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### Editor's Note

#### Philosophy in the Age of Artificial Intelligence: From the Problem of Technology to Rethinking Humanity, Knowledge, and Responsibility

In recent years, we have witnessed artificial intelligence move beyond the domain of specialized and predominantly computational technology to become one of the most significant intellectual, social, and civilizational phenomena of our time. Artificial intelligence is no longer merely a tool for data processing, automation, or accelerating computation; it is gradually intervening in the ways we know, choose, judge, communicate, and even define ourselves as human beings. Accordingly, the question of artificial intelligence is no longer simply an engineering question concerning “what machines can do,” but also a philosophical question concerning “what it means to be human,” “what human beings know,” “how they make decisions,” and “what responsibility they bear for the consequences of their actions.”

A number of articles published in this field in the Journal of Philosophical Investigations at the University of Tabriz have approached artificial intelligence from precisely this perspective: not as a merely technological subject, but as an interdisciplinary issue situated at the intersection of philosophy of mind, ethics, philosophy of technology, law, epistemology, and philosophical anthropology. The journal's special call for papers (Issue 56, Volume 20, Fall 2026) has likewise emphasized this interdisciplinary approach, focusing on such topics as the nature of science, the philosophy of artificial intelligence, scientific discovery, algorithmic governance, value alignment, AI ethics, responsibility in autonomous systems, the symbol-grounding problem, agency, and dependence on algorithmic decision-making.

One of the most fundamental issues addressed in this collection concerns the relationship between artificial intelligence and human autonomy. If algorithms can predict our preferences on the basis of vast quantities of data, rank the options available to us, and even influence our choices without our direct awareness, can we still speak of free will in the traditional sense? A study on the “transformation of human autonomy” suggests that the issue is not simply whether machines make decisions in place of human beings; the deeper issue is the gradual transformation of the horizon within which human choices are made. In data-driven environments, part of the decision-making process—from data collection and analysis to algorithmic recommendation—takes place beyond the individual’s direct control. Human autonomy, therefore, is not necessarily eliminated, but its structure is transformed.

This transformation leads directly to the question of moral responsibility. In classical moral philosophy, responsibility is generally attributed to an agent who possesses intention, awareness, freedom, and the capacity to control an action. Yet in complex artificial intelligence systems, a final decision may result from the interaction of designers, programmers, organizations, data, algorithms, users, and the broader social environment. From this perspective, it is no longer always possible to identify a single individual as the ultimate bearer of responsibility. An article addressing the “responsibility gap” proposes that responsibility in such circumstances should be understood as distributed and networked, with its design, organizational, and institutional dimensions distinguished from one another.

Alongside responsibility, justice and inclusiveness have also become central concerns in the philosophy of artificial intelligence. Intelligent systems operate on the basis of data and classifications that may themselves embody social assumptions and biases. The important question, therefore, is who is represented in the design and benefits of artificial intelligence and who is left at the margins. A study of inclusiveness in artificial intelligence, adopting a philosophical-legal approach, demonstrates that even the legal concepts used to define stakeholders are significant. Achieving inclusive artificial intelligence requires a movement away from restrictive frameworks toward more comprehensive and inclusive concepts. This discussion makes clear that algorithmic justice is not merely a technical matter; it ultimately concerns the ethical and legal foundations of society.

At the same time, artificial intelligence has placed the longstanding philosophical question of knowledge and understanding before us in a new form. If an intelligent system can analyze information and provide recommendations in medicine, law, media, or science, can we say that it “knows”? Or are we merely witnessing an extraordinarily sophisticated process of data processing? In the article “Knowledge without a Subject,” this question is examined from an epistemological perspective: might the production of knowledge become detached from the human subject and instead emerge through a network consisting of human beings, data, and algorithms? Within such a framework, epistemic validity can no longer be assessed solely in

terms of the truth of a proposition; the transparency of the process, explainability, and the possibility of accountability also become essential.

This issue raises an even deeper question concerning the nature of the human being and the distinction between humans and machines. If artificial intelligence surpasses human beings in many cognitive activities, should we distinguish between computational intelligence and human reason? Are problem-solving, language generation, or behavioral prediction sufficient grounds for attributing “understanding” or “consciousness” to a machine? Some of the philosophical studies in this collection, drawing on Transcendent Philosophy (Hikmat al-Muta‘aliyah) and Heidegger’s philosophy, emphasize that reducing the human being to data and computation may result in a form of “ontological reductionism.” From this perspective, the human being is not merely a collection of information that can be processed. Lived experience, self-awareness, presence-based consciousness, existential possibilities, and the human relationship to meaning cannot easily be reduced to algorithmic computation.

From a Heideggerian perspective, the question is not merely what technology makes possible for us, but how technology changes the way in which the world and the human being appear to us. When the world—and even human beings themselves—are viewed in terms of data, resources, and calculability, there is a danger that human beings too may become reduced to components of a technological system. Philosophical criticism of artificial intelligence, therefore, does not necessarily imply a rejection of technology; rather, it represents an attempt to establish a measured, responsible, and genuinely human relationship with technology. The comparative study of Transcendent Philosophy and Heidegger’s philosophy reaches a similar conclusion: the solution does not lie in rejecting technology, but in redefining the relationship between human beings and technology on the basis of self-awareness, practical wisdom, and philosophical reflection.

From this perspective, philosophy in the age of artificial intelligence is not an external and passive observer, but one of the principal participants in the dialogue concerning the future of technology. Philosophy must ask questions about the criteria of “intelligence,” “agency,” “consciousness,” “responsibility,” “justice,” “freedom,” and “dignity,” while at the same time learning from engineering and data science how technologies are actually designed and implemented. Such a dialogue can be fruitful only when philosophy and the technical sciences move beyond their separate intellectual islands and enter a shared space of inquiry and discussion.

The significance of this approach lies in the fact that the future of artificial intelligence will not be determined solely by increases in computational power or by increasingly sophisticated algorithms. To an equal extent, its future will depend on our ethical, legal, political, and cultural choices. The fundamental question is not whether artificial intelligence “will replace human beings,” but rather what position human beings will choose to occupy in the process of

expanding artificial intelligence. Will humans become merely consumers of algorithmic outputs, or will they continue to retain their roles as judges, responsible agents, and creators of meaning?

For this reason, the articles in this field may be understood as an invitation to rethink the traditional boundaries of philosophy. Artificial intelligence compels philosophy once again to reflect on mind and consciousness, knowledge and truth, freedom and responsibility, ethics and justice, humanity and technology, and even the meaning of being human. More than a test of machines, artificial intelligence is a test of humanity itself; for in the mirror of artificial intelligence, we see not only the capabilities of machines but also our own assumptions about reason, freedom, morality, and humanity.

It is hoped that the publication and continuation of these discussions will contribute to a serious dialogue among philosophers, computer scientists, cognitive scientists, legal scholars, ethicists, and other researchers in the humanities and social sciences. The aim of such a dialogue should be neither uncritical celebration of technology nor fear of it, but rather a critical and responsible understanding of the place of artificial intelligence within the human world. Perhaps the most important task of philosophy in the age of artificial intelligence is precisely this: to help us ensure that, amid the rapid transformation of technology, we do not lose sight of the questions of humanity, freedom, truth, responsibility, and meaning.

Finally, I would like to express my sincere appreciation and gratitude to the authors of all the articles, and especially to Professor Slavoj Žižek, Professor Michael Peters, Professor David Gunkel, Professor Robert Hanna, Professor David M. Boje, and the other contributors, for their valuable cooperation and participation in this special issue.

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