

The Relativity of the Subject of Truth in Alain Badiou's Philosophy

Zahra (Sara) Namayandegi^{✉1}  | Ali Fath Taheri²  | Alinaghi Baghersshahi³

1. Corresponding Author, PhD Candidate of Philosophy, Imam Khomeini International University, Qazvin, Iran. E-mail: S962193004@edu.ikiu.ac.ir
2. Associate Professor of Philosophy Department, Imam Khomeini International University, Qazvin, Iran. E-mail: fathtaheri@hum.ikiu.ac.ir
3. Associate Professor of Philosophy Department, Imam Khomeini International University, Qazvin, Iran. E-mail: baghersshahi@hum.ikiu.ac.ir

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ABSTRACT

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Badiou offers a concept of the subject that is completely intertwined with event and truth; in his view, the subject is not an isolated and secluded entity that is supposed to contemplate the world only, rather it is linked to the event, and as a faithful element, initiates the process of truth. Every human being is not necessarily a subject, but in the face of an event and the acceptance of its occurrence, the person in the situation can become the subject. For Badiou, the subject is only part of the process of truth, and this reduces the subject to a part of a material process that has no existential independence. He explicitly states that the subject subordinates to the truth and considers the subjectification of some members of the situation as the result of the occurrence of an event and the beginning of the process of truth. The authors are of the view that Badiou's theory of the subject eventually leads to the relativity of the subject and makes it impossible to provide any explanation about the existence of the subject. He considers truth to be not general but dependent on any particular situation in which the event takes place; again, in his view, truth has a general proclamation and address. But in the authors' view, his type of explanation of the subject also makes the generality of the proclamation of truth relative and so, the truth cannot be generic anymore.

Keywords:subject, situation, event, truth,
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Introduction: Truth, the Savior of Philosophy

The concept of truth and its rediscovery is the main focus of Badiou's philosophy. Among contemporary thinkers, he is a thinker of truth in its Platonic sense. Indeed, he seeks to uncover the truths. For him, the concept of truth is what must be saved from the devastating flood of attacks on contemporary philosophy. Truth is universal in his scheme, something like Platonic ideas.

For Badiou, the truth only happens in certain circumstances when the three inseparable parts of a process come together: an event, a subject of the event, and the subject's fidelity to the event. Truth emerges when there is a subject or subjects who have declared their allegiance to the event and this is the only way to become a subject. Simultaneously truth and event can be considered one of the most controversial aspects of Badiou's thought. In this regard, Badiou argues that every truth is rooted in an event. He explicitly states that something has to happen before something new as truth can happen; something unpredictable, immeasurable, and uncontrollable; there must be an unexpected rupture, something called an event (Hallward, 1998: 124).

The truth-procedure is created only by the commitment of individuals, who care about the event and express allegiance to it. According to Badiou, it is the truth-procedure that turns some ordinary and normal situations objects into subjects. But this constructive process is rare, moreover, its emergence and manifestation is a very special and unique thing and this is what makes Badiou consider the subject to be rare.

According to some of Badiou's works such as *Being and Event*, *Logic of Worlds*, *Ethics*, and *Theory of the Subject*, he seems to believe in a multiple and universal truth which at the same time is not transcendental and ideal. He believes in Plato, but at the same time, he does not believe in the transcendent truth; The truth is multiple and material for him and interpretations of an event never end in an absolute. Truth is what happens after an event; maximum but not absolute. This feature makes Badiou speak of a mathematical ontology and in *Being and Event*, declares that "mathematics is ontology" (Badiou, 2006: xi).

We find two important and constitutive propositions: the first is that mathematics is ontology, and the second is that the new happens in being under the name of the event. In Badiou's terms, the proposition "mathematics is ontology" is a philosophical idea conditioned by an event and its consequent truth procedure in the domain of science. The event is Cantor's invention of set theory and the truth procedure is subsequent axiomatization by Zermelo and Fraenkel¹. Badiou names the Zermelo-Fraenkel axiomatization of set theory as a truth procedure that follows upon the "Cantor-event". For this reason, he uses the Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory and also considers George Cantor's ideas and innovations in mathematics; The truth for him is multiple that is in the form of *Axioms*² to answer the question of whether what happened is an event or not? (Badiou, 2003: 62)

1. Badiou uses axioms of set theory as the axiom of choice. Of course, there are other axiomatizations of set theory, such as void set, power set, replacement, but this multiplicity simply reveals the contingency of philosophy's conditioning: a conditioning that can only be contrasted by developing another Meta ontology on the basis of another axiomatization of set theory.

2. He uses 9 axioms of set theory to provide a mathematical framework which can explain multiple truth and subject.

He believes that there is a direct link between mathematical ontology and the philosophical theory of the concept of truth and says being is multiple and the only rational theory related to the multiple is the set theory; Truth, like everything else that exists, is multiple. But how can a multiple have a universal and generic value? The answer to this question, according to Badiou, is in mathematics, especially in set theory. He uses the theories of mathematicians such as Cantor and Zermelo Frankel to explain the generic nature of truth. These mathematicians believe that there are such things as a generic multiplicity that belong to the field of set theory. According to Badiou, what gives generality to the multiple truth, must be a generic set.

He believes that in today's world, the task of philosophy is to become a tool to access the truths that are happening in the wider world. He introduces philosophy as an area that intends to present a kind of theory of truth; this truth is quite a mixed concept for Badiou, a combination of intellect and action. A combination of the subject's awareness and conscious actions in any given situation.

Situations

If Aristotle says "there *are* substances"; Badiou believes that: "there *are* situations"; this statement is an indisputable principle of ontology for him. A situation is every presented thing that we are facing, such as a TV program, a school, a sports match, a room, or even a university; and because every presented thing is multiple, so we know one situation as a pure multiplicity, as a "multiple of multiples" or in the other words, a situation is the name of every "presented multiplicity", and for him, situation is the place of taking-place (Badiou, 2006: 24). As a result, the fact that we are always in a situation is a certain ontological statement.

What ontology tells us in the form of the theory of pure multiplicity is that the existence of any multiple, depends only on its belonging to another multiple, and this means that to exist (a multiple) is always synonymous with belonging to a multiplicity (situation), and since in mathematical ontology, the situation is itself also a mathematical set, in result to exist means to be a member of a set. To be an element of a situation is equal to being a member of a set.

According to Being and Event, every given situation has four main characteristics which are: Situation is an infinite multiplicity. There is a dominant language in any given situation which is actually a potential and capacity to name components of a situation, the relation between them, and so its specific qualities and properties. As we said, any situation is equivalent to a mathematical set and since any set includes members and sub-sets, likewise every situation has its elements and sub-situations. Some multiple elements that be counted under the situation's structure. There is an Encyclopedia of knowledge in any single situation which has fundamental relation to the dominant language in that situation.

Badiou emphasizes the distinction between knowledge and truth and radically rejects de-naturing of the truth, in doing so, he insists that de-naturing is nothing but limiting truth to propositions; because the perception of truth as a kind of *correspondence* holds the premise that truth can be expressed in the form of a proposition. For Badiou, Truth is not the relation of

correspondence of object and mind, nor a proposition; rather, is a material multiple that appears in any situation after the occurrence of an event and the formation of a subject or subjects.

As Badiou claims "philosophy is not the creator of truths, but is an operator based on countless truths.", therefore, there is no question about transcendental truth; Rather, it is the rupture in the circumstances and knowledge of any situation that can lead to the emergence of truth, and this is the truth that the subject initiates its process and is rooted in its conscious actions. And all of this is possible when something happens in a situation, that is, a rupture in all the normal and routine procedures of the situation, an event. Thus, every ontological state, according to Badiou, has its own language, the encyclopedia that governs it, and the components and members to which it belongs, as well as the laws that govern it; so there is stability in the situation until, by chance, something happens in the situation and instability is achieved in all the elements that caused the situation to be stable; there is a rift in language, in knowledge, and in all members of the situation.

Prior to the event, all members of the situation are normal and ordinary objects, but with the occurrence of the event, some of these objects "decide" to recognize the event and, more importantly, to be faithful and committed to it.

Event: The Foundation for Truth

Badiou offers several definitions of the event concludes an event is nothing other than a set, a multiple, a supplement of situation, whose form is that of a site. But the arising of the event, as a supplementation, subtracts one of the axioms of the multiple, namely the axiom of foundation. What does the axiom of foundation say? In every multiple, there is at least one element that "founds" this multiple, in the following sense: there is an element that has no element in common with the initial multiple (Badiou, 2004: 100).

Sometimes he introduces the event as random and dependent on chance, which means that it gives the possibility of encountering or disturbing the order of the perceptible in some cases, the event is defined as the creation of something out of nothing or he sees the event as a structural necessity that happens sooner or later, according to him, the event disrupts the continuity of determinism and subsequently allows something completely new to come to life. why? Because it provides an opportunity to make decisions. In response to the question of what is event? Badiou explains its features: an event is something that reveals an unseen and unimaginable possibility. The event itself is not the creation of reality, but the creation of a possibility.

The event shows us that there is a possibility that has been previously ignored; as if the event itself is an invitation, an offer, or a chance. If there is an event, it belongs to a position that cannot be decided from the point of view of that position (Hewlett, 2010: 38-9). Event is the cause of decision-making, but it cannot be decided.

It all depends on the possibility that the event offers, and is organized in reality by subjects; in a sense, the subject is the path from possibility to reality and this is what Badiou calls the truth-procedure, that is, the event creates a possibility but an effort must be made to make this possible

real. Realizing the possibility is the subject's job. This process of turning the possible into the tangible, is a step-by-step process. For Badiou, the event seems inseparable from the truth and truth is also an integral part of the event. The important point is that there is no universal event and each event is related to and belongs to a specific situation, therefore, since the truth is related to the event, truth is also a matter of situation and is situational.

Events have no basis; that is, there is no fundamental situation that produces events, and no situation can be considered as the source of events. Therefore, events do not belong to any situation; Badiou puts them under the category of that which is not being-qua-being. Nevertheless, the event itself is the foundation of truth. If it does not happen, the process of truth does not occur.

However, from a situational point of view, there is no criterion for determining what is an event, a random rise from another situation, or an unknown product of the situation itself. As a result, the event as a presented multitude has no compatibility or support. In a rare use of phenomenological language, Badiou says that an event is doomed to appear to disappear immediately¹ (Feltham, 2008: 100).

This feature may seem to equate the event with a chance. If the event does not belong to any situation, a cause cannot be attributed to it and so, does not follow the Leibnizian principle of sufficient reason. Of course, this is not a very accurate statement. Because chance can be calculated and to be considered as something belonging to the reasoning situation in the science of statistics; In addition, as Brasier has said, some computer programs that have special algorithms can produce randomness (Brasier, 2004:50-8).

It is not accurate to say that the event is the emergence of a new being like a rift in the context of any situation. The event is ambiguous and does not establish anything. Why is it vague? Because it really breaks the situation, a radical rupture that affects all belonging to the situation.

Another characteristic of the event is that it is local and not global; that is, it only happens at a certain point. Of course, this cannot mean the existence of an event. Another feature that Badiou has explicitly stated for the event is that it is absolutely probable. The specific hypothetical point at which an event occurs is called the eventual site; the absolute probability of an event means that nothing guarantees the occurrence of an event, even the existence of an eventual site, although a necessary condition, is insufficient (Feltham,2008:101).

Another characteristic is the indecisionability that we mentioned earlier: the event is indecisive as to whether it belongs to the situation or not. Event is the cause of the decision in the event, but it is indecisive.

1.In the *Logic of Worlds*, Badiou introduces objective phenomenology, which, of course, is fundamentally different from the Husserlian tradition of phenomenology.

Subject of truth

The term subject has a special meaning in Badiou's work. It does not refer to any and all social actors. It is reserved only for those social actors who are acting on an event and a truth. To be a subject is thus radically contrary to being aligned to a state or a dominant discourse. Badiou relates the subject to individual and collective actors; the subject lacks its classical meaning for him. The subject is not the essence and cannot be the lone thinker that the outside world thinks of. basically, the concept of the subject is meaningless for Badiou, independent of events and truth and it is because of this connection that the subject is rare; a subject is a point of truth (Badiou, 2009a: 6). But we should know that he does not define these actors as primary in events. Rather, the subject is an effect of an event and a truth. A subject is an effective part of a truth procedure. In the theory of the subject, we see Badiou's materialist account of the subject that is articulated in reference to Lacan, who conceives the subject not as an ideal stance facing the world, but as a specific result of a multiplicity of elements (Badiou, 2008: 48).

The subject believes that there is truth and this belief takes the form of knowledge (Badiou, 2006a: 397). The subject arises from people's encounters with the event of truth, that is, we do not really have a subject that comes into being on its own rather, the subject is created and constructed. Therefore, the subject does not already exist. Being a subject is a potential that comes to actual under certain conditions. According to Badiou's definition of truth and how the truth-procedure begins, he depicts a mental truth that exactly for this reason, always needs someone who can achieve the status of the subject by confirmation and loyalty to the truth event.

This subject, in addition to being infinite, is also non-essential, the subject is that part of the situation who makes choices and decisions; they decide to recognize the event and choose to remain faithful to it; So they think about the event and they decide, and that decision is a way of thinking that is an integral part of their identity. In fact, this subject has a different application and its own emergence and emergence conditions. Therefore, Badiou's subject is not one of the kinds of consciousness that we already attribute to every human being. This subject is made and it is a rare thing (Badiou, 2006a: 392).

In our opinion, the rarity of the subject is exactly the same as the rarity of the event; the event is a disruptive factor in the situation and the subject imposes his decision on the order of the pre-eventual situation. According to Hallward, when the event happens residents of the situation are faced with the choice to recognize the event as an event or consider it only as a temporary problem; those whose decision is to confirm the event will be subjects of that event (Hallward, 2005: 14).

Badiou does not mean that the Decision itself, makes anyone a subject; that is, whoever makes the decision is not the subject. Rather, the concept of a subject includes only those who act according to an event and a truth. It can be said that the subject is the effect of an event and the truth or the inevitable consequence of an event. The subject for Badiou is the effect of change, not

the agent of change. It can be said that the subject for Badiou is a synthesis of the processes that create change and is made through praxis.

Badiou's emphasis on decision and its importance goes back to the distinction he makes between knowledge and truth. Each situation has its own knowledge and in fact, knowledge is the pre-eventual dominant encyclopedia in any situation. Knowledge is a science that does not need a subject. In fact, before the occurrence of the event, every object and member in a situation is aware of the knowledge governing that state; and this kind of awareness, no need to decide. Therefore, no knowledge makes the subject. Before the event, we are faced with a situation that has its own order and knowledge as well as members who have no desire to disrupt this order as well as to know the truth and this is the occurrence of the event that begins the truth-procedure and production of the subject in any given the situation.

The subject is rare to the rarity of the event, to the rarity of the truth. As Badiou said: the process of truth can be considered as the process of becoming a subject and as we believe, the process of becoming a subject-subjectivation- can be considered the same as the process of truth. now, here is the point, since each situation has its own event and thus each truth is specific to a situation; truth is situational.

Another point that is important for the authors of this article is the importance that Badiou attaches to fidelity. In *Being and Event*, he sees the subject as nothing but an active allegiance to the truth. This means that the subject is a fighter for the truth. This loyalty is so important that it makes the subject not only a supporter of the truth but a fragment and parcel of the truth; and of course, an integral part of it. In this regard, Hallward believes that a subject is a person who is transformed by the truth he has revealed (Hallward, 2003:122). On the other hand, as seems, Badiou distinguishes the subject man from the man in a particular animal status and the subject is a human being who transcends the animal and this transcendence owes to fidelity to the truth. By declaring allegiance to an event and to the truth, the subject becomes for Badiou only a part of a three parts processes: event, subject, and truth.

Another point that the authors of the article pay attention to is that with this explanation of the relationship between these three concepts, not only is the subject an integral part of the truth, but the truth is also an integral part of the subject. While Badiou puts the subject in second place and tries to always introduce the subject as a mere under the domination of truth. We are faced with a chain of three links, the absence of each of which destroys the entire chain. So, of course, they are equally important, and neither can be considered superior to the other and this is Badiou's questionable attempt to make the truth more important. We believe, as the subject, is the subject of truth, Truth is also subjective. as this is the beginning of the event and process of truth that makes the person the subject, it is also the decision of the subject and his loyalty that reveal the truth, and the existence of both is completely interdependent. This is also a questionable issue in Badiou's work.

Another issue that can be raised is that Badiou sees subjectification as a reaction to an event and the subject has no role in the occurrence of the event, however, the completion of the event depends on the committed decision of the subject but Badiou does not specify exactly where the subject is located in the event. As we know, he says the event is local and the subject is local too, so he must be able to determine exactly how the event affects the subject in a particular place in the situation. It seems that the existence of the subject is tied to the event, but it has no role in its occurrence of it. This explanation of how events occur without the presence of individuals, and subjects, is somewhat incomplete.

Fidelity: The Subjective Dimension of Truth

Fidelity is a key element for Badiou and if it is removed, the person will remain suspended in indecision, Pure indecision towards the event. While to become a subject one must remain faithful to the event and truth. the truth's existence is not indebted to the subject but who does not know that the validity and continuity of the process of truth depend entirely on the faithful decision of the subject. It is only fidelity and steadfastness that gives credence to the universal dimension of truth.

The characteristic of loyalty, in addition to having a complete and direct connection with the identity of the subject, as Badiou says in *Ethics*, it also helps the event to happen and remain stable, and truth without a faithful subject does not join the event, and the event devoid of truth is an absurd event. According to Badiou, truth is the true process of loyalty to an event (Badiou, 2001: 42).

In short, an event occurs in a situation that is outside the realm of knowledge and identification, and functioning of it. People who live in the situation and are present in it are faced with a choice; the choice to accept or reject the event; those who decide to consider it as an event and accept the changes and changes that result from it become subjects and are no longer ordinary objects of the situation. So subjectivity is the result of two decisions: first, the decision to accept the occurrence of the event and second, decide to stay loyal to it; according to Badiou, the state in which subjects react to an event is loyalty. therefore, it can be concluded that loyalty is a unique feature of the subject and an identifying feature of it. it is loyalty that makes the ordinary object in the situation the subject.

What these subjects, or in other words, the process of loyalty of these subjects to the event in the situation produces, is truth. The subject decides to remain faithful to the event until the process of producing truth begins then decides to use all its abilities to serve the truth and be faithful to it and persevere in this loyalty; to the extent that, according to Badiou, the subject itself is part of the process of truth; that is, it can be said that it becomes part of the process in which it plays a role, a vital role.

The important thing is that even with Badiou's own definitions which introduce the event as a constructive and primary factor to truth, he also emphasizes its instability; the important and

decisive thing that can bring stability out of instability is the subject. Therefore, the subject has a *constitutive* role; according to the authors of the article, in any truth process, its beginning depends on the event but its continuity, its validity, its generic proclamation, and its *presence* depend on the subject.

The truth is that situational multiple which is specific to each situation; the multiple is not transcendental and not dependent on any external matter because it is not relative. It seems that what makes the unstable factor - event - a solid foundation for the truth is the subject. If there is no subject, there is no truth and if there is no truth, there is no subject and that means dialectic.

Dialectics of Subject and Truth

Truth can only originate in an event. We can say Badiou is well-known for insisting on the integral role of the category of truth in philosophy. He asserts that such a view of truth has ever been advanced by any philosopher other than as a mediatory image that the philosopher's entire thought will subsequently be devoted to dismantling (Badiou, 1999: 57). Badiou often refers to the period between 1975 and 1988-between the first of the seminars which would result in 1982's theory of the subject and the 1988 publication of *Being and Event*- as the end of the "Red Years", a period of restoration, a period, ideologically speaking, analogous to that of the thermidorian reaction of year 2 of the French Revolution, a period when the "brigands triumph", and when what takes the place of the thoughtful, subjective production of truths is the production of the unthinkable, of what must not be thought, to the point where thought itself becomes "suspect".

A truth's first step is to wager on this event and we remember that this event is a supplement of situation, one decides to hold to the statement "the event has taken place", which comes down to deciding the undecidable. But of course, since the undecidable is subtracted from the norm of evaluation, this decision is an axiom. It has no basis other than the presupposed vanishing of the event. Thus every truth passes through the pure water on what has been only disappearing. The axiom of truth which always takes the form "this took place, which I can neither calculate nor demonstrate"- is simply the affirmative obverse of the subtraction of the undecidable (Badiou, 2004:112).

In *Metapolitics*, Badiou compares the role of the nouveau philosophes of the latter part of the twentieth century with that of several figures of the thermidor, boissy d'anglais most prominently. This constitution of the unthinkable, which Badiou surveys, can have long-lasting power. It provides the historical matrix for the destitution of thought (Badiou, 2005: 138).

In some meditations in *Being and Event* Badiou formulates his concepts of subject and truth and demonstrates how its proof reproduces within mathematical ontology itself the chance of the generic procedure (Badiou, 2006: 439) with explicit reference to Lacan, Badiou argues that truth is something that exceeds the knowledge that one can have of the current mode in which objects are organized inside an intelligible situation: "truth is not a qualification of knowledge nor an intuition of the intelligible. one must come to conceive of truth as making a hole in knowledge.

Lacan¹ is paradigmatic on this point. the subject is thus convoked as a border-effect or a delimitating fragment of such a hole-piercing" if a truth performs a cut into a situation where it appears, it is because "it is the metonymy of the situation's very being" (Badiou, 1991: 25-6). Truth is therefore the exposition of two things: on the one side the fact that each element of the situation, as such, is "nothing", it is a pure multiple of multiples void of atomic elements, and on the other that, therefore, the consistent manner in which the elements of the situation are presented, structured, hierarchized is not a necessary reality, but a *contingent* construction. To this extent, the archetypical example of truth is for Badiou that "everyone (being a pure multiple) is equal to anyone else, and each one counts as one". Such a statement appears in a given state of facts as a violent cut that breaks the evidence of the structure that attributes a different value to different individuals according to determinate properties (money, culture, social role, nationality, etc.) that each one possesses in a different measure.

Truth cannot appear as a normal part of the situation, but only as a dramatic rupture with the latter. The process of truth is a material one insofar as its subject is the body seized in its creative capacity, deploying itself in material axioms and geneses in a world. The subject is the oriented, creative name of a new body, which suddenly appears in the world around the trace of the event.

Truth exists as exceptions to what there is. we admit therefore that" what there is"- that which makes up the structure of worlds-is well and truly a mixture of bodies and languages. But there is not only what there is and the truth is the philosophical name of what interpolates itself into the continuity of the "there is (Badiou, 2008: 4).

Dependent on a truth that appears as an eventual, radical novelty in the situation, a "subject is a forced exception, always coming in the second place". In fact, set between an event, of which it unfolds the consequences locally, and a truth, a subject is the local, finite form of the consequences of such a truth. The subject, suspended between an event and a truth, is the point at which, on the one hand, the empty, universal truth, carried by the event, is verified and, on the other, is the point through which the event of the appearance of this truth is retrospectively made true, by the unfolding of its consequences.

It recognizes the wholly exceptional, ontological, and logical status of truths. Truths are without existence. Is that to say they do not exist at all? Far from it. Truths have no *substantial* existence.

Badiou argues that truth is something that exceeds the knowledge that one can have of the current mode in which objects are organized inside an intelligible situation: "truth is not a qualification of knowledge nor an intuition of the intelligible. one must come to conceive of truth as making a hole in knowledge. Lacan is paradigmatic on this point. The subject is thus convoked as a border-effect or a delimitating fragment of such a hole-piercing (Badiou, 1991: 25).

1. Descartes is a staple reference for Lacan; precisely the former is the thinker who provides the concept of a new subject able to rebind without a new division of matter and mathematics.

If a truth performs a cut into a situation where it appears, it is because "it is the metonymy of the situation's very being". For Badiou, each thing appears as one according to a given criterion of the count, but, as such, is infinitely multiple, is a pure multiple of multiplicity, with no original element.

Truth is therefore the exposition of two things: on the one side the fact that each element of the situation, as such, is "nothing", it is a pure multiple of multiples void of atomic elements, and on the other that, therefore, the consistent manner in which the elements of the situation are presented, structured, hierarchized is not a necessary reality, but a *contingent* construction. To this extent, the archetypical example of truth is for Badiou that "everyone (being a pure multiple) is equal to anyone else, and each one counts as one". Such a statement appears in a given state of facts as a violent cut that breaks the evidence of the structure that attributes a different value to different individuals according to determinate properties (money, culture, social role, nationality...) that each one possesses in a different measure (Badiou, 2006b: 83).

The declaration of equality of each one is therefore the removal of the pretended naturalness of such categories, and it is based on the exposition of the indifferent ontological nature of each element of the situation (it is based on the fact that there is no original essence of each thing whereby one might attribute different values to different things, but on the contrary, each thing is no-thing specific, is a pure multiple, counted as one): this is why truth is properly empty of specific content, is purely formal, and is universal. Furthermore, exceeding the current mode of organization of the objects of a situation, the truth cannot appear as a normal part of the situation, but only as a dramatic rupture with the latter. Dependent on a truth that appears as an eventual, radical novelty in the situation, a "subject is a forced exception, always coming in the second place (Badiou, 2009: 84).

"The truth is in the actions that appear," Badiou said in an interview with Hallward. So, as it is the only truth that can distinguish man from his animality and become a subject, on the other hand, and at the same time, the truth itself is for the subject something completely subjective and of the nature of pure belief. Because we have to keep in mind that for Badiou, there is no transcendent truth; although he is influenced by Platonic truth, he denies maximal and ideal Platonic ethics that deal with typical and transcendental forms for comparing and measuring action. The truth is multiple for him, and interpretations of an event never end in an absolute; so he does not accept any moral system that measures good and evil with an absolute and perfect object.

In fact, truth is what happens after an event, a maximum but not an absolute; truth is inseparable from the event; on the other hand, truth, with its constant and undeniable connection with the subject, seems to become a specific set of speeches and discourses that the subject follows in the situation after the occurrence of the event. Thus it can be said that truth for Badiou is always the truth of a particular situation and so, there is no meta-situational truth. Moreover, according to Badiou, as we have said, the truth ultimately comes from action, perseverance, and struggle. In a

sense, truth is situational and not meta-situational; and this feature implies the dialectic between subject and truth.

Badiou claims that the subject is in a state of forced exception but on the other hand, he considers the subject as the only being who is aware of captivity in the state, on the one hand, Badiou emphasizes the subject's awareness of captivity in the situation and his declaration of allegiance to the truth, on the other hand, he considers the emergence of truth to depend solely on the actions of the subject, thus, contrary to Badiou's claim in *Being and event*, the subject cannot be merely a function of truth and in the second place; here is a dialectic.

After an event occurs in a situation, the human being uses all his abilities and even his instincts to serve the truth; if he does not announce the occurrence of the event, if it does not confirm the beginning of the truth process, if he does not decide to distance himself from the knowledge that governs the situation, if he does not use his will to be faithful to the truth, and if he does not have perseverance and perseverance in this faithful practice, how will the truth be allowed to be revealed?

According to the authors of the article, as much as the subject's rise and appearance owe to the truth, the truth also owes its public proclamation to the subject, and this is two-way communication, not a one-way one, as a result, the best interpretation for this two-way relationship between subject and truth seems to be dialectic.

The dialectic of truth and subject in Badiou's philosophy also determines his political outlook; however, in this article, only the ontological aspect of this dialectic is considered, nevertheless the role of this dialectic in the formation of the political subject and the state cannot be ignored; although we do not intend to address it in this article.

The subject of truth: a relative and concrete thing

In the process of truth, as Badiou explains, events, situations, facts, and subjects are like links in a chain. although Badiou's subject is clearly different from its predecessors and classic types, this explanation has problems; the points that Badiou has left unsaid. The important issue is the ontological aspect of the subject. He tries to show the subject as something completely dependent on the event and the truth. So that without the occurrence of events and the beginning of the process of truth, it is not possible for a human to become a subject. It is as if being a subject is a role that man accepts and not his innate and inner characteristic, but Badiou did not even specify the beginning and end of this role. Badiou states that there is no general and abstract subject for him and only the subject of truth. On the other hand, there is no general truth, and the truth is quite situational and specific to the event. Every truth is the truth of a particular situation. the consequence of this claim is that every subject is merely the truth to which it is faithful; and since truth is situational, then its subject is also situational. But we know that man does not belong to just one situation, and there are other situations to which he belongs. the question here is how does this subject relate to other situations? Can he be considered as a subject in other situations as well?

According to Badiou, the answer is: **No**. Well, then he is not a subject while he is a subject. He is subject only to one situation and plays the role of a human-animal in others. In such a case, how can the ontological dimension of the subject be explained? on the other hand, being a subject has its own characteristics, Characteristics of consciousness, and will that Badiou does not attribute to the human animal.

Being a subject becomes a relative thing because every human being does not belong to just one situation, but to different and possibly many situations; so with Badiou's interpretations, the subject becomes completely relative. that is, a human being at the same time who can be in a particular situation and for the truth of that situation the subject, it can be just a normal, obedient object for the other situations to which it belongs and this is the point that Badiou has to answer.

Therefore, it seems that the relativity of the subject can be examined from two perspectives: first, at the situation's level itself, and second, the different roles of the subject in the different situations to which they belong. Since for Badiou, the event is a local thing in the situation, the resulting truth is also situational and is completely dependent on the situation. So the related subject to them cannot be general and is completely local. So even at the level of a particular situation, the component that has become the subject is both the subject and not the subject. Being a subject in this state can only be a procedure and a manner and does not find an existential role. As if the object that has become the subject is both a subject and not. It has become a subject somewhere in the situation, but at the same time, it remains an object for other parts of the situation.

In such a case, the general address of the truth is also affected. The truth about such a subject cannot be generalized. In such a case, the general address of the truth is also affected. The truth about such a subject cannot be generalized because being a subject only happened in a part of the situation. How can one be considered existential for such a subject? when he explains the subject only by his actions, even the limits of these actions and the scope of the subject's duties cannot be properly explained.

The second/ the next level is related to the different situations that each person belongs to at the same time. When the occurrence of an event makes a person the subject of truth in a situation, he remains a normal object in other situations. This not only affects the subject existentially but also distorts his expected behaviors in the process of producing truth.

Contrary to Badiou's claims the subject in question is both outside the realm of ontology, such as an event, and so he must explain how he considers the truth about such a subject to be material. If truth is considered to be due to the merging of existence with the material subject, its foundation is fundamentally shaky, like the existential basis of the subject itself and if, as the subject, there is more emphasis on the actions and behavior of truth, how can its material soul be justified?

Conclusion

Finally, we can say that there is a subjective truth in Badiou's project because any ordinary element of the situation (subject) constitutes relative truth of the situation to which are belonged; and also

there is a subject of truth, which exactly means, the existence of subject depends on truth procedure and in the other hand, the existence of truth depends on some faithful multiple, one is active and thinker who serves its abilities in order to protect the existing truth in the context of the situation. Subject and truth both are equally important and effective in the truth process. There is a two-way relationship between them and neither can be considered more important than the other, and neither can be considered a subset of the other. the existence of each depends on the existence of the other. The truth will not be created without a subject, and so on the subject will not be formed without the truth. In the absence of truth, only the normal objects of the situation exist, and this is the truth that causes the ordinary multiples to become extra-ordinary, to become the subject. If there is no faithful and active subject, there is no truth, and if there is no truth, there is no subject. Badiou tries to introduce the subject as dependent on the truth but he has neglected the constitutive role of the subject in the process of truth. The subject is not only the protector of truth but also the creator of it.

It is true that the occurrence of an event causes the formation of the subject, but on the other hand, it is this subject that with its awareness, fidelity, and activism, produces the truth. therefore, the subjective dimensions of truth should not and cannot be ignored. Just as there is a subject of truth, there is also a subjective truth. A multiple existent that belongs to a presented multiple recognizes the occurrence of the event; It declares allegiance to multiple truths and thus finds it possible to be the subject. The subject is the faithful multiple to the multiplicity. The subject is very multiple without the need for a unit that can admit his initial captivity in any situation and then releases itself of pre-eventual position and finally, becomes an active creature called the subject. The subject owes the emergence of his conscious qualities and purposeful activities to the truth instead, the truth owes its validity and emergence to the perseverance and persistence of the subject. Subject fidelity is the subjective dimension of truth.

Especially since Badiou does not explain the subject's position in the event and does not specify exactly where the starting point of this connection is? Another issue that Badiou seems to have overlooked is the relativization of the subject in this way. He believes in Platonic truth, because he insists there is no relative truth, but at the same time, he considers it situational. Each truth is specific to the situation in which the event took place. The point is that in such a case, the subject also becomes a situation thing, and even more, it becomes relative. For a particular situation and its truth, it is the subject, but for another situation and another truth, it may be just an ordinary object. And this is an important point that Badiou did not pay attention to.

Because with his explanation, it seems that it is not possible to speak from the ontological aspect of the subject and Contrary to his claims, the subject finds only one epistemological dimension. It is as if the subject is quite similar to Husserl's subject, because for him, the subject is always in the world and part of the world he thinks about. It means that whenever we talk about the subject, we inevitably talk about a truth related to it. Just as conscience and appearance are inseparable in

Husserl, so here too truth and subject are inseparable; the subject of truth is also an integral part of the process of truth, the difference is that here this subject is not transcendental and cannot be; even the truth is immanent for Badiou.

Although the truth does not owe its existence to the subject, it owes its appearance to, at the same time, although the subject does not owe its existence to the truth, she owes her actualization to it. and this connection, contrary to what Badiou portrays, is two-way and dialectical.

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