University of TabrizJournal of Philosophical Investigations2251-796061020120822The primary of ethics upon philosophyThe primary of ethics upon philosophy244199FAMohammadAsghari0000-0003-3874-4702Journal Article20121203This article considers the primacy of ethics upon philosophy in Levinas’s thought. Having focus on “Other” in his philosophy, Levinas looks radically different view at traditional ethics and concepts such as other, face, infinity, transcendence are opposite concepts as I, totality, and imminence. He believes that ethics is primacy upon philosophy and regards ethics as kind of first philosophy which is essentially other than western first philosophy. Of course, Levinas points that first philosophy includes wide realm which epistemology and ontology are its realm. The ethics that levinas defends it, is ethics which its realm is transcendence not immanence. He holds that western philosophy reduced other to same or self and it is in doing so antiethical.This article considers the primacy of ethics upon philosophy in Levinas’s thought. Having focus on “Other” in his philosophy, Levinas looks radically different view at traditional ethics and concepts such as other, face, infinity, transcendence are opposite concepts as I, totality, and imminence. He believes that ethics is primacy upon philosophy and regards ethics as kind of first philosophy which is essentially other than western first philosophy. Of course, Levinas points that first philosophy includes wide realm which epistemology and ontology are its realm. The ethics that levinas defends it, is ethics which its realm is transcendence not immanence. He holds that western philosophy reduced other to same or self and it is in doing so antiethical.https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_99_69c3e78b1780826c1eec83e1c2c079df.pdfUniversity of TabrizJournal of Philosophical Investigations2251-796061020120822Universal Logic as a General Theory of LogicUniversal Logic as a General Theory of Logic4461100FAMusaAkramiJournal Article20120923 Nowadays, we are confronted with important debates concerning “pluralism”, “monism”, “relativism”, and “absolutism” in logic on the one hand, and “combinations of logics”, and “translations of logics into each other”, on the other hand. <br />In a global reaction to the plurality of logics. Some important researches have been done in the framework of an extensive project called “universal logic” with two readings: 1) “universal logic as the general theory of logic(s)” or “universal logic as a general theory of logic(s)”; 2) “universal logic as the comprehensive logic”, or “super-logic”, or “mother logic”, a notion which encompasses all logics and generates them., The author gives a description as well as an explanation of the first reading, enumerating and evaluating the important constituents, fields, approaches, and methods of enquiry within the framework of “universal logic as the general theory of logic(s)”. Nowadays, we are confronted with important debates concerning “pluralism”, “monism”, “relativism”, and “absolutism” in logic on the one hand, and “combinations of logics”, and “translations of logics into each other”, on the other hand. <br />In a global reaction to the plurality of logics. Some important researches have been done in the framework of an extensive project called “universal logic” with two readings: 1) “universal logic as the general theory of logic(s)” or “universal logic as a general theory of logic(s)”; 2) “universal logic as the comprehensive logic”, or “super-logic”, or “mother logic”, a notion which encompasses all logics and generates them., The author gives a description as well as an explanation of the first reading, enumerating and evaluating the important constituents, fields, approaches, and methods of enquiry within the framework of “universal logic as the general theory of logic(s)”.https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_100_63207d8527227b85e8d0267a96eba24c.pdfUniversity of TabrizJournal of Philosophical Investigations2251-796061020120822The Position of Logic in Aristotle`s Divisions of SciencesThe Position of Logic in Aristotle`s Divisions of Sciences6396126FAAhmad AliHeidariMehdiHatefJournal Article20111102 One of the subject-matters that Aristotle had raised in his works is the division of sciences. He divides sciences, in different positions of his works, into parts and branches. Aristotle is the first one who articulated logical issues and introduced logic as a science. But in his divisions of sciences seems no name of logic. The question of this article is that where is the position of logic in Aristotle`s divisions of sciences. In this paper, referring to Aristotle works, we attempted to show that logic, by attention to discussions and topics that entails, is one of the parts or branches of the first philosophy and we must consider it as a theoretical science. <br /> In Aristotle`s viewpoint, the subject matter of the first philosophy is "being" qua being. But the term "Being" has several meanings; one of them is "<em>being</em> in the sense of <em>true</em>". Aristotle holds that, since all of these senses are synonymous, investigation of them, including the investigation of "true", belong to one science; namely first philosophy. On the other hand logic is the science that is investigating about "true". Therefore logic would be a part or branch of the first philosophy. <br /> From viewpoint of Aristotle, logic, at the same time, is an instrumental science. But this instrumentality of logic has no contradictory with the fact that it is a theoretical science. Since what makes a science a theoretical one is the fact that in that science there would be no purpose other than "knowledge"; but what makes a science a non-instrumental one is the fact that in that science there would be no purpose other than "knowledge about the subject matter of that science". Therefore the criterion of "being theoretical" is different from criterion of "being non-instrumental"; and for this reason a science can be a theoretical one, and at the same time be instrumental. One of the subject-matters that Aristotle had raised in his works is the division of sciences. He divides sciences, in different positions of his works, into parts and branches. Aristotle is the first one who articulated logical issues and introduced logic as a science. But in his divisions of sciences seems no name of logic. The question of this article is that where is the position of logic in Aristotle`s divisions of sciences. In this paper, referring to Aristotle works, we attempted to show that logic, by attention to discussions and topics that entails, is one of the parts or branches of the first philosophy and we must consider it as a theoretical science. <br /> In Aristotle`s viewpoint, the subject matter of the first philosophy is "being" qua being. But the term "Being" has several meanings; one of them is "<em>being</em> in the sense of <em>true</em>". Aristotle holds that, since all of these senses are synonymous, investigation of them, including the investigation of "true", belong to one science; namely first philosophy. On the other hand logic is the science that is investigating about "true". Therefore logic would be a part or branch of the first philosophy. <br /> From viewpoint of Aristotle, logic, at the same time, is an instrumental science. But this instrumentality of logic has no contradictory with the fact that it is a theoretical science. Since what makes a science a theoretical one is the fact that in that science there would be no purpose other than "knowledge"; but what makes a science a non-instrumental one is the fact that in that science there would be no purpose other than "knowledge about the subject matter of that science". Therefore the criterion of "being theoretical" is different from criterion of "being non-instrumental"; and for this reason a science can be a theoretical one, and at the same time be instrumental.https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_126_5639a01c14b37dfb89535ca63249839e.pdfUniversity of TabrizJournal of Philosophical Investigations2251-796061020120822Freud on Ethics: The Equivalence of Evolution of Morality in Individual and SpeciesFreud on Ethics: The Equivalence of Evolution of Morality in Individual and Species97116127FAHeidariAhmad AliMehdiHatefJournal Article20111120The explanation made by Freud for the institution of morality and its relation with human psyche proceeded in two separate projects. At the first, it is described the establishment of moral sense in individual’s psyche, and at the second an explanation for its generation and continuity in human species is presented. This essay deals with the relation between these two. First, two description related to these projects are presented in which the possibility of comparison and criticizing them have been provided. The main claim of this essay which is itself an admitted Freud’s idea involved in an equivalence between two projects. It means that it is possible to establish a one-to-one equivalence between the foundational concepts and general mechanisms of moral institution. The place of this principle have not been determined in Freud’s thought; if it is a result of his discussion in that he presented separate arguments, or concerns with that as n axiom. Next, it is explained that this equivalence could be reduced into an equivalence between their two central concepts; The notion of moral judgment in its Aristotelian-Kantian sense, and the notion of Taboo in which anthropologists are concerned with. At the end, the similar and distinct aspects of these two concepts are discussed by which some critical considerations on Freud’s attitude toward moral institution have beed presented.The explanation made by Freud for the institution of morality and its relation with human psyche proceeded in two separate projects. At the first, it is described the establishment of moral sense in individual’s psyche, and at the second an explanation for its generation and continuity in human species is presented. This essay deals with the relation between these two. First, two description related to these projects are presented in which the possibility of comparison and criticizing them have been provided. The main claim of this essay which is itself an admitted Freud’s idea involved in an equivalence between two projects. It means that it is possible to establish a one-to-one equivalence between the foundational concepts and general mechanisms of moral institution. The place of this principle have not been determined in Freud’s thought; if it is a result of his discussion in that he presented separate arguments, or concerns with that as n axiom. Next, it is explained that this equivalence could be reduced into an equivalence between their two central concepts; The notion of moral judgment in its Aristotelian-Kantian sense, and the notion of Taboo in which anthropologists are concerned with. At the end, the similar and distinct aspects of these two concepts are discussed by which some critical considerations on Freud’s attitude toward moral institution have beed presented.https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_127_964da7d576410791374217cb5aec92be.pdfUniversity of TabrizJournal of Philosophical Investigations2251-796061020120822The Role of Perception in Objectivity of Objects in View of Husserl’s PhilosophyThe Role of Perception in Objectivity of Objects in View of Husserl’s Philosophy119137128FAMahmoudSufianiorcid 0000-0003-180Ahmad AliAkbar MesgariJournal Article20121107 Objectivity is one of the most basic and difficult issues in modern and contemporary philosophy. The present paper is devoted to this issue from view- point of Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology. Since perception, particularly sense perception, in view of intentionality, as lowest level of objectivity can act as the base for perceiving the objectivity of other objects, whether real or unreal (ideal), it has been discussed in this paper. To do this, objectivity of the sense perception and its role in leading the mind toward essential and ideal objects, and conversely, the role of latter objects in objectivity of the perception itself will be explored. Because the concepts of objectivity and evidence are correlate in Husserl’s philosophy, and since evidence as the self-given manifests itself, from the very beginning, in the lowest level, namely the objects of sense perception, and considering that evidence and objectivity of sense perception concern this lowest level, the critical viewpoint of Husserl’s phenomenology provides a firm and new basis for objectivity if taken at its full competence. Objectivity is one of the most basic and difficult issues in modern and contemporary philosophy. The present paper is devoted to this issue from view- point of Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology. Since perception, particularly sense perception, in view of intentionality, as lowest level of objectivity can act as the base for perceiving the objectivity of other objects, whether real or unreal (ideal), it has been discussed in this paper. To do this, objectivity of the sense perception and its role in leading the mind toward essential and ideal objects, and conversely, the role of latter objects in objectivity of the perception itself will be explored. Because the concepts of objectivity and evidence are correlate in Husserl’s philosophy, and since evidence as the self-given manifests itself, from the very beginning, in the lowest level, namely the objects of sense perception, and considering that evidence and objectivity of sense perception concern this lowest level, the critical viewpoint of Husserl’s phenomenology provides a firm and new basis for objectivity if taken at its full competence.https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_128_0b2861e9e24a1ccc6d83d2e30b8496bf.pdfUniversity of TabrizJournal of Philosophical Investigations2251-796061020120822Empiricism and the Challenge of AnalyticsEmpiricism and the Challenge of Analytics139158129FARezaSadeghiJournal Article20111123Although in the last decades positivistic view about analytic-synthetic distinction has encountered serious challenges, but the main results of this distinction such as antirealism in the mathematic an logic and the distinction of value-fact has been remained in the contemporary philosophy of science. this article at first will consider the main problems of empiricists in accounting the epistemic place of analytics and then will argue that Quinean approach is success in showing the problems of positivism but has embraced the conventionalism in physic which is in contrast with any serious scientific research. Reexamining the aristotlian realism in the logic and mathematic is the final position of this article. Although in the last decades positivistic view about analytic-synthetic distinction has encountered serious challenges, but the main results of this distinction such as antirealism in the mathematic an logic and the distinction of value-fact has been remained in the contemporary philosophy of science. this article at first will consider the main problems of empiricists in accounting the epistemic place of analytics and then will argue that Quinean approach is success in showing the problems of positivism but has embraced the conventionalism in physic which is in contrast with any serious scientific research. Reexamining the aristotlian realism in the logic and mathematic is the final position of this article. https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_129_0deaa032fb93a18ad1278f1532bed455.pdfUniversity of TabrizJournal of Philosophical Investigations2251-796061020120822Heidegger’s Deconstructive Interpretation of Plato
In the Light of
Platons Lehre Von der WahrheitHeidegger’s Deconstructive Interpretation of Plato
In the Light of
Platons Lehre Von der Wahrheit159180130FAAli AsgharMoslehRezaDehghaniJournal Article20120722Heidegger’s interpretation of Plato related to turning (<em>Kehre</em>) period of his thought. In the <em>Platons Lehre Von der Wahrheit</em> (which pertains to this period), by interpreting Plato’s Allegory of Cave and through deconstruction of Plato’s metaphysical tradition, he proceeds to present his own view of truth. While in <em>Being and Time</em> (Which pertains to first period of his thought) he had asserted that Correspondence and Openness as two senses of truth are alongside and in a sense the first is the condition of the realization of the latter, in the <em>Platons Lehre Von der Wahrheit</em> he has contrasted them and given value to Openness instead of Correspondence. Heidegger believes that although Pre-Socratic philosophers have been taking Being as <em>Aletheia,</em> it was Plato’s Allegory of the Cave that has opened the way to change the essence of truth and replaced truth as openness by truth as correspondence. Hence, taking Plato’s movement as the beginning of metaphysics and also by deconstructive interpretation of Plato’s Allegory of Cave, he proceeds to interpret the history of metaphysics. Therefore, the problem, on Heidegger’s view, is that history of metaphysics (even humanism and contemporary philosophies) was in the service of Plato’s movement. In conclusion, our main task, here, is to contemplate on beginning and understand Pre-Socratic philosopher’s view of Being.Heidegger’s interpretation of Plato related to turning (<em>Kehre</em>) period of his thought. In the <em>Platons Lehre Von der Wahrheit</em> (which pertains to this period), by interpreting Plato’s Allegory of Cave and through deconstruction of Plato’s metaphysical tradition, he proceeds to present his own view of truth. While in <em>Being and Time</em> (Which pertains to first period of his thought) he had asserted that Correspondence and Openness as two senses of truth are alongside and in a sense the first is the condition of the realization of the latter, in the <em>Platons Lehre Von der Wahrheit</em> he has contrasted them and given value to Openness instead of Correspondence. Heidegger believes that although Pre-Socratic philosophers have been taking Being as <em>Aletheia,</em> it was Plato’s Allegory of the Cave that has opened the way to change the essence of truth and replaced truth as openness by truth as correspondence. Hence, taking Plato’s movement as the beginning of metaphysics and also by deconstructive interpretation of Plato’s Allegory of Cave, he proceeds to interpret the history of metaphysics. Therefore, the problem, on Heidegger’s view, is that history of metaphysics (even humanism and contemporary philosophies) was in the service of Plato’s movement. In conclusion, our main task, here, is to contemplate on beginning and understand Pre-Socratic philosopher’s view of Being.https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_130_45bc508677ce4c6eaceee4fc6ae27155.pdf