The Quarterly Journal of Philosophical Investigations

نوع مقاله : مقاله علمی- پژوهشی

نویسنده

دانشجوی دکترای فلسفه دانشگاه امام خمینی قزوین

چکیده

پِلِیس بر این باور است که مسائل فلسفی مرتبط با ماهیتِ نسبتِ میان ذهن و مغز، در نهایت به­نفعِ مادی­گرایی -خصوصاً نظریه این­همانیِ نوعی- کنار گذاشته یا منحل خواهند شد. او این مدعا را فرضیه­ای علمی و مستدل می­داند. من در این مقاله نشان خواهم داد که ماجرا به­گونه­ای نیست که او می­پندارد. اگر چه این متن، سراسر، حاوی جزئیات فراوانی در باب موضع پِلِیس است ولی به­ منظور فراهم آوردن بستری برای نقد، در ابتدا، رویکرد او به مسئله مد نظر را اجمالاً توضیح خواهم داد. سپس، موضع او را به چهار تز فروکاسته و نشان خواهم داد که مدعای اصلی نظریه این­همانیِ نوعی، علاوه بر آن که مستدل نیست بلکه حتی مسئله­ای صرفاً متعلق به علوم تجربی نیز به ­شمار نمی­آید. من بر این باورم که نظریه این­همانیِ نوعی، حداکثر، باید به­ منزله فرضیه­ای تلقی شود که اگر چه به ­طور تقریبی ناظر به کارکردِ نسبتِ میان ذهن و مغز است ولی هیچ چیزی را درباره ماهیتِ واقعیِ این نسبت نمایان نمی­سازد.

کلیدواژه‌ها

عنوان مقاله [English]

Place Goes Wrong in Treating Mind-brain Relationship Clarifying why identity theory is neither reasonable nor a mere scientific problem in disguise

نویسنده [English]

  • Mahdi Soleimani Khourmouji

PhD Candidate of philosophy, Imam Khomeini International University of Qazvin

چکیده [English]

U. T. Place claims that philosophical problems concerning the true nature of mind-brain relationship disappears or is settled adhering to materialism, especially type identity theory of mind. He takes above claim as a reasonable scientific hypothesis. I shall argue why it is not as he claims. At first, to pave the way for refutation, I will briefly clarify Place's approach to the subject in hand; although the rest of the paper will also contain more details about his position. Then, I will reduce his position into four theses and try to prove that the main claim of type identity theory is neither reasonable nor a mere scientific problem in disguise. I think that we ought to regard type identity theory, at most, just as a hypothesis which approximately displays the function of mind-brain relationship but tells us nothing justifiably about its true nature.

کلیدواژه‌ها [English]

  • mind
  • brain
  • identity
  • analytic and synthetic
  • a posteriori necessity
  • internalism
  • externalism
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