University of TabrizJournal of Philosophical Investigations2251-796091720160220Metaphysics of Logical RealismMetaphysics of Logical Realism12114932FAMohammadrezaAbdollahnejadAssistant Professor in Philosophy Departmrnt, University of TabrizAbdollahnejad@tabrizJournal Article20150712Despite the often false impression that the analytic philosophy as an anti-metaphysical movement has nothing to do with metaphysics, there can be found good reasons to grant the metaphysical dispositions and theses of analytic philosophers, and thereby, to minimize the anti-metaphysical nature of analytic philosophy in its all phases. Since analytic philosophy is a historical movement which its main nature developed through several stages, it can be easily portrayed the very kinds of metaphysical dispositions within each one of its various stages. One of the most important stages of analytic philosophy there can be found within which a plenty of metaphysical dispositions is its early stage (viz. the stage of Logical Realism). Undoubtedly, one cannot say that analytic philosophy in this period was not committed to metaphysical theses about the plurality of entities, the ultimate nature of reality and the logical structure of the world. In this paper, then, after giving a relatively complete explanation of the logical realism, we claimed that although logical realists rejected the traditional speculative metaphysics of their predecessors, they also replaced it by the metaphysics of logic that pursues the metaphysical aims, this time, by logical means. So, we portrayed this kind of metaphysics as Bolzano’s Semantic Platonism, Frege’s and Russell’s Pluralistic Platonism, Russell’s Pluralistic Atomism, and Wittgenstein’s logical atomism.Despite the often false impression that the analytic philosophy as an anti-metaphysical movement has nothing to do with metaphysics, there can be found good reasons to grant the metaphysical dispositions and theses of analytic philosophers, and thereby, to minimize the anti-metaphysical nature of analytic philosophy in its all phases. Since analytic philosophy is a historical movement which its main nature developed through several stages, it can be easily portrayed the very kinds of metaphysical dispositions within each one of its various stages. One of the most important stages of analytic philosophy there can be found within which a plenty of metaphysical dispositions is its early stage (viz. the stage of Logical Realism). Undoubtedly, one cannot say that analytic philosophy in this period was not committed to metaphysical theses about the plurality of entities, the ultimate nature of reality and the logical structure of the world. In this paper, then, after giving a relatively complete explanation of the logical realism, we claimed that although logical realists rejected the traditional speculative metaphysics of their predecessors, they also replaced it by the metaphysics of logic that pursues the metaphysical aims, this time, by logical means. So, we portrayed this kind of metaphysics as Bolzano’s Semantic Platonism, Frege’s and Russell’s Pluralistic Platonism, Russell’s Pluralistic Atomism, and Wittgenstein’s logical atomism.https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_14932_fd2860ec654e4b61a052c8e06f2c07fe.pdfUniversity of TabrizJournal of Philosophical Investigations2251-796091720160220The Need for the Dualist View to Combat Extremism: How the Dualist View Can Combat Extremis?The Need for the Dualist View to Combat Extremism: How the Dualist View Can Combat Extremis?23524695FAAlistair J.SinclairPhD in philosophy, The Center for Dualist Studies, Glasgow, UKJournal Article20160419<em><span lang="EN-GB"><span>This paper argues that we will never get rid of the extremist mentality unless the dualist view prevails and is taught as part of the educational system. The dualist view takes account of both sides of an argument whereas the extremist view promotes one side unequivocally without considering the merits of the opposing view. The merits of the dualist view can be taught in schools so that everyone learns to recognise that mentality when it is evident not only in other people’s behaviour but also in their own thinking about things. The dualist view is a flexible one involving trial-and-error processes as we work our way through life. That view is contrasted with the monist view that focuses on one point of view to the exclusion of all others. The extremist’s view is usually monistic and is intolerable of views that contradict or dispute their dogmatic view of things. This paper therefore examines these two contrasting views. It outlines the spectrum between monist and dualist ways of thinking, and it concludes that systematic form of dualism is possible that takes the middle way between the extremes of dogmatic and sceptical thinking. Only through dualist studies will the dualist view be more thoroughly developed, as is outlined here</span></span></em><em><span lang="EN-GB">. </span></em><em><span lang="EN-GB"><span>This paper argues that we will never get rid of the extremist mentality unless the dualist view prevails and is taught as part of the educational system. The dualist view takes account of both sides of an argument whereas the extremist view promotes one side unequivocally without considering the merits of the opposing view. The merits of the dualist view can be taught in schools so that everyone learns to recognise that mentality when it is evident not only in other people’s behaviour but also in their own thinking about things. The dualist view is a flexible one involving trial-and-error processes as we work our way through life. That view is contrasted with the monist view that focuses on one point of view to the exclusion of all others. The extremist’s view is usually monistic and is intolerable of views that contradict or dispute their dogmatic view of things. This paper therefore examines these two contrasting views. It outlines the spectrum between monist and dualist ways of thinking, and it concludes that systematic form of dualism is possible that takes the middle way between the extremes of dogmatic and sceptical thinking. Only through dualist studies will the dualist view be more thoroughly developed, as is outlined here</span></span></em><em><span lang="EN-GB">. </span></em>https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_4695_4f8ccfbd4ec62e874f9e3b254169e564.pdfUniversity of TabrizJournal of Philosophical Investigations2251-796091720160220Has Rorty a moral philosophy?Has Rorty a moral philosophy?557414934FAMohammadAsghariAssociate Professor in Philosophy, University of Tabriz, Iran0000-0003-3874-4702Journal Article20151230I try to show that Richard Rorty, although is not a moral philosopher like Kant, nerveless, has moral philosophy that it must be taken seriously. Rorty has not engaged with moral philosophy in the systematic manner common among leading modern and contemporary moral philosophers. This paper has two parts: first part, in briefly, is concerned with principles of his philosophy such as anti-essentialism, Darwinism, Freudism, and historicism. second part, will be a long and detailed, considers many moral themes in Rorty''''''''s thought such as critique of Kantian morality, solidarity, moral progress, cruelty and concept of other, etc. subsequently, we will try to answer question of the article (namely, has Rorty a moral philosophy?).I try to show that Richard Rorty, although is not a moral philosopher like Kant, nerveless, has moral philosophy that it must be taken seriously. Rorty has not engaged with moral philosophy in the systematic manner common among leading modern and contemporary moral philosophers. This paper has two parts: first part, in briefly, is concerned with principles of his philosophy such as anti-essentialism, Darwinism, Freudism, and historicism. second part, will be a long and detailed, considers many moral themes in Rorty''''''''s thought such as critique of Kantian morality, solidarity, moral progress, cruelty and concept of other, etc. subsequently, we will try to answer question of the article (namely, has Rorty a moral philosophy?).https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_14934_f870dc06490d9574a08a5748c8625fbe.pdfUniversity of TabrizJournal of Philosophical Investigations2251-796091720160220Lakatos and Hersh on Mathematical ProofLakatos and Hersh on Mathematical Proof759314915FAHosseinBayatPhD in Philosophy, Department of Philosophy of Science, Science and Research Branch of Islamic Azad University, Tehran, Iran.Journal Article20150614The concept of Mathematical Proof has been controversial for the past few decades. Different philosophers have offered different theories about the nature of Mathematical Proof, among which theories presented by Lakatos and Hersh have had significant similarities and differences with each other. It seems that a comparison and critical review of these two theories will lead to a better understanding of the concept of mathematical proof and will be a big step towards solving many related problems. Lakatos and Hersh argue that, firstly, “mathematical proof” has two different meanings, formal and informal; and, secondly, informal proofs are affected by human factors, such as individual decisions and collective agreements. I call these two theses, respectively, “proof dualism” and “humanism”. But on the other hand, their theories have significant dissimilarities and are by no means equivalent. Lakatos is committed to linear proof dualism and methodological humanism, while Hersh’s theory involves some sort of parallel proof dualism and sociological humanism. According to linear proof dualism, the two main types of proofs are provided in order to achieve a common goal: incarnation of mathematical concepts and methods and truth. However, according to the parallel proof dualism, two main types of proofs are provided in order to achieve two different types of purposes: production of a valid sequence of signs (the goal of the formal proof) and persuasion of the audience (the goal of the informal proof). Hersh’s humanism is informative and indicates pluralism; whereas, Lakatos’ version of humanism is normative and monistic.The concept of Mathematical Proof has been controversial for the past few decades. Different philosophers have offered different theories about the nature of Mathematical Proof, among which theories presented by Lakatos and Hersh have had significant similarities and differences with each other. It seems that a comparison and critical review of these two theories will lead to a better understanding of the concept of mathematical proof and will be a big step towards solving many related problems. Lakatos and Hersh argue that, firstly, “mathematical proof” has two different meanings, formal and informal; and, secondly, informal proofs are affected by human factors, such as individual decisions and collective agreements. I call these two theses, respectively, “proof dualism” and “humanism”. But on the other hand, their theories have significant dissimilarities and are by no means equivalent. Lakatos is committed to linear proof dualism and methodological humanism, while Hersh’s theory involves some sort of parallel proof dualism and sociological humanism. According to linear proof dualism, the two main types of proofs are provided in order to achieve a common goal: incarnation of mathematical concepts and methods and truth. However, according to the parallel proof dualism, two main types of proofs are provided in order to achieve two different types of purposes: production of a valid sequence of signs (the goal of the formal proof) and persuasion of the audience (the goal of the informal proof). Hersh’s humanism is informative and indicates pluralism; whereas, Lakatos’ version of humanism is normative and monistic.https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_14915_3abfd3ec0f6069c49faf82e10de5e8a4.pdfUniversity of TabrizJournal of Philosophical Investigations2251-796091720160220Does the conceptual interdependency of belief and desire undermine the normativity of content?Does the conceptual interdependency of belief and desire undermine the normativity of content?9510314873FAAliKalantariAssistant Professor of Philosophy Department, University of IsfahanJournal Article20140914The normativity of mental content thesis has been very influential in contemporary philosophy of mind. Paul Boghossian (2003, 2005) has developed an argument for the normativity of mental content on the basis of two premises, i.e. firstly, the normativity of the notion of belief and secondly, the priority of the notion of belief to the notion of desire. In his recent article Alexander Miller (2008) has criticised Boghossian’s argument for the normativity of mental content. To make the objection against the normativity of content Miller has argued that the second premise of Boghossian’s argument is false to the effect that belief and desire are conceptually interdependent. My purpose in this paper is to show that content normativity thesis survives Miller's attack. In order to establish the claim I will argue that content is normative even if belief and desire are conceptually interdependent.The normativity of mental content thesis has been very influential in contemporary philosophy of mind. Paul Boghossian (2003, 2005) has developed an argument for the normativity of mental content on the basis of two premises, i.e. firstly, the normativity of the notion of belief and secondly, the priority of the notion of belief to the notion of desire. In his recent article Alexander Miller (2008) has criticised Boghossian’s argument for the normativity of mental content. To make the objection against the normativity of content Miller has argued that the second premise of Boghossian’s argument is false to the effect that belief and desire are conceptually interdependent. My purpose in this paper is to show that content normativity thesis survives Miller's attack. In order to establish the claim I will argue that content is normative even if belief and desire are conceptually interdependent.https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_14873_9327d41ad8a217a4dc9a04f33d9a5f5c.pdfUniversity of TabrizJournal of Philosophical Investigations2251-796091720160220Plantinga’s Reformed Epistemology and Religious Extremism: Some Historical EvidencesPlantinga’s Reformed Epistemology and Religious Extremism: Some Historical Evidences1051164699FAJalalPeykaniAssosiate Professor in philosophy, Payam-e Nour UniversityMeysamSadeghpourInstructor of Art & Architecture, Payam-e Nour UniversityJournal Article20160419 <br /><em><span lang="DE">According to Plantinga’s reformed epistemology, as perceptual beliefs, religious beliefs are properly basic, and therefore need no additional justification. But as it has been said frequently, this idea may lead to relativism. In this paper, first, we argue that not only its relativistic aspect allows for </span><span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: medium;">religious extremism, but also it could be used to justify that kind of extremism. Then, reciting some historical testimonies, including John Calvin, Khawarij, Ibn Taymiyye and Seyyed Qutb, we suggest that in principle, for many centuries extremists have derived a benefit from an idea similar to reformed epistemology to justify </span><span><span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: medium;">committing </span></span><span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: medium;">violence and other unacceptable behaviors.</span></em> <br /> <br /><em><span lang="DE">According to Plantinga’s reformed epistemology, as perceptual beliefs, religious beliefs are properly basic, and therefore need no additional justification. But as it has been said frequently, this idea may lead to relativism. In this paper, first, we argue that not only its relativistic aspect allows for </span><span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: medium;">religious extremism, but also it could be used to justify that kind of extremism. Then, reciting some historical testimonies, including John Calvin, Khawarij, Ibn Taymiyye and Seyyed Qutb, we suggest that in principle, for many centuries extremists have derived a benefit from an idea similar to reformed epistemology to justify </span><span><span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: medium;">committing </span></span><span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: medium;">violence and other unacceptable behaviors.</span></em> <br /> https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_4699_19473dcf590c02648f3c0f004d061557.pdfUniversity of TabrizJournal of Philosophical Investigations2251-796091720160220The Ethics (Ethos) of HistoryThe Ethics (Ethos) of History1171364700FAJamesRisserProfessor of philosophy, Seattle University, ?USAJournal Article20160419<em><span style="font-size: medium;">This paper provides a critical analysis of Heidegger’s brief remarks in his “Letter on Humanism” in which he links ethics to ethos and ultimately to our relation to time and history. Central to this analysis is the phrase of Heraclitus, ēthos anthrōpōi daimōn, from which Heidegger claims that human living (ethos) is inseparable from the event of appropriation (Ereignis) which generates our historical destiny. Through further analysis that draws from the work of Jean-Luc Nancy and Giorgio Agamben, it is shown just how Heraclitus’s phrase can be interpreted differently and thus presents us with an idea of human destiny that serves to qualify Heidegger’s claim.</span></em><em><span style="font-size: medium;">This paper provides a critical analysis of Heidegger’s brief remarks in his “Letter on Humanism” in which he links ethics to ethos and ultimately to our relation to time and history. Central to this analysis is the phrase of Heraclitus, ēthos anthrōpōi daimōn, from which Heidegger claims that human living (ethos) is inseparable from the event of appropriation (Ereignis) which generates our historical destiny. Through further analysis that draws from the work of Jean-Luc Nancy and Giorgio Agamben, it is shown just how Heraclitus’s phrase can be interpreted differently and thus presents us with an idea of human destiny that serves to qualify Heidegger’s claim.</span></em>https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_4700_b7a26de7b253bd314cd6d7a9f60dc074.pdfUniversity of TabrizJournal of Philosophical Investigations2251-796091720160220Relativism:Protagoras and Nelson GoodmanRelativism:Protagoras and Nelson Goodman13715115756FAEsmaeilSaadati KhamsehAssistant Professor in Philosophy
Mohaghegh Ardabili’s University, IranJournal Article20160118<em>Discussion of the many faces of relativism occupies a highly prominent place in the epistemological literature. Protagoras in ancient Greece and Nelson Goodman in the modern period are two most notable proponent of relativism. In the present article, I discuss and explain relativistic approaches of this two important relativist. I will first briefly define and review some faces of relativism. Then I will discuss and elaborate Protagorean or true-for-me relativism and Goodman’s radical relativism in turn. I will argue that there are crucial difficulties in Protagorean and radical relativism, and that these difficulties, as the realist philosophers insist, make these two faces of relativism be undefensible. No doubt, these two shapes of relativism have paved the way for anti-realism. In the end, it will appear that Goodman’s radical relativism and so the theory of worldmaking, like Protagorean relativism, suffers from a fatal flaw: the flaw of self-refuting. </em><em>Discussion of the many faces of relativism occupies a highly prominent place in the epistemological literature. Protagoras in ancient Greece and Nelson Goodman in the modern period are two most notable proponent of relativism. In the present article, I discuss and explain relativistic approaches of this two important relativist. I will first briefly define and review some faces of relativism. Then I will discuss and elaborate Protagorean or true-for-me relativism and Goodman’s radical relativism in turn. I will argue that there are crucial difficulties in Protagorean and radical relativism, and that these difficulties, as the realist philosophers insist, make these two faces of relativism be undefensible. No doubt, these two shapes of relativism have paved the way for anti-realism. In the end, it will appear that Goodman’s radical relativism and so the theory of worldmaking, like Protagorean relativism, suffers from a fatal flaw: the flaw of self-refuting. </em>University of TabrizJournal of Philosophical Investigations2251-796091720160220The Creation of Necessity: Making Sense of Cartesian ModalityThe Creation of Necessity: Making Sense of Cartesian Modality1531714702FABethSeacordAssistant Professor, Grand Valley University, USAJournal Article20160419<em><span>In Descartes theological writing, he promotes two jointly puzzling theses: T1) God freely creates the eternal truths (i.e. the Creation Doctrine) and T2) The eternal truths are necessarily true. According to T1 God freely chooses which propositions to make necessary, contingent and possible. However the Creation Doctrine makes the acceptance of T2 tenuous for the Creation Doctrine implies that God could have acted otherwise--instantiating an entirely different set of necessary truths. Jonathan Bennett seeks to reconcile T1 and T2 by relativizing modality to human understanding. I argue that Bennett’s approach to Cartesian modality is misplaced: One does not have to resort to conceptualism about modality in order to explain the subjective language found in Descartes or to reconcile Descartes’ Creation Doctrine with the necessity of the eternal truths. After showing that Bennett’s argument implies that Descartes held the non-eternality of the eternal truths and the independence of the eternal truths from God, I show that if one understands Descartes’ use modal terms as indexed to God’s willing, then apparent contradictions vanish. In addition, I show that if one evaluates the truth value of modal propositions ‘non-bivalently’, then one can also unravel the apparent contradiction. One can reconcile Descartes’ Creation Doctrine (T1) and the necessity of the eternal truths (T2) without Bennett’s conceptualism. </span></em><em><span>In Descartes theological writing, he promotes two jointly puzzling theses: T1) God freely creates the eternal truths (i.e. the Creation Doctrine) and T2) The eternal truths are necessarily true. According to T1 God freely chooses which propositions to make necessary, contingent and possible. However the Creation Doctrine makes the acceptance of T2 tenuous for the Creation Doctrine implies that God could have acted otherwise--instantiating an entirely different set of necessary truths. Jonathan Bennett seeks to reconcile T1 and T2 by relativizing modality to human understanding. I argue that Bennett’s approach to Cartesian modality is misplaced: One does not have to resort to conceptualism about modality in order to explain the subjective language found in Descartes or to reconcile Descartes’ Creation Doctrine with the necessity of the eternal truths. After showing that Bennett’s argument implies that Descartes held the non-eternality of the eternal truths and the independence of the eternal truths from God, I show that if one understands Descartes’ use modal terms as indexed to God’s willing, then apparent contradictions vanish. In addition, I show that if one evaluates the truth value of modal propositions ‘non-bivalently’, then one can also unravel the apparent contradiction. One can reconcile Descartes’ Creation Doctrine (T1) and the necessity of the eternal truths (T2) without Bennett’s conceptualism. </span></em>https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_4702_d5b84d2fd45aaef7295073f251e70f14.pdfUniversity of TabrizJournal of Philosophical Investigations2251-796091720160220Place goes wrong in treating mind-brain relationship: Clarifying why identity theory is neither reasonable nor a mere scientific problem in disguisePlace goes wrong in treating mind-brain relationship: Clarifying why identity theory is neither reasonable nor a mere scientific problem in disguise17320214816FAMahdiSoleimani KhormujiPhD Candidate in Philosophy, Imam Khomeini International University, Qazvin, IranJournal Article20140510U. T. Place claims that philosophical problems concerning the true nature of mind-brain relationship will be disappeared or settled in favor of materialism, especially type identity theory of mind. He takes above claim as a reasonable scientific hypothesis. I shall argue why it is not as he claims. At the first, to pave the way for refutation, I will briefly clarify Place's approach to subject in hand; although the rest of paper will be also contained more details about his position. Then, I will reduce his position into four theses and try to prove that the main claim of type identity theory is neither reasonable nor a mere scientific problem in disguise. I think that we ought to take type identity theory, at most, just as a hypothesis approximately displays the function of mind-brain relationship but tells us nothing justifiably about its true nature.U. T. Place claims that philosophical problems concerning the true nature of mind-brain relationship will be disappeared or settled in favor of materialism, especially type identity theory of mind. He takes above claim as a reasonable scientific hypothesis. I shall argue why it is not as he claims. At the first, to pave the way for refutation, I will briefly clarify Place's approach to subject in hand; although the rest of paper will be also contained more details about his position. Then, I will reduce his position into four theses and try to prove that the main claim of type identity theory is neither reasonable nor a mere scientific problem in disguise. I think that we ought to take type identity theory, at most, just as a hypothesis approximately displays the function of mind-brain relationship but tells us nothing justifiably about its true nature.https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_14816_08d9d65626e539a6556c824f51532cf4.pdfUniversity of TabrizJournal of Philosophical Investigations2251-796091720160220The Humanisti Heritage of Muhammad ArkounThe Humanisti Heritage of Muhammad Arkoun2032274704FAKatharinaVolkerIndependent Researcher (Post-Doc),Otago University ,New ZealandJournal Article20160419<em><span lang="EN-GB"><span style="font-size: medium;">This article presents Muhammad Arkoun's (1928-2010) key ideas on ethos, civil society, and secularism. Following reflections on adab, Arkoun's inspiration for rethinking Islamic heritage (turāth), this contribution shows how Arkoun reconsiders the impact of philosophy, both in theology as well as academic scholarship. The paper displays his hopes for generating an innovative intellectual education, which eventually leads to a humanistic consciousness within the Islamic as well as the non-Islamic realm. The paper closes with a display of Arkoun's thoughts on the emergence of individual citizenhood. </span></span></em><em><span lang="EN-GB"><span style="font-size: medium;">This article presents Muhammad Arkoun's (1928-2010) key ideas on ethos, civil society, and secularism. Following reflections on adab, Arkoun's inspiration for rethinking Islamic heritage (turāth), this contribution shows how Arkoun reconsiders the impact of philosophy, both in theology as well as academic scholarship. The paper displays his hopes for generating an innovative intellectual education, which eventually leads to a humanistic consciousness within the Islamic as well as the non-Islamic realm. The paper closes with a display of Arkoun's thoughts on the emergence of individual citizenhood. </span></span></em>https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_4704_afab7a92f4204cfa2a6b2e5603989a9c.pdf