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<Journal>
				<PublisherName>University of Tabriz</PublisherName>
				<JournalTitle>Journal of Philosophical Investigations</JournalTitle>
				<Issn>2251-7960</Issn>
				<Volume>10</Volume>
				<Issue>18</Issue>
				<PubDate PubStatus="epublish">
					<Year>2016</Year>
					<Month>03</Month>
					<Day>20</Day>
				</PubDate>
			</Journal>
<ArticleTitle>The Evolution of Patterns of Sciences Differentiation According to Muslim Scholars</ArticleTitle>
<VernacularTitle>The Evolution of Patterns of Sciences Differentiation According to Muslim Scholars</VernacularTitle>
			<FirstPage>125</FirstPage>
			<LastPage>152</LastPage>
			<ELocationID EIdType="pii">14802</ELocationID>
			
			
			<Language>FA</Language>
<AuthorList>
<Author>
					<FirstName>Hamed</FirstName>
					<LastName>Mostafavi Fard</LastName>
<Affiliation>PhD of Quran and Hadith Sciences, Ferdowsi University of Mashhad</Affiliation>

</Author>
</AuthorList>
				<PublicationType>Journal Article</PublicationType>
			<History>
				<PubDate PubStatus="received">
					<Year>2014</Year>
					<Month>04</Month>
					<Day>14</Day>
				</PubDate>
			</History>
		<Abstract>The oldest pattern of sciences differentiation is owned by Aristotle, which promoted by Muslim philosophers. But over time, its inefficiency became evident for Muslim scholars, especially Usulis, theologians, logicians and etc. As far as Khorasani, offered pattern of differentiation based on the purpose of creation; and Isfahani and Khomeini raised pattern of differentiation based on the relevance theorems. But each of these exclusivistic models were flawed, and this led to combine models proposed. It also, by revealing weaknesses, replaced by pattern of differentiation based on agreement. They believe that science is a collection of different issues and all things that are valid in the sight of the wises, are involved in this unity and differentiation and may be considered, like the time to learn science, the aesthetics, community needs, historical preferences and etc.</Abstract>
			<OtherAbstract Language="FA">The oldest pattern of sciences differentiation is owned by Aristotle, which promoted by Muslim philosophers. But over time, its inefficiency became evident for Muslim scholars, especially Usulis, theologians, logicians and etc. As far as Khorasani, offered pattern of differentiation based on the purpose of creation; and Isfahani and Khomeini raised pattern of differentiation based on the relevance theorems. But each of these exclusivistic models were flawed, and this led to combine models proposed. It also, by revealing weaknesses, replaced by pattern of differentiation based on agreement. They believe that science is a collection of different issues and all things that are valid in the sight of the wises, are involved in this unity and differentiation and may be considered, like the time to learn science, the aesthetics, community needs, historical preferences and etc.</OtherAbstract>
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			<Param Name="value">Sciences Differentiation</Param>
			</Object>
			<Object Type="keyword">
			<Param Name="value">The Differentiation Based on The Subject</Param>
			</Object>
			<Object Type="keyword">
			<Param Name="value">The Differentiation based on The Purpose</Param>
			</Object>
			<Object Type="keyword">
			<Param Name="value">The Differentiation Based on The Relevance Theorems</Param>
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<ArchiveCopySource DocType="pdf">https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_14802_b249faeb93d8a6ca723fddff3ae1dc5d.pdf</ArchiveCopySource>
</Article>

<Article>
<Journal>
				<PublisherName>University of Tabriz</PublisherName>
				<JournalTitle>Journal of Philosophical Investigations</JournalTitle>
				<Issn>2251-7960</Issn>
				<Volume>10</Volume>
				<Issue>18</Issue>
				<PubDate PubStatus="epublish">
					<Year>2016</Year>
					<Month>03</Month>
					<Day>20</Day>
				</PubDate>
			</Journal>
<ArticleTitle>Paul Masson-Oursel's Reading of Comparative Philosophy</ArticleTitle>
<VernacularTitle>Paul Masson-Oursel&#039;s Reading of Comparative Philosophy</VernacularTitle>
			<FirstPage>153</FirstPage>
			<LastPage>169</LastPage>
			<ELocationID EIdType="pii">14804</ELocationID>
			
			
			<Language>FA</Language>
<AuthorList>
<Author>
					<FirstName>Mohammad Sina</FirstName>
					<LastName>Mirzaei</LastName>
<Affiliation>PhD Candidate of Philosophy, University of Tabriz</Affiliation>

</Author>
<Author>
					<FirstName>Mostafa</FirstName>
					<LastName>Shahraeeni</LastName>
<Affiliation>Associate Professor of Philosophy Department, University of Tabriz</Affiliation>

</Author>
</AuthorList>
				<PublicationType>Journal Article</PublicationType>
			<History>
				<PubDate PubStatus="received">
					<Year>2014</Year>
					<Month>04</Month>
					<Day>23</Day>
				</PubDate>
			</History>
		<Abstract>Masson Oursel is considered as the father of comparative (or as some believe, compared) philosophy. His work is influenced by two main stream of thought in the early twentieth century: historicism and positivism. By appealing the comparative method, Oursel, in his book, La philosophie comparee (comparative philosophy), aims to make philosophy free from both absolute dogmatism and relativism. To accomplish this, he makes some close relation among abjective facts with their historical formation context, so that one cannot understand completely one without the other. Oursel believes that different philosophies and historical periods, would better to be compared. In their cultural context, with each other through analogy. He was convinced that in any society or civilization, there is not a solitary/individual historical fact which could not be interpreted comparatively an in accordance with positive scientific method</Abstract>
			<OtherAbstract Language="FA">Masson Oursel is considered as the father of comparative (or as some believe, compared) philosophy. His work is influenced by two main stream of thought in the early twentieth century: historicism and positivism. By appealing the comparative method, Oursel, in his book, La philosophie comparee (comparative philosophy), aims to make philosophy free from both absolute dogmatism and relativism. To accomplish this, he makes some close relation among abjective facts with their historical formation context, so that one cannot understand completely one without the other. Oursel believes that different philosophies and historical periods, would better to be compared. In their cultural context, with each other through analogy. He was convinced that in any society or civilization, there is not a solitary/individual historical fact which could not be interpreted comparatively an in accordance with positive scientific method</OtherAbstract>
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			<Param Name="value">positivism</Param>
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			<Param Name="value">applicability</Param>
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<ArchiveCopySource DocType="pdf">https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_14804_f90ce01af4871fb0cd05df30d3fb0d26.pdf</ArchiveCopySource>
</Article>

<Article>
<Journal>
				<PublisherName>University of Tabriz</PublisherName>
				<JournalTitle>Journal of Philosophical Investigations</JournalTitle>
				<Issn>2251-7960</Issn>
				<Volume>10</Volume>
				<Issue>18</Issue>
				<PubDate PubStatus="epublish">
					<Year>2016</Year>
					<Month>03</Month>
					<Day>20</Day>
				</PubDate>
			</Journal>
<ArticleTitle>Separate Material Intellect in Philosophy of Averroes</ArticleTitle>
<VernacularTitle>Separate Material Intellect in Philosophy of Averroes</VernacularTitle>
			<FirstPage>171</FirstPage>
			<LastPage>187</LastPage>
			<ELocationID EIdType="pii">14824</ELocationID>
			
			
			<Language>FA</Language>
<AuthorList>
<Author>
					<FirstName>Ali</FirstName>
					<LastName>Qorbani Sini</LastName>
<Affiliation>Faculty Member of Islamic Azad University, Isfahan (Khourasghan)</Affiliation>

</Author>
</AuthorList>
				<PublicationType>Journal Article</PublicationType>
			<History>
				<PubDate PubStatus="received">
					<Year>2014</Year>
					<Month>05</Month>
					<Day>10</Day>
				</PubDate>
			</History>
		<Abstract>In Aristotle works, the essence of intellect faced with ambiguous. Peripatetic philosophers, specially, Ibn Rushd (Averroës), have been tried to clear it. Ibn Rushd knows material intellect as the infrastructure of the intellect essence interpretation to Aristotle taught and considering previous interpreters, propounds it in his in depth commentary on &quot;on the soul&quot; of Aristotle. He tries to describe coherently recognition quality and determines the human intellect power. And believes that Material intellect is an abstract power but with engagement essence. This paper, regarding Ibn Rushd works, presents, at first three definition of hylic intellect , then his critique on interpretation of previous Aristotle commentator, and his answer to the relevant questions on Material intellect, in order to achieve the main goal of Ibn Rushd on Material intellect.</Abstract>
			<OtherAbstract Language="FA">In Aristotle works, the essence of intellect faced with ambiguous. Peripatetic philosophers, specially, Ibn Rushd (Averroës), have been tried to clear it. Ibn Rushd knows material intellect as the infrastructure of the intellect essence interpretation to Aristotle taught and considering previous interpreters, propounds it in his in depth commentary on &quot;on the soul&quot; of Aristotle. He tries to describe coherently recognition quality and determines the human intellect power. And believes that Material intellect is an abstract power but with engagement essence. This paper, regarding Ibn Rushd works, presents, at first three definition of hylic intellect , then his critique on interpretation of previous Aristotle commentator, and his answer to the relevant questions on Material intellect, in order to achieve the main goal of Ibn Rushd on Material intellect.</OtherAbstract>
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			<Param Name="value">Soul</Param>
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			<Param Name="value">Agent Intellect</Param>
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			<Param Name="value">Imagination power</Param>
			</Object>
			<Object Type="keyword">
			<Param Name="value">sensitive power</Param>
			</Object>
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<ArchiveCopySource DocType="pdf">https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_14824_f858c7c354676f282f82c300e43d35de.pdf</ArchiveCopySource>
</Article>

<Article>
<Journal>
				<PublisherName>University of Tabriz</PublisherName>
				<JournalTitle>Journal of Philosophical Investigations</JournalTitle>
				<Issn>2251-7960</Issn>
				<Volume>10</Volume>
				<Issue>18</Issue>
				<PubDate PubStatus="epublish">
					<Year>2016</Year>
					<Month>03</Month>
					<Day>20</Day>
				</PubDate>
			</Journal>
<ArticleTitle>Moral Luck from Bernard Williams' Point of View</ArticleTitle>
<VernacularTitle>Moral Luck from Bernard Williams&#039; Point of View</VernacularTitle>
			<FirstPage>189</FirstPage>
			<LastPage>218</LastPage>
			<ELocationID EIdType="pii">14866</ELocationID>
			
			
			<Language>FA</Language>
<AuthorList>
<Author>
					<FirstName>Zahra</FirstName>
					<LastName>Khazaei</LastName>
<Affiliation>Associate Professor of Philosophy Department, University of Qom</Affiliation>

</Author>
<Author>
					<FirstName>Fatemeh</FirstName>
					<LastName>Tamaddon</LastName>
<Affiliation>PhD Candidate of Philosophy of Ethics, University of Qom</Affiliation>

</Author>
</AuthorList>
				<PublicationType>Journal Article</PublicationType>
			<History>
				<PubDate PubStatus="received">
					<Year>2014</Year>
					<Month>09</Month>
					<Day>06</Day>
				</PubDate>
			</History>
		<Abstract>Moral luck is an important issue in meta- ethics that because of its conflict with principle of control would face to challenge moral assessment, moral judgment and moral responsibility. Bernard Williams is the first philosopher who introduced the expression &quot;moral luck&quot; and tries to show that the contradiction between “moral” and “luck” is not so serious. Williams in contrast to Kantians and our intuitions doesn’t believe that morality is immune of luck and, against other values, is accessible to all people. Should moral value is accessible to all, according to his idea, it should be not only immune of luck but also supreme. Giving some examples, Williams by concepts justification, regret and retrospective , shows that morality hasn’t these characteristics. Dividing moral luck into four types: resultant, circumstantial, constitutive and causal, Thomas Nagel puts williams&#039; moral luck under the first type and criticizes it. This study seeks to explain Bernard Williams’ viewpoint on moral luck. At first it clears types of moral luck , principle of control and its contradiction with moral luck. Then after explaining Williams’ account of moral luck criticizes it. Nagel’s criticisms and others show that although they accept the existence of moral luck and also their account is compatible to williams’ but they deny williams’ success in defending of this phenomenon. Finally, despite of all critiques, it seems that Williams’ failure in defense of moral luck didn’t decrease the importance of this matter, but made some stronger ideas were appeared by Thomas Nagel in this regard.</Abstract>
			<OtherAbstract Language="FA">Moral luck is an important issue in meta- ethics that because of its conflict with principle of control would face to challenge moral assessment, moral judgment and moral responsibility. Bernard Williams is the first philosopher who introduced the expression &quot;moral luck&quot; and tries to show that the contradiction between “moral” and “luck” is not so serious. Williams in contrast to Kantians and our intuitions doesn’t believe that morality is immune of luck and, against other values, is accessible to all people. Should moral value is accessible to all, according to his idea, it should be not only immune of luck but also supreme. Giving some examples, Williams by concepts justification, regret and retrospective , shows that morality hasn’t these characteristics. Dividing moral luck into four types: resultant, circumstantial, constitutive and causal, Thomas Nagel puts williams&#039; moral luck under the first type and criticizes it. This study seeks to explain Bernard Williams’ viewpoint on moral luck. At first it clears types of moral luck , principle of control and its contradiction with moral luck. Then after explaining Williams’ account of moral luck criticizes it. Nagel’s criticisms and others show that although they accept the existence of moral luck and also their account is compatible to williams’ but they deny williams’ success in defending of this phenomenon. Finally, despite of all critiques, it seems that Williams’ failure in defense of moral luck didn’t decrease the importance of this matter, but made some stronger ideas were appeared by Thomas Nagel in this regard.</OtherAbstract>
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			<Object Type="keyword">
			<Param Name="value">Moral luck</Param>
			</Object>
			<Object Type="keyword">
			<Param Name="value">Bernard Williams</Param>
			</Object>
			<Object Type="keyword">
			<Param Name="value">Epistemic luck</Param>
			</Object>
			<Object Type="keyword">
			<Param Name="value">Luck</Param>
			</Object>
			<Object Type="keyword">
			<Param Name="value">Morality</Param>
			</Object>
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<ArchiveCopySource DocType="pdf">https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_14866_4a19fcd7653b1a0909dc1fb389ab8515.pdf</ArchiveCopySource>
</Article>

<Article>
<Journal>
				<PublisherName>University of Tabriz</PublisherName>
				<JournalTitle>Journal of Philosophical Investigations</JournalTitle>
				<Issn>2251-7960</Issn>
				<Volume>10</Volume>
				<Issue>18</Issue>
				<PubDate PubStatus="epublish">
					<Year>2016</Year>
					<Month>03</Month>
					<Day>20</Day>
				</PubDate>
			</Journal>
<ArticleTitle>The status of "Anthropology" in Kant's moral system</ArticleTitle>
<VernacularTitle>The status of &quot;Anthropology&quot; in Kant&#039;s moral system</VernacularTitle>
			<FirstPage>219</FirstPage>
			<LastPage>241</LastPage>
			<ELocationID EIdType="pii">14880</ELocationID>
			
			
			<Language>FA</Language>
<AuthorList>
<Author>
					<FirstName>Azam</FirstName>
					<LastName>Mohseni</LastName>
<Affiliation>PhD Candidate, Imam Khomeini’s International University, Qazvin</Affiliation>

</Author>
<Author>
					<FirstName>Yousef</FirstName>
					<LastName>Shaghoul</LastName>
<Affiliation>Associate Professor of Philosophy Department, University of Isfahan</Affiliation>

</Author>
</AuthorList>
				<PublicationType>Journal Article</PublicationType>
			<History>
				<PubDate PubStatus="received">
					<Year>2014</Year>
					<Month>11</Month>
					<Day>05</Day>
				</PubDate>
			</History>
		<Abstract>Establishing an efficient moral discipline depends on the accurate and comprehensive recognition of the human nature as the morality subject. In fact, the necessary precondition of founding a moral system depends on; what we are considering the human and his nature, if know him as a wicked creature by nature, or treating him as an existence to which belongs both sensible and rational, which in each realm appears an aspect of his nature. Human, for Kant, is not a mono-dimension of being, but it is a citizen of both sensible and rational worlds. Human, based on his rational nature, is good, and is bad based on his sensible nature. So, in Groundwork of the metaphysics of moral, he emphasizes that now because the world of understanding contains the ground of the world of sense and so too of its laws, we must suppose that in our capacity as members of the World of understanding, we give laws to ourselves as members of the World of sense. And this is what gives us obligations. The necessity of founding the morality on anthropology-which in Kant&#039;s viewpoint is an empirical science methodologically-on the one hand, and the possibility of establishing a pure moral philosophy which is quite free of any empirical element, on the other hand, has led some interpreters to doubt whether Kant has really been able to found such a moral system Therefore, here, in order to reveal the purity of Kant&#039;s moral philosophy, and also, to detect the way it is based on anthropology, we are going to study the relation of Kant&#039;s anthropology and his ethics.</Abstract>
			<OtherAbstract Language="FA">Establishing an efficient moral discipline depends on the accurate and comprehensive recognition of the human nature as the morality subject. In fact, the necessary precondition of founding a moral system depends on; what we are considering the human and his nature, if know him as a wicked creature by nature, or treating him as an existence to which belongs both sensible and rational, which in each realm appears an aspect of his nature. Human, for Kant, is not a mono-dimension of being, but it is a citizen of both sensible and rational worlds. Human, based on his rational nature, is good, and is bad based on his sensible nature. So, in Groundwork of the metaphysics of moral, he emphasizes that now because the world of understanding contains the ground of the world of sense and so too of its laws, we must suppose that in our capacity as members of the World of understanding, we give laws to ourselves as members of the World of sense. And this is what gives us obligations. The necessity of founding the morality on anthropology-which in Kant&#039;s viewpoint is an empirical science methodologically-on the one hand, and the possibility of establishing a pure moral philosophy which is quite free of any empirical element, on the other hand, has led some interpreters to doubt whether Kant has really been able to found such a moral system Therefore, here, in order to reveal the purity of Kant&#039;s moral philosophy, and also, to detect the way it is based on anthropology, we are going to study the relation of Kant&#039;s anthropology and his ethics.</OtherAbstract>
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			<Object Type="keyword">
			<Param Name="value">anthropology</Param>
			</Object>
			<Object Type="keyword">
			<Param Name="value">Good will</Param>
			</Object>
			<Object Type="keyword">
			<Param Name="value">Duty</Param>
			</Object>
			<Object Type="keyword">
			<Param Name="value">Moral law</Param>
			</Object>
			<Object Type="keyword">
			<Param Name="value">Kant</Param>
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<ArchiveCopySource DocType="pdf">https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_14880_b505b70b16ff0a032b3b5249a312915a.pdf</ArchiveCopySource>
</Article>

<Article>
<Journal>
				<PublisherName>University of Tabriz</PublisherName>
				<JournalTitle>Journal of Philosophical Investigations</JournalTitle>
				<Issn>2251-7960</Issn>
				<Volume>10</Volume>
				<Issue>18</Issue>
				<PubDate PubStatus="epublish">
					<Year>2016</Year>
					<Month>03</Month>
					<Day>20</Day>
				</PubDate>
			</Journal>
<ArticleTitle>The Meaning of Life in Plato's Philosophy with Emphasis on the Doctrin of the "Form of Good"</ArticleTitle>
<VernacularTitle>The Meaning of Life in Plato&#039;s Philosophy with Emphasis on the Doctrin of the &quot;Form of Good&quot;</VernacularTitle>
			<FirstPage>243</FirstPage>
			<LastPage>264</LastPage>
			<ELocationID EIdType="pii">14883</ELocationID>
			
			
			<Language>FA</Language>
<AuthorList>
<Author>
					<FirstName>Parvaneh</FirstName>
					<LastName>Aghaei Togh</LastName>
<Affiliation>MA of Philosophy, University of Tabriz</Affiliation>

</Author>
<Author>
					<FirstName>Majid</FirstName>
					<LastName>Sadremajles</LastName>
<Affiliation>Assistant professor of philosophy, Tabriz university</Affiliation>

</Author>
<Author>
					<FirstName>Hassan</FirstName>
					<LastName>Fathi</LastName>
<Affiliation>Associate Professor of Philosophy,  University of Tabriz</Affiliation>

</Author>
</AuthorList>
				<PublicationType>Journal Article</PublicationType>
			<History>
				<PubDate PubStatus="received">
					<Year>2014</Year>
					<Month>12</Month>
					<Day>24</Day>
				</PubDate>
			</History>
		<Abstract>The question of the &quot;meaning of life&quot; and its answer, is one of the most important concerns of the human mind. Some argue that research of the meaning of life in fact is the study of the &quot;end&quot; or &quot;purpose&quot; of life. In this article, we attempt to examine the meaning of life according to Plato&#039;s belife in the end of life. Plato&#039;s Philosophy is a type of life philosophy and life&#039;s meaning is discovered by a philosophy based on the &quot;absolute truth&quot;. According to plato, human life is a purposeful process that its end is the &quot;Form of Good&quot;. The process is implied the knowledge and love of the Good along with acquisition of virtues. The &quot;Form of Good&quot; is located as the king of the intelligible world and is absolute goodness and beauty and its attainment, is the end of &quot;philosophia&quot;: philosophical life is the best way for attaining the Good. Due to the Plato&#039;s teleological view of life and position of the Form of Good in his philosophical system it is appropriate that attribute to him supernaturalistic point of view of the meaning of life.</Abstract>
			<OtherAbstract Language="FA">The question of the &quot;meaning of life&quot; and its answer, is one of the most important concerns of the human mind. Some argue that research of the meaning of life in fact is the study of the &quot;end&quot; or &quot;purpose&quot; of life. In this article, we attempt to examine the meaning of life according to Plato&#039;s belife in the end of life. Plato&#039;s Philosophy is a type of life philosophy and life&#039;s meaning is discovered by a philosophy based on the &quot;absolute truth&quot;. According to plato, human life is a purposeful process that its end is the &quot;Form of Good&quot;. The process is implied the knowledge and love of the Good along with acquisition of virtues. The &quot;Form of Good&quot; is located as the king of the intelligible world and is absolute goodness and beauty and its attainment, is the end of &quot;philosophia&quot;: philosophical life is the best way for attaining the Good. Due to the Plato&#039;s teleological view of life and position of the Form of Good in his philosophical system it is appropriate that attribute to him supernaturalistic point of view of the meaning of life.</OtherAbstract>
		<ObjectList>
			<Object Type="keyword">
			<Param Name="value">Plato</Param>
			</Object>
			<Object Type="keyword">
			<Param Name="value">Meaning of Life</Param>
			</Object>
			<Object Type="keyword">
			<Param Name="value">end</Param>
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			<Object Type="keyword">
			<Param Name="value">Form of Good and Supernaturalism</Param>
			</Object>
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<ArchiveCopySource DocType="pdf">https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_14883_eec41d4fd44dbb2f04ac8075ca58c939.pdf</ArchiveCopySource>
</Article>

<Article>
<Journal>
				<PublisherName>University of Tabriz</PublisherName>
				<JournalTitle>Journal of Philosophical Investigations</JournalTitle>
				<Issn>2251-7960</Issn>
				<Volume>10</Volume>
				<Issue>18</Issue>
				<PubDate PubStatus="epublish">
					<Year>2016</Year>
					<Month>03</Month>
					<Day>20</Day>
				</PubDate>
			</Journal>
<ArticleTitle>Studying and Analysis of the Relationship between Human Perfection and Vertical and Horizontal Spheres of Life in Mulla Sadra's Philosophy</ArticleTitle>
<VernacularTitle>Studying and Analysis of the Relationship between Human Perfection and Vertical and Horizontal Spheres of Life in Mulla Sadra&#039;s Philosophy</VernacularTitle>
			<FirstPage>265</FirstPage>
			<LastPage>282</LastPage>
			<ELocationID EIdType="pii">14896</ELocationID>
			
			
			<Language>FA</Language>
<AuthorList>
<Author>
					<FirstName>Hossein</FirstName>
					<LastName>Zamaniha</LastName>
<Affiliation>Assistant Professor of Islamic Philosophy and Wisdom Department, Shahid University</Affiliation>

</Author>
</AuthorList>
				<PublicationType>Journal Article</PublicationType>
			<History>
				<PubDate PubStatus="received">
					<Year>2015</Year>
					<Month>01</Month>
					<Day>13</Day>
				</PubDate>
			</History>
		<Abstract>Human life, contrary to other beings, has different vertical and horizontal spheres, Islamic philosophers traditionally using different sources such as those adopted from Greek philosophers, their contemplation on the Islamic sources and their own philosophical innovations, Introduced a special viewpoint about the vertical spheres of life and it&#039;s relation to the human perfection. Mulla Sadra as one of the most outstanding Islamic philosophers using his own philosophical bases such as primacy and gradation of being and trans-substantial motion represents a profound explication of the vertical spheres of human life and identifies these spheres of life with vertical gradation of the existential perfection. He calls these vertical spheres sensible, imaginal and intelligible world. Although Mulla Sadra has been able to give a philosophical explication of the role of vertical spheres of human life in the pass of human perfection, according to his philosophical bases one cannot make a plausible explication about the role of horizontal spheres of life in the existential perfection of human being.</Abstract>
			<OtherAbstract Language="FA">Human life, contrary to other beings, has different vertical and horizontal spheres, Islamic philosophers traditionally using different sources such as those adopted from Greek philosophers, their contemplation on the Islamic sources and their own philosophical innovations, Introduced a special viewpoint about the vertical spheres of life and it&#039;s relation to the human perfection. Mulla Sadra as one of the most outstanding Islamic philosophers using his own philosophical bases such as primacy and gradation of being and trans-substantial motion represents a profound explication of the vertical spheres of human life and identifies these spheres of life with vertical gradation of the existential perfection. He calls these vertical spheres sensible, imaginal and intelligible world. Although Mulla Sadra has been able to give a philosophical explication of the role of vertical spheres of human life in the pass of human perfection, according to his philosophical bases one cannot make a plausible explication about the role of horizontal spheres of life in the existential perfection of human being.</OtherAbstract>
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			<Param Name="value">Human Life</Param>
			</Object>
			<Object Type="keyword">
			<Param Name="value">Human Perfection</Param>
			</Object>
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			<Param Name="value">Vertical Sphere</Param>
			</Object>
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			<Param Name="value">Horizontal Shere</Param>
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			<Param Name="value">MullaSadra</Param>
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<ArchiveCopySource DocType="pdf">https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_14896_bf68f7188fe60777a7ea29537304f099.pdf</ArchiveCopySource>
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<Article>
<Journal>
				<PublisherName>University of Tabriz</PublisherName>
				<JournalTitle>Journal of Philosophical Investigations</JournalTitle>
				<Issn>2251-7960</Issn>
				<Volume>10</Volume>
				<Issue>18</Issue>
				<PubDate PubStatus="epublish">
					<Year>2016</Year>
					<Month>03</Month>
					<Day>20</Day>
				</PubDate>
			</Journal>
<ArticleTitle>Gelassenheit and the problem of the will in heidegger's philosophy</ArticleTitle>
<VernacularTitle>Gelassenheit and the problem of the will in heidegger&#039;s philosophy</VernacularTitle>
			<FirstPage>283</FirstPage>
			<LastPage>307</LastPage>
			<ELocationID EIdType="pii">14897</ELocationID>
			
			
			<Language>FA</Language>
<AuthorList>
<Author>
					<FirstName>Mahdi</FirstName>
					<LastName>Kord Noghani</LastName>
<Affiliation>PhD Candidate of Philosophy of Art, Bu Ali Sina University of Hamedan</Affiliation>

</Author>
</AuthorList>
				<PublicationType>Journal Article</PublicationType>
			<History>
				<PubDate PubStatus="received">
					<Year>2015</Year>
					<Month>01</Month>
					<Day>14</Day>
				</PubDate>
			</History>
		<Abstract>In Heidegger’s philosophy, the problem of “will” is crucially significant. Indeed, this problem can be traced from Being and Time to Heidegger’s later works. It seems that despite Heidegger’s criticism of subjectivism and representational thinking, which are different names for will, he couldn’t stay away from will absolutely until invoking the complicated term “Gelassenheit”. Prior to invoking this term, Heidegger’s philosophy is not utterly devoid of “will” and one might find it in decisions of Dasein (Being and Time) or as a transcendental will in 1928-1929 works which makes every will possible. After these two periods, Heidegger’s alliance with National Socialism leads his thought to developing a political voluntarism, in which every individual must sacrifice his will in favor of will of the Volk. After these three periods, Heidegger’s confrontation with Neitzsche leads him to turn away from the will. Nietzsche as a thinker in “the end of metaphysics” and whom his philosophy is the culmination of this issue, shows him that Being in modern epochs has been revealed as “will” and eventually as the technological “will to will”. If Nietzsche characterizes the problem for Heidegger, that is Eckhart that suggests him a starting point for the solution. This article attempts to elucidate these issues: what is the “domain of the will”, relation between Gelassenheit and action/passivity, relation between the will and “question of the Being”, and finally Heidegger’s relation to Eckhart’s christian mysticism.</Abstract>
			<OtherAbstract Language="FA">In Heidegger’s philosophy, the problem of “will” is crucially significant. Indeed, this problem can be traced from Being and Time to Heidegger’s later works. It seems that despite Heidegger’s criticism of subjectivism and representational thinking, which are different names for will, he couldn’t stay away from will absolutely until invoking the complicated term “Gelassenheit”. Prior to invoking this term, Heidegger’s philosophy is not utterly devoid of “will” and one might find it in decisions of Dasein (Being and Time) or as a transcendental will in 1928-1929 works which makes every will possible. After these two periods, Heidegger’s alliance with National Socialism leads his thought to developing a political voluntarism, in which every individual must sacrifice his will in favor of will of the Volk. After these three periods, Heidegger’s confrontation with Neitzsche leads him to turn away from the will. Nietzsche as a thinker in “the end of metaphysics” and whom his philosophy is the culmination of this issue, shows him that Being in modern epochs has been revealed as “will” and eventually as the technological “will to will”. If Nietzsche characterizes the problem for Heidegger, that is Eckhart that suggests him a starting point for the solution. This article attempts to elucidate these issues: what is the “domain of the will”, relation between Gelassenheit and action/passivity, relation between the will and “question of the Being”, and finally Heidegger’s relation to Eckhart’s christian mysticism.</OtherAbstract>
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<ArchiveCopySource DocType="pdf">https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_14897_8779cd2a3f11be9a4a12977cce5370e3.pdf</ArchiveCopySource>
</Article>

<Article>
<Journal>
				<PublisherName>University of Tabriz</PublisherName>
				<JournalTitle>Journal of Philosophical Investigations</JournalTitle>
				<Issn>2251-7960</Issn>
				<Volume>10</Volume>
				<Issue>18</Issue>
				<PubDate PubStatus="epublish">
					<Year>2016</Year>
					<Month>03</Month>
					<Day>20</Day>
				</PubDate>
			</Journal>
<ArticleTitle>Being and the problem of symbolic language (examination of Tillich's theory of symbolism)</ArticleTitle>
<VernacularTitle>Being and the problem of symbolic language (examination of Tillich&#039;s theory of symbolism)</VernacularTitle>
			<FirstPage>309</FirstPage>
			<LastPage>328</LastPage>
			<ELocationID EIdType="pii">14898</ELocationID>
			
			
			<Language>FA</Language>
<AuthorList>
<Author>
					<FirstName>Shima</FirstName>
					<LastName>Shahriari</LastName>
<Affiliation>PhD Candidate of Philosophy of  Religion, University of Tehran</Affiliation>

</Author>
</AuthorList>
				<PublicationType>Journal Article</PublicationType>
			<History>
				<PubDate PubStatus="received">
					<Year>2015</Year>
					<Month>02</Month>
					<Day>03</Day>
				</PubDate>
			</History>
		<Abstract>Paul Tillich is one of the most influential Christian philosophers and theologians in the twentieth century. His new theory about speaking of God is known as the theory of symbolism. He shows in this theory that we cannot speak of God literally because religious language is the language of symbols. Tillich established his symbolism theory on his ontological assumptions. According to them, although God as a being-itself and transcendent being is different from any human, but the human participates in existence with God. This assumption requires using of religious symbols in speaking of God. For assert this view, Tillich shows at the first the properties of symbols and then defines the religious symbols. Finally he argues that religious symbols have two features that face us with two different aspects, because with using these symbols we can introduce Gad as being itself and the wholly other on the one hand and we can contact with him personally on the other hand.</Abstract>
			<OtherAbstract Language="FA">Paul Tillich is one of the most influential Christian philosophers and theologians in the twentieth century. His new theory about speaking of God is known as the theory of symbolism. He shows in this theory that we cannot speak of God literally because religious language is the language of symbols. Tillich established his symbolism theory on his ontological assumptions. According to them, although God as a being-itself and transcendent being is different from any human, but the human participates in existence with God. This assumption requires using of religious symbols in speaking of God. For assert this view, Tillich shows at the first the properties of symbols and then defines the religious symbols. Finally he argues that religious symbols have two features that face us with two different aspects, because with using these symbols we can introduce Gad as being itself and the wholly other on the one hand and we can contact with him personally on the other hand.</OtherAbstract>
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<ArchiveCopySource DocType="pdf">https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_14898_14d746552a4c0dc70a948ca605307f3e.pdf</ArchiveCopySource>
</Article>

<Article>
<Journal>
				<PublisherName>University of Tabriz</PublisherName>
				<JournalTitle>Journal of Philosophical Investigations</JournalTitle>
				<Issn>2251-7960</Issn>
				<Volume>10</Volume>
				<Issue>18</Issue>
				<PubDate PubStatus="epublish">
					<Year>2016</Year>
					<Month>03</Month>
					<Day>20</Day>
				</PubDate>
			</Journal>
<ArticleTitle>The Study of Rationality and Faith in Robert Audi</ArticleTitle>
<VernacularTitle>The Study of Rationality and Faith in Robert Audi</VernacularTitle>
			<FirstPage>329</FirstPage>
			<LastPage>357</LastPage>
			<ELocationID EIdType="pii">14900</ELocationID>
			
			
			<Language>FA</Language>
<AuthorList>
<Author>
					<FirstName>Alireza</FirstName>
					<LastName>Dorri Nogoorani</LastName>
<Affiliation>PhD Candidate of  Philosophy of Religion,  Institute for Humanities and Cultural Studies</Affiliation>

</Author>
</AuthorList>
				<PublicationType>Journal Article</PublicationType>
			<History>
				<PubDate PubStatus="received">
					<Year>2015</Year>
					<Month>11</Month>
					<Day>10</Day>
				</PubDate>
			</History>
		<Abstract>Robert Audi, well-known American epistemologist, has a distinctive approach toward the rationality of faith which is worth studying. Audi attempts to differentiate non-doxastic propositional faith (NDPF) from other kinds of faith, which is irreducible to just a propositional belief (PB) and to distinguish rationality from justification in order to make it clear that the rationality pertaining to NDPF differs from the one pertaining to PB. The big part of Audi’s work has dedicated to redefine the conception of faith and rationality, which both criticized. For instance, some Audi’s specifications for describing NDPF are somehow ambiguous. It seems, moreover, that there is no propositional attitude satisfying all of the specifications. Furthermore, NDPF is different from the faith accepted by religions and devoted religious people. Considering these and other challenges Audi’s theory faces, it seems he is not highly successful in his theory.</Abstract>
			<OtherAbstract Language="FA">Robert Audi, well-known American epistemologist, has a distinctive approach toward the rationality of faith which is worth studying. Audi attempts to differentiate non-doxastic propositional faith (NDPF) from other kinds of faith, which is irreducible to just a propositional belief (PB) and to distinguish rationality from justification in order to make it clear that the rationality pertaining to NDPF differs from the one pertaining to PB. The big part of Audi’s work has dedicated to redefine the conception of faith and rationality, which both criticized. For instance, some Audi’s specifications for describing NDPF are somehow ambiguous. It seems, moreover, that there is no propositional attitude satisfying all of the specifications. Furthermore, NDPF is different from the faith accepted by religions and devoted religious people. Considering these and other challenges Audi’s theory faces, it seems he is not highly successful in his theory.</OtherAbstract>
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<ArchiveCopySource DocType="pdf">https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_14900_69ba3ac821428ae5c0ce3d743e48d62b.pdf</ArchiveCopySource>
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