

Embodied Judgment: Kant, Gallagher, and Merleau-Ponty on Guilt in Dostoyevsky's *Crime and Punishment*

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Article Info	ABSTRACT
Article type: Research Article Article history: Received 14 July 2025 Received in revised form 07 October 2025 Accepted 13 April 2026 Published online 25 October 2026 Keywords: Embodied judgment; Kantian respect (Achtung); Intentional arc; Body schema; Affordances; Moral uptake; Crime and Punishment	This article argues that Raskolnikov's guilt is not primarily a conclusion of moral reasoning but first a disturbance in bodily attunement, including fever, nausea, spatial disorientation, and dream imagery, that gradually reorients judgment toward confession. Bringing Kant's <i>Achtung</i> (respect for the moral law) into conversation with phenomenologies of embodiment, Merleau-Ponty's motor intentionality and "corporeal schema," and Gallagher's body schema and posture and attention coupling, I propose embodied judgment as a continuum from pre-reflective grip to rational acknowledgment. On this view, normativity shows up first as a felt interruption of self-love and habitual ease, then crystallizes as the recognition of duty. Close readings of <i>Crime and Punishment</i> show how sensory atmospheres and affordances, stifling rooms, crowd pressure, overheard talk, thresholds, objects like the axe and the New Testament, format what appears morally salient and doable. The horse-dream, febrile wanderings, Porfiry's interrogations (as "objectified conscience"), and the Lazarus scene all stage shifts in Raskolnikov's intentional arc: postural collapse and proprioceptive instability narrow his field of action; Sonia's room and scripture function as moral affordances that reorganize that field toward confession. Kant's account of respect as a self-effected feeling clarifies how these bodily disruptions become practical acknowledgment rather than mere affect. The payoff is conceptual and methodological: the article bridges Kantian normativity and Merleau-Pontian habit, showing how literary scenes supply ecologically rich cases of moral psychology. <i>Crime and Punishment</i> thus models how guilt is enactively realized in and through bodies, spaces, and second-person grips, where judgment emerges before, and then alongside, explicit moral reasoning.

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Intruduction

This article replaces the familiar opposition between Raskolnikov's "theory" and his "conscience" with the claim that *Crime and Punishment* stages guilt first as embodied judgment: a pre-reflective, sensorimotor, and affective disruption that motivates rather than merely follows explicit moral recognition. From the opening pages, the city impresses itself on the nervous system so strongly that smell, heat, and density predispose posture and timing before thought settles:

"The heat in the streets was stifling. The stuffiness, the jostling crowds, the bricks and mortar, scaffolding and dust everywhere, and that peculiar summer stench ... all combined to aggravate the disturbance of the young man's nerves" (Dostoevsky, 1998, 2).

Atmosphere here is not decorative background; it functions as a field of bodily solicitations that orients conduct in advance of reasons.

The novel immediately shows how crowd-pressure becomes moral torque by interrupting composure and narrowing what feels doable. When a drunken carter points and jeers, Raskolnikov "stopped dead and clutched feverishly at his hat," a sequence of startle and concealment that discloses judgment as posture and tempo before it becomes proposition (Dostoevsky, 1998, 3). The adverb "feverishly" locates the scene in agitated motor time, and the frozen verb "stopped" records the body's refusal; in such moments, agency is steered by proximity and spectacle. Rather than a neutral stage set, the street recruits the body into patterned responses (flinch, grasp, flee) that tilt practical possibility.

Dostoevsky splices this bodily susceptibility to a running self-diagnosis that names the rift between imagined heroism and micro-fears: "To think that I can contemplate such a terrible act and yet be afraid of such trifles," he muses, then adds, "I talk so much just because I can't act" (Dostoevsky, 1998, 1–2). What these sentences expose is not mere inconsistency but a mismatch between motor readiness and reflective control. This is what I call a nascent normative grip. The will is not empty; it is out of sync with its own timing, and the body bears the evidence in hesitation and breath. The city amplifies this misalignment into a baseline of nausea and fatigue that drives him paradoxically "among people" to feel "more alone," turning crowding itself into a cue of disorientation (Dostoevsky, 1998, 2). Guilt thus first appears as a degraded ease in moving and being among others.

On the eve of the crime, the narrative marks a further degradation: action feels externally driven, as if the will were outsourced to alien kinematics.

His reactions during this last day ... were almost completely mechanical, as though someone had taken his hand and pulled him along irresistibly, blindly, with supernatural strength and without objection. It was as if a part of his clothing had been caught in the wheel of a machine and he was being dragged into it (Dostoevsky, 1998, 67–68).

The key terms (“mechanical,” “irresistibly,” “dragged”) reject intellectualist accounts of decision. Judgment has not vanished; it has been mis-housed in a compulsive sequence that the mind belatedly rationalizes. Responsibility is legible here as a felt loss of adjustable tempo: he is carried, not carrying himself.

Social affordances lock to this bodily priming, converting overheard speech and available objects into executable paths. Raskolnikov feels the situation closing in on him:

It was almost as though fate had laid an ambush for him (Dostoevsky, 1998, 58).

The notorious tavern calculus, “One death, and a hundred lives in exchange, why, it’s simple arithmetic!” does not hover as abstraction; it tunes his orientation toward an “axe sequence” he can now imagine performing (Dostoevsky, 1998, 62–63). In this way, utterance, setting, and tool act together as triggers of a motor script whose very plausibility is a moral fact, because what the body finds executable begins to masquerade as what the mind finds permissible. As Furtak (2020) argues, Dostoevsky dramatizes moral reasoning not as isolated cognition but as entangled with the body’s orientation in a world of contingent cues, “a world of temporality, chance, and intersubjective concern” where moral failure begins not in ideology but in lived, embodied exposure (p. 61).

Crucially, decisive intervals arrive as compressions of time rather than cool deliberations. Standing “behind the old woman,” he senses “there was not a moment to lose,” a phenomenology of narrowed alternatives that precipitates a single pressured move (Dostoevsky, 1998, 392). Later, in Sonia’s room, confession feels “terribly like that other” moment, repeating the structure of urgency while reversing its end (Dostoevsky, 1998, 392). Conscience is not an internal tribunal so much as a rhythm that can be reoriented (first to kill, then to avow) under similar felt constraints. The moral turning, in other words, is a retiming.

Porfiry renders this intersubjective shape of judgment explicit by reading bodily style as meaning and returning it to Raskolnikov as accusation. On the way to Sonia, he feels helpless “before the inevitable,” a phrasing that captures being drawn by a social field rather than deciding in isolation (Dostoevsky, 1998, 389). In the interview room, Porfiry diagnoses “bookish dreams” propelled by “some outside force,” naming the interplay between self-image and situation that converts posture into evidence (Dostoevsky, 1998, 437). The interrogator thus functions as an objectified conscience whose pacing, thresholds, and questions narrow what Raskolnikov can plausibly say or do without contradiction. Judgment is co-authored, second-personally, in the grain of the encounter.

Dream and fever double this dynamic from within, offering somatic commentary on rationalization. In the mare-beating nightmare, he wakes “panting,” asking, “God! is it possible ... that I really shall take an axe ...?,” a sequence that moves from gasp to proposition, showing physiology leading acknowledgment (Dostoevsky, 1998, 57). Later, amid the tavern’s din,

pangs of conscience begin to torment him, an intrusion of felt aversion into a convivial soundscape that makes the moral present as pain before it is present as principle (Dostoevsky, 1998, 152). In both episodes, the body refuses in advance what the mind is still attempting to license, and that refusal is already a mode of judgment.

Taken together, these scenes warrant a minimal theoretical frame, developed without jargon in what follows. Gallagher's distinction between pre-reflective body schema and reflective self-image clarifies why jeers, heat, and available tools reorganize salience and tempo, making some moves feel available and others impossible. Body schema names subpersonal control of movement, whereas the intentional arc names the broader, diachronic organization of agency. The scene below turns on their interaction; local schematic misfires within a still-shifting arc. Merleau-Ponty's intentional arc helps explain why breakdowns in habitual ease (visible in breath, posture, and bearing) signal a world that no longer fits, and why renewed attunement would count as moral repair. Anticipating Kant, acknowledgment does not strike *ex nihilo* but crystallizes from a disturbance already lived as the humbling of self-love; respect becomes thinkable because the body first refuses certain moves. The novel's method is therefore our method: to understand guilt in *Crime and Punishment*, begin where the text begins (in the press of air, the jeer that freezes a hand on a battered hat, the "mechanical" pull of a corridor) where judgment first takes hold as movement and breath and only later becomes the verdict we call conscience.

Edward Wasiolek's classic account frames the novel's design as architecturally intentional rather than improvisatory: drawing on notebooks and internal symmetries, he argues the book is built around interlocking hinges (murder, confession, epilogue) whose seams distribute thematic weight with care (Wasiolek, 1959, 131–136). This structural claim cautions against treating the epilogue as detachable moral afterthought. Yet precisely because Wasiolek focuses on compositional craft, a question emerges: by what means do such hinges acquire force for characters and readers? My answer locates that force in embodied shifts of posture, breath, and timing that make a "turn" in the plot felt before it is avowed.

Konstantine Klioutchkine situates the novel amid feuilletons, courtroom reportage, and polemics saturating Petersburg's public sphere in the 1860s (Klioutchkine, 2002, 88–108). His emphasis on print ecology reframes Raskolnikov's self-fashioning as mediated by genres and readerships no less than by private psychology. Building on this, I argue that discursive pressure meets sensorimotor pressure in the city's heat, stench, and crowding; the media-saturated air becomes action-guiding only as it is taken up by bodies whose attention, balance, and breath are already under strain. My account supplements Klioutchkine by tracking how the environment's discursive tempo translates into embodied affordances that bias what feels doable next.

On the problem of ending, Katherine Bowers reads the epilogue through genre, arguing that it holds detective and redemption trajectories in "generic stasis," both satisfying and suspending

closure (Bowers, 2020, 95–108). I accept this diagnosis and find it mirrored at the bodily level in Raskolnikov's halting, stilling, and starting over. Where Bowers maps the *what* of generic pull, I specify the *how*: the novel orchestrates a bodily re-attunement (posture-led attention, recalibrated pacing) through which acknowledgment becomes practicable. Generic stasis is thus also a motor state that moves the agent toward confession.

Kate Holland's account of "open moments" clarifies the temporal design: murder, confession, and conversion are simultaneously anticipated and deferred, keeping interpretive horizons active (Holland, 2020, 109–122). I translate this formal openness into a sensorimotor one: in Dostoevsky's hands, the space of possible readings is a space of literally possible movements for an embodied agent.

From a different angle, Eric Naiman reads the epilogue "hard against the grain," uncovering friction and tonal dissonance where some presume homogeneous Christian closure (Naiman, 2020, 123–143). I share this resistance to harmonization. In my terms, the epilogue's stylistic quivers index incomplete re-habitation: the narrative voice unsettles because Raskolnikov's bodily economy has not stabilized into a durable "I can." The text's polyphonic aftertremors register the bodily costs of living into an avowal.

Turning to Russian philology and theology, Tatiana A. Kasatkina's reappraisal of Porfiry reframes interrogation as moral pedagogy: calibrated guidance rather than crude coercion (Kasatkina, 2024, 29–44). I adopt this insight in an embodied key: Porfiry's office and pacing operate as an affordance field (chairs, thresholds, silences) that narrows denial into bodily unsustainability and makes self-accusation a coherent next act. Thus Kasatkina's philological correction dovetails with my claim that environments can reorganize an agent's field of possibilities.

Finally, Enisa Uspenskaya follows the epilogue across cinematic adaptations, showing how shot duration, lighting, and framing "actualize" the novel's open-ended regeneration on screen (Uspenskaya, 2022, 101–132). Her media-comparative analysis reinforces my central conviction: moral transformation in *Crime and Punishment* is inseparable from the choreography of attention and posture. The novel supplies not just an idea of conversion but a script for embodiment (a pacing of breath, a repertoire of gestures) that filmmakers materialize.

Against this multi-strand background, my intervention is to theorize guilt as embodied judgment. I propose a concrete sequence: somatic disturbance → phenomenological re-attunement (intentional arc; body schema) → Kantian acknowledgment (respect) that links norm and habit without collapsing one into the other. In practice, this shows how the novel's genres and media pressures become doable through posture-led attention; how Porfiry's pedagogy functions by affordance management; why the Lazarus episode repairs agency by repacing breath and voice; and how the epilogue's "gradual renewal" reads as habit-level reformation rather than instantaneous doctrinal closure. The aim is to preserve Kant's account of

rational acknowledgment while specifying the bodily mechanisms by which Dostoevsky makes acknowledgment live first in lungs and knees, then in public words and renewed routines.

1. Reading for Embodied Judgment: Inputs, Units, Outputs

The method of “reading for embodied judgment” focuses on how somatic signals (posture, breath, gesture, and timing) function within specific scenes to structure moral decision-making. Inputs include key textual scenes where agency is enacted (e.g., rooms, objects, and bodies), with special attention to motor signals (e.g., “stopped,” “knelt”), respiratory cues (e.g., panting, breath catching), and temporal cues (e.g., “suddenly,” “no moment to lose”). These signals are paired with units of analysis, which include (1) somatic responses (e.g., bodily interruptions or disturbances); (2) arc/schema reorganization (how habits of action are recalibrated); (3) affordance fields (what the environment makes available, possible, or impossible for action); and (4) interpersonal procedures (such as the pacing of interrogation or ritual). Outputs involve mapping a scene’s unfolding through these units, observing how a character’s physical experience leads to moral acknowledgment. This approach helps reveal not just how reasons are conceptualized, but how they are prefigured in bodily movements and actions, thus illuminating the embodied mechanisms by which acknowledgment becomes possible.

2. Mechanisms: Intentional Arc, Body Schema, and Affordances

Kant gives the normative shape of the disturbance we observe in Raskolnikov: a feeling neither empirical pull nor fear, but the subject’s affective registration of reason’s claim. Against any reduction of morality to sentiment, Kant insists that respect (*Achtung*) is affective without being an inclination: “even if respect is a feeling, it is not one received through influence but a feeling self-effected through a concept of reason ... considered as an object neither of inclination nor of fear” (Kant, 2002, 18). This both vindicates the felt character of moral experience and protects its rational source. Crucially, respect humbles self-love, “the representation of a worth that infringes on my self-love”, thereby reorienting agency from preference to principle (Kant, 2002, 18). Hence duty is “the necessity of an action from respect for the law,” not from desire for outcomes or attachment to objects (Kant, 2002, 16).

The upshot for a theory of guilt is straightforward: if respect is a self-effected feeling that checks self-conceit, guilt can be read as the subjective appearance of that check when one’s maxim violates the law. The binding force lies neither in consequences nor in pathologically pleasant motives, but in the agent’s acknowledgment of lawfulness as such, “nothing other than the representation of the law in itself ... is the determining ground of the will” (Kant, 2002, 17). Thus, when embodied aversion presses toward confession in Dostoevsky, Kant’s vocabulary explains how a felt necessity can be rational without reducing to inclination.

Where Kant articulates normativity’s source, Merleau-Ponty clarifies its first mode of appearance: through the body’s pre-reflective organization of a world of action. Habit is not

stored proposition but a “motor grasping of a motor significance,” in which “the body ... ‘catches’ and ‘comprehends’ movement” (Merleau-Ponty, 2002, 164–165). Understanding begins not as subsumption under concepts, but as the experienced harmony of intention and performance, whereby “the body is our anchorage in a world” (Merleau-Ponty, 2002, 167). The classic illustration is the blind man’s cane: no longer an object, its point becomes an “area of sensitivity,” extending the active radius of touch; the environment is disclosed through an incorporated instrument rather than represented as coordinates (Merleau-Ponty, 2002, 165). So too for practiced skills: a typist or organist does not compute positions; “a motor space opens up” beneath the hands, and the performer “settles into” the instrument as into a house (Merleau-Ponty, 2002, 166–167).

Two implications for guilt follow. First, if the body possesses a world as a repertoire of “I can,” then moral conflict can register as a distortion of this possession: the refusal of a hand, a stumble at the threshold, an atmosphere that no longer affords ease. Merleau-Ponty names such crises breaks in the “intentional arc,” where the habitual syntheses of posture, gesture, and aim “give way,” and the field no longer answers with ready-to-hand bearings (Merleau-Ponty, 2002, 163–164). By body schema I mean subpersonal, pre-reflective control processes that govern posture and movement; by the intentional arc I mean the global, diachronic synthesis that coordinates habits, projects, and meanings across situations. The schema handles moment-to-moment motor readiness, while the arc tracks how those readinesses pattern a life-wide ‘I can.’ Second, because motor intentionality “possesses the basic power of giving a meaning,” heat, press, and crowd can reorganize which meanings are practically available—what seems passable, whom one can face (Merleau-Ponty, 2002, 163). A norm can thus bind first as a felt mismatch between operative orientations and actions one tries to sustain, before any explicit verdict is formulated.

Gallagher specifies this pre-reflective architecture by distinguishing body schema from body image. The schema is a “set of tacit performances: preconscious, subpersonal processes that play a dynamic role in governing posture and movement,” operating “close to automatic,” whereas body image involves reflective, perceptual, and conceptual awareness (Gallagher, 2005, 27). Because the schema regulates action without constant monitoring, “the body-in-action tends to efface itself in most of its purposive activities,” surfacing when breakdowns or novelty force attention back to posture and limb position (Gallagher, 2005, 27). Movements governed by the schema are shaped by intention while remaining below explicit perceptual control (Gallagher, 2005, 27–28).

From here Gallagher threads to posture–attention coupling: in ordinary action our focus is on tasks and interlocutors, yet “much of the action is controlled by body-schematic processes below the threshold of consciousness,” such that gait, reach, and stance automatically adjust to terrain and aims while remaining part of our “functioning intentionality” (Gallagher & Zahavi, 2020, 165). Pathologies show the stakes: in deafferentation, an agent may initiate movement

but “has no control over where the moving part ended up ... unless he kept an eye on his hands”; by marshaling visual cues and attention, one can partially rebuild a minimal schema and recover pragmatic agency (Gallagher & Zahavi, 2020, 166; Gallagher, 2005, 45).

Finally, Gallagher naturalizes phenomenological talk of “world” with affordances: environments offer opportunities for action relative to capacities, and the body schema mediates which invitations are legible (Gallagher, 2005, 62). Though not propositional, affordances structure what can count as a next step. When the schema is taxed by fatigue, fever, or crowd-pressure, affordances shift: doors loom, stairs repel, faces solicit avoidance. Because the schema “enables and controls posture and movement,” disturbances here are not background noise; they reshape the practical field from which deliberation later extracts reasons (Gallagher, 2005, 24–25).

In sum, Kant secures the normative claim (respect as a non-pathological, self-effected feeling of law’s authority); Merleau-Ponty explains its first grip (motor intentionality and habit as our anchorage and its breakdowns); Gallagher renders the mechanisms (body-schematic coupling of posture and attention, and affordance-level reweighting). Read together, these frameworks show how guilt can begin as a pre-reflective sensorimotor-affective disruption that motivates rational acknowledgment: the very trajectory Dostoevsky stages from bodily aversion to the self-effected necessity of duty.

3. Signals: Somatic Disturbance in Dream and Street

Dostoevsky’s first full disclosure of guilt appears not as a syllogism but as visceral flood. In the nightmare of the mare’s killing, Raskolnikov does not deduce wrongness; he shudders into it. The scene registers somatically before it is judged:

“His heart seemed to rise into his throat, and tears rained from his eyes ... he was wringing his hands and crying aloud” (Dostoevsky, 1998, 55).

The piling of bodily predicates (crying, wringing, choking) marks a pre-reflective crisis in breath, posture, and pressure, precisely where normative grip first appears as a demand to recoil. The bodily crescendo is paired with the child’s untheorized compassion: “‘Papa, papa,’ cried the child, ‘look what they are doing ... They are beating the poor horse!’” (Dostoevsky, 1998, 55). Compassion here functions as a sensorimotor summons (calling, reaching, and sobbing) that drives judgment. Only later does language try to domesticate what the body already knows; the belated “Napoleonic” rationalization is exposed by the dream as an after-image of bodily refusal (“He woke panting and sweating ... ‘God! ... is it possible ... that I really shall take an axe ...?’”; Dostoevsky, 1998, 57–58).

Even the crowd’s complicity is rendered kinesthetically, “six whips rained blows on her from every side” and “the laughter in the cart and among the crowd redoubled” (Dostoevsky, 1998, 54–55) so that others co-constitute the field of action not by argument but by a choreography of arms and voices. Read this way, the dream’s moral force lies in the way somatic overflow

and shared motion disclose value prior to reflective endorsement, staging guilt as the body's refusal to inhabit a world where blows and cheers synchronize.

The waking city repeats the lesson in slower time: heat, stink, and bustle tilt posture and timing until conscience is audible as a disturbance of breath and stride. Early in Part I, atmosphere is explicitly linked to embodied pressure:

The heat in the streets was stifling ... all combined to aggravate the disturbance of the young man's nerves (Dostoevsky, 1998, 2).

"Combined" names a vector acting on a body whose balance and attention are already at risk. The same coupling of crowd and proprioception returns in a tavern, where convivial noise cannot mute the interior tug: he enters a side room while "choruses" screech next door (Dostoevsky, 1998, 447). Moral salience erupts as timing (an interruption of ongoing rhythm) rather than as the endpoint of prior deduction. The social tempo becomes an acoustic affordance that marks up-tempo unease; the more the scene invites sway, the more conspicuously his breathing and stride misalign. Hence the oscillation between isolation and crowds, "he now shrank from every kind of contact (Dostoevsky, 1998, 1), and the postural spasm a jeer can induce: "the young man stopped dead and clutched feverishly at his hat" (Dostoevsky, 1998, 3). Guilt becomes a timing problem: a world that no longer lets the feet keep time with the will.

Against this sensorimotor backdrop, Porfiry's interrogations function less as a duel of doctrines than as a room-sized affordance that narrows what Raskolnikov can do next. The Oxford introduction makes the dramaturgical point: Porfiry appears as "objectified conscience," aiming "to save him by bringing him to repentance" (Dostoevsky, 1998, viii–ix). "Objectified" signals that conscience is not only an interior whisper but a social presence that structures movement, pause, and reply; "bringing" names an action-on-action, a guided choreography. The scenes stage this choreography as a slow modulation of breath and posture into admissions: under Porfiry's easy tempo, denials become physically hard to sustain. Raskolnikov "suddenly dropped his voice to a whisper, instantly recognizing ... that he felt obliged to submit to the command," and Porfiry even "seiz[es] his arm ... stopping him by the door" (Dostoevsky, 1998, 335–336). The tactile interruption and enforced modulation of tone convert abstraction into posture: being-held and being-hushed mark how acknowledgment advances through a body-felt check, not merely through logical cornering. This interpersonal affordance extends to others in the room (clerks, policemen, visitors) whose presence constricts exits without locks; boasts crumple in delivery ("Raskolnikov's voice cracked, and his words seemed unwilling to emerge clearly," Dostoevsky, 1998, 262). Feebleness here is vocal and respiratory before it is argumentative. As scholarship on interpersonal communication in Dostoevsky notes, emotions and tension are conveyed not only by words but through the physical context that surrounds them (Safronova, 2020, 56).

Across dream, street, and interrogation, the novel renders guilt as a sequence of embodied signals (ruptures of breath, posture, and tempo) that organize what counts as action before reasons are articulated. The dream compresses this into a cry and a clench (Dostoevsky, 1998, 55, 57–58). The streets stretch it into oscillations of speed and avoidance (pp. 1–3). Porfiry’s room choreographs the difficulty by managing air, pace, and posture, “I’ll let some fresh air in! ... You’ve had an attack!”, and seating him again (Dostoevsky, 1998, 330–331). In each case, others do not merely witness a private drama; they co-constitute the field of agency that gives guilt its grip. Dostoevsky’s moral psychology is thus less a duel between theory and conscience than a drama of embodied judgment, where obligation is first felt in lungs and legs, and acknowledgment brings that felt necessity into speech.

4. Repair: Procedural ‘Forms,’ Sonia’s Room, and Respect

Raskolnikov’s body registers guilt before his reason can avow it, and that disturbance is not psychological embroidery but the negative moment that clears space for Kantian respect. In *Crime and Punishment*, the somatic surge that seizes posture, breath, and timing repeatedly interrupts the self-love sustaining his theory. When a stranger hisses “Murderer!” in the street, “His knees felt terribly weak, a chill ran up his spine, his heart seemed to stop for a moment and then began to thump as though it had torn loose from its place (Dostoevsky, 1998, 262). This cascade is not a conclusion from principles; it is the body’s pre-reflective refusal of the maxim licensing killing, the felt “check” Kant calls the humiliation of self-conceit before the law (Kant, 2002, 18). On a standard reading, the intellectual aspect of respect motivates directly, while the affective “feeling of respect” is the sensible after-effect of reason’s constraint on inclination (Reath, 1989, 287–289). Dostoevsky’s staging matches this profile: as critics have shown, the novel thematizes shame and guilt as embodied disruption that surfaces in nerves, breath, and posture before explicit assent, the body’s knowledge preceding the mind’s alibi (Martinsen, 2018).

So Raskolnikov’s guilt is not froth but a profound, embodied summons that clears a space in which moral respect can occur. In this he stands with Kant rather than against him: the body’s abasement becomes the mind’s instruction, and the ethical law is honored before it is explained.

A similar counter-theoretical convulsion structures the Zametov episode: the brink of confession appears not as deliberation but as involuntary tremor. Raskolnikov presses in, “his eyes ... glittering,” his “upper lip trembled and twitched, an unspeakable word “trembled on his lips, as the bolt had trembled then on the door (Dostoevsky, 1998, 159). Agency is figured as a stuck mechanism losing tension; the body, not the will, first articulates the unsustainability of his posture. What follows, “And what if it was I who killed the old woman and Lizaveta?”, arrives as discharge rather than syllogistic endpoint. The negative moment is a physiological destabilization that humbles self-love before it can self-justify.

That humbling continues as narration lingers on the jagged rhythm of arousal and collapse that defeats stable self-assertion: he leaves “shaking all over,” his face “distorted as if he had had some kind of seizure,” his energies “aroused and summoned up in a moment ... and [failing] with the same suddenness” (Dostoevsky, 1998, 160). The alternation of sympathetic overdrive and depletion renders, in somatic time, what a Kantian would state in moral terms: self-love cannot hold the field because the subject cannot hold himself together under the law’s internal pressure.

Porfiry’s interrogations convert diffuse disturbance into an encounter with form. The magistrate’s “game” is not cruelty; it is an environmental staging of law’s *Form der Gesetzmäßigkeit*: procedure, order, a controlled setting that narrows available moves. When Raskolnikov snarls, “You knew I was ill ... you have no facts, you have only paltry, rubbishy guesses,” Porfiry replies, unruffled: “And to act as you say would not be in accordance with the forms. You don’t understand what the procedure is, my dear chap ... The forms are still there, as you will see for yourself!” (Dostoevsky, 1998, 336). The repetition of “forms” refuses personal struggle in favor of juridical constraint, bending the interaction away from pride toward a universal standpoint. The “pressure” is the situation in which a maxim must fit a rule that could bind anyone, catalyzing the acknowledgment Kant calls *Achtung*. Darwall’s account of recognition respect clarifies how procedure itself structures action: recognition respect “consists in giving appropriate weight or consideration in one’s practical deliberations to some fact ... and regulating one’s conduct by constraints derived from that fact” (Darwall, 1977, 38).

Acknowledgment does not arrive as tidy inference but as intensified embodied disarray that later crystallizes into respect. On the eve of confession, Raskolnikov is all interference patterns: He seemed not to be himself. He was unable to stay in any one place for more than a moment or concentrate his attention on any one object; his thoughts cut across one another; he talked incoherently; his hands trembled slightly (Dostoevsky, 1998, 503). The narration substitutes a choreography of micro-failures (wandering attention, tremor, cross-cut thoughts) for any stance of sovereign control. This is the negative moment against self-love’s “I can,” a lived *non possum* preparing the ground for a law that claims without bargaining.

Sonia then offers the clearest formula for converting disturbance into universal address by instructing Raskolnikov to turn private turmoil into a public act: “Go at once ... stand at the cross-roads, first bow down and kiss the earth you have desecrated, then bow to the whole world ... and say aloud ... ‘I have done murder’” (Dostoevsky, 1998, 503–504). Her prescription relocates guilt from privacy to publicity, from affect to acknowledgment, from exception to equality. Not contrition as inner warmth but an enacted rule: a body kneels, earth is kissed, words are declared to the world. The Haymarket confirms this shift in strictly performative terms: he shudders, falls, kneels in the square, bows to the ground, kisses its filth, and walks toward the police office (Dostoevsky, 1998, 505–506). Read through Kant, this marks the passage from pathological self-relation to a standpoint any rational being could recognize:

maxims that can be publicly avowed without special pleading are those that can be willed as universal law (Kant, 2002, 37). As Frank notes, Dostoevsky frames such acknowledgment in an austere register: “The murderer and the harlot ... came together ... to read the eternal book,” so that the exposed act becomes the medium of renewal rather than its mere consequence (Frank, 2009, 502).

When Raskolnikov recalls Sonia’s words in the Haymarket, the transition to respect is experiential before doctrinal:

A shudder shook his whole body ... a single spark was kindled in his spirit and suddenly, like a fire, enveloped his whole being. Everything in him softened on the instant and the tears gushed out. He fell to the ground where he stood ... (Dostoevsky, 1998, 505).

The ignition (spark to flame) tracks the rhythm: bodily shock precedes and enables avowal. The bowing makes this explicit: “He knelt in the middle of the square, bowed to the ground, and kissed its filth with pleasure and joy” (Dostoevsky, 1998, 505). The crowd’s laughter, “Look, here’s a chap who’s had a drop too much” (Dostoevsky, 1998, 505), prevents pious closure and aligns with Kant’s claim that respect is not agreeable but an affect that humbles self-conceit. His “joy” is relief at no longer sustaining the antagonistic posture toward others and the law that fractured his sensorimotor economy. The body’s axis lowers so the universal can be raised.

This sequence clarifies Porfiry’s earlier “forms”: procedural shorelines that channel agitation into an avowable maxim. The magistrate’s teasing “surprise,” control of thresholds and doors, and insistence on “procedure” confine pride’s evasions until the only doable action remaining is public acknowledgment. Porfiry’s office is the institutional analogue of Raskolnikov’s trembling lip: both are sites where self-love can no longer maintain poise and must cede to a rule that binds without favoritism (Dostoevsky, 1998, 336). The juridical environment and the trembling organism speak the same language at different scales.

Finally, the rhetoric underlines that respect erupts from within bodily history, not after it. When the stranger names him “Murderer,” spine, knees, and heart respond before he does (Dostoevsky, 1998, 262); with Zametov, confession forms on his lips as spasm; approaching Sonia for the crosses, his hands “trembled slightly”; in the square, shudder and fall precede speech. At each turn, the body first negates the sovereignty of self-love, clearing the stage on which reason can speak as law. In *Crime and Punishment*, respect is not the last word in an argument; it is the name we give, finally, to a posture already assumed.

5. Mechanisms (Deep Dive): Intentional Arc and Body Schema

Dostoevsky’s aftermath chapters let us watch the collapse and gradual reorganization of Raskolnikov’s habitual intentional arc (Merleau-Ponty) together with the embodied filters Gallagher would call body-schema-driven salience. The result is a shifting field of affordances:

what feels doable, urgent, and ignorable through which Sonia's room eventually functions as a site of environmental repair. Across these scenes, posture, timing, and motor readiness—not abstract propositions—govern what counts as action and thought.

Immediately after the murder, Raskolnikov's practical know-how disintegrates into misfires and misdirections. The narrator marks a characteristic loss of autopilot:

But a growing distraction, that almost amounted to absent-mindedness, had taken possession of him; at times he seemed to forget what he was doing, or rather to forget the important things and cling to trivialities (Dostoevsky, 1998, 77).

The sentence pinpoints exactly the kind of motor-intentional breakdown Merleau-Ponty predicts when the habitual arc that anchors the body to its world no longer holds; importance no longer grips. Raskolnikov's subsequent compulsive ablutions (washing hands, axe, boot leather) literalize this derailment of purposive skill into bodily micromanagement: "He put the head of the axe in the water, then took a piece of soap that lay in a broken saucer on the window-sill, and began to wash his hands in the pail" (p. 77); moments later, "[he] washed the blade and then spent some three minutes trying to clean the part of the handle that was blood-stained" (p. 77). These are not steps in a coherent plan but staccato gestures that substitute scrubbing for deciding: sensorimotor ritual where deliberation should be. The arc has gone slack, so the body defaults to local, graspable routines.

The same unhinging appears in how surfaces and objects stop "fitting" his movements. Fumbling the keys, the narration underscores misdirected energy rather than trembling: "With dreadful urgency he seized the keys and began to struggle with them once more. But all his efforts failed to force them into the locks, not so much because his hands were trembling as because his energy was misdirected; he would see, for example, that a key was the wrong one and would not fit, and yet go on thrusting at the lock with it" (Dostoevsky, 1998, 75). Habitual coupling between intention and completion fails; the body repeats an action schema even as cognition registers its inappropriateness. What ought to be seamless, pre-reflective completion (unlock, open, exit) becomes a looped misfit between motor program and situation. Gallagher's point that agentive awareness is generated "between intention and performance," not after the fact, clarifies why each failed thrust amplifies panic: the forward model can no longer settle the movement as "mine," so each motion rebounds as alien, effortful, exposed.

Breakdown is also postural. When sounds on the stairwell explode into a battering hallucination, Raskolnikov "thought of fastening his door, but he could not raise his arm ..." (Dostoevsky, 1998, 110). The sentence compresses posture-and-intention uncoupling into one refusal of the limb. Rather than a mind failing to command, the body schema withholds the readiness that would make the intention executable. The putative intention to fasten the door cannot gain purchase on a frame that, proprioceptively, no longer offers the door as graspable.

Because body schema gates what shows up as salient, the arc's fracture yields a signature pattern of hyperfocus and blindness. After the killings, Raskolnikov is exquisitely sensitive to smears on the axe handle, dampness on the coat, and stains on the boots, yet he misses the larger horizon of danger: staying in the apartment, leaving evidence elsewhere, even the open door. His proprioceptive attention tunnels: [he] spent a long time examining it carefully at the window. There were no stains left, but the handle was still damp (Dostoevsky, 1998, 77). This is posture-led attention: head bent, shoulders drawn, object in near peripersonal space, filtering the world to the radius of the hand. Conversely, the macrostructure of the situation recedes. The narrator's dry shock when he "stood still, staring, unable to believe his eyes; the door, the outer door leading to the staircase ... by which he had entered, was ... at least a hand's-breadth open; all this time it had been like that, neither locked nor bolted, all the time!" (p. 78) captures the cost of such tunnel vision: an entire layer of situational affordances (entry, egress, witnesses) drops out until too late.

The same coupling of posture and selective noticing explains the notorious "forgetting" episodes that punctuate the aftermath. Collapsing on his bed later, the body keeps setting the agenda; he "lay down, shuddering like an overdriven horse, pulled his winter overcoat over him, and fell instantly asleep," then wakes into a barrage of stairwell noises that pins him upright "in a torment of fear" (Dostoevsky, 1998, 109–110). It is not that thought fails and then posture responds; rather, posture (hunched and tremulous) is already a stance toward a hostile environment, pre-structuring what is hearable (thumps, cries) and thinkable (they are coming "because ... yesterday"). The felt body's crisis reorganizes attention before any concept of guilt is articulated.

Even his tactical successes bear this bodily signature. Consider the concealment scene, where he discovers a micro-niche at a yard's edge:

He bent over the stone, seized it firmly near the top with both hands, exerted all his strength, and turned it over. There was a small hollow under the stone and he threw into it all the things from his pockets ... Then he seized the stone and rolled it back again ... No appearance of disturbance remained (Dostoevsky, 1998, 104).

The description reads like an inventory of hand-sized affordances (lift, hollow, deposit) rather than a plotted plan. The choice is guided by what the body can immediately do and by what the environment invites, not by detached calculus. The niche's advantage is explicitly ecological: the spot sits "close against the outer wall ... Beyond the wall was the street ... but he could not be seen there behind the gate unless someone came right in from the street" (Dostoevsky, 1998, 104). Space here is not abstract geometry but an agent-relative field organized by occlusion, reachability, and traffic: features the body schema transparently measures.

If the aftermath chapters display disintegration, Sonia's room stages a counter-arc: a sparse environment that steady's posture and widens the horizon of salience. The narrative frames the place as an affordance-laden field. A single object anchors the scene:

On the chest of drawers lay a book. He had noticed it every time he passed in his pacing up and down; now he took it up and looked at it. It was a Russian translation of the New Testament (Dostoevsky, 1998, 312).

Raskolnikov's pacing has repeatedly passed this object before the text lets him take it up; the moment he reaches for it, the room's affordances reorganize from shabby surfaces to a readable, graspable norm. That the book arrived from Lizaveta, "'Who brought it?' 'Lizaveta. I asked her to'" (p. 312), folds Raskolnikov's guilt object back into the scene as the source of this moral implement. The drawer top becomes a moral workbench.

Crucially, he does not request argument but a reading, a bodily performance that binds breath, voice, and shared time: "Where is that about the raising of Lazarus? Find it for me, Sonya" (Dostoevsky, 1998, 312). When Sonya begins, "Now a certain man was sick, named Lazarus, of Bethany", "after two or three words her voice broke like an over-strained violin string" (Dostoevsky, 1998, 313). The simile returns us to the body: a strained instrument, breath that catches, the throat's spasm. The gospel is not a proposition but a disciplined, effortful act that recruits posture and breath to refit the field of action. By demanding that reading, Raskolnikov lets his attention be paced by another's embodied performance; the coupling of posture and attention flips valence as Sonya's upright, trembling recitation entrains his listening stance.

The room's furniture organizes this reparative arc. The table supports his elbows; the chair frames a listening posture: He sat down, with his elbows on the table and his head propped in his hands, and sombrely prepared to listen, with his eyes turned away (Dostoevsky, 1998, 312). "Prepared to listen" names a bodily readiness whose agency is receptive rather than executive, precisely the shift required for guilt to become acknowledgment instead of mere panic. Sonya's hesitation (her "hands shook," her "heart ... laboured") also functions as resistance to being turned into an instrument; the moral affordance she offers is not neutral technology but a costly gift (Dostoevsky, 1998, 313).

That costliness is what Raskolnikov senses and roughens into insistence, as if he knows only an enacted, choral temporality (reader and hearer) can restring his broken arc. The upshot is that Sonia's room remaps what is available: not ideas but acts: reading aloud, kneeling, confessing. The sequence that narrowed his world to axe handle, damp cloth, and door latch now broadens it to book, candle, and voice. When the reading continues, "Jesus said unto her, I am the resurrection and the life ...", the narrated verses themselves articulate a horizon of possibility other than escape and concealment (Dostoevsky, 1998, 313). In this way, the text dramatizes how a setting, a posture, and a script reshape the body schema's map of what can

be done next. Sonya does not persuade by syllogism; she recomposes his sensorimotor situation so that confession becomes, at last, an intelligible move.

Read through Merleau-Ponty and Gallagher, these chapters show that Dostoevsky's psychology is not interiorist. Guilt first appears as arc break, absent-minded scrubbing, misapplied keys, an arm that will not rise, and as posture-led attention that alternately magnifies minutiae and blanks the obvious. But because the field of action is co-constituted by others, that same body can be reoriented. Sonia's room, with its chest-of-drawers gospel and paced voice, restores a horizon in which acknowledgment becomes doable. The moral upshot is not that reason finally conquers feeling, but that a re-patterned bodily grip makes rational acknowledgment possible at all.

6. The Lazarus Episode as Embodied Judgment

The Lazarus scene gathers light, breath, and poverty into a choreography that steers Raskolnikov's body toward acknowledgment before he can name it as such. Atmosphere is not décor but a motor program: the candle's flicker, the cramped furniture, and Sonya's strained voice pace his posture and attention until confession becomes not merely thinkable but Kant would say, necessary from respect. Joseph Frank captures the tonal frame: in pages "depict[ing], with the bleakly reverential simplicity of a Rembrandt etching, 'the candle end [that] had long since burnt low in the twisted candlestick, dimly lighting the poverty-stricken room and the murderer and the harlot ... who had come together so strangely to read the eternal book,'" Dostoevsky aligns setting with moral possibility, staging a "symboli[c] ... moral resurrection" (Frank, 2009, 502).

From the first exchange, the scene yokes atmosphere to motor intentionality. Raskolnikov does not ask for an argument but for an act that binds breath and time: "Read! I want you to!" (Dostoevsky, 1998, 313). The imperative is embodied; he compels a cadence that will carry him. Sonya's body answers before her doctrine does: Her hands shook, her voice failed. Twice she tried to begin, but could not utter the first word (Dostoevsky, 1998, 313). Trembling, failure, stoppage (disruptions of the very mechanisms that carry speech) mark throat and hands as the first registers of what is to be said.

When the words arrive, they arrive against resistance: Now a certain man was sick, named Lazarus, of Bethany, ' ... she pronounced at last, with an effort, but after two or three words her voice broke like an over-strained violin string. Her breath caught and her heart laboured (Dostoevsky, 1998, 313). The snapped-string simile converts theology into physiology: voice (bow, string) fails under load, so that the reading's first truth is respiratory and postural. Poor light and cramped room already act through the body as a metronome of acknowledgment.

Raskolnikov's body takes up the script by adopting a posture of reception: Raskolnikov sat listening, motionless, his elbows on the table, his eyes turned away (Dostoevsky, 1998, 312). Elbows braced, eyes averted, motion stilled: the novel composes an attentional stance that

suspends flight and confronts exposure. The stillness is not neutral; it is the motor correlate of allowing something to count. Thus, the scene coordinates motor intentionality toward confession: it rearranges the listening body until the only sustainable action is to remain and hear.

As Sonya advances, the atmosphere tightens and the agent's salience landscape with it. The reading climbs to its hinge, "Jesus said unto her, I am the resurrection and the life: he that believeth in me, though he were dead, yet shall he live:" (Dostoevsky, 1998, 313), and Raskolnikov registers arousal keyed to bodily limits: She was approaching the moment of the greatest, the unheard-of miracle, and was filled with immense triumph. Her voice rang like a bell ... Her eyes had grown dark, and the lines of print danced before them, but she knew the passage by heart (Dostoevsky, 1998, 315). Darkened vision, ringing voice, dancing lines: breath and gaze are now governed by the performance's arc rather than the reader's convenience. The miracle's possibility is announced as a transformation of tempo and volume, an atmosphere-driven recruitment of posture and voice to a new practical horizon.

Dostoevsky also scripts the ethical cost of making this horizon audible. The narration pauses on Sonya's reluctance as a struggle over ownership: He knew very well how difficult it was for her to expose and betray all that was her own ... yet she had a tormenting desire to read ... 'whatever might happen afterwards' (Dostoevsky, 1998, 312). The shaking, spasm, and strained breath are not generic pieties but the exertions of a self risking its secret before another's gaze. By turning that risk into bodily effort (spasm overcome) the scene links respect's humbling of self-love to the concrete work of breath and throat.

The environment's poverty is not negation but affordance: the room supplies just enough (table, chair, and book) for a ritual of pacing and pause. "She stopped again, anticipating with shame that her voice would again begin to quiver and break" (Dostoevsky, 1998, 313). Stopping, anticipating, quivering: micro-temporalities that show how obligation takes hold before it is avowed. They also disclose a path between thought and act: the body learns to continue, voice steadied, breath managed; in learning, it readies the agent for confession.

What changes in Raskolnikov under this regimen is not yet belief but the modality of thought: avowal moves from conceivable to compulsory. The narration marks the shift from guarded watching to an affective turn: "Raskolnikov turned and looked at her with emotion: Yes, that was it!" (Dostoevsky, 1998, 313). The exclamation answers not an argument but an atmosphere ripened into salience; the turn of the head testifies that the listening body has crossed a threshold. In Kant's terms, respect has begun to "infringe on self-love," and the acknowledgment it requires is no longer optional ornament but the next coherent act for this body in this room.

Frank's reading clarifies why this somatic choreography does moral work rather than merely depicting it. By placing "the murderer and the harlot ... came together ... to read the eternal book," the scene fuses guilt and grace in a single spatial composition (Frank, 2009, 502). The

fusion is enacted, not asserted: Sonya's failing and recovering voice, Raskolnikov's immobilized listening, the weak light on poor furniture: each coordinates motor intentionality toward an ordering of possibilities in which denial becomes harder to hold than avowal. In that sense, the scene perfects the paper's thesis: atmosphere, light, voice, poverty pre-structure the agent's field so that confession is not an afterthought of conscience but the body's intelligible next step.

If, as the novel later insists, respect is a felt determination that humiliates self-conceit (Kant, 2002, 18), the Lazarus episode shows how such determination is first breathed and borne. The voice must pass where it had broken; the listener must keep still where he had fled. Only then can the demand shift from thinkable to necessary. The candle gutters; the room holds; the book is read. The world, poor as it is, proves rich enough to recompose a will.

7. Open Ends: Siberia as Re-habitation (Against Tidy Closure)

A "pure intellectualist" reading treats conscience as a punctual act of propositional recognition that directly determines the will. But that model cannot explain the novel's timing/tempo facts: the dream's cry and convulsive breath (Dostoevsky, 1998, 55–58), the street-startle and freezing grasp (pp. 2–3), and Porfiry's paced silences and touch that narrow denials (pp. 330–336) all show judgment arriving as rhythm and posture before assertion. The intellectualist may dismiss these as epiphenomenal feelings, but then their predictive force, why tempo and setting make certain avowals doable now and not ten minutes earlier, remains unexplained.

A predictable objection is that reading Raskolnikov's bodily upheavals as steps toward acknowledgment "psychologizes" Kant, collapsing respect into mere feeling. But Kant is explicit that respect is a feeling, though not an empirical inclination: it is "not one received through influence but a feeling self-effected through a concept of reason" (Kant, 2002, 18). As Reath clarifies, Kant treats respect in two tightly linked aspects: intellectual (the will's direct determination by the law) and affective (the sensible effect when the law checks inclination). Crucially, the effect is posterior to reason's constraint rather than an independent motive (Reath, 1989, 287–289). On this reading, the bodily look of respect (shudder, pallor, breath catching) does not reduce it to appetite; it is the phenomenology of finite agents registering reason's claim. Dostoevsky keeps putting that registration on stage as a negative check on self-love, prior to tidy avowal: at the chest of drawers, "a convulsive shudder shook him; he longed suddenly to abandon the whole affair and go away" (Dostoevsky, 1998, 75).

Under the stranger's pressure, even before the famous collapse of the knees, Raskolnikov's speech recoils: "Raskolnikov's voice cracked, and his words seemed unwilling to emerge clearly" (Dostoevsky, 1998, 262). These somatic and vocal refusals stage Kant's point that respect "infringes on self-love" (Kant, 2002, 18): it is felt first as a check, an arrest of hand and voice before it becomes articulated reason.

A second objection targets the epilogue: if the book ends in tidy penitence, embodiment may seem merely a prelude to a moral that closes the case. Yet Dostoevsky's ending is notably open-ended. The narrator refuses closure: "But that is the beginning of a new story, the story of the gradual renewal of a man" (Dostoevsky, 1998, 550). Read through Bakhtinian time, the finale signals surplus possibilities rather than completion: as Morson argues, Bakhtin's model of narrative temporality insists on the persistence of alternative futures that resist a sealed telos (Morson, 1993, 486). Recent epilogue-focused work also emphasizes deferral over consummation: Holland shows that the section thematizes the difficulties of closure, staging anticipation and delay rather than a finished moral (Holland, 2020, 109–110). On this view, the Siberian routine (labor, illness, Sonya's visits) reads less like a halo than rehabilitation: posture, timing, and attention are patiently rewoven into a livable "I can" across time. What confession initiates as respect is not a switch but a practice, its force announced (not exhausted) by the epilogue's opening turn (cf. Morson, 1991).

Textually, the epilogue tracks that work in minor keys. When Raskolnikov reaches for the book, "There was a New Testament under his pillow. Mechanically he took it out ... He did not open it even now" (Dostoevsky, 1998, 549). The scene keeps the gap between posture and assent; only over time do Sonia's visits recalibrate his set, at first "irritated by her presence," later finding their meetings "had grown necessary to him" (Dostoevsky, 1998, 519). Fittingly, the narrator refuses a tidy finish: "that is the beginning of a new story, the story of the gradual renewal of a man" (Dostoevsky, 1998, 550). Read through an embodied affordance lens, the shift is not merely devotional but ecological: changes in posture, pacing, and shared attention reconfigure what the environment affords the agent to do (Rietveld & Kiverstein, 2014, 336–338). On this view, the Lazarus episode resists the "theology vs. biomechanics" binary. Doctrinally, it is unmistakable: "I am the resurrection and the life ..." (Dostoevsky, 1998, 313), and yet its force arrives by enacting a new perceptual grip on the room: "He sat down, with his elbows on the table and his head propped in his hands, and sombrely prepared to listen, with his eyes turned away" (Dostoevsky, 1998, 312), while Sonia's "voice broke like an over-strained violin string" and then steadied (pp. 312–313). In contemporary terms, the scene alters the field of available actions: listening becomes executable, resistance less so, illustrating how bodily set and social cueing scaffold cognitive uptake (Clark, 1999, 345–347; Rietveld & Kiverstein, 2014, 338–340). The epilogue's routine (work, illness, visits) then sediments that uptake into habit, so that what confession initiates as respect is lived forward as a gradually renewed "I can."

Table and chair frame a listening posture. The falter and recovery of voice pace his attention. Even the candle's nearness, "He took the book to the candle and began to turn over the pages" (Dostoevsky, 1998, 312), gathers them into a near peripersonal circle where words can be borne.

None of this cancel's doctrine; it enacts it. As Frank observes, Dostoevsky composes "the murderer and the harlot ... came together ... to read the eternal book," a Rembrandt-like poverty

that materializes moral possibility (Frank, 2009, 502). Theology supplies the content of the horizon; embodiment supplies the means by which the horizon becomes livable.

Seen this way, “theology vs. embodiment” misreads the craft. Raskolnikov’s respect does not descend upon a neutral substrate; it must be learned across the very systems that had betrayed him: breath, balance, and timing. Thus, the epilogue’s “new story” is not an add-on but the method by which doctrine takes flesh: routine, posture, practice (Dostoevsky, 1998, 550). The reader is left not with a moral already possessed but with the conditions under which a will might come to possess it, slowly, with setbacks, and in company.

The three objections converge on a single clarification. Kant’s respect is a feeling, but one self-effected by reason (Kant, 2002, 18); Dostoevsky stages its arrival in the only medium a novel finally has: bodies in rooms, without reducing it to inclination. The epilogue’s alleged neatness dissolves under the text’s own markers of gradual rehabilitation (Dostoevsky, 1998, 549–550). And the Lazarus episode refuses the binary between doctrine and embodiment by yoking proclamation to posture and room (pp. 312–315). Rather than diminishing moral life, embodiment is how *Crime and Punishment* keeps it honest: acknowledgment begins in lungs and knees and only then learns to speak.

Conclusion

Across *Crime and Punishment*, guilt does not arrive as a sudden verdict of “conscience” that defeats “theory”; it unfolds as embodied judgment—a sequence in which somatic disturbance precedes and motivates acknowledgment. The novel first renders guilt as a breakdown in posture, breath, and timing (heat, stench, startle, trembling), then as a phenomenological re-attunement in which the body’s “I can” falters, routines misfire, and attention tunnels or widens; only then does acknowledgment crystallize in the register of respect. In this arc—somatic disruption → arc/schema reorganization → rational avowal—Dostoevsky gives moral life a legible mechanism rather than a merely moralistic outcome. The point is not to deny reasons, but to show how reasons gain uptake in a creature whose access to the world is always already postural, paced, and shared.

This account yields three payoffs.

First, it bridges norm and habit. Respect names the binding force of law without collapsing it into inclination; motor intentionality and body schema specify how that force first makes contact in the subject. The result is a vocabulary for the “negative moment” against self-love (weak knees, caught breath, misfiring hands) and for the slow work by which acknowledgment becomes livable (new postures, paced attention, re-habitation). Moral normativity need not float above life or sink into feeling; it can be seen moving through habit. Second, it offers a method for literary moral psychology. Rather than mining speeches for propositions, we track the choreography of rooms, objects, and bodies: what a space affords; how a voice paces breath; where a hand refuses or reaches. On this method, the Lazarus episode

is not only doctrine but environmental repair—a sparse room, a candle, a book, and a shared cadence that make confession intelligible as a next step. Likewise, Porfiry's office is not merely a site of ideas but a procedural tempo that narrows evasions into avowal. Reading for embodied judgment integrates atmosphere, gesture, and institutional form into moral interpretation. Third, it opens comparative prospects. Within Dostoevsky, one can test the same arc in *The Idiot*'s seizures, *Demons*' crowd dynamics, or *The Brothers Karamazov*'s kneeling and kisses—each a different calibration of posture, tempo, and shared space. Beyond Dostoevsky, tragic confessions, courtroom dramas, and modernist interiorities can be reread as experiments in affordance design and habit change. What varies is not whether reasons matter, but the paths by which bodies are readied to own them.

In the end, *Crime and Punishment* refuses the tidy opposition of “theory” and “conscience.” It shows a world in which air, crowd, furniture, voice, and form bear on what can be done and said, until the law that binds us can also be breathed.

In Siberia, the rehabilitation of Raskolnikov's “I can” takes shape in daily routine. Early on, he bends to lift a bucket of water; his arms ache under the weight, yet he adjusts his stance, flexes his knees, and rises slowly, methodically. The act is not a revelation but a subtle shift in agency: he no longer falters or freezes, but engages the labor, letting it shape his body as much as his will. Over time, this steadier rhythm reorients his posture to the world around him, rendering action intelligible again—not as a struggle, but as a manageable, embodied norm.

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