

The Nature of the Soul from Mullā Ṣadrā and John Hick's Viewpoint

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Article Info

ABSTRACT

Article type:

Research Article

Article history:

Received 1 May 2022

Received in revised 30 October
2022

Accepted 1 November 2022

Published online 1 January
2023

What this essay is to discuss is Mullā Ṣadrā and John Hick's viewpoint about the "nature of the soul". Mullā Ṣadrā considers the real nature of human beings to be "the immaterial soul" based on his own principles in the science of the soul. He explains the nature of the soul with respect to substantial motion that the human being is corporeal in coming into being and the immateriality of the human soul in survival and afterlife. John Hick considers the consciousness as the most basic characteristic of mind, which is identical with the soul. He considers the nature of the soul as "human self" which forms his truth. Most of the viewpoints of both thinkers are similar or close to each other such as belief in the existence of the soul and being two-dimensional, quality of Genesis, substantiality, incorporeity, and corporeality of coming into the soul.

Keywords:

nature of the soul, Mullā Ṣadrā,
John Hick, consciousness, self.

Cite this article: Mohammadi, H.; Kashfi, A. (2023). The Nature of the Soul from Mullā Ṣadrā and John Hick's Viewpoint. *Journal of Philosophical Investigations*, 16(41), 271-284. DOI: <http://doi.org/10.22034/JPIUT.2022.51391.3195>



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DOI: <http://doi.org/10.22034/JPIUT.2022.51391.3195>

Publisher: University of Tabriz.

Introduction

Whatness of the nature of the soul is one of the most important philosophical issues, which have long been the subject of controversy among thinkers and each one has a special view about it. From the insights of many philosophers and theologians, belief in the life after death and immortality of man is based on belief in the existence of the soul. Hence, clarifying of the nature of the soul has been sought by scholars.

Aristotle considers "soul" as the first perfection for instrumental natural body or for a body, which potentially has life (Aristotle, 2010: 75-83). The definition of Aristotle is accepted by Ibn Sīnā¹. However, he disagrees with some concepts (Ibn Sīnā, 1984: 10). This article compares the views of "Şadr al-Muta'allihin"² and "John Hick"³ on the nature of the soul.

Mullā Şadrā and John Hick are two divine thinkers who have innovative theories about the nature of the soul, which are influenced by their religious thoughts and philosophical principles. Mullā Şadrā tries to clarify the nature of the soul by using the definition of past philosophers and his philosophical principles. He defines the soul, for the sake of belonging the primary perfection and moderator of "body." He then tries to clarify the nature of the soul based on his own principles in the science of the soul, in explaining the nature of the soul, in terms of the essence.

John Hick tries to reveal the nature of the soul. He considers consciousness identical with the mind and the important traits of the soul considers the soul as identical with the nature of the human itself. The main purpose of this paper is to survey the views of these two philosophers on the nature of the soul. Hence, the similarities and the differences and principles and requirements of their views will be discussed.

1. Literature review

"Socrates"⁴ is the first thinker who seriously focused on the nature of the soul. For Socrates, the soul is the principle of human beings (Aristotle, 2010: Code that, KO). Before Socrates, "Pythagoras" and "Anaxagoras" also had talked about the immaterial dimension of man and the nature of the soul (Taliaferro, 2010: 218-219; Reese, 1980: 845). Anaxagoras has used the words of "Psuchka" and "Nous"⁵ about the "Spirit."

Plato (Copelston, 2012: Vol. 1, 242) and his followers, who were influenced by the views of Socrates, considered the nature of the soul separate and independence from the material.

Aristotle and his supporters consider the soul as the material substance and the body's form, which has unity and entailment with the body (Aristotle, 2010: 75-94; Copelston, 2012: Vol. 1, 193, 248).

1. Soul is the first perfection for instrumental natural body.

2. Şadr al-Din Muhammad Shirazi, known as Mullā Şadrā (979 / 1571- 1050 AH / 1640 AD), the founder of the Transcendent Philosophy.

3. John Hick, a contemporary English philosopher (to whom attributed the theory of religious pluralism is attributed).

4. Socrates (400-470 CE), one of the ancient philosophers in Athens.

5. To explain more about: William L. Reese 1980.

"Stoicism"¹ and epicurean school² have a materialistic view toward humans because the soul is considered to physical and composed of thin components that overwhelmed all of the body (Bern, 1983: 105-113).

The anthropological philosophical thought of most of the medieval thinkers such as "Plotinus"³ and "Augustine"⁴ on the nature of the soul is based on the views of Plato and Aristotle (Bréhier, 1979: Vol. 1: 36-41; Laskem, 2001: 206). "Plotinus"⁵ believes in the existence of Nous (Yaspers, 1984: 16-27, 86-88, 90-111).

The self-knowledge thoughts of "Bonaventura"⁶ and "Aquinas"⁷ are influenced by Aristotle⁸. However, Bonaventure had a general tendency toward Plato and "Augustine"⁹ (Copelston, 2011: Vol. 2: 228-361, 363- 366).

Among the philosophers of the Middle Ages, the minority stream had a materialistic view toward human nature. Philosophers such as the "Tertullianus"¹⁰ denied the existence of an immaterial and independent substance called soul (Laskem, 2001: 206).

"Descartes"¹¹ had Platonic thinking about the nature of the soul (Descartes, 1982: 57-58; 1985: 37-41; 1997: 33). David Hume and Thomas Hobbes (Copelston, 2009: Vol. 5: 21-18) and schools of "behaviorism", "functionalism"¹², "physicalism" and "eliminativism" denied the existence of soul but thinkers such as Eccles and Swinburne (Watson, 1913: Vol. 20: 77-158 ;Ryle 1949: ch1) and John Hick have discussed about soul, its nature, and its issues in their works (Hick, 2010; Hick, 1997).

Muslim scholars have seriously pursued the discussions about self-knowledge with regard to its importance in the book and tradition (Ibn Sīnā, 1992: 182). The theories of Hishām bin Ḥakam (Al-Sha'arī, 1400: 190), "Ṣaikh Ṣadūq", "Allāmah Ḥillī", "Ḥwāja Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī", "Ja'far bin Muḥammad Mu'tazili" (Faḥr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, 1407: Vol. 7: 35-38), "Fayyād Lāhījī", "Ġazzālī", most of the Mu'tazilites, including Mu'ammār Mu'tazilī (Jarullah, 2002: 131), most Sufis and mystics, such as Ibn 'Arabī (Ibn 'Arabī, 1405: 1. 117-121), and other scholars are among those (al-

1. Porch School (5 / 336-3 / 264 BC), the philosophical school in Athens and Xenon from its founders.

2. Epicurean school (1 / 342- BC), its founder, Epicurus Born in Samos. R K: Bern, 1996, 15-16.

3. Plotinus (205-270 AD), a Roman-Egyptian philosopher and the founder of the Neoplatonic School.

4. Augustine Saint (354-430 AD), a famous philosopher and divine wise, and the Latin Church of the Church.

5. Plotinus (205-270 AD), a Roman-Egyptian philosopher and the founder of the Neoplatonic School. To explain more about Plotin's life. K: Yaspers, 1974, 9.

6. Bonaventura (1274-1217), a philosopher, an Italian theologian and bishop of the church who followed St. Francis of Augustine. Henry Thomas 1973.

7. Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274), the philosopher, theologian and Christian monk of the Middle Ages of Italy.

8. For further explanation, refer to Copelston, 2011, 296-303; Akinas, Thomas, *Summa Theologica*, Washbome, London, 1912.

9. For further explanation of the views of Bonaventura, refer to Ḥabībullahī, 2009. 92-103.

10. Tertullianus (222-155), he is the father of the Latin theology and the greatest and the first Christian writer in Latin.

11. Rene Descartes (1596-1650), philosopher, mathematician, and reputed French physicist of the Renaissance.

12. Functionalism (In terms of functionalists, states and events, the mediator is between the sensory inputs of an identifier and his next behavior).

Ṭūsī, 1405: 378-379). It can be understood from anthropological views of some theologians that human reality is the same material object (al-Rāzī, 1407: 7, 38-35).

Most Muslim philosophers such as al-Kindī (al-Kindī, 1990: 165); Faḥūrī, Ḥannā, al-Fārābī, (Al-fakoori, 1979: Vol. 2, 136-137), Avicenna, (Avicenna, 1996: 21), Ġazzālī (Ġazzālī, 1972: 5-6), Šihāb al-Dīn al-Suhrawardī (Suhrawardī, 2009: 1, 206), "The Iḥwān al-Šafā'" or "Brethren of Purity" , "Mullā Šadrā", "Ḥāj Mūllā Hādī al-Sabziwārī" (al-Sabziwārī, 1987: Vol. 5: 305-310) have accepted the existence of soul as the true dimension of humans. Literature review shows that there has not been particular research to compare the views of Mullā Šadrā and John Hick.

2. Quality of formation of the soul

2_1. Mullā Šadrā's View

Mullā Šadrā explains the quality of the appearance of the soul based on his philosophical principles (Mullā Šadrā, 2004: 8, 285). The existing consists of "matter" and "form." The compound creatures are formed from the combination of elements¹ with each other and then elemental shape is formed after that and then "temperament"² and "mineral form" are realized by the substantial motion of the primary material³. The "primary material" accepts the form of the body and will be effective with it. Then the soul will be obtained for the body and the human form will be formed (Mullā Šadrā, 2004: Vol.2, 35; Vol. 9, 187; Oboudiat, 2012: Vol. 3: 49-50) and the rational soul will be realized as real essence⁴. For Mullā Šadrā, the soul is present in the whole body by adjustment of the temperament (Mullā Šadrā, 1410: Vol. 8: 76-77).

2_2. John Hick's View

John Hick considers natural factors and the will of God as the source of the formation soul.⁵ In his view, the formation of humans takes place in two fetal and psychical stages and these should be separated from each other. The first stage is the creation of human nature as a rational being, which becomes ready for the second stage of creation as a raw material in the result of the gradual biological evolution. "The soul is potentially realized in a fetus not yet born or a newborn baby" (Hick, 1997: 45).

The human soul along with the body ensures the continuity of the individual or natural, social or psychical life of human beings throughout the stages of the life due to their mutual effect of each other (Hick, 47-48).

2_3. Similarities, differences, and comparison

1. For further explanation, refer Aristotle, 2013.

2. For further explanation, refer: Ibn Kamūneh 1403: 59; Ṭūsī 1980.

3. For more details on ink. K: Aristotle 2013: 385-386.

4. For further study on elements, elemental and physical forms, temperaments and mineralogy. K: 'Ubūdiyyat, 2012: 3, 22-58.

5. For further explanation of the quality ebraof formation of the soul and body, see: Migne 1844: vol. 30: col. 265, 9.

Mullā Ṣadrā and John Hick consider the soul to be a divine creation which natural factors - the formation of the fetus – are effective in the formation of it. Even though Hick explains this in his works but it has not been explicitly mentioned in Sadra's words. They both believe that the time of formation of the human soul is after the development of the fetus and the realization of the ability to accept soul and the soul has gradation in existence, begins from primary material and natural level, and reaches natural – psychological level.

Mullā Ṣadrā explains various stages of the emergence of the soul, which are elemental, physical, mineral, and human form in detail, interpreted in the natural – psychological level, but John Hick did not mention this process and stated this in general including emergence, the development of the fetus, and realization of the ability to have soul.

Therefore, John Hick considers man to be of matter and form in the same way that Mullā Ṣadrā believes in the primary material and a substantial movement in the soul. Even though material movement is among Mullā Ṣadrā's self-centered principles but studying Hick's work on the soul shows that formation of the soul is based on it.

3. Whatness of Soul

3.1. Mullā Ṣadrā's View

From the perspective of "Ṣadr al-Muta'allihin", human is a set of "soul" and "body" which coexist identically to be one and have an identity from the beginning to the end of their lives¹(Mullā Ṣadrā, 1410: 105; Vol. 5: 286, 289, 190; Vol. 8:10, 134, 150). Mullā Ṣadrā describes the nature of the soul from the belonging aspect: "But the earthly soul ... from our view is that: the first perfection is for the natural body ..." (Mullā Ṣadrā, 1934: 179) The soul in the belonging soul as far as manages the body has no particular case to refer to it (Qaiṣarī, 2001: 796-797).

The definition of the soul from the aspect of belonging was first introduced by Aristotle (Aristotle, 2009: 75-83). Ibn Sīnā accepted the definition of Aristotle (Ibn Sīnā, 1993: 320) but disagreed with him in some ways² (Ibn Sīnā. 1984: 10).

The soul is the first perfection of the organic and natural body or the first perfection for a body that has a potential life (Ibn Sīnā, 1979: 29-36; 2004: 10-11; 1992: 55-56; 1984: 14).

Therefore, Ibn Sīnā accepted the definition of Aristotle and agreed generally with Ibn Sīnā in this case (Ibn Sīnā, 2004: 9, 10).

The soul can be defined as "potency", "form", or "perfection" but Mullā Ṣadrā has adapted "perfection" from the three definitions mentioned above and considers it to be superior to potential and form because it is more complete than the other two. The perfection is what makes the

1. For further explanation of the soul and body. K: Ibrāhīmī Dīnānī 2007 & Mullā Ṣadrā 1410.

2. For further explanation of the definition of the soul and the differences between the views of philosophers. K: Lāhījī 1426: Vol. 3: 426; Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī 2005: Vol. 2, 201; Mullā Ṣadrā 2003: 228-229; Ibid 2004: Vol. 2, 349; Ibn Sīnā 1404: 5-10; 1985: 319-320; Ibid 1981: 165-167.

imperfect object complete and the type comes with it such as rationality compared to animals which creates the human's being a type because there are two kinds of perfections for the soul. One is the "rationality" for the "humans" and the other is secondary perfection, which after obtaining a species will get into it so that accidental defects of species are removed such as good ethos of humans, which are formed after formation of species and are considered as the secondary perfection of humans¹. The perfection requires to the associate. The body is an associate for perfection ('Ubūdiyyat, 2012: Vol. 3: 75).

Mullā Ṣadrā explains that the wise men have defined the body in the definition of the soul but this has some problems. Because the soul becomes the object of comparative which its other side is the body such as "fatherhood" who has a relation to "child" which has been used in the definition, while the soul is not identical with the body. Since the fatherhood consists of two aspects of "being human," which is its intrinsic nature, and its "belonging aspect" which is a relative nature. However, taking the body in the definition of soul is different from the fatherhood because selfhood and belonging to the body is all of the soul and its component and I is not an accident of soul². (Mullā Ṣadrā, 2004: Vol. 8: 9-13).

Afterward, Mullā Ṣadrā defines the soul from the perspective of existence and dignity of nature. This type of definition is "composite whetherness"³ (Mullā Ṣadrā, 2012: 16) that soul is in its essence by disregarding its relation with something else in terms of nature. In other words, it is defined regardless of the aspect of the belonging to the body and counsel to the body. Similar to the concept of human which can be considered for each person extension individual in-itself regardless of its connection with another existence.

Mullā Ṣadrā believes that the soul is actually a substance and it is not the accident because on the one hand, the soul is aware of itself to presence knowledge and its existence is just for itself not the other has and does not come to inhere in a locus. Because the thing, which is, comprehended its existence by knowledge, not by the presence, its existence is to the others. Humanity also perceives its being through presence knowledge and its existence is for itself. On the other hand, the source of human perception is his own soul and not his body and not the whole of him, which is composed of the soul and body. So the human soul does not come to inhere in a locus and as a result, the soul is not the accident and it is a substance⁴ (Mullā Ṣadrā, 1967: 211; Ibn Sīnā, 1971: 94, 214), which is independent and does not dependent on anything else.

11. To explain the priority of perfection relative to potential and face. K: Mullā Ṣadrā 2004: Vol. 8: 7-9.

2. For further explanation of the nominal definition of the soul. K: 'Ubūdiyyat 2012 & Mullā Ṣadrā 2004.

3. Compound expresses the "method of existence" and the nature of the soul; for more information: Ḥānsārī 1974: Vol. 1: 124-199, 161-163; Al-Muẓaffār 1400: Vol. 1-3: 93-95; Ḥillī 1413: 16-23.

4. Mullā Ṣadrā, in the book "Origin and Resurrection," has also used another proof of the essence of the human soul which in brief can be said that he proves the being- substance of the soul through the existence of substantial meanings in the soul. To explain more about this argument: Mullā Ṣadrā 2011: Vol. 2: 140.

Muslim philosophers consider the soul to be an immaterial and abstract substance¹. Ibn Sīnā and Sheikh Ashraq believe in the abstraction of the soul (Ibn Sīnā, 2016: 187; Suhrawardī, 2009:17). Peripatetic philosophers consider the nature of vegetative and animalistic souls to be material and physical, but they consider human soul to be abstract both in its creation and in survival and they consider it to be apart from any changes and believe that if there is a change, it will happen only in the accidents that are outside the essence of the soul (Fayyādī, 2010: 186).

Mullā Ṣadrā also believes soul abstraction but not in a way explained by the schools before him. He considers the vegetative soul to be immaterial in creation and survival². However, considers animal and human souls to be material in creation and abstract in survival. However, he considers the soul of some individuals who enter into the wisdom world to be intellectual (Mullā Ṣadrā, 1980: 143; 2004: Vol. 8: 402; 2000: Vol. 6: 85, 109; Vol. 9: 85; Vol. 8: 347, 391, 393).

In Mullā Ṣadrā's view, the soul is not abstract at the beginning of the Genesis but an abstraction of the soul is gradual and it is due to its evolutionary process. The change in the substance of soul directs the corporality toward mortality but it directs soul toward abstraction and rationality and the soul becomes stronger every day and becomes abstract intellect after separating from the body (Mullā Ṣadrā, 1410: Vol. 9: 261-273).

Mullā Ṣadrā³ considers intellectual faculty, which is a mental spiritual, and abstract that is capable of performing infinite works (Mullā Ṣadrā, 2004: Vol. 8: 333) and considers the human presence-based knowledge of itself as a reason for abstraction of the soul (Mullā Ṣadrā, Vol. 8: 320). Ibn Sīnā also considers the knowledge by presence to be the reason for the abstraction (Ibn Sīnā, 1992: 155- 156).

Mullā Ṣadrā considers the soul to be a nature with two aspects and explains that physical aspect of humans and their soul should be separated. Individual humans are different but their souls are the same at the beginning of creation but soon changes based on their secondary instinct and other nature and are divided into many kinds (Mullā Ṣadrā, 1962: 19-25). Ṣadrā explains based on the "primacy of existence", "the gradation of existence", and "material motion", "substantial motion"⁴ that soul is an original form with two aspects and there are no differences between these two aspects and these two are related⁵. The nature of soul is in a way that it cannot be considered to be static and one-dimensional essence and it rather reaches to higher levels by passing each stage and the internal changes and moves from material body to pure abstraction in this way (Mullā Ṣadrā, 2000: Vol. 9: 125). The soul is a material part of the body at the beginning because it lowers the level of

1. Abstraction and materiality of the soul are one of the most discussed topics in philosophy. Aristotle has contradictory and ambiguous words about this. K: Aristotle 1970: 32-33, 78-80. At the same time, Mullā Ṣadrā attributed to him the "Abstraction" of the soul. K: Mullā Ṣadrā 2000: Vol. 8: 307.

2. For further explanation, see. K: Mullā Ṣadrā 2011: 143; Ibid 2004: Vol. 8: 402; Ibid 2000: Vol.6: 85 109.

3. Mullā Ṣadrā has alleged twelve proofs of abstraction. R.K : Mullā Ṣadrā 1383.

4. For further explanation of philosophical principles. K: Ibid 2012: 87-91; Ṭabāṭabāyī 1995; Ḥāmina'ī 2001: 79; Mullā Ṣadrā 1410.

5. For further explanation, K: Mullā Ṣadrā 1410: Vol. 3: 83; ibid 1984: 12, ibid 2003: 49; Ṭabāṭabāyī 1995.

animals in its animalistic aspect ... as a result; the soul is the corporeality of coming into being and immateriality of the soul in survival and afterlife.

Initially, there is a natural form for sensuous substance and this power has rational form ... the soul moves from hardest to the most delicate ranges in its perfection process (Mullā Ṣadrā, 1996: 88-89). The "Natural", "imaginary" and "rational" existence of the soul are considered to be its levels which are connected to each other (Mullā Ṣadrā, 2012: 299; 1967, 221). However, a small number of souls will reach pure abstraction and find their way to Wisdom (Corbin, 2001: 483; Mullā Ṣadrā, 2003: Vol. 8: 144-145; 1996: 88 - 89).

The emergence of this meaning in Ṣadrā's science of the soul is in a way that the rational soul of humans potentially contains all aspects of existence and is transformed during its movement from one world to another. At the same time, this evolution does not harm the simplicity and immateriality of the soul. Because the human is hierarchical which one thing is from "pertaining to hyle to the rank of "abstraction" and beyond it but has different degrees of weakness and intensity and its various degrees arise in its course of substantial motion (Mullā Ṣadrā, 2003: Vol. 9: 128, 125-138). Nevertheless, the difference between the soul and the body, as Mullā Ṣadrā believes, goes back to the difference in the hierarchical (Mullā Ṣadrā, 2003: Vol. 9: 130 - 131). In Mullā Ṣadrā's thought, the renewal and change is a connection and the unity of the existing personality does not disappear¹. This issue helps to resolve the problem of differentiation of body from the soul, which has been the most important problem of old, and new philosophers.

3_2. Nature of Soul from the perspective of John Hick

John Hick has a dualistic view about soul and body and believes in the existence of souls and different states of the soul for human beings. In his view, the soul and body form the existential existence of humankind and are two different and independent essences but are at the same time mysteriously linked together (Hick, 1997: 119-120). "... In addition, the soul that each of us knows is what is has a body as a human" which understands the universe from a unique point of view within itself (Hick, 1997: 35). He explains the nature of the soul through the phenomenon of "consciousness" and "self."

3_2_1. Truth of consciousness

John Hick considers consciousness to be the product of the soul and one of its important features because consciousness is the most basic feature of the mind in his view and the mind and soul have identity relationship. He believes that truth of the human being is formed from a soul or mind that the perceptions are made by it because the body becomes mortal by death but soul or mind continues to live and is an immortal and eternal substance.

1. For further explanation, K: Mullā Ṣadrā, 2012: 13.

Hick believes that the soul has two types of consciousness. One is self-consciousness, which without intermediary perceives itself and its states such as suffering and pleasure, sadness and happiness and pain, and there is no need to make a person be aware of pain or suffering. "Soul is directly aware of itself while it is unaware of others" (Hick, 1997: 35). The other one is consciousness toward others that is obtained indirectly. For example, the soul can perceive, see, hear, and touch matters using the apparent senses because the soul has the ability to accompany the body (Hick, 2010: 89-91).

John Hick uses the view of a neuroscientist to clarify the nature of consciousness. U. T. Place and Vilayanur Ramachandran¹ consider consciousness as a brain process and material event, (Hick, 1997: 113). "Even though philosophers are investigating the human mind for two hundred years, they have not yet found an answer in terms of truth about consciousness" (Ramachandran, 1998: 6). In fact, they believe in the existence of consciousness but they do not consider it to be a mental state and they rather tend to suppress brain processes and consider awareness as unknown but Roger Penros does not consider consciousness as materialistic² and rather believes that its truth is not simply recognizable and we should have hope that the nature of consciousness will become known one day. The conscious activities and perceptions, as it deserves, have not been well described in the contemporary person's conception in the material world. However, at the same time, it is necessary for us to move from the conventional framework of the image of the material world to a new physical image (Penrose, 1999: 14). He explains that: "we need to look for a place inside the brain; the effects of particles are likely to be found more and we should not consider a proper role for new physics without such "quantum coherence"³ which can provide "non-computational prerequisite" so that scientific terms include consciousness" (Penrose, 1999: 409). Steven Rose⁴ confirms Penrose's view. "The subject of consciousness goes beyond neuroscience and even psychology and philosophy" (Rose, 2005: 14). He believes that neuroscientists have not known the nature of consciousness up until now (Rose, 2005: 4). Antonio Damasio⁵ is similar to Steven Rose and believes that new age sciences cannot recognize the truth of consciousness and it is a mere mystery the field of neuroscience (Hick, 2010: 90) and there is an explanation (Damasio, 1990: 14). Damasio states that if all scientific issues have been discovered for human life and only the question of explaining the nature of mind remains, the only thing that can solve it is knowing

1. Vilayanur S. Ramachandran, director of the Center for Brain and Perception of the University of California, San Diego, in the twentieth century, and researcher in the field of behavioral neurology and visual psychology. 1951.

2. Roger Penros is a mathematician, physicist and philosopher of English and retired professor at the Institute of Mathematics at Oxford University in the twentieth century. 1031.

3. Quantum coherence.

4. Steven Rose. M. A retired English think tank in the field of biology and neuroscience and director of the Brain and Behavioral Research Group at the University of the United Kingdom, 1938.

5. Antonio Damasio. An American neuroscientist and president of the University of Iowa in the United States of America. 1944.

the nature of consciousness, (Damasio, 1990: 14) but the problem is that common human science such as neuroscience is not able to recognize the nature of consciousness to make last scientific problem of man which is the meaning of the mind clear. Susan Greenfield does not deny the phenomenon of knowledge but remains silent about its nature and explains that:

In this case, I cannot fully explain how a lot of nerves create awareness (Greenfield, 1999: 220).

John hick explains according to the viewpoint of the thinkers that we cannot say that consciousness is a material phenomenon but it is nevertheless accepted as a mere secret by scholars and philosophers. "In fact, today, there is a widespread acceptance about consciousness" in the way that nature and states of consciousness remain as a pure mystery (Hick, 2010: 89). From Hick's point of view, the consciousness is different from "cerebral activity" and distinct from "physical states" and it is related to "non-material mental processes" and different from "electrochemical processes" of brain activity. In addition, the existence of consciousness as a state of soul opens up to us the existence of immaterial facts such as God and others and consciousness is along with "introspection". The introspective state is different from the known physical variations, which simultaneously occupy a place in the brain (Hick, 2010: 82). Therefore, John Hick's point of view about the soul is based on the phenomenon of consciousness.

John Hick interprets the reality of man as self. Hick believes that material terms, such as having a place, etc., are not used in describing the "soul" because soul is a single and metaphysical phenomenon but immaterial language is used in the definition of the man and soul is diverse and confusing phrases such as spirit, self, I, person, ego, consciousness, psyche, subconscious, unconscious and others are related to soul (Hick, 1997: 35). He uses the term "self" to interpret these varied and vague terms because "self" represents the truth and the human soul. The word "self" is used to refer to the "soul." A person who uses terms such as thinking, feeling, willing, remembering and consciousness is "self" while building these sentences and anyone who reads these sentences is also "self" (Hick, 1997: 35).

The "self" in terms of human's knowledge of the universe has different aspects and grades. Our knowledge of the universe is formed on two levels. One is the individual and material knowledge that is formed based on the nature and through the material body. At this level, humans have less understanding of the world because human vision is material and at the material level such as the fact that man is born in the world, he lives and then is destroyed in the world. Other is social and affective recognition where a man considers himself the most important beings in the universe of beings. From this aspect, "self" is intrinsically "self-centered" and it has a constant sense of panic and concern because it is continuously threatened by others due to various events. Based on this, understanding individual and social self can have an important role in the understanding of the nature of the soul.

Human reality consists of semi-self-conscious, semi-conscious and unconscious parts that interact with the self-conscious part. Individual self of humans also consists of memory and other mental affairs and the person is not actually aware of those but is open to awareness and also includes a substance (body) in which the soul forms itself as human self but social self-conscious consciousness also exists inside this individual self-conscious consciousness which is common among humankind (Hick, 1997: 51-52).

In this part of his speech, John Hick refers to the role of the soul as the real self of human beings. He considers such a soul to be a factor for preserving self and body or human. He considers the soul as a boundary, which limits self, is relative to others and protects self and body that is related to it. Accordingly, one of the achievements of the soul as a self is to preserve the existence of man (Hick, 1997: 45). From the point of view of John Hick, the value of humankind is provided and sustained by "the soul." The soul gives personality to humans and makes human existence valuable as an entity among other beings of the universe.

Though Hick has not explicitly referred to the definition of "self", his views show that it has a substantive, immaterial nature, perceiving about which consciousness is a prominent feature. The soul is an essence which forms the soul's true truth as "self" and it becomes an object in the human body as a person and a human being is formed in its light; but at the same time, he states that there must be sufficient reasons for denying the soul as a being created and blessed by God (Hick, 1997: 39).

3.3. Similarities, differences, and comparison

Mullā Ṣadrā clarifies the nature of soul by an explanation of soul in terms of belonging and its nature. His expressions, in this case, are clear and he has explained the nature of the soul well but John Hick has not explicitly referred to the definition of "soul" and has not mentioned any solid reason for its existence and nature. In fact, Hick does not deny the existence of the soul and even explains that those who deny soul have no reason for their claim. We can understand the issues of the body being controlled by soul, essence, abstraction, having two aspects and being understandable from his works. He has somewhat clarified the nature of the soul by explaining the phenomenon of consciousness and considering the soul as the real self of human beings and has considered those to be two reasons for the existence of the soul. However, his words about the nature of consciousness are vague and uncertain and understanding his language in the explanation of the truth of "self" is complex and difficult.

The common point of Mullā Ṣadrā and John Hick is considering two aspects for humans. They both believe that humans have two material and spiritual substance but Hick is a dualist in the case of the soul problem and considers humans to have two independent soul and body substances while Mullā Ṣadrā is not a dualist in the case of the soul. He considers human as a being who has two body and soul aspects and considers the body to be a part of the soul. Ṣadrā considers man as a soul with two aspects where the body is the natural state of the soul. John Hick also refers to this.

From John Hick's point of view, humans are first embryonic and natural which is potentially the same as soul and humans find the talent to accept it after completing various stages and fetus becomes soul. So, both thinkers believe that the soul has two aspects and there is a relation between the soul and the body and they are influenced by each other.

Bodily harmony of the soul is the common belief of two thinkers. Mullā Ṣadrā considers the substance of the soul to be natural at the beginning, which is embodied in the natural body and then it goes up to the level of abstraction. John Hick also believes that human is in the form of fetuses and raw material at the beginning of being natural, which potentially has the ability to accept the soul so that it is added by God but human will have two independent substances of the soul and body after this stage.

The quality of the connection of abstract soul with the material body is the most important problem of philosophers and philosophical belief of these two thinkers overcomes it because Mullā Ṣadrā considers the soul to have two aspects according to his philosophical foundations and its simplicity, continuity, and personal unity. John Hick also considers two natural and natural-soul aspects for humans and these two substances are tied together. John Hick assumes the cognition problem by humans in two material and spiritual terms. In his view, consciousness is the cognition that is achieved by the human self and includes the unconscious, semi-conscious, self-conscious, and collective consciousness subset of the human being. Mullā Ṣadrā also recognizes the soul to be the factor of cognition in man but does not consider the body involved in cognition, rather considers it as a tool for the soul in this regard.

Both thinkers perceive self as the true truth of humankind because, from John's point of view, the soul is the real self of human beings using which individuality of man is distinguished. Mullā Ṣadrā also considers the soul to be the intrinsic truth of humankind because he believes that soul forms all of human beings and soul is something that is not a body. Hence, the body cannot be the reality of man. Mullā Ṣadrā regards the soul as the perfection of the body based on which the nature of man is completed but this is not the case in John Hick's words. He has only referred to the fetal stage, which is natural, and natural- soul stage of human kind but does not refer to the fact that those are perfection for humans.

Another common belief of humans is that the soul is an abstract and immaterial substance. They consider man-made knowledge of the human being about self and states of self as reasons for abstraction of the soul because Hick considers knowledge which is abstract as the most important feature of the soul is the same with the mind. Hence, the soul has knowledge by presence toward self. He also considers the real self of humans, which expresses soul to be immaterial because he believes that immaterial words are used in the description of "soul" because the soul is an abstract phenomenon.

Conclusion

Hick's view of the nature of the soul is in line with or close to the view of Mullā Ṣadrā in many cases. Both thinkers consider the soul to be the perfection of man, provider of knowledge of the presence and truth of man, which remains after the destruction of body and continues to live eternally in another world. John Hick, in fact, considers consciousness among the essential features of the soul, which is the true self of humans. They both consider human to be physically created but Mullā Ṣadrā considers the soul spiritual while John Hick does not believe in this because in his opinion, the soul is created after creation of body and it is an essence independent of the body. The fundamental difference between the two thinkers about the nature of the soul is that Mullā Ṣadrā considered the soul to be the entire human and even body while John Hick believes that the soul is independent of the body and body is independent of the soul. John Hick has in fact adopted the view of having two aspects for essences, Sadra does not believe in this, and he rather considers human with two aspects of soul and body. Belief in the existence of the soul, the quality of the genesis, the human being is corporeal in coming into being, abstraction, graded motion, gradation in existence, having two aspects, interaction of the soul and body and the effect of each one on the other are among common points in the views of these two thinkers about the nature of the soul.

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