, infrastructural, and cultural and social, technical, process, and organizational concerns. The research results contribute to the discourse on the use of AI tools and provide practical insights for professors, policymakers, and administrators who intend to integrate AI into teacher education. The present study aimed to implement artificial intelligence in teacher education in Iran: tools and challenges. This study is a qualitative narrative scoping review in terms of its applied purpose and approach. The research field of study included empirical research, theoretical articles, surveys, case studies and researchers lived experiences and field evidence from 2020 to 2025 that significantly addressed artificial intelligence and teacher education. The statistical sample was selected purposively based on their relevance to the study objectives and questions and artificial intelligence in teacher education. Thematic analysis was used to analyze the data.The findings show that the tools of artificial intelligence applications in teacher education include intelligent tutoring systems, automated assessment and feedback systems, virtual and augmented reality, artificial intelligence-based learning and training analytics, personalized and adaptive learning systems, virtual teaching assistants, data analysis, and management decision support. The major challenges of using artificial intelligence in teacher education include ethical challenges and personal, educational, infrastructural, and cultural and social, technical, process, and organizational concerns. The research results contribute to the discourse on the use of AI tools and provide practical insights for professors, policymakers, and administrators who intend to integrate AI into teacher education. https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_20670_421fad8797200647f5359aebaea1c208.pdf

University of Tabriz Journal of Philosophical Investigations 2251-7960 19 52 2025 11 22 Moral Agency and Aesthetic Creativity within the Framework of Kantian Consciousness of Self-Activity Moral Agency and Aesthetic Creativity within the Framework of Kantian Consciousness of Self-Activity 429 448 20009 10.22034/jpiut.2025.61657.4090 FA Omid-Reza Janbaz Assistant Professor, Department of Philosophy, University of Yasuj, Yasuj, Iran Milad Salahi-Fard M.A. Student of Philosophy of Science, Sharif University of Technology, Tehran, Iran Journal Article 2025 05 01 Descartes grounded modern epistemology in the thinking subject, while Hume denied the enduring self, viewing it as a collection of fleeting perceptions. Though Hume’s critique dismantled Cartesian assumptions, it also opened the path for Kant’s redefinition of the self on rational grounds. This article explores how the self, despite losing its presumed original unity, retains its essential role in volition and experience. Kant’s critical philosophy reveals that the spontaneity of the subject—irreducible to causal explanation—requires investigation within practical reason and aesthetic judgment. Beginning with purposiveness as the basis for reflective judgment, the self emerges as a cognitive, moral, and artistic agent. It synthesizes sensory input to form knowledge, legislates moral norms through free will, and expresses creative force in aesthetic production. By integrating Kant’s critiques into a unified framework, this interpretation shows that post-Kantian philosophy no longer treats the self as a fixed entity, but as a dynamic, future-oriented agent of self-activity. The transcendental ego, though not an object of knowledge, functions as the condition for cognition, moral autonomy, and aesthetic creativity—marking a shift from metaphysical substance to active principle.  Descartes grounded modern epistemology in the thinking subject, while Hume denied the enduring self, viewing it as a collection of fleeting perceptions. Though Hume’s critique dismantled Cartesian assumptions, it also opened the path for Kant’s redefinition of the self on rational grounds. This article explores how the self, despite losing its presumed original unity, retains its essential role in volition and experience. Kant’s critical philosophy reveals that the spontaneity of the subject—irreducible to causal explanation—requires investigation within practical reason and aesthetic judgment. Beginning with purposiveness as the basis for reflective judgment, the self emerges as a cognitive, moral, and artistic agent. It synthesizes sensory input to form knowledge, legislates moral norms through free will, and expresses creative force in aesthetic production. By integrating Kant’s critiques into a unified framework, this interpretation shows that post-Kantian philosophy no longer treats the self as a fixed entity, but as a dynamic, future-oriented agent of self-activity. The transcendental ego, though not an object of knowledge, functions as the condition for cognition, moral autonomy, and aesthetic creativity—marking a shift from metaphysical substance to active principle.  https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_20009_21fe392300f61b82539a35ff0fc4993c.pdf

University of Tabriz Journal of Philosophical Investigations 2251-7960 19 52 2025 11 22 A Post-Phenomenological Analysis of Ex Machina and Final Fantasy VII: Advent Children through Don Ihde’s Perspective Emphasis on the Concept of “Techno Body” A Post-Phenomenological Analysis of Ex Machina and Final Fantasy VII: Advent Children through Don Ihde’s Perspective Emphasis on the Concept of “Techno Body” 449 470 19785 10.22034/jpiut.2025.66059.4020 FA Masoumeh Roushenasi-Gharadaghloo M.A. Student of Art Research, Art University of Isfahan, Isfahan, Iran Marziyeh Piravi-Vanak Professor of Art Research Department,, Art University of Isfahan, Isfahan, Iran. Journal Article 2025 02 25 The interplay between art and technology in the contemporary era has paved the way for the development of concepts like the “technobody.” Within this framework, the biological essence of modern humans is put into question, highlighting the need to reassess how humans engage and interact with technology. Therefore, this study relies on Don Ihde’s post-phenomenological perspective as a systematic framework to explore how this concept is represented in the film <em>Ex Machina</em> and the animation <em>Final Fantasy VII: Advent Children</em>, and how their similarities and differences can be explained. The findings show that in Ex Machina”, the human world and the technological world merge, presenting the technobody as a form of artificial intelligence that directly interacts with its human counterpart. In <em>Final Fantasy VII: Advent Children</em>, however, the posthuman figure appears through its connection with instruments in a cybernetic space where reality and virtuality blend, and the boundaries between human and technology disappear. Both works emphasize the mutual influence and interaction between humans and technology. By mediating human experience, technology transforms the very concept of humanity and broadens the potential for new kinds of experiences, continually redefining what it means to be human. The interplay between art and technology in the contemporary era has paved the way for the development of concepts like the “technobody.” Within this framework, the biological essence of modern humans is put into question, highlighting the need to reassess how humans engage and interact with technology. Therefore, this study relies on Don Ihde’s post-phenomenological perspective as a systematic framework to explore how this concept is represented in the film <em>Ex Machina</em> and the animation <em>Final Fantasy VII: Advent Children</em>, and how their similarities and differences can be explained. The findings show that in Ex Machina”, the human world and the technological world merge, presenting the technobody as a form of artificial intelligence that directly interacts with its human counterpart. In <em>Final Fantasy VII: Advent Children</em>, however, the posthuman figure appears through its connection with instruments in a cybernetic space where reality and virtuality blend, and the boundaries between human and technology disappear. Both works emphasize the mutual influence and interaction between humans and technology. By mediating human experience, technology transforms the very concept of humanity and broadens the potential for new kinds of experiences, continually redefining what it means to be human. https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_19785_7ae5c46300bf7aee58d6b33679256a30.pdf

University of Tabriz Journal of Philosophical Investigations 2251-7960 19 52 2025 11 22 Critical Analysis of the Idea of "Bildung" According to Humboldt Critical Analysis of the Idea of "Bildung" According to Humboldt 471 494 19793 10.22034/jpiut.2025.66271.4029 FA Fatemeh Nazari-Roodbali PhD of Philosophy of Education, Shahid Chamran University of Ahvaz, Ahvaz, Iran. , Masoud Safaei-Moghadam Professor of Educational Sciences Department, Shahid Chamran University of Ahvaz, Ahvaz, Iran Seyyed-Mansour Maraashi Professor of Philosophy of Education Department, Shahid Chamran University of Ahvaz, Ahvaz, Iran. Seyyed-Jalal Hashemi Associate Professor of Educational Sciences Department, Shahid Chamran University of Ahvaz, Ahvaz, Iran Journal Article 2025 03 07 <strong>Objective:</strong> The present paper analyzes and critically evaluates the concept of “Bildung” in the thought of Wilhelm von Humboldt and seeks to provide the necessary foundations for a proper understanding of this idea based on his major works. It first examines the difficulties involved in interpreting and translating the notion of Bildung, showing that due to its deep philosophical and cultural dimensions, this concept cannot be easily transferred across languages or contexts, and therefore requires a careful and context-sensitive approach within Humboldt’s intellectual framework.<br /><strong>Conclusion:</strong> To address the challenges surrounding the idea or concept of Bildung, the study proposes a methodology grounded in conceptual analysis with certain minor modifications. It then examines Humboldt’s formulation of the idea within the broader intellectual and historical frameworks of his time, arguing that any accurate understanding of his thought is impossible without reference to these contexts. Based on several of Humboldt’s works, the paper further explains the foundations and structure of Bildung and demonstrates that the unity and coherence of Humboldt’s philosophy can only be understood through what may be called the Metaphysics of Bildung—a philosophical perspective that seeks to interpret, in a metaphysical and systematic way, the nature and position of fundamental categories such as the human being, the world, knowledge, and human action. <strong>Objective:</strong> The present paper analyzes and critically evaluates the concept of “Bildung” in the thought of Wilhelm von Humboldt and seeks to provide the necessary foundations for a proper understanding of this idea based on his major works. It first examines the difficulties involved in interpreting and translating the notion of Bildung, showing that due to its deep philosophical and cultural dimensions, this concept cannot be easily transferred across languages or contexts, and therefore requires a careful and context-sensitive approach within Humboldt’s intellectual framework.<br /><strong>Conclusion:</strong> To address the challenges surrounding the idea or concept of Bildung, the study proposes a methodology grounded in conceptual analysis with certain minor modifications. It then examines Humboldt’s formulation of the idea within the broader intellectual and historical frameworks of his time, arguing that any accurate understanding of his thought is impossible without reference to these contexts. Based on several of Humboldt’s works, the paper further explains the foundations and structure of Bildung and demonstrates that the unity and coherence of Humboldt’s philosophy can only be understood through what may be called the Metaphysics of Bildung—a philosophical perspective that seeks to interpret, in a metaphysical and systematic way, the nature and position of fundamental categories such as the human being, the world, knowledge, and human action. https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_19793_7764009af894ab78486fe5f4cf1b9174.pdf

University of Tabriz Journal of Philosophical Investigations 2251-7960 19 52 2025 11 22 Structural Modeling of the Relationship between Religiosity and Political Participation: The Mediating Role of Philosophical Mindset Structural Modeling of the Relationship between Religiosity and Political Participation: The Mediating Role of Philosophical Mindset 495 518 19586 10.22034/jpiut.2025.66062.4016 FA Homa Rahmani Department of Islamic Education, Farhangian University, Tehran, iran. 0000-0002-0078-6782 Journal Article 2025 02 23 This study was conducted with the aim of explaining the structural relationship between religiosity and political participation, with the mediating role of philosophical mentality, among student-teachers at Farhangian University in East Azerbaijan Province. The present research is applied in nature and employed a descriptive-correlational method with a structural equation modeling approach. The statistical population included all undergraduate student-teachers in the 2024–2025 academic year, and through stratified random sampling, 290 individuals were selected as the sample. Data collection instruments consisted of three standardized questionnaires on religiosity, philosophical mentality, and political participation, all scored on a five-point Likert scale. Data analysis was carried out using SPSS and AMOS software. The results indicated that religiosity has a moderate to relatively strong effect on philosophical mentality and political participation. Moreover, the combination of religiosity and philosophical thinking leads to the formation of more multidimensional attitudes toward life and society, and strong religious beliefs reinforce values such as justice and social responsibility, thereby increasing the motivation for political participation. The findings suggest that enhancing religiosity and philosophical mentality can play an effective role in improving political hope and vitality, national cohesion, meritocracy, and sustainable development, and can be beneficial for educational policy-making at Farhangian University. This study was conducted with the aim of explaining the structural relationship between religiosity and political participation, with the mediating role of philosophical mentality, among student-teachers at Farhangian University in East Azerbaijan Province. The present research is applied in nature and employed a descriptive-correlational method with a structural equation modeling approach. The statistical population included all undergraduate student-teachers in the 2024–2025 academic year, and through stratified random sampling, 290 individuals were selected as the sample. Data collection instruments consisted of three standardized questionnaires on religiosity, philosophical mentality, and political participation, all scored on a five-point Likert scale. Data analysis was carried out using SPSS and AMOS software. The results indicated that religiosity has a moderate to relatively strong effect on philosophical mentality and political participation. Moreover, the combination of religiosity and philosophical thinking leads to the formation of more multidimensional attitudes toward life and society, and strong religious beliefs reinforce values such as justice and social responsibility, thereby increasing the motivation for political participation. The findings suggest that enhancing religiosity and philosophical mentality can play an effective role in improving political hope and vitality, national cohesion, meritocracy, and sustainable development, and can be beneficial for educational policy-making at Farhangian University. https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_19586_e055b4615cccf860335d5db970fc28b4.pdf

University of Tabriz Journal of Philosophical Investigations 2251-7960 19 52 2025 11 22 The Application of Metaphor in Philosophical Hermeneutics of Gadamer and Pragmatism of Davidson The Application of Metaphor in Philosophical Hermeneutics of Gadamer and Pragmatism of Davidson 519 542 19795 10.22034/jpiut.2025.66818.4072 FA Raed Faridzadeh Assistant Professor, Department of Germany Language and Literature, Shahid Beheshti University, Tehran, Iran Sepehr Salimi PhD Candidate, of philosophy of art, Bu Ali Sina University, Hamedan, Iran Journal Article 2025 04 16 Many theorists have been developing their concepts on metaphor, among which Gadamer and Davidson are two thinkers for whom metaphor plays a key role in their philosophical project—and, interestingly, both disagree with Aristotle’s view which considers metaphor as a shortened simile. Both philosophers believe that there is no definite method or systematic procedure for understanding truth; every interpretation is based on language, and the foundation of understanding is also structured by interpretation and language. Additionally, any act of understanding requires a prior background agreement, principle of charity. Metaphor, too, is a concept entirely dependent on understanding, therefore on language. For Gadamer, the conception of understanding is based on the "fusion of horizons". This fusion does not at all mean the suppression of difference; rather, he considers understanding as a fusion that occurs in metaphor. On the other hand, Davidson believes that what is recognized as metaphorical meaning is not meaning, but rather, in fact, its particular use. Now, considering both philosophers’ serious attention to the concept of metaphor, the main question of this research is: How can metaphor be grounded as a central concept in Gadamer and Davidson`s view on elucidating “understanding truth”? Through the investigation carried out, it becomes clear that for Gadamer, metaphor has a hermeneutic and ontological function, whereas for Davidson, it is examined as a literary device with epistemological implications. Nevertheless, this concept can be considered a foundational point through the determination of “Horizon”. Many theorists have been developing their concepts on metaphor, among which Gadamer and Davidson are two thinkers for whom metaphor plays a key role in their philosophical project—and, interestingly, both disagree with Aristotle’s view which considers metaphor as a shortened simile. Both philosophers believe that there is no definite method or systematic procedure for understanding truth; every interpretation is based on language, and the foundation of understanding is also structured by interpretation and language. Additionally, any act of understanding requires a prior background agreement, principle of charity. Metaphor, too, is a concept entirely dependent on understanding, therefore on language. For Gadamer, the conception of understanding is based on the "fusion of horizons". This fusion does not at all mean the suppression of difference; rather, he considers understanding as a fusion that occurs in metaphor. On the other hand, Davidson believes that what is recognized as metaphorical meaning is not meaning, but rather, in fact, its particular use. Now, considering both philosophers’ serious attention to the concept of metaphor, the main question of this research is: How can metaphor be grounded as a central concept in Gadamer and Davidson`s view on elucidating “understanding truth”? Through the investigation carried out, it becomes clear that for Gadamer, metaphor has a hermeneutic and ontological function, whereas for Davidson, it is examined as a literary device with epistemological implications. Nevertheless, this concept can be considered a foundational point through the determination of “Horizon”. https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_19795_bfb6c032203aa468b07b1e4c437367ff.pdf

University of Tabriz Journal of Philosophical Investigations 2251-7960 19 52 2025 11 22 Exceptional Trials in Political Crimes with Reference to the Concept of General Will in Rousseau’s Thought Exceptional Trials in Political Crimes with Reference to the Concept of General Will in Rousseau’s Thought 543 564 20207 10.22034/jpiut.2025.67588.4133 FA Hadi Salehi Assistant Professor of Public and International Law Department, Shiraz University, Iran Emad Safarnejad-Broujeni PhD Candidate of Public Law, Shiraz University, Shiraz, Iran Journal Article 2025 06 11 Political crime is one of the most contested concepts in criminal law and political philosophy, having undergone substantial transformations alongside shifts in the foundations of political legitimacy. This article traces the historical evolution of political crime—from classical Athens and imperial Rome to the medieval intertwining of church and state, and through to the ideological conflicts of the 19th and 20th centuries—highlighting how dissent has moved from being considered heresy and treason to being (partially) legitimized within modern legal frameworks. Drawing on the political philosophy of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, particularly his notion of the "general will," the article proposes a new conceptual framework for distinguishing political crime from ordinary offenses. Through an analysis of three main interpretations of the general will—democratic, transcendental, and critical—the author argues that only the critical reading can meaningfully recognize the political dissenter as a legitimate actor rather than a deviant. Within this framework, exceptional trials in political crimes are not only justifiable but essential for preserving political participation and preventing authoritarian closure. The article concludes by offering a practical model for identifying political crimes and outlining the procedural and penal features of a rights-oriented exceptional trial that safeguards freedom of expression and dissent within the legal order. Political crime is one of the most contested concepts in criminal law and political philosophy, having undergone substantial transformations alongside shifts in the foundations of political legitimacy. This article traces the historical evolution of political crime—from classical Athens and imperial Rome to the medieval intertwining of church and state, and through to the ideological conflicts of the 19th and 20th centuries—highlighting how dissent has moved from being considered heresy and treason to being (partially) legitimized within modern legal frameworks. Drawing on the political philosophy of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, particularly his notion of the "general will," the article proposes a new conceptual framework for distinguishing political crime from ordinary offenses. Through an analysis of three main interpretations of the general will—democratic, transcendental, and critical—the author argues that only the critical reading can meaningfully recognize the political dissenter as a legitimate actor rather than a deviant. Within this framework, exceptional trials in political crimes are not only justifiable but essential for preserving political participation and preventing authoritarian closure. The article concludes by offering a practical model for identifying political crimes and outlining the procedural and penal features of a rights-oriented exceptional trial that safeguards freedom of expression and dissent within the legal order. https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_20207_b9a44754125572a35dfdf68af89c0ada.pdf

University of Tabriz Journal of Philosophical Investigations 2251-7960 19 52 2025 11 22 Explanation and Analysis of Lahav's View on Philosophical Counseling Explanation and Analysis of Lahav's View on Philosophical Counseling 565 586 20372 10.22034/jpiut.2025.67862.4137 FA Zahra Fallahi Ph.D. Candidate of Islamic Philosophy, University of Imam Sadigh, Tehran, Iran. 0009-0002-9018-401x Fatemeh Soleymani Associate Professor, Department of Philosophy, University of Imam Sadigh, Tehran, Iran Raham Sharaf Associate Professor, Department of Philosophy, University of Zanjan, Zanjan, Iran Journal Article 2025 06 25 Philosophical counseling is one of the ways to apply philosophy in practice and nowadays, it is the answer to some spiritual and psychological problems that cannot be solved by psychology. This type of counseling consists on variety approaches. Introducing the Lahav approach, due to its element of philosophical transcendence has a privileged position among the approaches, and its theoretical and practical uses require an explanation of its principles, goals, and methods. while his current viewpoint is scattered unsystematically in his works. To the extent that Mills accuses him of confusing theory and method. Such dispersion makes the present work necessary. Hence, the research question is how to explain and analyze Lahav's view on the method and goals of philosophical counseling in a descriptive-analytical method and based on basic principles, using Lahav's intellectual foundations. The findings of this study indicate that self-transformation and self-realization as goals of philosophical counseling were analyzed with the basic principles of depsychologization and spiritual pluralism. The author conceptualized Lahav's method with dialectics and addressed it in two methodological axes of crossing the pattern and examining dialectical contradiction in different stages of transformation. These two axes were analyzed with the basic principles of the concept of transformation and depsychologization in the interpretation of worldview. This is the first work to be written with the aim of dispelling Lahav's accusation of confusing theory with method and providing a basis for fair criticism of it. Philosophical counseling is one of the ways to apply philosophy in practice and nowadays, it is the answer to some spiritual and psychological problems that cannot be solved by psychology. This type of counseling consists on variety approaches. Introducing the Lahav approach, due to its element of philosophical transcendence has a privileged position among the approaches, and its theoretical and practical uses require an explanation of its principles, goals, and methods. while his current viewpoint is scattered unsystematically in his works. To the extent that Mills accuses him of confusing theory and method. Such dispersion makes the present work necessary. Hence, the research question is how to explain and analyze Lahav's view on the method and goals of philosophical counseling in a descriptive-analytical method and based on basic principles, using Lahav's intellectual foundations. The findings of this study indicate that self-transformation and self-realization as goals of philosophical counseling were analyzed with the basic principles of depsychologization and spiritual pluralism. The author conceptualized Lahav's method with dialectics and addressed it in two methodological axes of crossing the pattern and examining dialectical contradiction in different stages of transformation. These two axes were analyzed with the basic principles of the concept of transformation and depsychologization in the interpretation of worldview. This is the first work to be written with the aim of dispelling Lahav's accusation of confusing theory with method and providing a basis for fair criticism of it. https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_20372_2f2f9eeb2a393db73dd58d65e3c1b191.pdf

University of Tabriz Journal of Philosophical Investigations 2251-7960 19 52 2025 11 22 Lukács's Critical Realism and the Place of Art Under the Banner of Bourgeois Class Ideas Lukács's Critical Realism and the Place of Art Under the Banner of Bourgeois Class Ideas 587 606 19608 10.22034/jpiut.2025.65861.4000 FA Ali Salmani Associate Professor of Philosophy of Art Department, Bu-Ali Sina University, Hamadan, Iran Seywan Nikpey M.A. Student of Philosophy of Art, Bu-Ali Sina University, Hamadan, Iran Journal Article 2025 02 11 The bourgeois intellectual system is extremely incoherent and disjointed, and this incoherence is only one of the consequences of capitalism and its relations based on commodity relations and idolatry. Therefore, in Lukács's view, despite the dominance of bourgeois class ideas, only the proletariat has the ability to recognize the totality of the system and can act as a subject of revolution due to its special social position. In this intellectual system, art has an epistemological position, and critical realism, as Lukács's most prominent artistic theory, is meaningful only in this process of the proletariat's self-awareness and the development of the moment of revolution. The realist writer, who reflects the totality and culture of bourgeois societies, is the same subject of the proletariat that goes through the process of achieving self-consciousness and, by creating beautiful works and realistic reflections of the totality, helps the proletariat to develop and understand the contradictions of capitalist societies, as well as to understand its position as a social force. In this research, by collecting information and library data and using a descriptive-analytical method, we have answered this question: If the dominant ideas are those of the bourgeois class, how can the proletariat achieve general knowledge and change and transform relations? Also, how have writers who belong to the bourgeois class achieved understanding and knowledge of the general? While, according to Lukács, knowledge of the general is impossible for this class. The bourgeois intellectual system is extremely incoherent and disjointed, and this incoherence is only one of the consequences of capitalism and its relations based on commodity relations and idolatry. Therefore, in Lukács's view, despite the dominance of bourgeois class ideas, only the proletariat has the ability to recognize the totality of the system and can act as a subject of revolution due to its special social position. In this intellectual system, art has an epistemological position, and critical realism, as Lukács's most prominent artistic theory, is meaningful only in this process of the proletariat's self-awareness and the development of the moment of revolution. The realist writer, who reflects the totality and culture of bourgeois societies, is the same subject of the proletariat that goes through the process of achieving self-consciousness and, by creating beautiful works and realistic reflections of the totality, helps the proletariat to develop and understand the contradictions of capitalist societies, as well as to understand its position as a social force. In this research, by collecting information and library data and using a descriptive-analytical method, we have answered this question: If the dominant ideas are those of the bourgeois class, how can the proletariat achieve general knowledge and change and transform relations? Also, how have writers who belong to the bourgeois class achieved understanding and knowledge of the general? While, according to Lukács, knowledge of the general is impossible for this class. https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_19608_b02e52b300ab59978e540dd1b7c8a284.pdf

University of Tabriz Journal of Philosophical Investigations 2251-7960 19 52 2025 11 22 Suffering as Divine Grace: Kierkegaard's Confrontation with the Problem of Evil Suffering as Divine Grace: Kierkegaard's Confrontation with the Problem of Evil 607 630 20217 10.22034/jpiut.2025.66835.4073 FA Asma Fanni-Asl M.A. Student, Department of Philosophy, University of Allameh Tabataba'i, Tehran, Iran Mahdi Akhavan Associate Professor, Department of Philosophy, University of Allameh Tabataba'i, Tehran, Iran Journal Article 2025 04 17 One of the important issues in the field of philosophy of religion is the problem of evil. The problem of evil deals with how, if we accept the existence of an omnipotent and purely good God, we can accumulate all the evil in the world despite this purely good God. This article attempts to present a faith-based and existentialist response to the problem of evil, taking into account the works and thoughts of Søren Kierkegaard. Emphasizing the originality of the individual, he considered religious life to be the only way to achieve it. In religious life, a person faces only with God and distances himself from society and its conventions, and is drawn into isolation and loneliness. This loneliness will bring him suffering, which is a sign of his becoming authentic. The person accepts this suffering with his faith, and this suffering becomes sweet to him. He considers a true believer someone who considers evil and suffering as necessary and is ready to accept it. The answer we can give to the problem of suffering, considering Kierkegaard's thoughts, is that a believer with a positive approach to suffering considers the challenges of life as divine grace for his development. Therefore, evil and suffering are not only not a defect in the pure goodness and omnipotence of God, but are also a gift and grace from God to the servant to actualize his abilities and guide him to authenticity. One of the important issues in the field of philosophy of religion is the problem of evil. The problem of evil deals with how, if we accept the existence of an omnipotent and purely good God, we can accumulate all the evil in the world despite this purely good God. This article attempts to present a faith-based and existentialist response to the problem of evil, taking into account the works and thoughts of Søren Kierkegaard. Emphasizing the originality of the individual, he considered religious life to be the only way to achieve it. In religious life, a person faces only with God and distances himself from society and its conventions, and is drawn into isolation and loneliness. This loneliness will bring him suffering, which is a sign of his becoming authentic. The person accepts this suffering with his faith, and this suffering becomes sweet to him. He considers a true believer someone who considers evil and suffering as necessary and is ready to accept it. The answer we can give to the problem of suffering, considering Kierkegaard's thoughts, is that a believer with a positive approach to suffering considers the challenges of life as divine grace for his development. Therefore, evil and suffering are not only not a defect in the pure goodness and omnipotence of God, but are also a gift and grace from God to the servant to actualize his abilities and guide him to authenticity. https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_20217_0dfdb4a457c37c6217327d252ac726f8.pdf

University of Tabriz Journal of Philosophical Investigations 2251-7960 19 52 2025 11 22 The Relationship between History and Understanding from the Perspective of the German Historical School The Relationship between History and Understanding from the Perspective of the German Historical School 631 652 20005 10.22034/jpiut.2025.67768.4132 FA Asghar Vaezi Associate Professor, Department of Philosophy, Shahid Beheshti University, Tehran, Iran Journal Article 2025 06 10 In the nineteenth century, special attention was given to history and its relationship with understanding. Initially, Hegel, adopting a philosophical and meta-historical perspective on history grounded in an a priori and teleological principle, viewed the movement of history as deterministic yet progressing toward perfection. However, the emergence of the German Historical School in the nineteenth century arose as a reaction to Hegel’s philosophy of history. Ranke, Droysen, and Dilthey, the founders of this school, firmly maintained that the history of the world should not be understood through an a priori or meta-historical framework, arguing that humans, as historical beings, cannot observe the course of history from a meta-historical standpoint. Consequently, the Historical School, by connecting the understanding of history to hermeneutics, deemed the comprehension of world history possible only some posteriori, relying on empirical research. Furthermore, concerning the possibility of understanding past historical periods, the Historical School emphasized that an objective understanding of earlier eras is feasible only if we interpret the past not by our contemporary standards but by the standards of those times. Nevertheless, the Historical School encountered two significant challenges. The first was the prevailing belief in human historicity, which considered an objective understanding of the past unattainable. The more substantial issue was that, by rejecting God or Spirit as meta-historical factors determining historical events, the Historical School struggled to justify the coherence and unity of history. This article will elucidate the perspectives of Ranke and Droysen on how history should be understood while also addressing the criticisms directed at them. In the nineteenth century, special attention was given to history and its relationship with understanding. Initially, Hegel, adopting a philosophical and meta-historical perspective on history grounded in an a priori and teleological principle, viewed the movement of history as deterministic yet progressing toward perfection. However, the emergence of the German Historical School in the nineteenth century arose as a reaction to Hegel’s philosophy of history. Ranke, Droysen, and Dilthey, the founders of this school, firmly maintained that the history of the world should not be understood through an a priori or meta-historical framework, arguing that humans, as historical beings, cannot observe the course of history from a meta-historical standpoint. Consequently, the Historical School, by connecting the understanding of history to hermeneutics, deemed the comprehension of world history possible only some posteriori, relying on empirical research. Furthermore, concerning the possibility of understanding past historical periods, the Historical School emphasized that an objective understanding of earlier eras is feasible only if we interpret the past not by our contemporary standards but by the standards of those times. Nevertheless, the Historical School encountered two significant challenges. The first was the prevailing belief in human historicity, which considered an objective understanding of the past unattainable. The more substantial issue was that, by rejecting God or Spirit as meta-historical factors determining historical events, the Historical School struggled to justify the coherence and unity of history. This article will elucidate the perspectives of Ranke and Droysen on how history should be understood while also addressing the criticisms directed at them. https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_20005_6179b87f3de99506dec5f1bb8e174d81.pdf

University of Tabriz Journal of Philosophical Investigations 2251-7960 19 52 2025 11 22 A Philosophical Explanation of Saedi's Fear and Trembling Based on the Modernist Criteria of the Novel A Philosophical Explanation of Saedi's Fear and Trembling Based on the Modernist Criteria of the Novel 653 672 20169 10.22034/jpiut.2025.67951.4143 FA Ebrahim Ranjbar Professor of Persian Language and Literature Department, University of Tabriz, Tabriz, Iarn Journal Article 2025 06 30 The novel <em>Fear and Trembling</em> (1968) by Gholamhossein Sa’edi is a Philosophical-psychological work written during the rise of modernism in Iran. Signs of Modernism can be observed in this novel. It was written to portray the psychological, social, and economic conditions of Iran’s underprivileged regions, and its central theme is the position of the marginalized human being in the modern world. According to Sa’edi, scientific, economic, and hygienic poverty led to fear and anxiety among the lower classes in Iran’s deprived areas. Fear causes people to become frightened of imaginary beings, and society, out of fear of poverty and hunger, falls into cultural death. The aim of this paper is to philosophically explain the causes and consequences of fear of poverty and hunger from Sa’edi’s perspective in this novel. Alongside this, the function of certain signs of Modernism is also analyzed. The research method is analytical-descriptive, occasionally incorporating interpretative criteria. The findings reveal that poverty, helplessness in fulfilling instinctive needs, and fear of hunger and death lead to a state that can be interpreted as alienation. In this novel, fear is portrayed as a psychological state rather than a philosophical concept. Some characters die from fear, while those who survive turn into puppet-like figures suitable only for satirical stories. Thus, the novel features characters whose social experience is at the level of the dawn of creation, and their ignorance is laughable.  The novel <em>Fear and Trembling</em> (1968) by Gholamhossein Sa’edi is a Philosophical-psychological work written during the rise of modernism in Iran. Signs of Modernism can be observed in this novel. It was written to portray the psychological, social, and economic conditions of Iran’s underprivileged regions, and its central theme is the position of the marginalized human being in the modern world. According to Sa’edi, scientific, economic, and hygienic poverty led to fear and anxiety among the lower classes in Iran’s deprived areas. Fear causes people to become frightened of imaginary beings, and society, out of fear of poverty and hunger, falls into cultural death. The aim of this paper is to philosophically explain the causes and consequences of fear of poverty and hunger from Sa’edi’s perspective in this novel. Alongside this, the function of certain signs of Modernism is also analyzed. The research method is analytical-descriptive, occasionally incorporating interpretative criteria. The findings reveal that poverty, helplessness in fulfilling instinctive needs, and fear of hunger and death lead to a state that can be interpreted as alienation. In this novel, fear is portrayed as a psychological state rather than a philosophical concept. Some characters die from fear, while those who survive turn into puppet-like figures suitable only for satirical stories. Thus, the novel features characters whose social experience is at the level of the dawn of creation, and their ignorance is laughable.  https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_20169_0cde89cb8afad2a1fec80ce4f861fe7b.pdf

University of Tabriz Journal of Philosophical Investigations 2251-7960 19 52 2025 11 22 Transformations of the Neoplatonic School; A Case Study: Proclus and Damascius Transformations of the Neoplatonic School; A Case Study: Proclus and Damascius 673 696 20787 10.22034/jpiut.2025.70164.4325 FA Hosein Kalbasi Ashtari Professor of Philosophy . Allameh Tabataba'i University . Iran Journal Article 2025 11 10 Throughout the history of its formation and development, the Neoplatonic school (or tradition), like many other philosophical traditions, underwent various changes —or, as we refer to them here, "transformations." These are discernible as shifts in the doctrines and viewpoints of later thinkers compared to their predecessors, even concerning fundamental principles. While the question of how changes in foundational ideas can still be subsumed under a single heading and considered part of one philosophical school—and what the criterion for unity or plurality in metaphysical thought might be—requires a separate discussion, it can be stated that under the title of Neoplatonism, a wide spectrum of diverse and often contrasting ideas and inquiries can be observed. Despite these differences and distinctions, a common spirit discernible among them alone guarantees their spiritual unity, and it is not unfounded to place them within a single philosophical tradition. Among these transformations are those revealed by comparing the thought of two prominent figures of this tradition: Proclus and his student, Damascius. Despite all their theoretical commonalities, they diverged from one another in significant elements of their metaphysical systems. In this paper, due to Proclus's greater renown, we will first outline the key features of his philosophical system and metaphysical views. Subsequently, we will discuss the ideas of his philosophical successor, Damascius, in greater detail. Throughout the history of its formation and development, the Neoplatonic school (or tradition), like many other philosophical traditions, underwent various changes —or, as we refer to them here, "transformations." These are discernible as shifts in the doctrines and viewpoints of later thinkers compared to their predecessors, even concerning fundamental principles. While the question of how changes in foundational ideas can still be subsumed under a single heading and considered part of one philosophical school—and what the criterion for unity or plurality in metaphysical thought might be—requires a separate discussion, it can be stated that under the title of Neoplatonism, a wide spectrum of diverse and often contrasting ideas and inquiries can be observed. Despite these differences and distinctions, a common spirit discernible among them alone guarantees their spiritual unity, and it is not unfounded to place them within a single philosophical tradition. Among these transformations are those revealed by comparing the thought of two prominent figures of this tradition: Proclus and his student, Damascius. Despite all their theoretical commonalities, they diverged from one another in significant elements of their metaphysical systems. In this paper, due to Proclus's greater renown, we will first outline the key features of his philosophical system and metaphysical views. Subsequently, we will discuss the ideas of his philosophical successor, Damascius, in greater detail. https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_20787_e225bde0492714bbcc68103fcc0aa3bf.pdf