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# The Kantian Self versus Pattern Theory of the Self

Mohammad Mahdi Moghadas<sup>1</sup>  | Ali Fath Taheri<sup>2</sup> 

<sup>1</sup> Corresponding Author, Ph.D. Candidate, Department of Philosophy, Imam Khomeini International University, Iran. Email: [mehmoghadas@gmail.com](mailto:mehmoghadas@gmail.com)

<sup>2</sup> Professor, Department of Philosophy, Imam Khomeini International University, Iran. Email: [fathtaheri@ikiu.ac.ir](mailto:fathtaheri@ikiu.ac.ir)

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### ABSTRACT

In the history of philosophy, the concept of the self has long been a subject of intense debate and scrutiny. Within Kant's critical philosophy, the self holds a significant position and is deemed essential for the very notion of experience. This article aims to clarify Kant's viewpoint on the concept of self. Kant posits the existence of an inner sense faculty, through which he introduces the empirical or phenomenal self, a concept that aligns with Hume's stance on the self. Furthermore, Kant introduces the idea of a noumenal self through the faculty of understanding and apperception, suggesting that this noumenal self is the foundation upon which all our experiences are made possible. Our primary objective is to clarify the distinctions between the two forms of self, which will be succeeded by an assessment of each. Although numerous scholars tend to view Kant's perspective on the self as a negative concept, an alternative viewpoint emerges, proposing a potential positive interpretation of Kant's concept of the self. Subsequently, we present Gallagher's Pattern theory of the self and conduct a comparative analysis between the Kantian self and the components that constitute the self.

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## Introduction

Immanuel Kant's philosophy has had a profound impact on Western thought, and his views on the self are no exception. However, understanding Kant's self is complex, as it lies at the intersection of his epistemology, metaphysics, and ethics. Central to Kant's project is the distinction between phenomena and noumena. We can only access the world through our *a priori* forms of intuition, space and time, and categories of understanding. This distinction, leaves the self-in-itself unknowable. However, Kant argues for a *transcendental self*, a unifying principle that synthesizes our diverse experiences into one cognition. This self is not a substance but an activity – the "I think" that accompanies all representations (B131).

Early interpretations of Kant's self-theory were heavily influenced by the prevailing philosophical movements. Fichte and Schelling, two prominent Post-Kantian Idealists, placed great emphasis on the active involvement of the self in the construction of reality. They viewed the transcendental self as a dynamic and innovative force, which propelled Kant's concept of self towards a more comprehensive and substantial understanding. Conversely, Realists such as Maimonides directed their attention towards the constraints inherent in Kant's project. They contended that the differentiation between the phenomenal and noumenal self ultimately erodes the possibility of attaining genuine knowledge about the self. In contrast, Neo-Kantians like Hermann Cohen highlighted the ethical aspect of the self, underscoring its significance in moral considerations. They saw the self as constituted through the pursuit of the Categorical Imperative, highlighting the role of moral agency in shaping selfhood. Phenomenologists like Edmund Husserl offered a different perspective. He argues that Kant neglected the lived experience of the self, focusing too heavily on the *a priori* structures of consciousness. Scholars like Henry Allison emphasize this active, unifying role of the self in constituting experience. He suggests the self is a 'regulative idea' that allows us to make sense of the unity of experience over time (Allison, 2001). Patricia Kitcher argues that the self is a "concept under which we subsume all our mental states" (Kitcher, 1982). According to Günter Zöllner's review of the literature, "differences of method and philosophical approach aside, the interpretations ... show a remarkable agreement in their understanding of Kant's thinking self as a form or structure that eludes any attempt at reification" (Zöllner 1993, 460).

On the other hand, Kant critiques the 'rational psychologist' tradition, which seeks to prove the self as a permanent, immaterial soul. He argues that such arguments, like the "cogito ergo sum", rely on Paralogisms that confuse the transcendental self with a psychological entity (B407-411). Wilfrid Sellars (1956) highlights this critique as a significant contribution to modern philosophy. Several scholars interpret the self as a schema, a unifying principle that organizes experience. These interpretations highlight the self's role in unifying consciousness without necessarily positing a permanent soul. While some may seek a positive account of the self ("the referent of 'I'") within

Kant's philosophy, the prevailing interpretation casts him as skeptical of such endeavors. Scholars often argue that Kant warns against attempts to define the self's essence and instead constructs his theories without relying on metaphysical assumptions. This dominant interpretive lens draws parallels between Kant's project and Ludwig Wittgenstein's assertion that the self "doesn't belong to the world, but is a limit of the world," suggesting a potential prefiguration of Wittgenstein's ideas (Marshall, 2010, 1).

Kitcher states that the problem with Kant's views about the self is that he has too many of them because the self has too many roles to play in his system (Kitcher, 1982, 41). Accordingly, Kant talks about the metaphysics of the I (*das Ich*), the mind (*das Gemüt*), the thinking subject (*das denkende Subjekt*), and the soul (*die Seele*). In addition, he uses both the substantive form of 'self' (*'Selbst'*) and the simple reflexive form (*'selbst'*). The specific interrelations between these terms remain unarticulated in Kant's work; however, he consistently deploys them in an indistinguishable fashion (Marshall, 2010, 2).

While Kant's conception of the self is multifaceted and intricate, it can be contextualized within a historical framework as a reaction to the ideas put forth by earlier philosophers such as René Descartes, John Locke, and David Hume. Kant's critique of Descartes' concept of the self and his rebuttal of Hume's bundle theory are especially noteworthy. This article aims to elucidate the relationship between Kant's responses to these two philosophers. Consequently, we will delve into Kant's perspective on the self, culminating in a critical examination of his views. Finally, we compare Kant's theory of the self with the 'Pattern Theory of the Self' proposing by Shaun Gallagher.

### **1. Kant, Descartes, Hume, and problem of the self**

Descartes suggests that the mind, or the self, which engages in thinking and knowing, is a substantial entity. Its essential nature is clearly understood through feelings and reflection, but can also be confused by the awareness of external ideas that are mistakenly perceived as qualities of physical bodies. The thinking mind is a non-physical substance, separate from the physical body. This thinking mind constitutes the self – an individual, immaterial entity. Descartes believed we can access the self through introspection, gaining clear and distinct knowledge of its essential nature as a thinking thing. In Descartes' view, the thinking mind is the self. Kant, it seems, provides a list of attributes for this self. These attributes are assigned to what we call "rational psychology":

The topics of the rational doctrine of the soul, from which everything else that it may contain has to be derived, are therefore the following: 1. The soul is substance 2. In its quality simple 3. In the different times in which it exists, numerically identical ..., and 4. In relation to possible objects in space (A344/B402).

Based on these four characteristics, Kant introduces four fallacies or Paralogisms in the section ‘Transcendental Dialectics’ of his *Critique of Pure Reason*. Kant challenged the notion of a purely individual, substantial self. He argued for a distinction between the phenomenal self (the self we experience) and the noumenal self (the "thing-in-itself" beyond experience). The phenomenal self is constituted by the transcendental unity of apperception, a unifying principle that allows us to synthesize experiences and maintain a sense of selfhood over time. This self is not a substance but a necessary condition for experience itself.

Hume argues that we have no direct experience of a self as a substance. Instead, the self is merely a ‘bundle’ or ‘collection’ of our perceptions – impressions and ideas. These perceptions constantly change, leading Hume to declare famously, “There is no abiding or identical impression, to which a train of thought can be referred, and which can be regarded as the foundation of personality.” For Hume, personal identity is a matter of memory and imagination, creating a sense of continuity across these fleeting perceptions. In his famous statement, Hume rejects that we can catch any perception of the self:

For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never can catch myself at any time without a perception, and never can observe anything but the perception. When my perceptions are removed for any time, as by sound sleep; so long am I insensible of myself, and may truly be said not to exist. And were all my perceptions removed by death, and could I neither think, nor feel, nor see, nor love, nor hate after the dissolution of my body, I should be entirely annihilated, nor do I conceive what is farther requisite to make me a perfect non-entity. If anyone, upon serious and unprejudiced reflection thinks he has a different notion of himself, I must confess I call reason no longer with him. All I can allow him is, that he may be in the right as well as I, and that we are essentially different in this particular. He may, perhaps, perceive something simple and continued, which he calls himself; though I am certain there is no such principle in me. But setting aside some metaphysicians of this kind, I may venture to affirm of the rest of mankind, that they are nothing but a bundle or collection of different perceptions, which succeed each other with an inconceivable rapidity, and are in a perpetual flux and movement... There is properly no simplicity in it at one time, nor identity in different; whatever natural propension we may have to imagine that simplicity and identity... They are the successive perceptions only, that constitute the mind; nor have we the most distant notion of the place, where

these scenes are represented, or of the materials, of which it is composed. (Hume, 2009, 395-396).

Hume argues that the evidence of experience provides no basis for believing in a distinct entity within the individual responsible for thought. Consequently, a singular, unified thinking self becomes even less tenable. In Hume's view, the mind lacks a singular, enduring substance. Instead, it is a collection of diverse perceptions, or mental states interconnected through specific relations. These relations, however, mislead us into mistaking a sequence of distinct experiences for a unified and lasting self. Hume contested the existence of inherent, necessary connections between mental states, suggesting that our perception of such relationships might be illusory. This is the point Kant conflicts with him. Kant aimed to establish essential connections among mental states by asserting that these are necessary conditions for the feasibility of experience. Kant's consistent focus on a necessary connection or necessary synthesis of mental states has virtually nothing to do with theoretical psychology. This is a typical Kantian reaction to the predicament that Hume posed. In both editions of the Deduction, Kant continually adverts to a relation among representations, the relation of synthesis. He offers an explicit definition of this relation:

By synthesis in the most general sense, however, I understand the action of putting different representations together with each other and comprehending their manifoldness in one cognition (A77/B103).

For Kant, 'representation' signifies both 'mental state' and the 'content of a mental state'. The last clause refers to the content (manifold) of different mental states being combined in a further mental state. As Kant realized, token mental states are episodic, occurring at different times, so they themselves cannot literally be put together (Kitcher, 1982, 53).

Kant establishes a clear link between transcendental synthesis and the concept of self-identity by directly equating transcendental synthesis with the transcendental unity of apperception. In B135, Kant states that "I am therefore conscious of the identical self in regard to the manifold of the representations that are given to me in an intuition because I call them all together my representations, which constitute one. But that is as much as to say that I am conscious a priori of their necessary synthesis, which is called the original synthetic unity of apperception..."

Despite these considerations, Kant, in his examination of the problem of the self, distinguishes at least two types of self: 'the empirical self' and 'the transcendental self'. In the following, we will strive to present a precise and clear outline of Kant's perspective on the self.

## **2. The Empirical Self and Inner Sense**

While the transcendental self is necessary for experience, Kant also acknowledges the empirical self. In this regard, we consider the self as an object of experience. We have an inner sense, a faculty that allows us to introspect our mental states like desires, thoughts, and feelings. This

empirical self is located in time and is constantly changing. Katharina Kraus (2020) argues that inner sense provides the raw material for self-knowledge, which is an ongoing process of self-reflection and moral development.

Before delving into an examination of Kant's perspective, two crucial considerations merit attention. According to Marshall (2010, 2), the two point is that (1) Kant recognizes a broad use of 'I' that refers to the "whole man," involving body and soul. However, Kant's use of 'I' in the *Critique of Pure Reason* is meant in a stricter sense: "I, as thinking, am an object of inner sense, and am called 'soul'" (A342/B400). (2) Kant holds that having a self requires more than merely possessing representations — it requires having certain faculties.

Kant presents the inner sense as an empirical apperception. Here, Kant admits Hume approach about the self that there is no abiding self. In A107 he states:

The consciousness of oneself in accordance with the determinations of our state in internal perception is merely empirical, forever variable; it can provide no standing or abiding self in this stream of inner appearances, and is customarily called inner sense or empirical apperception.

Kant distinguishes between two modes of 'I'. The first, the "I as subject of thinking," corresponds to pure apperception. Pure apperception represents the intellectual, a priori foundation for synthesizing our thoughts. This "I" is not an object but the unifying principle that allows us to experience ourselves as thinking beings. In contrast, the second mode, the "I as the object of perception," is linked to the inner sense. The inner sense is the subjective counterpart of the outer senses, providing us with a sensory consciousness of ourselves and our thoughts, including the various "determinations" that shape our inner experience. Kant, explicitly states that what we intuit in the inner sense is not the kind of things-in-itself (Forgione, 2019, 26-27):

We must order the determinations of inner sense as appearances in time in just the same way as we order those of outer sense in space; hence if we admit about the latter that we cognize objects by their means only insofar as we are externally affected, then we must also concede that through inner sense we intuit ourselves only as we are internally affected by our selves, i.e., as far as inner intuition is concerned we cognize our own subject only as appearance but not in accordance with what it is in itself (B156)

The crux of the matter lies in the subject's engagement with the appearances through the inner sense. This engagement leads to a self-perception that is no more than an appearance, mirroring how the subject interacts with appearances of external objects. In both scenarios, the subject fails to access the 'thing-in-itself.'

According to Kant, time is the a priori form of intuition which is the condition of all outer and inner perception.

Time is the a priori formal condition of all appearances in general. Space, as the pure form of all outer intuitions, is limited as an a priori condition merely to outer intuitions. But since, on the contrary, all representations, whether or not they have outer things as their object, nevertheless as determinations of the mind themselves belong to the inner state, while this inner state belongs under the formal condition of inner intuition, and thus of time, so time is an a priori condition of all appearance in general, and indeed the immediate condition of the inner intuition (of our souls), and thereby also the mediate condition of outer appearances (A34/B50).

Kant argues that time, as the a priori formal condition, allows for the revelation of all possible representations. Through time, which functions as the form of the inner sense, the subject recognizes these representations as belonging to itself. Similar to its role as the condition for all appearances in general, time is the immediate condition for inner intuition (of our souls) and the mediate condition for outer appearances. However, in A33/B50, it seems that Kant gives another role to inner sense. In this passage, Kant states “Time is nothing other than the form of inner sense, i.e., of the intuition of our self and our inner state”. Again, in B55, he says that the object of inner sense is the object of myself and my state. Kant distinguishes two critical roles for the time in this regard. The first concerns the subject's direct intuition of itself through the inner sense. Time, as the form of the inner sense, enables this immediate self-intuition. The second role involves the subject intuiting its own representations or mental states. Here, the subject's capacity to be affected by the specific determinations of these inner states allows for their recognition as belonging to the self.

In general, the inner sense has no separate manifold of its own. The matter of inner intuitions consists of no sensory impressions produced by or grounded in the self, much in the same way that the matter of outer intuitions consists of impressions produced by the affection from outer objects. According to Kant, there is no empirical intuition of the self as an external object, since the self cannot be encountered as a spatio-temporal object. For this reason, the manifold of the inner sense properly consists of *outer sense* representations: “the representations of outer sense make up the proper material with which we occupy our mind” (B67). As a result, the inner sense regarded as the limiting condition through which the empirical manifold given in outer sense may be attained: “I exist as an intelligence . . . which, in regard to the manifold that it is to combine, is subject to a limiting condition that it calls inner sense” (B158) (Forgione, 2019, 28).

As we have seen, there are two functions for the inner sense: 1- the intuition of the self, and 2- the intuition of the representations. Hence, if the subject intuites itself solely through the inner sense,

without any self-object that originates or causes the sensory impression, then the appearance of the self can only be produced by the empirical manifold presented in the inner sense. However, since the manifold of the inner sense is composed of representations from the outer sense, the cognition of the self as appearance, as argued by Kant in various passages, can only be realized through the introspectively available representations, essentially derived from the outer sense.

Kant makes a clear distinction between the 'I' as 'I think', 'intelligence', or 'thinking subject' in transcendental apperception, and the 'I' that intuits itself as two separate aspects of the same mind or subject. The 'I' as intelligence recognizes itself as an object of thought, since the subject is also presented to itself in intuition, along with other phenomena, "not as I am for the understanding but rather as I appear to myself". However, the subject presented to itself as appearance in intuition should be seen as the outcome of the combination or determination of the inner sense by understanding (Forgione, 2019, 29).

The faculty of inner sense is characterized as passive, whereas understanding is regarded as an active faculty. In B153, Kant warns that we, like rational psychologists, should not confuse these two faculties with different natures:

Here is now the place to make intelligible the paradox that must have struck everyone in the exposition of the form of inner sense (§ 6): namely how this presents even ourselves to consciousness only as we appear to ourselves, not as we are in ourselves, since we intuit ourselves only as we are internally affected, which seems to be contradictory, since we would have to relate to ourselves passively; for this reason it is customary in the systems of psychology to treat inner sense as the same as the faculty of apperception (which we carefully distinguish).

According to Kant, the mind is perceived through our inner sense or empirical apperception, which allows us to be conscious of the continuous flow of inner appearances related to the state of the self. According to both Hume and Kant, there is no abiding self in this process. The self that is spoken in psychology, known as the 'phenomenal self', empirically recognized as a series of mental states unfolding in time, with time being the inherent form of our inner sense as Kant stated. This, distinct from the 'noumenal or transcendental self', which is the enduring self that truly exists.

The phenomenal self comprises exclusively of the empirically observed self states within classical psychology, which are uncovered through introspective examination of internal states or experiences. On the other hand, the noumenal self represents a nonempirical "limiting concept" that reason guides us towards through an analysis of our phenomenal self (Chessick, 1980, 461).

However, Kant had a plan to introduce noumenal self, as an abiding self. In the next section, we probe the Kant's view about this abiding self.



### 3. Noumenal Self and Apperception

There is a crucial distinction in Kant, which separates two realms ontologically: phenomena and noumena. According to each realm, there is a particular idea of the self. As we have seen, the phenomenal self is an empirical self that associate with the faculty of inner sense and intuition, but, in Kant perspective of the self, there is another concept of the self that has different properties and associate with the other faculties. This, called 'noumenal or transcendental self' that has a clear link to the faculty of understanding.

Kant posits that the mind is comprised of two essential faculties, specifically 'receptivity' and 'spontaneity':

If we will call the receptivity of our mind to receive representations insofar as it is affected in some way sensibility, then on the contrary the faculty for bringing forth representations itself, or the spontaneity of cognition, is the understanding. It comes along with our nature that intuition can never be other than sensible, i.e., that it contains only the way in which we are affected by objects. The faculty for thinking of objects of sensible intuition, on the contrary, is the understanding. Neither of these properties is to be preferred to the other. Without sensibility no object would be given to us, and without understanding none would be thought (A51/B75).

Kant proceeds to introduce three distinct faculties that further elaborate on the general aspects of the mind. These faculties are 'sensibility', 'understanding', and 'reason'. By delineating these three specifications of receptivity and spontaneity, Kant provides a more comprehensive understanding of the workings of the human mind:

The genus is representation in general (*repraesentatio*). Under it stands the representation with consciousness (*perceptio*). A perception! that refers to the subject as a modification of its state is a sensation (*sensatio*); an objective perception a is a cognition (*cognitio*). The latter is either an intuition or a concept (*intuitus vel conceptus*). The former is immediately related to the object and is singular; the latter is mediate, by means of a mark, which can be common to several things. A concept is either an empirical or a pure concept, and the pure concept, insofar as it has its origin solely in the understanding (not in a pure image of sensibility), is called *notio*. A concept made up of notions, which goes beyond the possibility of experience, is an idea or a concept of reason (A320/B377)

Representation can be categorized into three main types: 'sensations', 'intuitions', and 'concepts'. Sensibility, which refers to the faculty of sensory representations, encompasses

sensations and intuitions. These sensory representations are influenced either by external entities or by the subject itself. On the other hand, the faculty of understanding is responsible for dealing with conceptual representations spontaneously. Reason, another spontaneous faculty, concerns concepts known as 'ideas'. It is important to note that these ideas, such as God and the soul, cannot be encountered through direct experience (Forgione, 2019, 23).

In the prominent passage, Kant states that what he calls 'I think' must accompany all my representation:

The I think must be able to accompany all my representations; for otherwise something would be represented in me that could not be thought at all, which is as much as to say that the representation would either be impossible or else at least would be nothing for me. That representation that can be given prior to all thinking is called intuition. Thus, all manifold of intuition has a necessary relation to the I think in the same subject in which this manifold is to be encountered. But this representation is an act of spontaneity, i.e., it cannot be regarded as belonging to sensibility. I call it the pure apperception, in order to distinguish it from the empirical one, or also the original apperception, since it is that self-consciousness which, because it produces the representation I think, which must be able to accompany all others and which in all consciousness is one and the same, cannot be accompanied by any further representation. I also call its unity the transcendental unity of self-consciousness in order to designate the possibility of a priori cognition from it (B131-132).

In this context, Kant establishes a connection between the 'I think' and the concepts of spontaneity, as well as the pure or original apperception or self-consciousness. Kant, then, presents a principle under that all manifolds can be united in one consciousness:

I can combine a manifold of given representations in one consciousness that it is possible for me to represent the identity of the consciousness in these representations itself, i.e., the analytical unity of apperception is only possible under the presupposition of some synthetic one... Synthetic unity of the manifold of intuitions, as given a priori, is thus the ground of the identity of apperception itself, which precedes a priori all my determinate thinking... only an operation of the understanding, which is itself nothing further than the faculty of combining *a priori* and bringing the manifold of given representations under unity of apperception, which principle is the supreme one in the whole of human cognition... Now this principle of the necessary unity of apperception is, to be sure, itself identical, thus an analytical proposition, yet it declares as necessary a

synthesis of the manifold given in an intuition, without which that thoroughgoing identity of self-consciousness could not be thought (B134-135).

In (A77/B103) Kant talks about synthesis that “By synthesis in the most general sense, however, I understand the action of putting different representations together with each other and comprehending their manifoldness in one cognition”. According to Kant, the term 'representation' encompasses two meanings: it refers to both the 'mental state' itself and the 'content' of that mental state. The latter aspect pertains to the combination of various mental states' contents into a subsequent mental state. Kant recognized that individual mental states occur episodically at different times, making it impossible to assemble them together.

Kant also firms about these facts that we are unable to know the things-in-themselves:

...in any case we would still completely cognize only our own way of intuiting, i.e., our sensibility, and this always only under the conditions originally depending on the subject, space and time; what the objects may be in themselves would still never be known through the most enlightened cognition of their appearance, which alone is given to us (A43).

The faculty of understanding, according to Kant, generates the synthetic unity of thought, which is an aspect of the mind that cannot be directly known. This synthetic unity of thought is closely linked to the unity of consciousness, the conscious sense of self, or what Kant refers to as the 'I am I.' This unity of consciousness is an integral component of all thinking processes and is necessary for the synthetic unity of the manifold, as described by Kant. Consequently, our comprehension of objects does not arise from a disjointed series of sensory representations, but rather is presented to us in a coherent and interconnected way. The faculty of understanding has the responsibility of presenting the synthetic unity of representation, in addition, these experiences must be perceived as belonging to a singular consciousness, commonly referred to as the 'I' or the self. Kant refers to this as the *synthetic unity of apperception*. The central argument in Kant's immensely challenging yet essential 'transcendental deduction of the pure concepts of the understanding' that stated in Deduction, relies on the premise of the transcendental unity of self-consciousness, the awareness of 'I am I', the cohesive perception of a continuous and unified self. This enduring core of self-consciousness is undeniably necessary to differentiate one's self-boundaries and self-experiences from those originating from the external world (Chessick, 1980, 459).

Kant posits that we can contemplate the external reality and the knowing self, but we can never directly comprehend or describe them. The unknown self, also known as the noumenal or intelligible self by Kant, influences the mind internally and contributes to our introspective empirical sense of self experienced over time. This unknown self is believed to be the cause of our introspective experiences of self states, forming the phenomenal self. Therefore, Kant's

fundamental unproven assumption is that there is an underlying, unknowable, enduring ‘I’ that underpins our mental activities.

The concept of the noumenal self, acting as a constraining concept, is closely related to our experiences, as it is directly inferred by our reason through our experiences. It serves as a *regulative* principle according to Kant, aiding reason in organizing and categorizing our experiences of the phenomenal self. Since it is solely a product of rational thought, no further elaboration can be provided. Kant refers to this notion of the noumenal self as the *negative* noumenal self.

Although Kant, in *Critique of Pure Reason*, describes the self as a negative concept, however, in *Critique of Practical Reason*, he ignored entirely it and gives a positive one. For Kant, the self achieves its highest form in the realm of morality. The Categorical Imperative, the cornerstone of his ethics, demands that we act on principles that could be universally willed. This, requires us to see ourselves not just as self-interested individuals but as rational beings capable of acting on reason alone. Allen Wood (1999) expresses that Kant's emphasis on the self as a free and autonomous being, bound by the moral law, is a defining feature of his ethical philosophy.

In Kant's Moral philosophy, the noumenal self is utilized as an autonomous entity, with many assumptions made about its nature. This transition is commonly characterized as a progression by Kant, moving from the negative connotation of the noumenal self to a more positive interpretation. This evolution involves a shift from a simplistic understanding of the noumenal self, derived from direct empirical observations to a more intricate and abstract concept, a transition that cannot be adequately supported within Kant's own philosophical framework outlined in the *Critique of Pure Reason* (Chessick, 1980, 461).

In the next section, we aim to evaluate and compare Kant's view on the self.

## **4. Evaluation and Comparison**

### **4.1. Evaluation**

Kant's view of the self has been subject to various criticisms. Some argue that the transcendental self is too abstract and provides little insight into the lived experience of the self. Others criticize the strict divide between the phenomenal and noumenal self, questioning whether the self-in-itself is truly unknowable. Patricia Kitcher (1982) critiques Kant's account of personal identity, arguing that it fails to capture the diachronic unity of the self. Kant's conception of the self is a complex and debated topic. Despite the challenges, his emphasis on the active, unifying role of the self in constituting experience, the distinction between the transcendental and empirical self, and the centrality of the self in morality, continue to influence contemporary discussions on selfhood.

As we have seen, Kant encountered the philosophical dilemma that arose from Hume's work, which ultimately led to an insurmountable obstacle, leaving only room for absolute skepticism. In an attempt to overcome this unsatisfactory conclusion, Kant redirected the focus of philosophy and psychology away from the empirical aspects of ‘reality’ towards the exploration of what could be

known or unknown beyond this perceived reality. In conjunction with Hume, Kant asserts that the phenomenal or empirical self, which arises from inner sense, cannot be considered enduring. However, to refute Hume's perspective, Kant introduces a noumenal or transcendental self that is indispensable for any form of experience. Without this transcendental self, the very possibility of experience is rendered unattainable.

According to Kant, the noumenal self has an internal impact on us, generating inner sense information. This inner sense data is then processed by the understanding, specifically through the "transcendental synthesis of the imagination," resulting in a consciousness of the self and a perception of how we appear to ourselves. There are two types of empirical experiences of the self: "1) 'I am I', which is required for all thought-the synthetic unity of apperception, and 2) self states appearing in a unified manifold in time" (Chessick, 1980, 460).

Kant employs the concept of the noumenal self as a regulatory notion, an 'idea of reason' that serves as a constraint. Kant dismisses "pure rational psychology" as a spurious field of study, as it attempts to examine the noumenal self as some form of 'substance'. According to Kant, the only viable approach is an empirical psychology, which entails an introspective examination of one's internal states as they manifest in the phenomena of our introspection, in contrast a purely rational psychology concerning the noumenal self underlying these experiences is deemed unattainable.

Accordingly, if the rational psychologist's argument regarding the thinking subject were accurate, we would possess a metaphysical understanding of the noumenal or things-in-themselves, like simple substance. This manner challenges Kant's limitation of metaphysics to experience in the *Critique of Pure Reason*. In the Paralogisms, Kant not only refutes the psychologist's argument, but also establishes what can be appropriately inferred about the thinking self. This affirmative inference is believed to align with his prohibition against knowledge of the noumenal. Peter Strawson believes that we can separate Kant's doctrine, transcendental idealism, and however reject the rational psychology: ". . . it is an important point that the force of Kant's exposure of the illusion of rational psychology can be carried out without any reference to these doctrines" (Strawson, 2007, 170).

Kant grappled with the concept of the inner self and endeavored to make a distinction between what can be known and what cannot be known about the self. According to Kant, there exists an unknowable self at the core of each individual that has the power to impact both the inner and outer experiences significantly. This noumenal self not only triggers these experiences but also shapes how they perceived. Due to the presence of this unique noumenal self or unconscious in every person, individuals may have vastly different reactions to themselves and the world around them, despite all being exposed to the same external stimuli on a biological or physical level.

Some philosopher probes the subject's separability from its materiality, namely from its body. Kant in the fourth Paralogism says that:

I distinguish my own existence, that of a thinking being, from other things outside me (to which my body also belongs) - this is equally an analytic proposition; for **other** things are those that I think of as **distinguished** from me. But I do not thereby know at all whether this consciousness of myself would even be possible without things outside me through which representations are given to me, and thus whether **I** could exist merely as a thinking being (without being a human being) ... It would be a great, or indeed the only stumbling block to our entire critique, if it were possible to prove a priori that all thinking beings are 'in themselves simple substances, thus (as a consequence of the same ground of proof) that personality is inseparable from them, and that they are conscious of their existence as detached from all matter (B409).

According to Kant, in terms of what can be inferred from the cogito, would be evident. Descartes argued that through reflection on the cogito, he distinctly perceived that as a thinking entity, he could exist independently from his body.

Discussion about bodily identity takes place in the B edition of *Refutation of Idealism* (B275-279). Kant argues that my existence is inherently tied to my ability to be influenced by outer factors, as well as to the experience of being influenced by outer factors. Contrary to proponents of psychological continuity views, Kant argues that I have a capacity for being a continuous and genuine holder of inner states. Additionally, Kant rejects the notion of bodily or organism identity, which posits that a person's identity is tied to the identity of their organized body, which possesses the ability to have an inner perspective. Unlike this perspective, Kant maintains that while embodiment is essential for me, bodily identity in any form does not contribute to my identity.

Arthur Melnick (2009) puts Wilfred Sellars and P.F. Strawson in one side, and John McDowell in the other side about bodily identity. According to Melnick, one perspective posited by Wilfrid Sellars and Strawson argues that Kant must fully embrace bodily identity, rather than just embodiment. Conversely, another viewpoint advocated by John McDowell contends that Kant falls short of even reaching embodiment. Sellars argues that Kant is compelled to adopt the position that I exist as a phenomenal (material) substance due to the implications of the First Analogy. According to Sellars, this analogy demonstrates that any alteration in state, including inner states, must be attributed to the transformation of an enduring intuitable substance (Sellars, 1970, 12). Peter Strawson (2007) argues that attributing states to oneself is only possible when contrasted with an objective spatial world. According to Strawson, our states form a pathway within this world, and for this to occur, it is necessary for us to be a material body that can be identified among other bodies.

McDowell has different ideas on materiality. Accordingly, once we allow that I am an ongoing capacity for inner attending and having thus a point of view, we must go on to hold that I am not essentially embodied at all:

If we insist on supplying this self-awareness with an object, we can locate the object in the world only geometrically, as a point of view...if we start from a putative sense of self as a most geometrically in the world, how can we work up from there to the sense of self we actually have, as a bodily presence in the world? (When I say that is what self-awareness is, I am not implying that one's bodily presence in the world is always borne in on one in self-awareness.) (McDowell, 2000, 104).

However, according to Kant, having a body for receptivity is essential, but it could not be part of my identity as a bodily one. Nevertheless, here we have a tension between B edition of Refutation of Idealism and B edition of forth Paralogism.

Kant in B409, is obviously referring to the B edition Refutation of Idealism for an answer to the question of separable existence (the question, recall, not fully answered in the A edition Fourth Paralogism). His answer there, contrary to McDowell, is that I (the capacity for unifying inner attending or for having a geometric point of view) must be an embodied perceiver. We have then, on the one side, Sellars and Strawson contending that Kant has to go all the way to my being identical to a body (of a particular kind 'person') and McDowell on the other side contending that Kant can't get as far as being embodied at all (whether or not such embodiment is part of my identity) (Melnick, 2009, 152-153).

So far, all the perspectives we have analyzed have regarded the notion of self in Kant as negative. However, scholars have also endeavored to portray a favorable outlook for self, based on Kant's perspective, employing the metaphysical definition. Collin Marshall (2010) attempts to give a positive metaphysics according to its definition in contemporary analytic philosophy. Accordingly, "... metaphysics of the self would be some account of how selves are individuated, what sort of entities they are, and how they fit into our broadest conception of reality" (Marshall, 2010, 2).

To summarize, it seems that Kant's analysis of the self indicates his belief that, if it exists, it must transcend the realm of appearances and belong to the realm of things in themselves. Given that this realm can only be understood a priori, a metaphysical exploration of the self would necessitate an a priori investigation of a thing in itself. However, Kant's fundamental tenet asserts that we lack any knowledge of things in themselves. Kant in B158 explicitly states that "I therefore have no cognition of myself as I am, but only as I appear to myself." Marshall gives a more and less radical version of this argument. Based on Kant's assertions regarding the boundaries of the categories, one can argue that our understanding of the self is limited. In this particular rendition of the argument, not only do we lack knowledge about the metaphysics of the self, but we are also

incapable of representing any factual information about the self as it truly exists. A less extreme version of this argument centers on Kant's ideas concerning the limitations of our cognition. This version is most effective when we assume that Kant's central proposition, which states that we have no cognitive understanding of our true selves, implies that we possess no knowledge about any aspects of our selves beyond their outward appearances (Marshall, 2010, 4).

Marshall highlights the grounds that form a basis for questioning these assumptions. The first ground is that, Kant's argument that we lack knowledge of ourselves beyond our appearances is undermined by his own assertions regarding our existence extending beyond mere appearances. For example, he argues that our sensations are caused by external objects impacting our minds (see A19/B33) and that the synthesis of representations can only be carried out by the subject itself (see B130). Kant's assertions regarding cognition (*Erkenntnis*) provide a second basis for doubting the assumption, he consistently employs this term to convey specific limitations. Kant explicitly states that 'cognition' is a technical term in the *Deduction*, where he defines it as the "determinate relation of given representations to an object" (B137, also B146–74). Additionally, in the *Introduction* to the B edition, he elucidates that the cognition production entails comparing various sensory representations. These passages present compelling grounds to question any hasty assimilation of Kant's statements about cognition with our conventional knowledge in our sense. Kant's third ground pertains to natural language. He does not assert that we lack knowledge or cognition of any facts regarding things in themselves; rather, he posits that we lack knowledge/cognition of the things in themselves. This distinction is significant because in ordinary discourse (in both German and English), the phrase "S does not know X" is commonly employed in situations where S does possess some knowledge about X (Marshall, 2010, 5).

Referring to the view of some commentators (e.g., Waxman, 1991, 276–77, Ameriks, 2000, 5), Marshall states that Kant's revolutionary 'Copernican' method in philosophy is rooted in the idea of a determinate mind with specific faculties. In the A edition, Kant asserts that "Thus we ourselves bring into the appearances that order and regularity in them that we call nature, and moreover we would not be able to find it there if we, or the nature of our mind, had not originally put it there" (A125). The project's validity hinges on our recognition of the mind as a genuine entity with its own inherent nature, which is more fundamental than the world of appearances. Furthermore, it is crucial that we must possess a priori knowledge of certain aspects of this nature. Kant's elucidation of the "logical" characteristics of the self or self-consciousness (e.g., A350, B413) effectively captures this notion. He describes 'transcendental logic' as the discipline that aims to "isolate the understanding ... and elevate from our cognition merely the part of our thought that has its origin solely in the understanding" (A62/B87). In the *Critique*, Kant investigates the self or mind as the object of his inquiry, indicating that he must have possessed some affirmative and positive concept of what he was delving into.



One of the crucial notions in Deduction, according to Marshall, is the “unity of apperception”. Kant depicts it as “the synthetic unity of apperception is the highest point to which one must affix all use of the understanding, even the whole of logic and, after it, transcendental philosophy” (B134n). Kant, somewhat more intelligibly, also describes it as the “identity of self-consciousness.” Kant argues that this unity is deemed as “necessary” in a certain manner (for example, A107, B142), and it is intrinsically linked to our basic notion of an object (for instance, A109, B139). He also posits that synthesis guided by concepts and/or judgments are the mechanisms through which cognitions are unified (such as A111-12, B141), and that we possess an a priori conception of this unity when applied to the manifold of sensible intuition (e.g., A118, B150). Accordingly, it is crucial to note that unless Kant is introducing a new philosophical concept or attributing self-consciousness to an external entity, it is difficult to comprehend the notion of “identity of self-consciousness” across various representations without interpreting it as a unified conscious self, present in all representations (Marshall, 2010, 7-8).

Therefore, as we have already seen, Marshall proposes a positive metaphysics of the self. However, this problem can be more complex, according to the Kant description about distinction between noumena and phenomena. According to Broad (1978, 234), it is argued that Kant's explanation of the human self and its understanding of itself is highly intricate, and there is uncertainty regarding the possibility of extracting a unified and coherent doctrine from his diverse statements. Kemp Smith emphasizes that the self is the only origin of all unity: “As a pure and original unity it precedes experience; to its synthetic activities all conceptual unity is due; and by reflection upon the constancy of these activities it comes to consciousness of its own identity” (Kemp Smith, 1962, 208).

A selection to Kant could involve an intellectual intuition faculty capable of directly perceiving the noumenal self and noumenal objects, similar to Husserl's (1913) ‘eidetic intuition’. This would suggest a favorable interpretation of noumena, referring to transcendent objects and a transcendent self that can be directly understood. Therefore, when noumena is used positively, it indicates that the reality or entities beyond our experiential world can be defined, structured, and assigned functions (Chessick, 1980, 460).

After assessing Kant's perspective on the concept of self, we proceed to compare it with the theory referred to as the “Pattern Theory of The Self.”

#### **4.2. Comparing Kantian View and Pattern Theory of the Self**

Shaun Gallagher (2013) proposes the new theory of the self that depicts the self as a pattern. Accordingly, he notices that we should not confuse it with a mathematics one: “I do not mean to associate a pattern theory of self with “Pattern Theory” in mathematics” (Gallagher, 2013, 2). Gallagher utilizes the pattern theory of emotion to elucidate his own pattern theory. He argues that this particular pattern is an appropriate framework for explaining his theory due to its inherent

characteristics: “(1) it reflects a commensurable concept of the pattern (i.e., it refers to the same kind of pattern that I think is relevant to the notion of self, and (2) it may contribute directly to a pattern theory of self since, as Gallagher suggests, affect is one aspect that forms part of the pattern of self” (Gallagher, 2013, 2). The pattern theory of emotion posits that emotions consist of intricate patterns involving bodily processes, experiences, expressions, behaviors, and actions, thereby defining them as “individuated in patterns of characteristic features” (Izard, 1972). Pattern theory suggests that the concept of “emotion” is a *cluster* concept that encompasses a multitude of characteristic attributes. These attributes, when combined, give rise to a specific pattern that represents an emotion. However, it is crucial to acknowledge that no single attribute in isolation is sufficient to define an emotion. Instead, it is the collective pattern of characteristic features that constitutes an emotion. For the self, also, we can make it similarly. Gallagher wants to create a pattern consist of multi features, together makes a pattern:

In a way similar to the construction of a pattern theory of emotion, I want to suggest that we can develop a pattern theory of self. On such a view, what we call self consists of a complex and sufficient pattern of certain contributories, none of which on their own is necessary or essential to any particular self. This is not a pattern theory of “*the self*.” Rather, what we call “self” is a cluster concept which includes a sufficient number of characteristic features (Gallagher, 2013, 3).

Gallagher (2013, 3-4) proposes the eight kinds of features that make a pattern of the self. These are an aspect or set of aspect that constitute the pattern theory of the self:

- (1) Minimal embodied aspects: include here core biological, ecological aspects, which allow the system to distinguish between itself and what is not itself (Gallagher, 2013, 3).
- (2) Minimal experiential aspects: to the extent that the bodily system can be conscious, it will pre-reflectively experience, from a first-person perspective, the self/non-self distinction in the various sensory-motor modalities available to it... such aspects contribute to an experiential and embodied sense of ownership... and a sense of agency for one’s actions (Gallagher, 2013, 3).
- (3) Affective aspects: the fact that someone manifests a certain temperament may reflect a particular mix of affective factors that range from very basic and mostly covert or tacit bodily affects to what may be for her a typical emotional pattern or mood, for example, someone may be a typical extrovert who enthusiastically engages in outwardly directed actions (Gallagher, 2013, 4).

- (4) Intersubjective aspects: human and possibly some nonhuman animals are born with a capacity for attuning to intersubjective existence (Neisser, 1988); this may take the form of being aware that someone else is present and possibly gazing at you (Gallagher, 2013, 4).
- (5) Psychological/cognitive aspects: traditional theories of the self focus on these aspects, which may range from explicit self-consciousness to conceptual understanding of self as self, to personality traits of which one may not be self-conscious at all (Gallagher, 2013, 4).
- (6) Narrative aspects: although there are many variations of this idea, the basic claim is that selves are inherently narrative entities (Schechtman, 2011), and for some theorists, narratives are constitutive for selves (Gallagher, 2013, 4).
- (7) Extended aspects: James (1890) suggested that what we call self may include physical pieces of property, such as clothes, homes, and various things that we own. We identify ourselves with stuff we own, and perhaps with the technologies we use, the institutions we work in, or the nation states that we inhabit (Gallagher, 2013, 4).
- (8) Situated aspects: these are aspects that play some ... role in shaping who we are. They include the kind of family structure and environment where we grew up; cultural and normative practices that define our way of living, and so on (see Gergen, 2011) (Gallagher, 2013, 4).

According to the different aspects of the pattern theory of the self, Gallagher states that some of these may be more important than other, some may be, in a particular theory of the self, completely rules out, and there can be some different aspect of self constitution that we have no mentioned. Therefore, here, the self not an entity that exist without worldly attributes. Most of these aspects related to our everyday life and the world we have inhabit. More important, the bodily features have a crucial one that constitute the self. Now, if we compare this pattern theory of self with Kantian theory of self, how many of these aspects can be attributed to the Kantian self?

If we start from the phenomenal self, we can assign some of the most important aspects to it. Accordingly, the phenomenal self is the self that originate from inner sense and intuition, which related to the time and space. For this type of self, the intuition and faculty of sensibility are crucial. Therefore, this phenomenal self inevitably dependent to the body and its capacity of receptivity. The configuration of our physical body, in conjunction with external stimuli, dictates the types of sensations that we are able to perceive and those that we are unable to. Accordingly, for the phenomenal self, we can ascribe the minimal embodied aspect. Conversely, this particular aspect cannot be attributed to the noumenal self, as it is a state that is not formed by the representation and intuition that are closely linked to bodily characteristics. Since, the minimal experiential aspects are related to what we experience in the world, and sensibility and intuition are related to the world we inhabit and experience, so that we can ascribe the second set of aspects to the phenomenal self; and in contrast, for this reason, this could not attribute to the noumenal self.

Despite the potential connection between bodily condition and affective aspects, Kant did not extensively address these aspects when exploring the concept of the self. Thus, we could not find a considered relation between phenomenal self and affective aspects. It has a same situation when we probe this aspect and the noumenal self. Descartes posits that the mind or the self has the capacity to exist, thrive, and maintain its identity independently of its presence in the world. Kant, on the other hand, appears to overlook this particular dimension of worldly existence. According to Kant, the phenomenal self is solely concerned with physical entities and does not encompass the intersubjective realm. This notion can be extended to the noumenal self, which is unrelated to these particular facets. However, if we probe this aspect with the self that Kant provided in moral philosophy, this aspect can be entered to the set of features of the self. Through examining psychological and cognitive aspects, such as self-consciousness, it becomes evident that this particular characteristic plays a vital role in defining and shaping the concept of self in both the phenomenal and noumenal realms. Kant's ability to elucidate and assign meaning to the notion of self hinges greatly on these features. If we compare the Kantian phenomenal self to Hume's bundle theory in terms of narrative aspects, we can conclude that the self in Kant's perspective possesses a narrative feature due to its constitution solely of representations and intuitions. However, Kant argues that the noumenal self cannot be attributed in this way. According to Kant, the noumenal self is considered to be the things-in-themselves and serves as a necessary condition for all of our experiences. It is not constituted from a collection of intuitions. Ultimately, taking into account the extended and situated aspects, it is incapable of being attributed to both the phenomenal and noumenal self. However, it can be readily associated with the self that Kant portrays and elucidates in his moral and legal philosophy.

### **Conclusion**

The concept of the self, is one of the most complex concepts in the history of philosophy. In Kant's philosophy, the concept of self holds significant importance amidst the numerous complex ideas presented. As observed, Kant discusses two distinct kinds of the self, corresponding to the two faculties of the mind. The self can be divided into two aspects: the empirical or phenomenal self, which is associated with sensibility and inner sense, and the noumenal or transcendental self, which is connected to understanding and apperception. One can gain self-awareness and awareness of one's states only through inner sense, as they manifest within the subjective framework of time in the phenomenal world. The timeless noumenal self, conversely, exists outside of one's knowledge, together with its distinctive functions. The noumenal self is accountable for pure apperception, leading to a coherent self-awareness and a combined consciousness when encountering one's self-experience. The department of the noumenal self, also known as the productive imagination, carries out the synthesis processes. These processes are guided by certain innate concepts that are part of understanding faculty. Through this method, all experiences, whether they pertain to external

objects or our internal states, are systematically and cohesively presented. This enables a distinct separation between the "I" experiencing the phenomena and the external reality. Kant does not considerate the phenomenal self as a true one. Instead, he attempts, by introducing phenomenal self, to depict Hume's position on the self. According to Kant, the noumenal self is the prerequisite for enabling all experiences. However, due to the differentiation between phenomena and noumena, we are unable to comprehend any knowledge regarding the noumenal self. Accessing this realm is impossible for beings like us, as it pertains to the things-in-themselves. Nevertheless, Collin Marshall endeavors to portray a positive perspective on the self as he delves into the potentiality of the metaphysics surrounding the concept of the self. We have introduced the theory of the self named 'Pattern Theory of the self'. Accordingly, we investigate features of Kantian self in terms of features that Gallagher posited as a constituting feature of the self. Finally, we have examined the constituent characteristics of the Kantian self, encompassing the phenomenal, noumenal, and potentially moral self. As observed, certain aspects of these features are harmonious, while others are not.

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