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    <title>Journal of Philosophical Investigations</title>
    <link>https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/</link>
    <description>Journal of Philosophical Investigations</description>
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    <pubDate>Fri, 20 Feb 2026 00:00:00 +0330</pubDate>
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    <item>
      <title>Creativity And Inspiration</title>
      <link>https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_20114.html</link>
      <description>While one version of belief in inspiration, for which the inspired human passively receives inspired deliverances, precludes human creativity, another, for which inspired compositions reflect human agency and ingenuity, presupposes it. Margaret Boden, however, suggests (in The Creative Mind: Myths and Mechanisms (2004)) that creativity is continuous with generic human powers, and also arises through infringing recognised rules. While the former suggestion (about continuity) is argued to be readily acceptable, problems are raised for the rule-breaking account of creativity. Accounts of creativity need to be supplemented with awareness that creativity commonly involves participation in traditions of skill or craftsmanship, and in a creative community, whether rules are broken or not. Further, the continuity approach is argued to be consistent with at least one particular variant of belief in inspiration, according to which God, as the universal Creator, can communicate through the imagination of receptive minds that reflect his/her creative imagination, as suggested by Austin Farrer in &amp;amp;lsquo;Inspiration: Poetical and Divine&amp;amp;rsquo; (1963). Other faculties as well as the imagination are held to be involved, in a manner consistent with the continuity approach: perception, memory, reflectiveness, historical awareness and artistic ingenuity.</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>The Crises of the Sciences and Skills and Objects Themselves</title>
      <link>https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_21213.html</link>
      <description>For Edmund Husserl, the crisis of the modern sciences consists in the reduction of beings and the world to the mathematically measurable. Yet the lifeworld with its things that we fashion and use with our hands is no less real than the objects of science, and the scientific attitude is always nested within this lived world. Martin Heidegger by contrast finds the major source of our crisis in the Cartesian conception of subject and world. This has culminated in Nietzschean theory of the will to power, which in its unity with technology has despoiled our environment. In all of this Heidegger retains a tenderness for the small-scale products of human handiwork, which are preferable to machines and machine tools. In his own philosophy of technology Gilbert Simondon shares some of these concerns, whilst contending that technological objects have untapped potentials in relation to those who invent, use and develop them. Common to all these philosophies is a worry about abstract theory and mechanization reducing our direct engagement with things. This worry is compounded by a sociocultural tendency identified by Matthew Crawford, a tendency to denigrate a career in the practical trades. Drawing on Crawford&amp;amp;rsquo;s experience of manual engagement in the world, I argue that a revalorization of such skilled work and of caring and repairing would help to ameliorate the climate and pollution crises and improve our lives. Many of our problems come from the discarding of things through our carelessness or through planned obsolescence by their makers.</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Genius Loci: from an atmospherological point of view</title>
      <link>https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_21214.html</link>
      <description>The theoretical vagueness of a concept such as genius loci (spirit of the place) makes often feel unsatisfied. To avoid the widespread more rhetorical trend to attributing a spirit to every place - a trend already discernible in the progressive secularisation from the Greek world (an uncanny daimon) to the Roman world (a familiar genius) &amp;amp;ndash; and/or to explaining it as the outcome of creative human planning (especially architectural-urban), my paper states that a place has its specific genius only if it radiates a specific and particularly intense-authoritative atmosphere. That is, when the place is pervaded by a quasi-objective feeling that affects the perceiver and finds in their felt (or lived) body its precise sounding board. Just as there are different types of atmospheres (prototypic, derivative, spurious) and atmospheric encounters, there are therefore different types of genius loci, also depending on one's conception of space, here always understood as lived space, i.e. qualitative-anisotropic, and not in a physical-geometric (isotropic) sense. Contrary to the today&amp;amp;rsquo;s prevailing projectivist-constructionist explanation (culturalist as well as neuroscientific) and the tendency to explain every affective quality inherent in the external world as a subjective projection, i.e. according to an hydraulic model following the Platonic &amp;amp;ldquo;invention&amp;amp;rdquo; of the soul, a &amp;amp;ldquo;pathic aesthetics&amp;amp;rdquo; based on a neo-phenomenological approach means with genius loci, in the authentic and original sense of the term, a lifewordly qualitative-emotional experience: in brief a spatialised atmospheric feeling that can sometimes be protected, maybe also improved but never arbitrarily created.</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>The Myth of AI, The Future of Human Intelligence, and The Role of Philosophy</title>
      <link>https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_21215.html</link>
      <description>In this essay, I argue (i) for the thesis I call dignitarian neo-luddism with respect to digital technology, which says not all digital technology is bad and wrong, but instead all and only the digital technology that harms and oppresses ordinary people (i.e., people other than digital technocrats), by either failing to respect our human dignity sufficiently or by outright violating our human dignity, is bad and wrong, and therefore all and only this bad and wrong digital technology should be rejected but not&amp;amp;mdash;except in extreme cases of digital technology whose coercive use is actually violently harming and oppressing ordinary people, for example, digitally-driven weapons or weapons-systems being used for mass destruction or mass murder&amp;amp;mdash;destroyed, rather only either simply refused, non-violently dismantled, or radically transformed into its moral opposite, also (ii) that the members of what I call &amp;amp;ldquo;the military-industrial-digital complex&amp;amp;rdquo; are systematically harming and oppressing ordinary people like us by not only enabling but also effectively mandating our excessive use of and addiction to digital technology, which in turn systematically undermines our innate capacities for thinking, caring, and acting for ourselves, and therefore undermines our human real personhood, and thereby violates our human dignity&amp;amp;mdash;therefore, we ought to ban all giant AI experiments and LLM/chatbot technology while they are still in their infancy, just as we ought to have banned all atomic bomb experiments and nuclear weapons technology while they were still in their infancy.</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Al-Biruni’s Ethical System Compared to Aristotle’s, Which Went to the Arab World</title>
      <link>https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_20959.html</link>
      <description>This study aims to compare the ethical systems of Aristotle and Al-Biruni. The former was built in the &amp;amp;lsquo;West&amp;amp;rsquo;, but the latter was on the &amp;amp;lsquo;Middle&amp;amp;rsquo; toward the &amp;amp;lsquo;East&amp;amp;rsquo;. Reviewing their literature and introducing the new concepts, this study found that while Aristotle&amp;amp;rsquo;s system influenced Al-Biruni&amp;amp;rsquo;s in the application of a scientific frame to ethical issues, the two systems shared a concern not for the moral judgment but for the moral agent. However, they differ from each other in the conceptualization of the agents. Aristotle&amp;amp;rsquo;s model is the person of virtue evaluated by the golden mean, but Al-Biruni&amp;amp;rsquo;s is the person of manliness rated by the reversibility of others. This comparison advanced the differentiation that the moral pragmatic is devoted to Aristotle&amp;amp;rsquo;s and the moral practical to Al-Bruni&amp;amp;rsquo;s. The study would contribute to resolving the current moral confusion and would demonstrate a model to integrate the systems of the western and eastern worlds.</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>The Elusiveness of the Content of Perception Non-existential, Nonsingular, and Incomplete</title>
      <link>https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_18526.html</link>
      <description>In this paper, I take for granted the view of a long tradition tracing back to Kant that the content of perception is nonconceptual, nonpropositional, and iconic. However, I challenge the idea that this content is either an existentially quantified proposition (the existential view), an object-involving proposition (the particularist view), both (the pluralist view), or still that there is no fact of the matter about the elusive content of perception (Block). Instead, I propose an alternative hybrid model as the most suitable for perception, namely a mix of the representation of properties (relativistic content) and acquaintance with whatever causes the relevant token experience. Although this format is iconic or map-like, the best semantic model for understanding this relativistic content of perception is an open sentence with predicates and free variables. Since this content is neither particular nor existential, it is incomplete (at least in the light of Fregean semantics). That is, it is neither accurate nor inaccurate per se. Perceptions do not represent particulars, let alone the causal relationship between particulars or environmental conditions and the token experience. In other words, neither particulars nor causal relations belong to the content of the experience. Instead, particulars and causal relations belong to the evaluative circumstances of the content (Lewis's context-index pairs). Perceptions represent "de re" properties as accurate or inaccurate attributions to what is causally responsible for the relevant token experience.</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Revisiting the Imagery of [Political] Violence: a philosophical interpretation</title>
      <link>https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_20658.html</link>
      <description>Contemporary critical reflections of violence immensely focus on an `ever war-like condition&amp;amp;rsquo; that makes the state of exception a permanent possibility. Most popular perspectives of western political philosophy seem to look at a bigger picture; a bird&amp;amp;rsquo;s eye-view of the world &amp;amp;ndash; looking at violence as violence of war and genocides. Every reflection is directed toward war, violence, here and there, and its effects on various human societies. Having a bigger picture is imminent. Besides this big picture we cannot overlook several micro-pictures. The bigger picture will lose its moral and political justification, this paper commits to argue, unless the claim of a permanent emergency locates itself in the manifold normalizations of everyday life that not just distort political objectivity, corrupt human nature, and create intolerant internal civic culture[s]. These instill in the civil society a dangerous indifference to the pain of the socially/politically vulnerable that greatly threatens the latter&amp;amp;rsquo;s political sense. The single line of argument here is only when the pathologies of everyday lives is grasped only then we can comprehend more deeply the reality of war and/or violence as a permanent condition.&amp;amp;nbsp;&amp;amp;nbsp;&amp;amp;nbsp;&amp;amp;nbsp;&amp;amp;nbsp;</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>From Nothing to Existence: quantum vacuum in light of the fundamentality of existence</title>
      <link>https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_20351.html</link>
      <description>The emergence of the universe from "Nothing" continues to be one of the most challenging questions in both physics and philosophy. Lawrence Krauss, in his theory, identifies the quantum vacuum with "Nothing" and attempts to explain the Cosmogenesis without invoking a metaphysical cause. This study, drawing on the Fundamentality of Existence (FOE) in Mulla Sadra&amp;amp;rsquo;s Transcendent Philosophy (al-hikmah al-muta&amp;amp;lsquo;āliyah), shows that the quantum vacuum possesses an ontological reality rather than being absolute Nothingness. According to Sadrian ontology, the quantum vacuum may be considered the weakest level of Existence within the gradational hierarchy of Existence (However, one may also argue&amp;amp;mdash;based on its proximity to immateriality and potentiality&amp;amp;mdash;that it paradoxically resembles a higher ontological intensity closer to Divine Simplicity. This dual reading remains open to further exploration). Furthermore, this paper critically examines Krauss&amp;amp;rsquo;s assertion that physical laws alone suffice to account for the Cosmogenesis. From the perspective of the Fundamentality of Existence, physical laws are merely descriptive and contingent rather than self-sufficient causes. Thus, the Sadrian framework provides a deeper metaphysical foundation, revealing the limitations of Krauss&amp;amp;rsquo;s scientific explanation and affirming that the cosmogenesis ultimately necessitates a cause beyond physical laws.</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>The Philosophical Future of the World: towards a philosophy of life</title>
      <link>https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_21095.html</link>
      <description>Today, it is very difficult to talk about the past and its history, let alone talk about the future, especially the philosophical future. However, since the futures studies movement has been formed in non-philosophical fields and has achieved relative success, it now seems that the time has come to address futures studies in the field of philosophy and test it in this area. This article acknowledges and addresses the availability of the objective ground and scientific background for the possibility of forming and developing a philosophical branch called the philosophy of life (of course, in a general sense and not solely focused on the purpose and meaning of life). The article's view is that life has gone beyond the limits of a scientific, social, economic, and cultural concept and has reached the level of a theoretical and philosophical concept. Also, due to the emergence of specific fields and the existence of a specific philosophical background in the last century, life has gone beyond the problematic level and has found the capacity to be at the level of a philosophical problem. Therefore, in the world of philosophy and philosophical discussion of life, it should be written with a capital L, meaning: Life, and we should wait for the emergence of a philosophical branch called philosophy of Life and also a tendency called Lifeism for it. Philosophy of Life is a reflection on life for the philosophical interpretation and expression of my life or I of life (my life/ego-life) or the subject of life, which in a way can be considered an idea for the sum of subject and Dasein. Philosophy of Life/Lifeism is distinct from realism, subjectivism, philosophy of life, vitalism, pragmatism, and existentialism. Philosophy of Life is philosophizing in the form of topics and categories such as understanding/defining life, distinguishing the subject of life from the pure subject and the dissolved Dasein in the world, important levels of life: &amp;amp;ldquo;states&amp;amp;rdquo;, situations, conditions&amp;amp;rdquo;, my life among lives, interaction, language, the embodiment of life, acting and spectating in life, the authenticity and inauthenticity of life, ethics, meaning, success, model, health, livelihood, death, happiness, pleasure, style, consumption, well-being, life as a perspective, etc.</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Reviving Rationality Theory: a comprehensive framework for reconstructing rationality in the age of crisis</title>
      <link>https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_20860.html</link>
      <description>A Reviving Rationality Theory offers a knowledge-based and practical framework to rebuild rational thinking in response to the complex crisis of our time. This crisis comes from the limits of traditional rationality, modern instrumental rationality, and postmodern relativism, which have led to stagnation, alienation, environmental destruction, and theoretical paralysis. Reviving Rationality defines rationality as an evolving system of knowledge and action based on three principles: coherent epistemic pluralism, constructive criticism, and evolutionary responsibility. Using multilayered critical realism, it examines reality at four levels (empirical, event-based, structural, and evolutionary) and draws knowledge from five sources (logical reasoning, empirical experience, practical intuition, social dialogue, and historical wisdom). By solving the paradox of fallibilism through distinguishing between the content, method, and purpose of knowledge, and emphasizing human dignity as a core principle for both knowledge and action, this theory moves beyond classic dualities like structure versus freedom or individual versus society. It systematically critiques instrumental rationality, postmodern relativism, and static traditionalism, proposing a three-stage process (analysis, synthesis, decision) and four criteria (logical coherence, alignment with evidence, practical effectiveness, and ethical consistency) to evaluate beliefs and decisions. Reviving Rationality is not a return to traditional or modern rationality, nor a full acceptance of postmodern critiques; instead, it provides an evolutionary, responsible, and inclusive framework that combines the strengths of scientific methods and logical analysis with diverse knowledge sources and ethical considerations to tackle complex issues like climate change and social inequality. This framework is a theoretical tool for rational and humane thinking, open to critique and improvement.</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Science and Spirituality in our Era</title>
      <link>https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_21148.html</link>
      <description>Science seeks to discover the order present in nature and describes this order in the form of laws. Religion is a response to a Transcendent Being Who transforms our lives and gives it a meaning. Traditionally, spirituality was regarded as an integral aspect of religious experience, and spirituality and religion were inseparable.&amp;amp;nbsp; But, the decline of organized religions and the growth of secularism in the western world have given rise to a broader view of spirituality which includes reference to those aspects of human experience which go beyond a purely materialist view of the world, without necessarily bringing in a supernatural reality. Scientific revolution started in the seventeenth century with the works of F. Bacon, Descartes, Galileo, Newton, Boyle, etc. and gave rise to the promotion of empiricism by Bacon and Galileo and the propagation of mechanical worldview by Descartes, Galileo and Newton. Gradually the power of Newtonian system impressed the scientists, and the role of God was first reduced to the initiator of the universe and with the French enlightenment it was eliminated. With the appearance of Philosophers and scientists&amp;amp;nbsp; like Hume ,Kant ,August Comte, Marx, Darwin , Durkhim , Freud and logical positivists, empiricism became the dominant philosophy and with that metaphysics ,religion and spirituality went into the sideline.Several important currents started during the second half of the twentieth century which had a revival effect on religion and spirituality and some eminent scientists of our era &amp;amp;ndash;including some non-theists &amp;amp;ndash; have emphasized the necessity of going beyond the material features of life and paying attention to its spiritual aspects (values, meanings, etc.).</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Philosophical Elucidation of Geographical Research Methodology for Enhancing Geography Education</title>
      <link>https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_21172.html</link>
      <description>Subject: The purpose of this research is to explain the philosophical implementation of research and education simultaneously in teaching geography.&#13;
Research Method: This study is fundamental research that uses a descriptive-analytical method and is based on collecting data through library and documentary-based research. This research uses philosophical thoughts, experimental backgrounds, teaching experiences, and theoretical articles and documents.&#13;
Findings and Results: The findings indicate that in geography education, the philosophical foundations of geographical thoughts are not well explained to learners. This is because the use of research alongside geography education is very fragmentary. It is necessary to use political philosophies, political economy, and social theories derived from exploratory methods, which are now the elements of modern geography knowledge, as well as using analyses of geographical schools and transferring them to the new generation with appropriate research approaches.</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Transcendental Philosophy and Linguistic Turn: Kantian echoes in Wittgenstein’s thought</title>
      <link>https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_18884.html</link>
      <description>This paper explores the philosophical relationship between Immanuel Kant's transcendental idealism and Ludwig Wittgenstein's linguistic philosophy, particularly focusing on the echoes of Kant's ideas in Wittgenstein's work. Kant's Critique of Pure Reason argues that human cognition is shaped by a priori categories, which structure our experience of phenomena but leave the noumenal realm unknowable. Wittgenstein, in his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, similarly examines the limits of what can be known; suggesting that language mirrors reality but also has its limits in expressing what lies beyond logic. In his later work, Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein emphasizes the social and contextual nature of meaning, developed through "language games" and "forms of life". This paper argues that while Wittgenstein shifts from Kant&amp;amp;rsquo;s universal transcendental structures to a more pragmatic view of language, both philosophers share a concern with the limits of human knowledge and expression. Furthermore, both thinkers acknowledge the ineffable about Kant&amp;amp;rsquo;s noumenal world and Wittgenstein&amp;amp;rsquo;s mystical realm as crucial yet unreachable domains. This comparative analysis contributes to contemporary discussions in epistemology and philosophy of language, demonstrating the enduring relevance of Kant&amp;amp;rsquo;s transcendental insights in Wittgenstein&amp;amp;rsquo;s linguistic turn.</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>The Remnants of Future in the Past</title>
      <link>https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_20043.html</link>
      <description>This paper explores the structure of time and the possibility of the future within it, challenging conventional linear representations of temporality. The central thesis argues that the future does not lie on a vertical line above or to the eternally far right of a horizontal timeline; rather, the it emerges logically, not merely sequentially, following the past and present. For the future to fully manifest, the past and present must be thoroughly processed and, in some sense, exhausted. However, catastrophes, which have occurred and will presumably continue to occur, disrupt the flow of time by halting the past and indicating future occurrences in unpredictable ways. Therefore, to truly engage with the future, it is sometimes necessary to revisit the past, much like in psychoanalysis, where exploring repressed experiences helps illuminate present and future trajectories. This brings us to a crucial idea of this article: history and historiography are not solely concerned with understanding past events but also with anticipating and shaping future possibilities. In this light, many future catastrophes have their roots in the past. Recognizing this dynamic allows us to see that many future catastrophes have their origins in unresolved past events, reinforcing the necessity of engaging with history not only as retrospective analysis but as a mode of future-oriented thinking.</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Why AI Can Never Have a Soul: a philosophical inquiry into language and consciousness</title>
      <link>https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_20557.html</link>
      <description>This paper examines the question of whether artificial intelligence (AI) could ever possess consciousness or soul. While rapid advances in machine learning, neural networks, and large language models have generated speculation about machine sentience, we argue that AI remains confined to the limits of language and computation, incapable of attaining the lived, experiential dimension that defines human subjectivity. Drawing upon both Western and Indian philosophical traditions, the paper explores the ontological and phenomenological nature of consciousness, the relation between language and experience, and the metaphysical concept of soul. Through engagement with Wittgenstein, Bhartṛhari, Descartes, Husserl, Nagel, Chalmers, and classical Indian systems such as Vedānta and Sāṅkhya, we demonstrate why AI cannot transcend simulation into embodiment. Critical responses to strong AI, functionalism, transhumanism, and emergentist theories are considered, yet all fail to address the irreducibility of subjectivity and the ontological distinctiveness of soul. The conclusion reaffirms that AI&amp;amp;rsquo;s boundaries are linguistic and computational, whereas human consciousness transcends language through lived experience, making the notion of a soulful AI both metaphysically impossible and philosophically incoherent.</description>
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    <item>
      <title>"Island Disease" and Its Treatment Through "Interdisciplinary Thinking" in The Educational System</title>
      <link>https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_21231.html</link>
      <description>The term &amp;amp;ldquo;island disease&amp;amp;rdquo; refers to the isolation and fragmentation of academic disciplines, a phenomenon prevalent in Iranian universities and research institutions. Specialization, while enhancing precision and depth within individual fields, often results in limited interdisciplinary interaction, leaving each discipline functioning as an isolated &amp;amp;ldquo;island.&amp;amp;rdquo; This fragmentation manifests in curricula that separate related subjects, minimal collaboration among faculty, and disciplinary languages that hinder cross-field understanding. Philosophical perspectives from Rumi, Jaspers, Heidegger, and Ortega y Gasset highlight the importance of holistic knowledge and the university&amp;amp;rsquo;s role in integrating education, research, and culture. Globally, universities increasingly adopt interdisciplinary, multidisciplinary, and transdisciplinary approaches to address complex societal problems, foster innovation, and prepare students for the demands of the twenty-first century. In Iran, recent initiatives&amp;amp;mdash;including the University of Tehran&amp;amp;rsquo;s College of Interdisciplinary Sciences and Technologies, interdisciplinary engineering programs at Amirkabir University, and national interdisciplinary journals&amp;amp;mdash;illustrate growing efforts to overcome the &amp;amp;ldquo;island disease.&amp;amp;rdquo; This study examines the origins, manifestations, and consequences of academic isolation in Iranian higher education and argues that interdisciplinary thinking is a necessary remedy for cultivating integrated knowledge, collaboration, and problem-oriented education.</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Hegelian Influence on Inferentialism, Plausibility and Limitations</title>
      <link>https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_21232.html</link>
      <description>The aim of this paper is to examine both the potential and limitations of Hegelianism in contemporary epistemology. To achieve this, the paper first explores Robert Brandom's interpretation of Phenomenology of Spirit in his 2019 work, Spirit of Trust. In this context, Hegel is positioned as a precursor to the holistic, historical, and social dimensions of belief, as well as a critic of the empiricist intuitions prevalent in modernity, aligning with the framework of American inferentialism. This section demonstrates that it is possible to discuss the constitution of concepts without invoking sensations or immediate knowledge. The paper then turns to the reception of Brandom&amp;amp;rsquo;s proposal by scholars such as Richard Rorty and Slavoj Žižek, who concurs that Brandom falls short in maintaining a radical stance toward empiricism, and highlight the ethical and political challenges inherent in Brandom&amp;amp;rsquo;s neo-Hegelian inferentialism. In this section, it becomes evident that Brandom&amp;amp;rsquo;s concept of the Hegelian absolute and his notion of remembrance cannot be reconciled with a conception of reality as negative and contingent, a view that assumes progressiveness&amp;amp;mdash;something Žižek, in contrast, succeeds in recognizing within Hegel's philosophy.</description>
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      <title>Hybridization and Empowerment: exploring the postmodern self in the context of cyborg feminism</title>
      <link>https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_19246.html</link>
      <description>The emergence of postmodernism has noticeably redefined the notion of the &amp;amp;ldquo;self,&amp;amp;rdquo; presenting it as a deconstructed postmodern subject. In this context, the postmodern self appears polysemic and decentered, embodying prominent characteristics of postmodernism. Donna Haraway&amp;amp;rsquo;s concept of the &amp;amp;ldquo;cyborg,&amp;amp;rdquo; characterized by its synthetic and hybrid nature, offers a framework for understanding this postmodern self. Haraway portrays the cyborg as a distinctly female figure which is constructed from a collage of fragments. The goal of this article is to explore the construction of the postmodern self in the context of cyborg feminism to illustrate how technology and cybernetics serve as tools for women&amp;amp;rsquo;s empowerment and to demonstrate how women can confront patriarchal systems and restore their rights by embracing the hybrid and synthetic aspects of the postmodern female identity. Succinctly, this article aims to exemplify how redefining female identity through the notion of the cyborg allows women to transcend male dominance and reject binary oppositions characterizing them as &amp;amp;ldquo;the Other&amp;amp;rdquo; and to surpass a society that has consistently endeavored to marginalize them. Thus, this essay maintains that cyborg feminism serves as an insightful lens for examining the construction of postmodern selves, challenging traditional distinctions between gender, technology, and identity.</description>
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    <item>
      <title>The Necessity of Illusion: on Hegel’s cunning of reason</title>
      <link>https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_20474.html</link>
      <description>In Hegel&amp;amp;rsquo;s Philosophy of History, one encounters the idea of the &amp;amp;ldquo;cunning of reason&amp;amp;rdquo; [List der Vernunft], which describes the unintended (universal) consequences of (particular) individual actions. However, the Philosophy of History is one of the most (if not the most) maligned of Hegel&amp;amp;rsquo;s works, attacked by non-specialists and anti-Hegelians who use it to easily stereotype and dismiss Hegel, for instance, as a teleological anti-individualist, while most serious Hegel interpreters avoid this work at all costs. To redress the lack of serious attention to Hegel&amp;amp;rsquo;s Philosophy of History, this paper aims to offer the strongest possible reading of Hegel&amp;amp;rsquo;s weakest &amp;amp;ldquo;text,&amp;amp;rdquo; reading it alongside his strongest, the Science of Logic, thereby bringing together two seemingly contradictory instances of the cunning of reason in Hegel&amp;amp;rsquo;s corpus. In the Logic, the cunning of reason shows how the universal emerges through the means which individuals use toward their particular ends. However, in the Philosophy of History, the cunning of reason describes how the universal acts through individuals, as it were, behind their backs and, problematically, Hegel goes on to claim that the universal (spirit [Geist]) ultimately sacrifices individuals on the &amp;amp;ldquo;slaughter bench&amp;amp;rdquo; of history to advance its own purpose(s). This paper&amp;amp;rsquo;s two-part thesis is: (1) the cunning of reason in the Philosophy of History is an internal illusion of the structure of cunning of reason in the Logic, and (2) this illusion is absolutely necessary. In particular, this paper builds upon the Hegel interpretations of Todd McGowan and Slavoj Žižek.</description>
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      <title>Teacher Expectations of South Asian Students in a Hong Kong Primary School</title>
      <link>https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_21252.html</link>
      <description>South Asian ethnic minorities (SAEMs) represent a growing population in Hong Kong public education. However, schools struggle to offer them fair and equitable education. One frequently mentioned, but rarely studied component in their performance is teachers&amp;amp;rsquo; lower expectations. This article reports on a qualitative case study to examine ethnically Chinese teachers&amp;amp;rsquo; expectations of South Asian students in a public primary school in Hong Kong. Five Chinese teachers were interviewed, with observations in three of these teachers&amp;amp;rsquo; classrooms. Results indicate teachers have lower expectations. Several influencing factors were identified, including perceptions of cultural differences between Chinese teachers and South Asian ethnic minorities&amp;amp;rsquo; families and inadequate training of teachers in Chinese as a second language and incorporating diversified learning strategies into the curriculum. This is one of the first studies specifically focused on exploring in greater details primary teachers&amp;amp;rsquo; expectations about South Asian students in Hong Kong.</description>
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      <title>Capitalism, Beauty Standards, and the Law: a feminist-foucauldian critique of body regulation</title>
      <link>https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_20442.html</link>
      <description>This study examines the convergence of law, beauty standards, and feminist-Foucauldian theory, emphasising the influence of beauty myths on cultural norms and legal frameworks. Beauty standards, shaped by media, commercial, and legal structures, establish a restrictive and exclusive notion of beauty, frequently favouring lighter complexion, thinner physiques, and straight hair. These norms, devoid of a biological foundation, originate from social constructs that perpetuate patriarchal and capitalist ideologies. The law significantly reinforces these standars by normalizing certain physical traita and marginalising those who differ. Utilising Foucault&amp;amp;rsquo;s notion of &amp;amp;ldquo;disciplinary power,&amp;amp;rdquo; the examination emphasises how individuals internalise societal norms and consciously modify their bodies to conform to these standards. It also attacks the legal system&amp;amp;rsquo;s inadequacy in addressing body image discrimination, which exacerbates the marginalisation of individuals who diverge from conventional beauty standards. This study underscores the significance of intersectionality, asserting how beauty myths intersect with race, gender, and class, while urging legal frameworks that accommodate diverse body types to strengthen equality and protect against appearance-based discrimination.&amp;amp;nbsp;</description>
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      <title>Che Vuoi? (What Does a Woman Want?)</title>
      <link>https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_19762.html</link>
      <description>Today, we encounter a question that has rarely been treated as a serious or provocative issue: women and sexuality as a philosophical problem. This theme now acts as a critical marker&amp;amp;mdash;an axis that divides entire fields of thought into a before and after. The beginning of this epistemic shift can be traced back to a Freudian question: What does a woman really want? In this article, we follow this question through the lens of Lacanian theory, in which he introduces the concept of sexuation and illuminates the foggy, ambiguous terrain of femininity through the formulation of the hysterical discourse. Moving beyond a purely hysterical approach to womanhood, the French psychoanalyst carved a path for the re-inscription of her historically ambivalent and fragmented image. For Lacan, woman is a symptom&amp;amp;mdash;an embodiment of the fundamental contradiction and rupture within the symbolic order. The Woman does not exist; rather, la femme is a rebel who struggles to exist</description>
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      <title>Examining the Einstein-Bergson Controversy about Time Considering the Time-Energy Uncertainty Principle</title>
      <link>https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_20678.html</link>
      <description>This paper revisits the famous 1922 debate between Einstein and Bergson on the nature of time, outlining its central philosophical and scientific points of contention and re-evaluating them in light of developments in quantum physics. Einstein&amp;amp;rsquo;s conception of time is that of an objective, measurable, and relative dimension within a static four-dimensional &amp;amp;ldquo;block universe.&amp;amp;rdquo; In contrast, Bergson conceives of time (dur&amp;amp;eacute;e) as a qualitative, continuous, and creative flow of consciousness that resists reduction to quantitative measurement. The emergence of quantum mechanics, particularly the Heisenberg time&amp;amp;ndash;energy uncertainty principle, introduces new complexities that challenge this dichotomy. Quantum features of time, such as intrinsic uncertainty, the indeterminacy of precise moments, and the relational role of the observer, undermine the deterministic framework of classical and relativistic physics and appear, at least superficially, to resonate with Bergson&amp;amp;rsquo;s critique of spatialized, discrete conceptions of time. However, a closer examination reveals that quantum time remains a quantitative, physical construct distinct from Bergson&amp;amp;rsquo;s qualitative dur&amp;amp;eacute;e. Drawing upon modern theories such as loop quantum gravity (as articulated by Carlo Rovelli and Lee Smolin) and the insights of contemporary philosophers, this study argues that neither a purely physical nor a purely philosophical approach can, in isolation, account for the multifaceted nature of time. Rather, a comprehensive understanding requires a synthesis of both, recognizing them as complementary perspectives on a single underlying reality.</description>
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      <title>A Philosophical Critique of Warfare in the Contemporary Era:  ethical justifications and competing theories</title>
      <link>https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_20842.html</link>
      <description>This study aims to provide a comprehensive philosophical critique of warfare in the contemporary era, focusing on ethical justifications and competing theoretical frameworks. It examines the extent to which classical just war theory remains applicable and explores how contemporary philosophers contribute to the redefinition of the ethics of war. Employing an applied, descriptive-analytical, qualitative approach, the study gathers data from library sources, theoretical literature, previous research, and scholarly articles. It reviews such sources to critically analyze the philosophical and ethical foundations of war. The findings show that states resort to war for reasons including the defense of human rights, protection of sovereignty, and response to significant threats. Just war theory distinguishes between conflicts that are ethically justified and those that are not. Although ethical principles invariably influence warfare, some conflicts can be justified on grounds of justice, rendering absolute pacifism impractical. Also the analysis reveals that classical frameworks, while foundational, are insufficient for addressing the moral complexities of contemporary warfare. Emerging forms of conflict challenge traditional notions of legitimacy and moral accountability, highlighting significant gaps in existing theories. Contemporary warfare necessitates a revised and integrative philosophical framework capable of accommodating new modes of violence and global security concerns. Such a framework should synthesize insights from just war theory, pacifism, and political realism to provide a robust basis for evaluating the morality of modern conflicts and international bodies must prioritize disarmament and ethically based legislation to safeguard human rights and dignity.&amp;amp;nbsp;</description>
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      <title>Examining and Analyzing Allameh Tabatabei’s Account on Faith within the Framework of Howard Snyder’s Non-Doxastic Approach</title>
      <link>https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_20000.html</link>
      <description>The aim of this study is to examine Allama Tabatabai&amp;amp;rsquo;s account on faith and analyze it within the framework of Daniel Howard-Snyder&amp;amp;rsquo;s non-doxastic approach. Faith is one of the key concepts in the epistemology of religion, and recent analytic approaches has increasingly distinguished it from belief. Allama Tabatabai describes faith as being based on two main components: "al- i'tiqad" and "tamakkun fi al-qalb&amp;amp;ldquo;. This paper employs a comparative method to evaluate Allama&amp;amp;rsquo;s account, interpreted as a form of doxastic faith, with the core components of Howard-Snyder&amp;amp;rsquo;s non-doxastic model, in order to address the ambiguities in the concept of faith and the challenges associated with doxastic faith. Based on Howard-Snyder&amp;amp;rsquo;s non-doxastic analysis of faith, the upshots show that the concept of "al- i'tiqad" in Allama&amp;amp;rsquo;s account, as a cognitive attitude, is ambiguous and lacks the essential characteristic which is constituent for belief. Additionally, the failure to explicitly define the conative and evaluative components of faith in Allama&amp;amp;rsquo;s account is another challenge. Drawing on Howard-Snyder&amp;amp;rsquo;s model, which emphasizes faith amid doubt, this article argues that the non-doxastic framework provides conceptual resources for clarifying these ambiguities and for constructing a meaningful bridge between classical Islamic thought and contemporary discussions in the epistemology of religion.</description>
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      <title>Responsibility-Internalism Collapses:  Conceptual, Normative, and Relational Challenges</title>
      <link>https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_19922.html</link>
      <description>Moral responsibility is a fundamental component of ethics, shaping our understanding of accountability, blame, and praise. Responsibility-internalism, which holds that moral responsibility is grounded in some internal mental states, such as beliefs, desires,&amp;amp;ensp;and intentions, represents a novel yet radical departure from traditional frameworks that focus on the outcome, circumstances, and interpersonal relationships to draw the moral line. While this theory presents a simple, self-contained picture of moral responsibility, it faces serious theoretical problems that challenge its coherence and practical utility. It specifically cannot adequately explain cases of negligence, culpable ignorance, and the relational aspects of moral responsibility that are central to human interactions. This paper offers a critical-analytic&amp;amp;ensp;examination of responsibility-internalism and its theoretical and practical shortcomings. It examines positions that would incorporate both&amp;amp;ensp;internalist assumptions, emphasizing the control agents possess over their actions, and externalist and interpersonal factors, aiming to offer a more complete and nuanced conception of moral liability. Some of the paper is devoted to discussing case studies in which the limitations of responsibility-internalism relative to its alternatives&amp;amp;ensp;are illustrated. And it concludes that although responsibility-internalism offers a novel take and a new tool&amp;amp;ensp;in the discussions of moral responsibility, such an internalist approach ultimately fails to provide a full and usable theory of moral responsibility.</description>
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      <title>Beckett’s Film: Perceiving Deleuze’s Time Film through Stiegler’s Negentropic Film</title>
      <link>https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_20548.html</link>
      <description>Gilles Deleuze argues that in Samuel Beckett&amp;amp;rsquo;s Film the perception of self by self, though agonizing, opens onto a promising vision: for one confined to the personal reduction of life, it discloses a transcendental expansion of LIFE. In cinematic perception, this transformation marks the shift from the classical cinema of movement, where protagonists made films, to a modern cinema of time, where the camera becomes the protagonist, inviting actors, like the audience, to watch the film enriched by its transcendental perspective. This article shows what appears in Deleuzian time-cinema as a proliferation of life, by sustaining the audience&amp;amp;rsquo;s belief in transcendental time as a horizon of perpetually emerging life-events, is, in fact, an entropic eventization of the audience&amp;amp;rsquo;s memory, a process that, according to Bernard Stiegler, entails the loss of savoir-faire. Thus, the revelatory shock-images in Beckett&amp;amp;rsquo;s Film signify an entropic loss of memory&amp;amp;rsquo;s ground, becoming pathological shocks that require therapeutic care and invention of new life-therapies, anticipating a negentropic reinvention of time the transcendental camera must watch and read its film from. Here, E is seen as a therapeutic camera, healed out of transcendental time through O&amp;amp;rsquo;s analysing the pharmacological shock.</description>
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      <title>The Political Philosophy of Artificial Intelligence</title>
      <link>https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_21149.html</link>
      <description>This paper examines the political philosophy of Artificial Intelligence (AI) through three distinct approaches: optimistic positivist scientism, critical middle ground, and phenomenological pessimism. The central issue addressed is the ethical and political implications of AI, specifically how it influences governance, social structures, and human autonomy. The research questions explore how AI can be understood in terms of its potential and risks, how different political philosophies interpret its role, and what governance models can mitigate its negative consequences. The methodology adopted is a comparative analysis of key thinkers and their contributions to the debate on AI. The framework includes positivist, critical theory, and phenomenological perspectives, with a focus on how these paradigms inform the understanding of technology and its societal impact. Key theorists discussed include Francis Bacon, Karl Marx, Yuval Harari, J&amp;amp;uuml;rgen Habermas, Martin Heidegger, and Hannah Arendt, each offering a unique viewpoint on the nature of AI and its implications for governance and human existence. The findings highlight three divergent views: the optimistic positivist approach sees AI as a tool for progress, advocating for technological innovation and global governance; the critical middle ground emphasizes ethical oversight and regulation to prevent social inequality; and the phenomenological pessimism warns of AI&amp;amp;rsquo;s potential to undermine human freedom and autonomy, leading to a dystopian, technocratic society. The study concludes that while AI offers significant potential for improving human life, it also raises profound challenges that require careful regulation, ethical consideration, and a commitment to preserving democratic freedoms.</description>
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      <title>The Intersection of Rousseau’s Participatory Democracy and Habermas’ Communicative Action: a transformation in geography education</title>
      <link>https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_20448.html</link>
      <description>In the contemporary world, education is recognized as a fundamental tool for fostering active, responsible, and capable citizens who require processes that strengthen participation, mutual understanding, and rational dialogue. The present study aims to examine the application of Rousseau&amp;amp;rsquo;s participatory democracy and Habermas&amp;amp;rsquo; communicative action in the teaching of spatial sciences, with a particular focus on geography. The research adopts an action research design with an applied orientation. The study population consisted of 24 undergraduate geography students enrolled in the course Urban Geography of Iran. Data were collected and analyzed across 14 instructional sessions through observation, evaluation, and the interpretation of lived experiences within an interpretive framework. The research process followed a cyclical pattern, including problem identification, theoretical review, formation of focus groups, and dialogue-oriented consensus building. Findings indicate that democratic, participatory, and communicative approaches to spatial education emerge gradually and require a process-oriented foundation. Accordingly, the integration of Rousseau&amp;amp;rsquo;s participatory democracy with Habermas&amp;amp;rsquo; communicative action demands active facilitation by instructors and the reinforcement of intra- and inter-group interactions. The results further reveal that combining these two approaches in geography education&amp;amp;mdash;particularly in spatially oriented courses&amp;amp;mdash;creates a pathway for transitioning from teacher-centered learning to participatory&amp;amp;ndash;discursive learning. This shift enhances skills of spatial analysis, critique, collaboration, and debate, thereby deepening learning and understanding of spatial concepts. Ultimately, the study proposes a practical framework for democratic, interactive, and active education, serving as an illustrative example of implementing these philosophical approaches in higher education.</description>
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      <title>Understanding Brain Rot:  a processual and philosophical analysis through Avicenna’s hierarchy of intellect</title>
      <link>https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_19989.html</link>
      <description>This study explores the concept of brain rot and its correlation with Avicenna&amp;amp;rsquo;s four stages of intellect, offering a philosophical and normative perspective on cognitive decline in the digital age. By mapping the stages of brain rot&amp;amp;mdash;excessive exposure to digital content, mediating factors, cognitive dysfunction, and chronic cognitive decline&amp;amp;mdash;onto Avicenna&amp;amp;rsquo;s hierarchy, this study reveals how digital overstimulation hinders intellectual progression. The research highlights the stagnation of cognitive faculties, from the passive, unactualized state of ʿAql Hayūlānī (potential intellect) to the irreversible decline seen in ʿAql Mustafād (acquired intellect). Mediating factors such as digital addiction, information overload, and mental fatigue exacerbate this stagnation, preventing the activation of higher cognitive functions and reflective reasoning. The study also integrates recent literature on brain rot and digital dementia to provide empirical support for the mapping process, demonstrating how excessive digital exposure disrupts intellectual growth and rational autonomy. These findings suggest the need for philosophical reflection on cognitive decline and underscore the importance of addressing the challenges posed by digital media in fostering intellectual engagement and development.</description>
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      <title>What Are the Criteria of Personality in Artificial Intelligence in Relation to Moral Status?</title>
      <link>https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_20857.html</link>
      <description>The present article examines the possibility of attributing personhood to artificial intelligence agents, a concept central to determining moral status. The debate on personhood has long been central in applied ethics, particularly in discussions on abortion, where philosophers such as Mary Anne Warren proposed five criteria&amp;amp;mdash;consciousness, reasoning, self-motivated activity, capacity for communication, and self-awareness&amp;amp;mdash;as key indicators of personhood. The present study applies these criteria to artificial intelligence systems and asks whether their cognitive and functional capacities are sufficient for moral consideration. While certain features such as memory, goal-directed behavior, and limited moral interaction are identifiable in some AI systems, the absence of self-awareness and subjective experience remains a fundamental obstacle to full personhood. The article further engages with the views of Kant, Locke, DeGrazia, and Searle, assessing the possibility of AI&amp;amp;rsquo;s moral standing&amp;amp;mdash;whether direct or indirect&amp;amp;mdash;through ethical frameworks such as deontology and virtue ethics. It concludes that although attributing personhood to AI remains highly problematic in its current state, addressing this issue is an urgent necessity for contemporary moral philosophy.</description>
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      <title>Philosophical Theories of Good Governance and Efficiency in Public Administration: a study of the views of selected philosophers in islamic and western philosophy on freedom, justice, equality, and fairness</title>
      <link>https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_20006.html</link>
      <description>Good governance and efficiency have long been important and central topics in philosophical and political discussions around the world. This study examined philosophical theories related to good and efficient governance, as well as their importance in government structure and performance. Among Western philosophers Plato in his book considers good governance as a government based on justice and the common good, while Aristotle considers it based on good people and citizens. On the other hand, Islamic philosophers such as Khwaja Nasir al-Din Tusi consider justice to be the basis of government, and Al-Farabi likens good government to the utopian city. This study shows that philosophical concepts in good governance should go beyond abstract theories and be effectively implemented at executive levels. In particular, the emphasis on justice and fairness, freedom and authority, equality and equity in good governance are considered as fundamental pillars in resource management and fair distribution in order to achieve social welfare and democracy. Ultimately, good and efficient governance not only contributes to justice but also to strengthening the relationship between the government and citizens a well as promoting social capabilities to achieve a dynamic and stable government.</description>
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      <title>Emotion, Ethics, and Conceptual Engineering: toward an affective-ethical framework</title>
      <link>https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_21182.html</link>
      <description>This study develops the Affective Ethical Model of Conceptual Engineering (AEMCE), a framework we introduce to address a critical and underexplored gap in conceptual engineering: the emotional dimension of concepts. While traditional normative conceptual engineering has focused on the application of concepts to moral and social applications, it has largely overlooked the overwhelming emotional impact a concept may have on individuals. These emotional resonances, whether harmful, isolating, or manipulative, are often ignored, creating ethical blind spots. The Affective Ethical Model of Conceptual Engineering rectifies this by introducing affective accountability and ethical adequacy as foundational criteria for conceptual success. This model is structured around four iterative and interdependent stages: Diagnosis, Design, Circulation, and Evaluation, which are operationalized through the Affective Performance Test. These rigorous mixed methods protocol empirically assesses both emotional engagement and harm reduction. The Affective Ethical Model of Conceptual Engineering demonstrates how concept revision, such as reframing the term &amp;amp;ldquo;illegitimate child&amp;amp;rdquo; in Algeria, can promote linguistic justice and social integration, transforming harmful labels into more neutral, inclusive language. This redesigns Conceptual Engineering not as an instrument of intellectual clarity but as a moral technology that has the capacity to transform the moral and emotional infrastructure of society. As a blend of emotional intelligence and philosophical accuracy, the Affective Ethical Model of Conceptual Engineering will provide a new concept of engineering, which improves the sense of moral quality in social life.</description>
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      <title>A Consideration of Hegel’s Philosophy According to Popper and to the Neo-Popperian Inversion Theory of Truth</title>
      <link>https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_21264.html</link>
      <description>This paper shows how Hegel&amp;amp;rsquo;s misconception of truth and knowledge misled his ideas of Absolute spirit, dialectically reinforced dogmatism and irrational historicism toward his disastrous conclusion of a &amp;amp;ldquo;totalitarian playbook&amp;amp;rdquo;. Analysis by Hegel scholars is presented and contrasted with Popper&amp;amp;rsquo;s Critical Rationalism-based critiques. Hegel held a version of Correspondence for everyday truth plus a deeper &amp;amp;ldquo;philosophical&amp;amp;rdquo; truth, similar to essence, which could be unified with consciousness. This is compared to Popper&amp;amp;rsquo;s anti-essentialism. Hegel&amp;amp;rsquo;s dialectical theory is contrasted to Popper&amp;amp;rsquo;s falsificationism. Popper showed that dialectical method produced historical relativism. Hegel&amp;amp;rsquo;s Philosophy of Identity, yielding the dialectical Idealism of &amp;amp;ldquo;what is reasonable must be real&amp;amp;rdquo;, led to &amp;amp;ldquo;might is right&amp;amp;rdquo; with emergence of nations by fighting for domination on the stage of history. Popper credited Hegel with formulating the &amp;amp;ldquo;playbook of totalitarianism&amp;amp;rdquo;, used lethally by followers of Hegelian Left and Right. Inversion Theory claims the word &amp;amp;ldquo;true&amp;amp;rdquo;, implying completeness, certainty, and self-consistency, is applicable only to the objective world. Perception of it, acquired by an evolved biological process (Active Subjectivism), incorporates essential falsehood, yielding &amp;amp;ldquo;best knowledge&amp;amp;rdquo; of reality. It solves problems related to the regulatory, statistical, evidentiary, inconstant and even indexical nature of knowledge. Only the Inversion theory exposes the errors of dialecticism: since it involves subjective concepts, it is impossible for a true synthesis plus its negative antithesis to give a true synthesis. The historical process of the Zeitgeist contains falsehood, the cunning of reason to move the spirit forward is uncertain, and nobody can perform the truth for their time.&amp;amp;nbsp;</description>
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      <title>A Philosophical Reflection on Governance Paradigms in Iran; Based on the Last Four Presidential Discourses</title>
      <link>https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_19825.html</link>
      <description>This study aims to examine the philosophical foundations of governance paradigms reflected in the election discourses of Iranian presidential candidates between 2005 and 2025, highlighting how these paradigms shape governance styles. The research employed a qualitative document analysis approach, focusing on primary sources such as campaign statements, election manifestos, interviews, and media reports. A comparative method was used to evaluate the ontological, epistemological, and methodological dimensions of each presidential discourse. Theoretical frameworks from the philosophy of science, particularly regarding positivist, interpretivist, and critical paradigms, provided the lens for analysis.&amp;amp;nbsp; The study found that Mahmoud Ahmadinejad&amp;amp;rsquo;s discourse embodied an interpretivist paradigm with positivist elements, emphasizing cultural narratives and measurable developmental policies. Hassan Rouhani&amp;amp;rsquo;s discourse reflected a hybrid of critical and positivist paradigms, balancing structural reforms with evidence-based governance. Ebrahim Raisi&amp;amp;rsquo;s approach was primarily interpretivist with critical elements, focusing on revolutionary ideals and social justice. Masoud Pezeshkian&amp;amp;rsquo;s emerging discourse aligned most closely with the critical paradigm while incorporating positivist techniques for policy development. Across the period from 2005 to 2025, a gradual philosophical shift was observed, moving from symbolic mobilization toward structural critique and pragmatic governance strategies. These evolving paradigms significantly influenced policymaking priorities, citizen participation models, and governance structures in Iran.&amp;amp;nbsp; The philosophical roots embedded in election discourses play a decisive role in shaping governance approaches in Iran. Understanding these paradigmatic orientations offers deeper insights into the evolution of political practices and state-citizen relations. Future studies should further explore the relationship between electoral rhetoric, governance implementation, and the broader socio-political transformations within Iran.</description>
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      <title>A Philosophical Look at the Place of Form in Modern Sciences</title>
      <link>https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_18422.html</link>
      <description>Form meaning typical form in philosophy is proved under the title of " total reality of an object" through a logical method. Modern sciences since 17th A.D. century have been formulated by the ideas of elites like Newton, Galileo, and Descartes via factors like alteration in academic tradition methodology, consolidation of mechanical look at nature and establishment of originality of evolution. Nowadays these sciences diminish the position of form and changethat high position of to a quantifiable accident or storable information or a cause of unification among organs of a living creature. Islamic philosophers though disagree each other regarding explanation of its truth and its combination with matter and how the essence of flesh is formed, in fact, they do not raise doubt in its truth. Some by denying matter regard flesh identical withform and some by accepting matter regard their combination concrete and MullaSadra regards its combination with form unifying and by introduction of substance theory brings a tremendous revolution in the explanation of its position and how it evolves.</description>
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      <title>Agency, Entanglement, and the Limits of Universalism: toward a situated posthuman ecology</title>
      <link>https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_21177.html</link>
      <description>This paper presents a systematic comparative and historical analysis of the concepts of agency and entanglement within ecological thought, arguing that contemporary new materialist approaches articulate a distinctly posthuman ecology. This ecology is fundamentally grounded in ontological entanglement, distributed agency across human and nonhuman entities, and an immanent, relational form of response-ability that emerges from intra-active becoming rather than individual intention. Drawing primarily on Karen Barad&amp;amp;rsquo;s agential realism, Jane Bennett&amp;amp;rsquo;s vital materialism, Rosi Braidotti&amp;amp;rsquo;s zoe-centred posthuman ethics, and Stacy Alaimo&amp;amp;rsquo;s trans-corporeality&amp;amp;mdash;while remaining critically attentive to recent decolonial, feminist, and Indigenous critiques that challenge universalized notions of entanglement&amp;amp;mdash;the paper meticulously traces a pivotal epistemic and ontological shift. It charts the movement away from earlier representational and managerial paradigms, such as systems ecology and deep ecology, which often preserved anthropocentric hierarchies despite their holistic rhetoric, toward a performative ontology of material-discursive intra-action. Through this transition, ethical and political responsibility is radically relocated: no longer vested in a sovereign, detached human subject issuing commands to passive Nature, but enacted performatively within the entangled phenomena themselves. The consequences are far-reaching, reshaping environmental theory, political ecology, climate justice frameworks, and praxis-oriented struggles in an era of planetary crisis.</description>
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      <title>A rethinking of Celine&amp;rsquo;s Journey to the End of the Night based on the concept of lived experience- ereignis in Heidegger&amp;rsquo;s thought</title>
      <link>https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_18902.html</link>
      <description>The purpose of this article is to give a new interpretation of the novel Journey to the End of the Night written by Louis Ferdinand Celine, based on Heidegger&amp;amp;#039;s concept of lived experience. In the book Towards the Definition of Philosophy, Heidegger defines the lived experience as an event of appropriation. Based on this, the lived experience is not an objective thing that a human being has to face, the lived experience comes from within the human being and belongs to the human being. And on the other hand, man also belongs to its area. Heidegger&amp;amp;#039;s discussions in this field are in such a way that Dasein is placed in its center. Based on this, it seems that the logical continuation of the discussion of lived experience in the book Being and Time can be followed under such issues as being-in-the-world, care and the truth. In the following, by looking at the narrative of Celine&amp;amp;#039;s novel, it becomes clear that the main character of the novel, Ferdinand Bardamu, can be considered as a Dasein whose existence is from Ek-sistenz, and the existentials of Dasein, such as being-in-the-world, care and disciverer, are applied to him. With considering of Celin&amp;amp;rsquo;s narrative and Heidegger&amp;amp;#039;s theories we findout that facing lived experience is not an objective encounter, but an existential event.</description>
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      <title>The Self in Prereflexive Self-Consciousness 

Self-concernment without Self-reference</title>
      <link>https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_19434.html</link>
      <description>This paper aims to explain the phenomenological concept of prereflexive self-consciousness in positive and constructive terms, using minimal analytical tools. The first step in this direction is the adoption of an adverbial theory of self-consciousness, inspired by the adverbial theory of perception. The adverbial theory of perception replaces the controversial sense-data theory of perception. We do not see a &amp;amp;quot;blue sense datum&amp;amp;quot; but rather perceive something &amp;amp;quot;in a blue-like manner.&amp;amp;quot; By analogy, we propose that prereflexive intransitive self-consciousness is not a representation of the thinking or perceiving subject. Instead, prereflexive self-consciousness is a peculiar way in which the subject performs an act of thinking or perceiving. The second step is to use Perry&amp;amp;#039;s framework of the &amp;amp;quot;unarticulated constituent&amp;amp;quot; to further clarify this claim. However, we will not rely on Perry&amp;amp;#039;s original view but on Recanati&amp;amp;#039;s critical review. We will argue that the adverbial characterization of prereflexive self-consciousness as &amp;amp;quot;the first-person way of experiencing or thinking&amp;amp;quot; means that the subjectless content of one&amp;amp;#039;s representation must be assessed within a broad context to which the subject necessarily belongs. This is what we call &amp;amp;quot;self-concernment without self-reference.&amp;amp;quot;</description>
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      <title>Meanings of Dunamis in Aristotle’s Philosophy</title>
      <link>https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_20167.html</link>
      <description>The term &amp;amp;quot;dunamis&amp;amp;quot; is a fundamental concept in ancient Greek thought that has held various meanings throughout its history. In the mythological era, it primarily referred to physical power, military strength, social influence, and political force. With the advent of philosophy, especially in Plato’s works, its meaning expanded to include numerical capacity, potential ability, possibility, and even economic power. Aristotle plays a central role in redefining and developing &amp;amp;quot;dunamis,&amp;amp;quot; making it a key pillar of his philosophy. For Aristotle, its primary meaning in nature is the &amp;amp;quot;source of movement and change,&amp;amp;quot; but its conceptual scope extends across philosophy: in ethics as &amp;amp;quot;capacity,&amp;amp;quot; in metaphysics as a &amp;amp;quot;mode of being,&amp;amp;quot; in politics as &amp;amp;quot;power,&amp;amp;quot; and in logic as &amp;amp;quot;possibility,&amp;amp;quot; among others. This study, through an analytical-comparative approach, aims to identify and clarify the various meanings of &amp;amp;quot;dunamis&amp;amp;quot; across different fields, preventing conceptual confusion and misinterpretation in Aristotelian philosophy. The main goal is not to propose a new meaning but to illuminate the diverse senses of &amp;amp;quot;dunamis&amp;amp;quot; so readers familiar with philosophical texts can better understand Aristotle’s works and their commentaries, avoiding interpretive errors.</description>
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      <title>Brazilian Neo-Pyrrhonism</title>
      <link>https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_20208.html</link>
      <description>Oswald Porchat and his followers define his neo-Pyrrhonism as a philosophy that strives to rethink, update, and extend the old Pyrrhonian skepticism, reformulating the classical notions of truth, reality and even knowledge in &amp;amp;quot;skeptical&amp;amp;quot; or &amp;amp;quot;phenomenal&amp;amp;quot; terms. This paper has two aims. First, I will show that such Brazilian neo-Pyrrhonism is nothing more than an updated version of Kant&amp;amp;#039;s transcendental idealism (when read metaphysically, as Paul Guyer did) or what Barry Stroud idiosyncratically calls &amp;amp;quot;verificationism.&amp;amp;quot; Since at least Berkeley, this has been a recurrent pattern in the modern history of external-world skepticism: whenever skeptics suspend their ordinary belief in a mind-independent reality while still having to make sense of their ordinary lives, they ultimately embrace some form of idealism—one that they should have questioned in the first place. The second aim of this article is to show that Kant&amp;amp;#039;s refutation of idealism is a transcendental argument that is both ambitious (truth-directed) and successful against neo-Pyrrhonism.</description>
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      <title>Ethics in a Future Technological World: 
A Levinasian Reading of Part One of Goethe’s Faust</title>
      <link>https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_20368.html</link>
      <description>The subject of this article is an inquiry into the possibility of ethics in the future technological world. This investigation proceeds through a Levinasian reading of the first part of Goethe’s drama Faust. According to Levinas, the &amp;amp;quot;Other&amp;amp;quot; constitutes the very condition for the possibility of ethics. For Levinas, the &amp;amp;quot;Other&amp;amp;quot; is absolutely foreign and infinite; hence, the subject bears an infinite responsibility toward the &amp;amp;quot;Other&amp;amp;quot;. The face of the &amp;amp;quot;Other&amp;amp;quot;, Levinas argues, is that which calls the subject to responsibility even unto death, thereby transforming the subject, in effect, into an object. Yet, in the world to come, the encounter between subject and &amp;amp;quot;Other&amp;amp;quot; will be profoundly mediated by technology. This article suggests that the three elements, subject, &amp;amp;quot;Other&amp;amp;quot;, and technology, can be corresponded to the three figures of Faust, Margarete (Gretchen), and Mephistopheles in Goethe’s Faust, thus enabling a renewed interpretation. Furthermore, by analyzing technology as that which claims to reduce the &amp;amp;quot;Other&amp;amp;quot; to the &amp;amp;quot;Same&amp;amp;quot;, this article proposes that in order to safeguard ethics in the future world, we must move beyond the prevailing, dominating technology and establish a new technology - one whose essence is non-dominating and which honors things in their inherent-being.</description>
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      <title>More Than a Satyr Play: Dreams of a Spirit-Seer as the Hidden Blueprint of Kant&amp;#039;s Critical Philosophy</title>
      <link>https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_20573.html</link>
      <description>Dreams of a Spirit-Seer Elucidated by Dreams of Metaphysics (1766) is one of Immanuel Kant’s most significant so-called “pre-Critical” writings. In this essay, Kant engages with the Swedish theologian, scientist, and mystic Emanuel Swedenborg, critically examining his alleged communications with a supersensible realm. This paper argues that Kant’s Dreams of a Spirit-Seer is not merely a satirical curiosity but a decisive step toward the Critique of Pure Reason. While often regarded as a transitional work, Dreams already anticipates central elements of Kant’s later philosophy: a critique of metaphysics, analysis of transcendental illusion, emphasis on experience, and the role of space as a necessary condition of sensibility. It also points toward the practical orientation that becomes characteristic of the Critical system. Drawing on Paul Guyer’s distinction between &amp;amp;#039;critical&amp;amp;#039; and &amp;amp;#039;constructive&amp;amp;#039; theory, I contend that Dreams functions as a katharticon, purging dogmatic metaphysics and it already enacts, in embryonic form, Kant’s organon of Critical philosophy.</description>
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      <title>A critical Evaluation of Heidegger&amp;#039;s interpretation of the Critique of Pure Reason in the light of the concept of Time</title>
      <link>https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_20635.html</link>
      <description>This present study analyzes and evaluates Heidegger&amp;amp;#039;s interpretation of Kant&amp;amp;#039;s Critique of Pure Reason, with a focus on the concept of time. In his book, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, Heidegger argues that beneath Kant&amp;amp;#039;s critical system lies a deeper foundation that is revealed only through an understanding of time. By highlighting the role of the power of imagination and schematism, he elevates time from the epistemological level to the ontological level, interpreting the Critique of Pure Reason as a text on the finitude of Dasein. The central question of this article is whether this appropriation can be considered a faithful account of Kant or should be seen as a creative distortion. To answer this, we first examine the extent of Heidegger&amp;amp;#039;s fidelity to Kant&amp;amp;#039;s text, and then show the dimensions of his departure from the critical system. The results of this study indicate that Heidegger&amp;amp;#039;s reading is neither a mere historical retelling nor an absolute distortion. Instead, it is a hermeneutical appropriation that lies on the border between interpretation and re-creation. While this reading carries the risk of distorting Kant&amp;amp;#039;s philosophy, it simultaneously reveals its hidden potentials and opens a new path for contemporary metaphysics.</description>
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      <title>Limitations of the Infinity Symbol and a New Suggestion</title>
      <link>https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_20785.html</link>
      <description>The concept of infinity has consistently drawn the attention of mathematicians, scientists, and philosophers throughout history. This simple yet powerful representation has influenced our understanding of boundlessness and endlessness for centuries. However, as our knowledge of existence, humans, and the universe expands, and by entering the realm of diverse and different intellectual civilizations, it seems necessary to consider a fresh perspective on how we visualize and conceptualize infinity. This article delves into a transformative recommendation for the reimagining of the infinity symbol, aiming to reflect better our current understanding of existence and cosmic structures and mathematical-philosophical concepts. Although the symbol of infinity is synonymous with boundlessness, it is constrained within its bounds and limitations. In this article, we&amp;amp;#039;ll investigate the current symbol of infinity and its limitations. We&amp;amp;#039;ll then introduce a new perspective on the infinity symbol and propose an innovative symbol: the boiling circle. This article will also dive into the potential impact of this new symbol on philosophy, mathematics, and science. By the end, readers will gain insights into how a simple change in symbolism could lead to new ways to think about and explore the concept of infinity, potentially opening doors to fresh discoveries and understandings in various fields of study.</description>
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      <title>Grammar and Rules: The Chomsky–Wittgenstein Divide</title>
      <link>https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_20836.html</link>
      <description>Chomsky and Wittgenstein are prominent representatives of two different perspectives on the relationship between language and thought. Both are regarded as epoch-making thinkers in their reflections on language. Yet what are the major differences between their views of language, and why is comparing these views important? A comparison of their ideas—independent of any partisanship—has intrinsic significance, for attending to the degree of divergence between these two intellectual trajectories is highly illuminating for gaining an overall picture of key currents in contemporary philosophy and linguistics and their differences. Chomsky’s mentalist approach to grammar and linguistic rules inaugurated a revolutionary shift in linguistic studies, whereas only a short time earlier, Wittgenstein’s later views had provoked serious debates among his philosophical contemporaries and gave rise to an innovative current in the philosophy of language. Wittgenstein’s novel approach emerged along a path wholly at odds with Chomsky’s revolutionary linguistic project, for in his account of language and verbal communication, Wittgenstein redirected philosophical attention from the inner realm of mind to the outer realm of behavior and social practices. In this study, using an analytical method and drawing on the works of both thinkers, we focus specifically on the topic of grammar and linguistic rules from their respective standpoints and examine their several arguments. The analysis shows that essentialism in Chomsky’s thought and Wittgenstein’s rejection of such essentialism constitute a fundamental divergence in their approaches to the problem of language. This foundational difference, moreover, carries significant implications for social issues, including the nature of dialogue.</description>
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      <title>Exploring the role of tradition in authentic life from Heidegger&amp;#039;s perspective</title>
      <link>https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_20968.html</link>
      <description>This article is structured to investigate the role of tradition within the existential structure of Dasein and to clarify its function in realizing authentic life in Heidegger’s thought. In the fundamental ontology horizon of Being and Time, tradition is not merely a heritage transmitted from the past but a mode of historical facticity into which Dasein is thrown and through which it confronts its possibilities. The main question of this paper is how a thrown human being, situated in the context of tradition, can live authentically. The research method employs conceptual analysis and phenomenological interpretation of the fundamental concepts of thrownness, historicality, resoluteness, and being-toward-death to reveal the relationship between tradition, authenticity, and freedom on an ontological level.

Findings show that the content of authentic life is determined by tradition, and in Heidegger&amp;amp;#039;s thought, authenticity and autonomy mean playing a role within the values existing in a tradition. Being truthful to one’s heritage and tradition corresponds to being truthful to one&amp;amp;#039;s deepest self. Tradition, as the historical actualization of facticity, embodies both limitation and freedom simultaneously; for in every tradition, inhibitory and enabling aspects coexist. Therefore, Dasein&amp;amp;#039;s freedom becomes possible within the boundaries of tradition, understood as the horizon of its own historicity. Authentic life is not a rupture from the past but a form of responsible openness of existence—an openness where Dasein, by embracing thrownness, transforms tradition from historical passivity into the possibility of self-understanding.</description>
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      <title>Fantasy, Miracle, and the Aesthetics of the Sacred: Philosophical Reflections on Art as a New Religion in the Twenty-First Century</title>
      <link>https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_20969.html</link>
      <description>This article investigates the convergence of art, religion, and technology in the twenty-first century, exploring whether artistic fantasy can function as a novel religious form in post-secular contexts. Drawing on philosophical accounts of the miracle (Augustine, Aquinas, Hume, Tillich), theories of the sacred (Eliade, Gadamer, Taylor), and Islamic perspectives (Al-Ghazali, Avicenna), it argues that digital media—cinema, transmedia franchises, video games, and virtual reality—replicate the phenomenological structure of miraculous encounters by suspending causal norms, evoking awe, and reorienting perception. A tripartite typology of aesthetic religion is proposed: weak forms generating awe without enduring structures; institutional forms sustaining communal identity through fandoms and virtual rituals; and robust forms theoretically assuming normative or metaphysical roles. Case studies—controversial art (Serrano, Ofili, Danish Muhammad cartoons, Tanavoli’s sculptures), global and Iranian fandoms (Marvel, Star Wars, Shahrzad, Prince of Persia), and VR pilgrimages—illustrate this framework. While aesthetic forms lack metaphysical grounding and binding normativity, they foster moral imagination and communal bonds, signaling transcendence’s migration into mediated realms. The article advocates for coexistence, where aesthetics gain sacral import and religious practices embrace artistic innovation, with profound implications for philosophy, theology, and cultural policy in technologically mediated societies.</description>
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      <title>Film Consciousness: The Reciprocal Perception of Spectator and Film</title>
      <link>https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_20995.html</link>
      <description>This article examines the dynamic, reciprocal relationship between spectator and film, arguing that the process of watching a film is not merely a passive reception but rather a mutual perceptual interaction deeply rooted in Merleau-Ponty’s notion of “intentionality.” Drawing upon the foundations of phenomenology, this study demonstrates how the film’s narrative, stylistic, and sensory structures activate the spectator’s cognitive and emotional processes, and, conversely, how the spectator’s experiences, memories, and expectations complete and reconstruct the meaning of the film. This reciprocal intentionality flows not only from the spectator toward the film, but—as Sobchack asserts—the film also, as a “living body” with an active gaze, looks back at the spectator and participates in this perceptual interaction. The article proposes the concept of the “perceptual–experiential loop.” Within this loop, the film, through its narrative and formal elements, invites the spectator into participation, while the spectator, through mindfulness and empathy/identification, confers meaning upon the film. The resulting dynamic reveals that the meaning of the film emerges in an interstitial space—at the intersection between the cinematic “text” and the spectator’s mental “context.” In this dynamic, the spectator not only perceives the film but is, in turn, perceived by it, culminating in what can be termed film consciousness.</description>
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      <title>Knowledge without a Subject: A Philosophical Reflection on the Epistemic Legitimacy of the Machine</title>
      <link>https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_21014.html</link>
      <description>The transformation of cognitive and ethical structures in the age of artificial intelligence confronts philosophy with a fundamental question: how does knowledge emerge, and where does responsibility reside when decision-making moves beyond the sphere of human consciousness into algorithmic networks? Focusing on the concept of subjectless knowledge, this study argues that intelligent systems have shifted knowledge from a mental capacity to a mediating process in which human agents, data, and algorithms jointly participate in the production of meaning. Employing a reflective-analytical methodology and examining cases in medicine, media, and law, the paper contends that epistemic validity in the digital era is no longer measured solely by truth, but by the transparency of processes, the capacity for explanation, and the possibility of accountability. Within this framework, social epistemology elucidates how belief is shaped in algorithmic environments, while the ethics of responsibility provides a structure through which the contribution of both human and machinic agents to outcomes can be traced. The proposed model integrates these two dimensions, conceiving knowledge as a mediating event where meaning arises through the interaction between human interpretation and computational reasoning. Accordingly, moral responsibility becomes a distributed property of a network in which every agent participates in the unfolding of cognition. This analysis suggests that maintaining epistemic and ethical legitimacy in intelligent systems requires a philosophical reorientation-from the individual subject toward the distributed architectures of knowing.</description>
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      <title>Social Constructivism and the Fluidity of Components in Political Philosophy</title>
      <link>https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_21036.html</link>
      <description>Various schools of political philosophy seek to answer major questions concerning the nature of government, the types of desirable political systems, the qualifications of rulers, governmental structures, and the criteria of legitimacy, popular acceptance, and efficiency of governments. They also examine citizens’ expectations of governments and the nature of the relationship between the people and the state. In reality, the type of answers given to such questions is fundamentally dependent on the worldview, philosophical anthropology, and political philosophy from which thinkers draw their assumptions. This study aims to examine the nature of these questions, and their corresponding answers, through the lens of socially constructed (iʿtibārī) concepts. Social constructs encompass all social principles, ideas, structures, and laws that human beings establish, which arise from human needs and function on the basis of those needs; they do not exist independently prior to such needs. The theory of social constructs demonstrates that rational responses to the aforementioned political questions are increasingly shaped by variables such as time, place, culture, traditions, customs, social classes, collective mentalities, as well as people’s needs and expectations. Since these variables are themselves fluid and subject to historical and geographical change, the core questions of political philosophy also lack fixed, immutable answers. Instead, the answers fluctuate in accordance with the evolving nature of these social constructs. it is possible to identify certain stable foundations rooted in historical experience, such as the centrality of knowledge, virtue, efficiency and skill, public satisfaction and acceptance, justice, freedom, welfare, security, and ethical life,</description>
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      <title>Gadamer&amp;#039;s Hermeneutical Rethinking on the Idea of the University</title>
      <link>https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_21078.html</link>
      <description>Abstract
The philosophical rethinking on the idea of the university and its specific functions did not necessarily coincide with the establishment of universities, but rather is a later matter, and its beginnings can be traced back to von Humboldt’s reflections in the nineteenth century. Gadamer’s reflections regarding the idea of the university, as well as its problematic relationship with the institution of politics, are rooted in this German tradition and are complementary to it. However, one cannot undoubtedly ignore the principles of his philosophical hermeneutics in the way he views the “essence” of the university. The central claim of this article is that Gadamer’s attitude towards the idea of Bildung in his various works has more or less determined the totality of his perspective regarding the idea of the university. In this article, we will use a descriptive-analytical method to review the views of Gadamer&amp;amp;#039;s contemporaries on the idea of the university, while also pointing out its historical context, especially in the midst of the Nazi rise in Germany, the difficulty of decision-making by academic elites, and Gadamer&amp;amp;#039;s analysis of it. Our overall goal is to highlight the problematic situation of academic elites in similar critical conditions and the necessity of philosophical rethinking of the idea of the university and its task in such conditions.</description>
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      <title>the Possibility of Moral Responsibility in Artificial Intelligence: A Philosophical Explaination of the Responsibility Gap</title>
      <link>https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_21146.html</link>
      <description>In recent years, the emergence and rapid expansion of artificial intelligence systems have posed a fundamental question to moral philosophy and the philosophy of technology: how can moral responsibility be meaningfully discussed in a context in which decision-making and action are carried out by non-human entities? In the classical philosophical tradition, moral responsibility has always been closely tied to human agency, intention, consciousness, and freedom of will; however, the advent of intelligent technologies has fundamentally challenged this traditional linkage. The present article aims to reconceptualize moral responsibility in relation to artificial intelligence and seeks to take a step toward a philosophical elucidation of the challenges surrounding it, commonly referred to as the “responsibility gap.”
The research method adopted in this article is analytical–interpretive and is grounded in the philosophy of technology and the ethics of artificial intelligence. The findings indicate that within human–machine interactive networks, classical models of moral responsibility are no longer sufficient. Instead, moral responsibility must be understood within a relational framework that is inherently distributed across both human and non-human agents. In the next stage, the article examines concrete instances of the responsibility gap through the analysis of two applied cases. Finally, it proposes a three-level model of moral responsibility encompassing the design level, the organizational level, and the institutional level.

This study seeks to demonstrate that, in the face of emerging technologies, the question of a single moral agent gives way to an inquiry into a network of relationships, influences, and reciprocal forms of accountability.</description>
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      <title>Inclusivity in Artificial Intelligence from a Philosophical-Legal Perspective</title>
      <link>https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_21151.html</link>
      <description>The rapid development of AI has drawn intense attention to its philosophical and legal implications, especially regarding discrimination and bias. A fundamental weakness in this discourse is the emphasis on the concept of “citizen,” which is an exclusive category that does not encompass all stakeholders. Achieving true inclusiveness in AI systems requires a fundamental shift in terminology from “citizen” to a more inclusive concept. The title “individual” is a common alternative, but the legal term “person” is more inclusive. Because it encompasses both natural and legal persons. This research emphasizes, using the method of conceptual and critical analysis within the framework of philosophical-ethical, jurisprudential-legal thought and with library tools, that protecting this inclusiveness is not only a moral necessity, but also a legal obligation, and examines the foundations of Imami jurisprudence as a Sharia law perspective to support and explain the person-centered approach. By combining philosophical-ethical, and jurisprudential-legal arguments, this article has provided a more robust framework for the design and governance of pervasive artificial intelligence systems.</description>
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      <title>Hidden Echoes: The Signs of Antinatalism in Some of Khayyam&amp;#039;s Poems from a Sociological and Philosophical Perspective</title>
      <link>https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_21154.html</link>
      <description>Antinatalism is a school of thought that considers the birth of a child immoral The aim of this research is to show signs of antinatalist thinking in the poems of Khayyam - one of the well-known Iranian poets and philosophers.
In this study, qualitative content analysis method was used and using purposive sampling method, first the quatrains in contradiction with the philosophy of birth and human existence and then in the next stages, the poems that had the most conceptual agreement with anti-natalism were selected as the final sample. The unit of analysis was considered to be the verse. Finally, the validity of the research was confirmed through data triangulation and researcher self-review.
The findings of the research are presented under the titles of: &amp;amp;quot;The Obesity of Structure and the Evaporation of Agency&amp;amp;quot; , &amp;amp;quot;Pleasure in the Shadow of Suffering&amp;amp;quot;, &amp;amp;quot;The Ladder of Suffering&amp;amp;quot;, &amp;amp;quot;The Dysfunction of Birth&amp;amp;quot;, and &amp;amp;quot;Justice in the Crossroads&amp;amp;quot;.
The findings show that in Khayyam&amp;amp;#039;s poem, man, who has no advantage for the world, has unwillingly and without choosing, entered the game of life in which justice is absent, and in this structural life, he is constantly in an anomic state of suffering that he cannot fight effectively. However, as a solution, it is better to seek pleasure in the midst of this suffering, smile, and realize the importance of the moment as long as he has life in his body.</description>
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      <title>Why the Engineering Model Is Inadequate as a Criterion of Efficacy in the Humanities</title>
      <link>https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_21174.html</link>
      <description>In recent years, the claim that the humanities are not applied and therefore must be made applicable to solving societal problems has become increasingly prominent in academic and policy debates. This claim is most often advanced by administrators and policymakers whose understanding of knowledge production is shaped by an engineering model of science. Within this model, research is expected to move linearly from basic inquiry to technical application and measurable problem solving. When this framework is imposed on the humanities, it produces policies and research agendas that fail to grasp their epistemic character and social function.
This article argues, through an epistemological analysis, that the widespread perception of the humanities as non applied rests on an idealized and reductionist conception of science. The engineering model presupposes a privileged relationship between basic sciences and engineering sciences and treats application as the primary criterion of relevance. Because the humanities do not conform to this structure, they are judged ineffective or irrelevant. The article maintains that this judgment results not from an inherent deficiency in the humanities, but from the inappropriate projection of a model designed for technical disciplines onto interpretive forms of knowledge.
Drawing on philosophical analysis and selected case studies, the article explores alternative models that challenge the dominance of the engineering paradigm while offering new ways of understanding the relationship between the humanities and application. Two such models are examined. The first is Bent Flyvbjerg’s concept of phronetic social science, which critiques social engineering and proposes a form of relevance grounded in practical wisdom, contextual judgment, and value oriented inquiry. The second is Hanson’s criterion of fit with practice, which questions conventional classifications of the natural and human sciences and criticizes the instrumentalization of the humanities.
Both models introduce philosophical concepts that reconfigure how application is understood in relation to the humanities. Phronetic social science emphasizes dialogical rationality and field based inquiry, while the criterion of fit with practice proposes a gradational understanding of applicability and highlights methodological pluralism. Together, these approaches demonstrate that the contribution of the humanities to social life cannot be adequately assessed in contemporary policy contexts.</description>
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      <title>the Plato&amp;#039;s rejection of Greek tragedy and epistemological - educational role in his philosophy</title>
      <link>https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_21178.html</link>
      <description>For Plato, what matters is the attainment of truth and the definition of the universal. Any kind of knowledge, in his view, is knowledge of the universal and apprehension of the world of Forms and Ideas. Without an understanding of Plato&amp;amp;#039;s epistemology, comprehending his view on art or any other issue within his intellectual system becomes ambiguous and intricate. Plato&amp;amp;#039;s perspective on tragedy and his expulsion of poets from the city-state can also be explained within this epistemological framework and the pursuit of truth. Plato&amp;amp;#039;s view on tragedy, like his view on art, is not entirely straightforward or simple. In Plato&amp;amp;#039;s works, we encounter both condemnations of false and deceptive art and acknowledgments of true art. It seems the same holds true for tragedy. Therefore, alongside condemnable and false tragedy, we can speak of genuine and true tragedy. Examining Plato&amp;amp;#039;s view on tragedy and its educational role is the main focus of this article. To address this issue, we will first examine Plato&amp;amp;#039;s epistemological views and their connection to his perspective on art. By clarifying the relationship between art and truth, we will then analyze the seemingly contradictory aspects of Plato&amp;amp;#039;s view on tragedy and its role in the process of education. A noteworthy point here is that in The Republic, Plato even sacrifices truth, true art, and consequently, true tragedy for the sake of educating the children, youth, and guardians of his ideal city.</description>
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      <title>Human Dignity as the Normative Foundation of Legal Legitimacy: A Pancasila-Based Philosophical Framework</title>
      <link>https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_21186.html</link>
      <description>This article examines human dignity as the normative foundation of legal legitimacy within the framework of Pancasila. This research stems from the conceptual problem that legal legitimacy is often reduced to formal legality, procedural compliance, and policy effectiveness, thus neglecting the dimension of normative justification toward legal subjects. The purpose of this research is to explain how Pancasila positions human dignity as a non-derivative principle that serves as the foundation and limit for the validity of law and the exercise of state power. Using a normative-philosophical approach, this article analyzes the relationship between Pancasila as a material basic norm, human dignity as the right to justification, and its implications for the principles of the rule of law, democracy, and legal pluralism. The research results indicate that in the Pancasila legal system, legal legitimacy cannot be understood solely as the outcome of procedures or the will of the majority but rather as a normative practice that must be rationally accountable to humans as dignified subjects. This research also shows that legal pluralism, including customary law practices, can serve as a means of actualizing human dignity as long as it remains within the horizon of rational justification and the prevention of institutional humiliation. This finding confirms that Pancasila offers a coherent philosophical framework for integrating legal legitimacy, democracy, and human dignity in a pluralistic society and provides a normative basis for human-centered legal reform.</description>
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      <title>A Philosophical Account of Educational Justice within the Framework of the Theory of Justice as Fairness</title>
      <link>https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_21202.html</link>
      <description>Educational justice is not merely an educational or pedagogical issue but a fundamental part of social justice and a necessary condition for achieving free and equal social cooperation. Drawing on John Rawls’s theory of justice, particularly the concepts of the basic structure of society, the sense of justice, and social cooperation, this study argues that public education plays a pivotal role in sustaining a just social order. By applying Rawls’s two principles of justice, the principle of equal basic liberties and the principle of fair equality of opportunity, to the educational system, it is argued that without ensuring equal and public education, none of the principles of justice can be realized. Furthermore, the concepts of the original position and the veil of ignorance are reconsidered as normative devices for evaluating educational policies from an impartial standpoint. Ultimately, the paper concludes that education is not a secondary good but a condition of possibility for a just society, since the cultivation of the sense of justice and the stability of social cooperation can only be achieved through public education. Thus, Rawls’s theory of justice provides a robust normative framework for rethinking educational justice in contemporary democratic societies.</description>
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      <title>Epistemic Duality in the Foundations of Public Law: A Genealogical Analysis of the Tension between Objective Realism and Interest-Based Constructivism (Case Study: The Iranian Legal System)</title>
      <link>https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_21246.html</link>
      <description>This study argues that structural challenges in public law are not the product of institutional weakness or the tension between tradition and modernity, but arise from an epistemic duality in understanding the nature of law. This duality is articulated between two competing intellectual frameworks: first, Objective Realism, which considers law and justice as pre-existing, discoverable realities independent of human convention; and second, Interest-Based Constructivism, which views legal norms as contingent, contractual products oriented toward efficacy and public interest. Using an analytical-genealogical approach, the article demonstrates that, at the theoretical level, the Iranian legal system adheres to a realist framework (discovering fixed divine standards), yet in governance, due to the imperatives of the modern nation-state, it increasingly relies on constructivist logic and instrumental rationality. This epistemic duality manifests in the functional tension between institutions safeguarding religious truth and bodies determining public interest. The findings indicate that the persistence of this situation generates inconsistency in the criteria legitimizing norms and reduces structural cohesion. Accordingly, sustainable resolution lies not in formal reforms but in reconstructing epistemic coherence, either through teleological reinterpretation (Maqasid al-Sharia) or conscious commitment to a consistent epistemological foundation.</description>
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      <title>Paraconsistency, relevance, and vagueness: A proof-theoretic approach to fuzzy relevant logic FR.</title>
      <link>https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_21260.html</link>
      <description>In scientific and even in everyday reasoning, and also in our intuitive understanding, relevance-preserving is of particular importance alongside truth-preserving. In an other hand,, we deal with many reasonings that are approximate and are true to a certain degree. In this article, considering two important categories in natural language and logic, namely &amp;amp;quot;relevance&amp;amp;quot; and &amp;amp;quot;vagueness&amp;amp;quot;, with a formal approach, and in continuation of the work of the my MSc&amp;amp;#039;s thesis entitled &amp;amp;quot;Fuzzy Relational Logic: A Propositional Approach&amp;amp;quot;, we present a Hilbert-style system and a hypersequent calculus as proof theories for fuzzy relevant semantics, and introduce logics are constructed whose reasoning is both fuzzy and relevant, and are called fuzzy relevant logics. Some fuzzy relevant logics (such as FRM) are obtained by eliminating the constants F and T, and some others are obtained without eliminating these constants and by adding the guaranteeing logical rules of prelinearity and excluded middle. In addition to the considerations of proof theory, the metatheorems of these logics will be addressed and the soundness and completeness (or incompleteness) will be proven with respect to ordered linear algebras (matrices). Philosophical considerations based on these proof theories and also the investigation of structural rules for resolving vagueness paradoxes are among the philosophical considerations of this research.</description>
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      <title>No. 54 Editorial</title>
      <link>https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_21272.html</link>
      <description/>
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      <title>Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology provides a philosophical foundation for the rearticulation of situated learning theory</title>
      <link>https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_21273.html</link>
      <description>The central idea of the present essay is to emphasize that situated learning theory is, at its core, a philosophical theory formulated on the basis of Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of embodied perception. According to Merleau-Ponty, the body constitutes the pivotal locus of the human relation to the world and the primary medium through which lived experiences and everyday interactions are apprehended. Beyond its biological structure, the body is a field of possibilities and capacities that continuously reconstitutes itself in the face of experience. In his account, learning is not confined to the subject’s mastery over nature; rather, it is the embodied perception of the world. Propositions, from Merleau-Ponty’s perspective, bear an embodied dimension that is rearticulated in relation to the situation or context in which the individual’s experience unfolds. Thus, body and world, in their reciprocal interaction, shape the overall structure of cognition, which is the key concern in situated learning theory. Situated learning is therefore a socio-corporeal theory whose fundamental orientation lies in examining the profound interrelation between mind and practice—an effort to transcend the dualism of subject and object. Learning is not a merely mental, individual, or socially disembedded activity; rather, it is inherently a social process constituted within the reciprocal encounter between mind and world. Accordingly, in the framework of situated learning—interwoven with Merleau-Ponty’s theory of perception—education is inseparable from the embodied existence of the subject, the concrete situation, and the social context.</description>
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      <title>Design as Art: An Analysis of Arthur Danto’s Concepts in Relation to Designed Objects
(A Case Study of Karim Rashid’s Works)</title>
      <link>https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_21277.html</link>
      <description>Abstract
In contemporary art—described by Arthur Danto as marking the end of the history of art—classical concepts of art have been fundamentally challenged. Art is no longer governed by traditional criteria, and anything may become art depending on its context. This approach has also influenced design. Today, designers engage with new conceptual frameworks that move beyond the mere resolution of practical problems, producing works that, while functional, embody complex layers of meaning and theoretical significance.
The primary aim of this article is to analyze Danto’s theories concerning art and design, examine their relationship to the concept of the “artworld,” and evaluate his contribution to perspectives associated with contemporary design. The research adopts a descriptive–analytical method based on the study of written sources on contemporary design and Danto’s philosophical writings. The central research question addresses the role and impact of Danto’s ideas in understanding and explaining the relationship between art and design, as well as its connection to the artworld. Additionally, the article includes a case study focusing on the contemporary artist and designer Karim Rashid.</description>
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      <title>Freedom and Responsibility in Islamic Thought: From Jabr to I&amp;#039;tizal and its Impact on Modern Individual Freedom Issues</title>
      <link>https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_21305.html</link>
      <description>Objective: This study explores the relationship between determinism (Jabriyya) and al-Mu&amp;amp;#039;tazila in Islamic thought, focusing on individual freedom, will, and responsibility. It examines how these philosophical debates have historically shaped understandings of authority and human accountability, and how they relate to contemporary issues such as despotism, suppression of freedoms, and social justice.

Methods: A comparative analytical approach was employed, analyzing theological and philosophical texts from determinist and Mu&amp;amp;#039;tazilite schools. The study compares their positions on human agency and moral responsibility, linking classical debates to contemporary social and political contexts.

Results: The analysis reveals that determinist doctrines justify authority through divine predestination, while Mu&amp;amp;#039;tazilite thought emphasizes human responsibility and moral choice. Recognizing these perspectives provides valuable insights for contemporary discussions on governance, human rights, and social justice. The study shows that classical Islamic concepts of freedom and will remain relevant for understanding and addressing modern challenges related to authority and societal accountability.

Conclusions: Revisiting Islamic philosophical debates on determinism and freedom can inform contemporary approaches to justice, governance, and individual rights. Integrating insights from both deterministic and Mu&amp;amp;#039;tazilite thought offers conceptual tools to critically assess authority, promote accountability, and enhance social justice. This demonstrates the enduring relevance of historical Islamic thought in addressing modern socio-political issues.</description>
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      <title>Beyond Neutrality: Identifying Nizārī Ismāʿīlī Footprints in Ṭūsī’s Nasirean Ethics</title>
      <link>https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_21307.html</link>
      <description>In the Preamble of The Nasirean Ethics, Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī, the outstanding philosopher and polymath of the time, claims neutrality towards any specific schools of thought, emphasizing that: “What is recorded in this book… is repeated from ancient and modern philosophers; not even a beginning is made to confirm the true or disprove the false, nor – in respect to our own convictions – do we engage to support any opinion or to condemn any particular school of thought.” This assertion of impartiality has significantly shaped modern interpretations of Ṭūsī&amp;amp;#039;s philosophical project, often leading scholars to view The Nasirean Ethics as a purely syncretic work devoid of a particular confessional leaning.
Drawing upon methodologies from literary analysis, comparative studies, and intellectual history, this paper aims to challenge Ṭūsī’s aforementioned assertion throughout the initial chapter of The Nasirean Ethics. By meticulously examining the linguistic choices, thematic developments, and subtle philosophical leanings within this foundational chapter, I&amp;amp;#039;ll demonstrate how Ṭūsī, despite his stated neutrality, implicitly privileges certain ethical frameworks and philosophical positions. In so doing, I&amp;amp;#039;ll bring the text into conversation with the author’s Ismāʿīlī-based treatises, specifically Paradise of Submission and Contemplation and Action. This comparative analysis will highlight the shared intellectual and theological foundations embedded at the core of these seemingly disparate books, revealing a profound and consistent underlying philosophical project that transcends the superficial claim of neutrality in The Nasirean Ethics. This paper will thus re-evaluate Ṭūsī’s intellectual trajectory, arguing for a more integrated understanding of his diverse philosophical output.</description>
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      <title>A Critical Analysis of Susan Haack’s Foundherentism in Epistemic Justification</title>
      <link>https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_21308.html</link>
      <description>Foundherentism, proposed by Susan Haack in her book Evidence and Inquiry, represents an attempt to combine the strengths of foundationalism and coherentism in epistemic justification. By critiquing both traditional approaches, Haack offers an alternative model in which the justification of beliefs depends both on experiential evidence and on coherence with the overall belief system. This study employs a descriptive-analytical method to examine the theoretical foundations of foundherentism, along with its advantages and criticisms. The findings indicate that this theory offers several advantages, including transcending the traditional foundationalism-coherentism dichotomy, flexibility in accommodating new evidence, and the ability to explain the process of scientific inquiry. Nevertheless, serious criticisms have been raised against it: ambiguity regarding the role of experience and the risk of reduction to coherentism; the problem of epistemic circularity and possible reduction to weak foundationalism; vagueness in justification criteria and conflict resolution; and the insufficiency of internalist justification from an externalist perspective. In conclusion, while foundherentism represents a significant step in contemporary epistemology, it faces fundamental challenges as a definitive solution to the problem of epistemic justification.</description>
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      <title>al-Fārābī and the Development of Galen&amp;#039;s Theory of Humor: Its Dimensions in Philosophy, Medicine, and Psychology Based on al-Fārābī&amp;#039;s Manuscript &amp;#039;Treatise on Humors&amp;#039;</title>
      <link>https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_21344.html</link>
      <description>Objective:
This study examines the differences between Galen and Al-Farabi regarding the factors affecting human health and humors. Galen emphasizes biological and environmental determinants, while Al-Farabi highlights mental, intellectual, and artistic influences. The aim is to provide a comparative analysis of these perspectives and their implications for holistic health.
Methods:
A qualitative, comparative approach was used. Textual analysis of Galen’s medical writings and Al-Farabi’s philosophical works was conducted. Key elements related to the causes of humor imbalance, health maintenance, and the role of cognitive and artistic practices were identified and compared.
Results:
Galen’s approach focuses on physical balance and external factors such as climate and lifestyle. Al-Farabi, however, emphasizes the mind, ethical conduct, meditation, and engagement with music and arts as crucial to well-being. Both acknowledge external influences, but Al-Farabi integrates psychological and intellectual dimensions into the understanding of health.
Conclusions:
Al-Farabi’s perspective provides a holistic view that complements Galen’s biological model. By combining mental, ethical, and artistic dimensions with physiological considerations, his framework offers a broader understanding of health. This comparison highlights the relevance of philosophical insights in contemporary discussions on psychosomatic and holistic health.</description>
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      <title>From the decrease of suffering to the destruction of the world: Reassessing Ninian Smart&amp;#039;s argument against negative utilitarianism.</title>
      <link>https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_21373.html</link>
      <description>This article analyzes one of the most important metaethical challenges to negative utilitarianism, focusing on Ninian Smart&amp;amp;#039;s argument for the destruction of the world. Smart shows that if the ultimate goal of morality is only to reduce suffering, then the complete elimination of suffering through the destruction of life can ultimately be justified, a result that is inconsistent with moral intuition. In this study, while examining the responses of defenders of negative utilitarianism, it is shown that they rely solely on practical or psychological obstacles in the logic of destruction and therefore completely deny the essence of the argument, namely the possibility of slipping from reduction to destruction. The article continues by examining historical and everyday examples of the “slippery slope from reduction to elimination” to show that such a tendency is real and dangerous, and at the very least needs to be taken seriously. Finally, it is suggested that negative utilitarianism be accompanied by complementary principles such as the right to life and attention to priorities in order to avoid slipping into an “ethics of destruction.”</description>
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      <title>Mapping Intellectual Genealogy in Semiotics: Investigating Indian Analogues of Peirce’s Icon, Index, and Symbol in Classical Philosophy</title>
      <link>https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_21375.html</link>
      <description>This paper undertakes a comparative investigation into the semiotic architectures of Charles Sanders Peirce and classical Indian linguistic philosophy to trace the conceptual affinities and divergences underlying their theories of signification. Peirce’s trichotomy of Icon, Index, and Symbol, grounded in the metaphysical categories of Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness, establishes meaning as a triadic and mediational process dependent on convention and interpretation. In contrast, Indian semantics articulated through the theories of Abhidhā (denotation), Lakṣaṇā (indication), Gauṇī (metaphor), Dhvani (suggestion), and Sphoṭa (linguistic totality) developed intricate analyses of linguistic relation (saṃbandha) and expressive power (śakti), yet operated within a fundamentally dyadic model of signification grounded in eternal, natural relations between word and meaning. The study argues that Indian theories anticipated Peirce’s lower dyad of Icon and Index through Gauṇī and Lakṣaṇā, which correspond to relations of likeness and contiguity, respectively. However, the emergence of the Symbol, representing Peirce’s Thirdness convention, mediation, and social law was metaphysically precluded by the Mīmāṃsā doctrine of the Veda’s authorlessness (apauruṣeyatva) and the inherent word–meaning relation (svābhāvika śakti). Later innovations such as Dhvani and Sphoṭa attempted to reintroduce the missing interpretive dimension but did so within a naturalized rather than conventional framework. By mapping these correspondences and constraints, the paper situates Peirce within a broader intercultural genealogy of semiotic thought and reinterprets Indian linguistic philosophy as a profound yet metaphysically distinct precursor to modern semiotics.</description>
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      <title>Ibn Rushd on truth between Religion and Philosophy</title>
      <link>https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_21412.html</link>
      <description>The research problem centers on the epistemological debate that emerged within Islamic thought concerning the nature of Truth and the methodologies for its attainment. A profound contention arose between theologians, who adhered to the primacy of the religious text, and philosophers, who championed reason and its demonstrative tools as the ultimate path to truth. This study aims to analyze Ibn Rushd’s methodology in resolving this intellectual deadlock, demonstrating the inherent harmony between Revelation and Reason to dissolve the conflict between Sharia and Philosophy.
By employing comparative, contextual, and critical analytical methodology, the study explores how Ibn Rushd reformulated the relationship between the sacred text and philosophical inference, asserting that Truth does not contradict Truth. The findings indicate that the perceived tension between revelation and reason is not an ontological contradiction but rather a methodological divergence. This is resolvable through a dual strategy: the allegorical interpretation (ta’wil) of the religious text to unveil its inner meaning, and the application of logical demonstration (burhan). Ultimately, the research affirms the Unity of Truth and the complementarity of philosophical proof and scriptural interpretation, establishing a foundation for societal and existential harmony by bridging the gap between faith-based certainty and demonstrative scientific knowledge.</description>
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      <title>Contemplating Religious Influencers; Religiosity through the Interplay of Embodied Habitus and Technological Affordance</title>
      <link>https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_21420.html</link>
      <description>In recent years, online religious engagement has expanded dramatically, transforming how faith is expressed, shared, and embodied. Within the Islamic context, a growing number of digital influencers—particularly hijab-wearing women—have emerged as prominent figures who promote Islamic values, modest fashion, and spiritual identity through social media. This article examines this phenomenon by drawing on two complementary theoretical frameworks: Bourdieu’s notion of embodied habitus and Gibson’s theory of affordance. It argues that the dynamic interplay between habitus—the socially and bodily ingrained dispositions that shape religious life—and affordance—the material and technological possibilities offered by digital platforms—constitutes a key mechanism through which online religious subjectivities are formed. Rather than viewing social media as a rupture from tradition, the article situates digital piety within a longer genealogy of mediation in religious practice. Religion, it suggests, has always been enacted through the interrelation of body and technology—from prayer beads and manuscripts to smartphones and social networks—each enabling new ways of sensing, performing, and sustaining the sacred in everyday life.</description>
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      <title>Music as a remedy for soul in Rumi&amp;#039;s educational system</title>
      <link>https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_21500.html</link>
      <description>This study is an attempt to reinterpret the role of music in the process of education and inner purification of the human being from Rumi’s perspective. In this article, music is viewed not merely as a mystical or ritual experience, but as a means of healing and reconstructing the human psyche. In Rumi’s intellectual system, education is understood as the process of returning the human being to their authentic self, and music is introduced as one of the most effective instruments for this return; for melody and rhythm, in his view, recall the primordial and heavenly tunes, and listening to them awakens the soul and stirs an inner refinement within the human spirit.

The innovation of this study lies in the fact that music in Rumi’s thought is analyzed not simply as a context for mystical ecstasy and spiritual enthusiasm, but as a process of self-therapy and emotional cultivation. That is, through the aesthetic experience of music and dance (samā‘), Rumi enables a form of psychological harmony, inner tranquility, and existential renewal. On this basis, Rumi’s educational system may be regarded as a form of “artistic and aesthetic education,” in which art and melody are not tools of amusement, but the very language of healing the soul and reviving the human being trapped in multiplicity and forgetfulness.</description>
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      <title>Kant’s Theory of Transcendental Subjectivity: A Response to Cartesian Scepticism</title>
      <link>https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_21517.html</link>
      <description>Kant’s theory of transcendental subjectivity develops in response to Cartesian scepticism. Kant criticises Descartes for trying to prove the existence of the external world based on his indubitable existence as a conscious, immaterial substance. Whereas Descartes, being a rationalist, counters scepticism about the external world by grounding knowledge in the consciousness of the self, for Kant, the existence of the external world is one of the two preconditions for human knowledge. Further, Kant avoids scepticism by introducing a transcendental subject vis-à-vis the Cartesian immaterial self as a real substance, where the transcendental subject is a formal condition of all possible knowledge. The paper critically examines Quassim Cassam’s materialist conception of self-consciousness, which treats the self as a bodily subject among other physical objects in the physical world, against his claim that the Kantian notion of transcendental self-consciousness as a formal condition supports the “exclusion thesis”, which proves the self to be an elusive entity because it can never be an object of self-consciousness. The paper argues that Kant’s transcendental subjectivity does not make the self elusive but only indicates that the very structure of self-awareness functions to maintain the self-notself distinction so essential for survival, and concludes with a brief response to Priest’s argument that we need the Cartesian self-substance as the bearer of metaphysical properties against Kant’s notion of the formal self.</description>
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      <title>Investigating the Deficiencies of Identity Theory in Explaining the Quiddity of the Mind Based on Sadrian Philosophy</title>
      <link>https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_21525.html</link>
      <description>The main claim of identity theory is that the mind and brain are one thing, not two things. Also, mental states are nothing other than physical brain-nervous states. With this expression, the mind is reduced to the brain, and mental states are reduced to brain states. From this perspective, the mind and its states are existentially nothing other than the brain and its states, but they are conceptually and lexically different from each other. Also, in Sadrian philosophy, the body has a special importance, and even the soul is considered to be the same as the body at the physical level; that is, Mulla Sadra also believes in the identicalness of soul and body, but not in general, rather, with some basic notes and not exactly like the identity theory. In this article, the intention is to investigate the deficiencies of identity in explaining the quiddity of mind and mental states based on Sadrian philosophy. These deficiencies have been enumerated in eight cases and indicate that although Mulla Sadra also believes that the soul is identical with the body at the physical level, but the principles and method of Mulla Sadra&amp;amp;#039;s explanation are such that he has taken a completely different path from identity theory, and as a result, identity theory from the lens of Sadrian philosophy has fundamental weaknesses.</description>
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      <title>Aristotle and Avicenna&amp;#039;s Solution to Overcome the Limitation of Syllogism</title>
      <link>https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_21565.html</link>
      <description>Understanding syllogism requires recognizing its limitations and the First Teacher’s strategies for overcoming them. Aristotle’s syllogism, due to its conceptual focus, cannot address relational propositions. To escape this constraint, Aristotle resorted to the relational context (sīāq-e taʿalloqī), whereas Avicenna, due to his formalist perspective, could not adopt this approach. Therefore, he expanded the very concept of syllogism. Aristotle’s ‘Organon’ and Avicenna’s ‘The Book of Healing’ (al-Shifāʾ) form the two primary texts of this study. Our method for analyzing these texts is critical and hermeneutic; that is, we directly examined the Organon and asked through a critical reading: Why does the First Teacher rely solely on relational context to present his three types of syllogism? With the same approach, we turned to Avicenna’s syllogism and found that he, too, recognized the limitations of syllogism but could not utilize relational context because, influenced by Porphyry, he leaned toward formal syllogism. Thus, to overcome its limitations, he adopted Galen’s method—expanding the definition of syllogism to include Stoic conditional reasoning. To escape the constraints of syllogism, Aristotle turned to relational context, while Avicenna expanded the meaning of syllogism and introduced the exceptional syllogism. Students of Aristotelian logic may become familiar with the different methods of these two great teachers for overcoming the limitations of syllogism and the reasons behind their divergence.</description>
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      <title>The Ethical Ontology of Artificial Intelligence: 
Between Agency and Instrumentality</title>
      <link>https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_21566.html</link>
      <description>This paper examines the ethical ontology of Artificial Intelligence (AI) by addressing the central question of whether AI should be understood as a moral agent or merely as an instrument. Drawing on the philosophical frameworks of John Searle, Ludwig Wittgenstein, and Robert Brandom, the study analyzes key criteria of moral agency, including intentionality, consciousness, and normativity. It argues that contemporary AI systems, despite their increasing autonomy and complexity, do not satisfy these conditions and therefore cannot be considered genuine moral agents. At the same time, AI cannot be reduced to a passive tool, as it actively shapes decisions and outcomes within complex socio-technical systems. The paper advances a hybrid ontological position, presenting AI as a quasi-agent or derived agent embedded in networks of human and institutional practices. This approach highlights the need for distributed responsibility, ethical governance, and interdisciplinary inquiry, while emphasizing the importance of culturally inclusive frameworks for addressing emerging challenges in AI ethics and philosophy.</description>
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      <title>Revisiting the Educational and Social Philosophy of Jyotiba Phule: A Critical Inquiry into Equity, Inclusion, and Transformative Pedagogy</title>
      <link>https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_21569.html</link>
      <description>This article revisits the educational and social philosophy of 19th century Indian social reformer Jyotiba Phule (1827–1890) to derive key principles for contemporary equity, inclusion, and transformative pedagogy. Phule’s anti-caste position is often acknowledged, but his pedagogical framework has not been adequately taken up in mainstream educational theory. This study adopts a hermeneutic-critical approach to analyze the primary Marathi texts of Phule (translated), namely Gulamgiri (Slavery), Shetkarayacha Aasud (Cultivator’s Whipcord) and his speeches on education. The analysis is framed by secondary sources from postcolonial and critical race theory. Phule’s philosophy anticipates the following key tenets of critical pedagogy: (1) equity as structural intervention (not just access), (2) inclusion as a political act against brahmanical patriarchy, and (3) transformative pedagogy based on the lived experience of the laboring classes. His pioneering work with his wife Savitribai Phule to establish schools for Shudras and Ati-Shudras (1884) offers a blueprint for decolonial, community-based education. This question moves the discussion from Phule as “reformer” to Phule as pedagogue of the oppressed, offering a non-Western genealogy of critical pedagogy, different from but similar to Freire.</description>
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      <title>The Relationship between Suffering and Pleasure in Epicurus’ Thought: A Reinterpretation of a Theory in Philosophical Psychotherapy</title>
      <link>https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_21572.html</link>
      <description>Epicurus, the Greek philosopher of the fourth century BCE, founded his philosophical system upon the dialectical resolution of the relationship between &amp;amp;quot;pleasure&amp;amp;quot; and &amp;amp;quot;suffering.&amp;amp;quot; Contrary to popular interpretations, pleasure in his thought is not hedonistic indulgence but rather the &amp;amp;quot;absence of bodily pain and mental disturbance.&amp;amp;quot; For this reason, his philosophy is not a superficial hedonism but a theoretical foundation for the &amp;amp;quot;care of the self.&amp;amp;quot; Employing qualitative content analysis and drawing upon the contemporary philosophical psychotherapy approach – which seeks to revive philosophy as an art of living and rational treatment of existential sufferings – this article reexamines the relationship between suffering and pleasure in Epicurus&amp;amp;#039; works and demonstrates that his fourfold therapeutic structure (Tetrapharmakos) can be regarded as a premodern &amp;amp;quot;cognitive restructuring&amp;amp;quot; protocol. This protocol is consistent with the fundamental principles of Rational Emotive Behavior Therapy (REBT) and the modern concept of &amp;amp;quot;stress management.&amp;amp;quot; The findings indicate that suffering in this model is not an &amp;amp;quot;absolute evil&amp;amp;quot; but rather a &amp;amp;quot;diagnostic sign&amp;amp;quot; and a warning of the presence of &amp;amp;quot;irrational beliefs.&amp;amp;quot; These hidden and false beliefs – fear of the gods, fear of death, and fear of fate – identified through &amp;amp;quot;Epicurean surgery,&amp;amp;quot; constitute the primary source of mental disturbances. The elimination of these beliefs is not an escape from suffering but rather a &amp;amp;quot;passage&amp;amp;quot; toward &amp;amp;quot;enduring tranquility&amp;amp;quot; as the common goal of Epicurus&amp;amp;#039; philosophy and contemporary existential psychotherapies.</description>
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      <title>The Critique and Reinterpretation of the Conflict Between Pippin’s and Žižek’s Readings of Hegel: Proposing a New Interpretation Based on Fundamental Historical Transformations Toward the Attainment of Freedom</title>
      <link>https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_21573.html</link>
      <description>Objective: This article examines two conflicting interpretations of Hegel’s philosophy regarding Concrete Freedom in relation to Historical Context. Robert Pippin, based on his particular reading of Hegel, emphasizes participation in existing institutions and historical rationality, conceiving freedom within the framework of modern society and gradual reform. In contrast, Slavoj Žižek, drawing on a distinct intellectual system shaped by his unique engagement with Hegel, argues that genuine freedom is only possible through revolutionary ruptures, emphasizing a radical critique of ideological structures and the internal contradictions of the system.The aim of this article is to analyze this conflict and propose a resolution derived from the of Hegel’s general system of philosophy and his philosophy of history. By focusing on an understanding of and Historical Time Awareness regarding historical change-points, the article shows how both perspectives are incomplete and neither, on its own, provides a comprehensive view of the dialectical development of society. Nevertheless, the two can be integrated through a new synthesis within the Hegelian dialectic. 
Methods: conceptual analysis and critical comparison
Results: The findings suggest that freedom is achieved neither solely through participation in existing institutions (Pippin) nor exclusively through radical critique (Žižek), but rather through a dynamic and historically aware engagement with history, especially by attending to decisive historical change-points.</description>
    </item>
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      <title>The Components of Masculine Gender in Ibn ʿArabī’s Thought</title>
      <link>https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_21582.html</link>
      <description>Femininity and masculinity are two correlative concepts, each of which can only be defined and explained by reference to the characteristics of the other. This article seeks to articulate the ontological, practical, and epistemological components of masculine identity in Ibn ʿArabī’s thought. The central signifier of masculine identity is &amp;amp;quot;unity,&amp;amp;quot; whereas the central signifier of feminine identity is &amp;amp;quot;multiplicity.&amp;amp;quot; This unity manifests itself ontologically at the level of aḥadiyya (uniqueness), whose principal characteristic is inclusivity, symbolized by Adam. From a practical perspective, unity is reflected in integration and order, exemplified by God&amp;amp;#039;s manifestation in the station of raḥmāniyya (all-encompassing mercy), with Idrīs serving as its symbol in Ibn ʿArabī&amp;amp;#039;s thought. The realization of unity in epistemological terms occurs through manifestation at the level of intellect (ʿaql), characterized by a transcendental, formless, and holistic understanding of reality, symbolized by Moses. Therefore, in Ibn ʿArabī&amp;amp;#039;s view, masculine identity, given the three aforementioned components, is oriented toward the arc of ascent (qaws al-ṣuʿūd) and the movement from multiplicity toward unity. This identity fundamentally seeks to gather and harmonize multiplicities under a singular entity. Its mode of perception and understanding is such that it grasps multiplicities in coherence with one another, in terms of a single whole, possessing a holistic understanding of reality. It is an identity that strives to reconcile and bring together divergent elements within itself.</description>
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      <title>The Simple yet Elusive: The Intertwinement of Ideology and Law in the Trajectory of Philosophical Thought (From Habermas to Foucault and Rancière)</title>
      <link>https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_21621.html</link>
      <description>The aim of this research is to analyze the multilayered relationship between ideology and law in the evolution of contemporary philosophical thought; a relationship that has often been explained in a one-dimensional or reductionist manner in the literature on the philosophy of law, and its complexities have been neglected. Focusing on three central approaches—Habermas, Foucault, and Rancière—and considering their formative theoretical backgrounds in Althusser, Arendt, and Lefebvre, this article seeks to show why the fusion of ideology with law is both self-evident and elusive; something that is referred to as the “impossible simpleton.” Methodologically, the present research is based on a critical-conceptual analysis and genealogy of legal discourses, and uses the main texts of the three thinkers to extract normative, power-oriented, and conflictual patterns in understanding law. The research findings show that law is linked to ideology at three levels; The legitimizing discursive level in Habermas, the disciplinary-power level in Foucault, and the discursive-liberatory level in Rancière. These three levels are neither fused into a single theory nor reducible to each other; rather, they collectively provide a multilayered picture of the ideological functioning of law. The final conclusion of the article is that law is not simply an instrument of legitimacy, nor simply a mechanism of power, nor simply a field of emancipation, but a multilevel arena in which ideology is both produced and reproduced, and is also capable of interruption, critique, and resistance. This summary paves the way for more complex analyses in legal theory, particularly in the areas of legitimacy, human rights, and penal policies.</description>
    </item>
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      <title>Parmenides and the Divine</title>
      <link>https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_21629.html</link>
      <description>The divine command and its exposition as the necessary realm of Being constitute the central theme of Parmenides&amp;amp;#039; poem. The work narrates the intellectual journey of a young [poet] guided by divine forces (daimon) along the path to true knowledge. The poem&amp;amp;#039;s structure delineates a coherent tripartite voyage: the ascent from the world of appearances to the divine realm (the Proem), contemplation of the singular and necessary essence (Aletheia, the Way of Truth), and the return to the cosmic order to comprehend how plurality is unified through divine principle (Doxa, the Way of Opinion). Parmenides&amp;amp;#039; thought is fundamentally related to the divine; in the Greek conception, the gods were characterized by honor (timē) and craft (technē), each allotted a distinct portion (moira) of the cosmos and Being, this order maintained by Ananke (Necessity) and Dikē (Justice). Parmenides appropriates these theological motifs to reconstruct the divine on the foundation of a singular, necessary Being; attributes such as permanence, immobility, and perfection in fact describe this essential realm of Being or the divine itself. Even within Doxa and the realm of plurality, knowledge is attained through apprehension of the divine unity that governs them. A recurring motif in the poem is circular motion and the convergence of dualities.  It is the same to Parmenides, From what place he should begin, to that place he shall come back again.</description>
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    <item>
      <title>The treatment of vulnerable narcissism and its application based on the views of Islamic philosophers</title>
      <link>https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_21635.html</link>
      <description>This study aimed to provide a conceptual analysis of the treatment of vulnerable narcissism and to explain its application based on the views of Islamic philosophers. In Psychology of Islamic philosophy, vulnerable narcissism is not merely a psychological disorder but rather a manifestation of a disruption in substantial motion (al-ḥarakah al-jawhariyyah) and a rupture in the soul&amp;amp;#039;s existential relationship with the Absolute Truth. This condition is characterized by fragility of the self (nafs), anxiety, and obsessive self-centeredness, rooted in the dominance of certain faculties and illusory imaginings (awhām), leading to the formation of a dependent and unstable identity. Vulnerable narcissism—marked by sensitivity to criticism, experiences of shame, fluctuations in self-worth, and a tendency toward social withdrawal—is examined in this research. Using an analytical-comparative approach, the study first delineates the dimensions of this disorder and then investigates its relationship with the vices of self-admiration (&amp;amp;#039;ujb) and arrogance (kibr) as discussed by Muslim philosophers. Furthermore, by reviving the theories of soul-health (ṣiḥḥat al-nafs), soul-illness (maraḍ al-nafs), and the paradigm of virtue-ethics-based therapy within the Transcendent Philosophy (al-ḥikmah al-muta&amp;amp;#039;āliyah), the principles and stages of an Islamic therapeutic model are extracted. The findings indicate that Islamic philosophers provide considerable theoretical capacity for developing a religion-based therapeutic model for vulnerable narcissism, which can serve as an integrative approach with culturally and spiritually effective dimensions in Iranian society and the broader Islamic world.</description>
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      <title>Racism, Gender, and Disability: Epistemic Injustice and Ideological Critique in Indian Educational Contexts</title>
      <link>https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_21641.html</link>
      <description>This research adapts Bufkin&amp;amp;#039;s materialist-ideological view to the Indian educational system by replacing &amp;amp;quot;caste&amp;amp;quot; with &amp;amp;quot;gender&amp;amp;quot; in order to examine how racism, gender oppression, and disableism combine to generate epistemic harm. We contend that testimonial and hermeneutical injustice in Indian schools cannot be explained as individual epistemic failures or conceptual deficiencies, based on qualitative interviews and focus groups with 48 students and teachers from marginalised positions across three Indian states (Uttar Pradesh, West Bengal, and Delhi). Rather, a materialist ideology of meritocracy, cis-heteropatriarchal normality, and ableist universalism that normalises racial, gender, and disability inequalities is the root cause of these injustices. We demonstrate how educational procedures solidify a &amp;amp;quot;racist-sexist-ableist common sense&amp;amp;quot; that makes prejudice seem reasonable, normal, and justified by using Stuart Hall&amp;amp;#039;s idea of ideology as a &amp;amp;quot;terrain of struggle.&amp;amp;quot; The study comes to the conclusion that removing the material and discursive structures that perpetuate epistemic exclusion across racial, gender, and disability boundaries is more important for anti-oppressive pedagogical transformation than just &amp;amp;quot;training better knowers.&amp;amp;quot;</description>
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      <title>The Body as the Substrate of Cognition: A Feasibility Study of “Embodied Cognition” in Al-Farabi’s Philosophical System</title>
      <link>https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_21663.html</link>
      <description>This article aims to assess the feasibility of an “embodied cognition” reading of Al-Farabi’s thought, drawing on the foundations of second generation cognitive sciences. The main question is whether the role of the body in the cognitive process from Al-Farabi’s perspective can be reinterpreted within the framework of contemporary theories of embodied cognition. The research method is analytical comparative, and the findings show that by defining the soul as the “first perfection” and the “form” of the body, and the body as the “matter” and “instrument” of the soul, Al-Farabi establishes an existential relationship between the two. In his philosophical system, the body plays the role of a necessary condition, an active instrument, and primary matter throughout all stages of cognition – from sensory and imaginative perception to practical and theoretical intellect. The influence of bodily health on the quality of perception, the dependence of the intellect on sensory data, and the role of repeating bodily actions in the formation of moral habits are among the confirmations of this reading. However, this reading is of the “weak embodied cognition” type, because the soul is ultimately capable of transcending bodily attachments and connecting with the Active Intellect. Furthermore, among the fourfold 4E approaches, Al-Farabi’s view is most closely related to “embodiment” in the specific sense and “situated cognition,” and distances itself from the radical extended view and extreme enactivism. The conclusion is that Al-Farabi’s thought offers considerable potential for interdisciplinary dialogue between Islamic philosophy and contemporary cognitive sciences.</description>
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      <title>Religion within the limits of public reason
 The place of comprehensive doctrines in John Rawls&amp;#039;s pluralist liberalism</title>
      <link>https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_21671.html</link>
      <description>John Rawls is one of the most influential political thinkers of the last century, who revived political philosophy with his work entitled &amp;amp;quot;A Theory of Justice&amp;amp;quot;. In a work based on Kant&amp;amp;#039;s &amp;amp;quot;noumenal self&amp;amp;quot; and the theory of place, Rawls tried to build a very profound theory entitled &amp;amp;quot;Justice as Fairness&amp;amp;quot;. Accordingly, Rawls also focused on religious issues. However, with the passage of time, changes in the social and political environment, the agenda of political philosophy also changed unexpectedly. With the decline of the influence of modernism, it seems that in the new ideas of postmodernism, religions themselves should seek to achieve cultural, political, and social power. Rawls, understanding this change, has adapted his thoughts to this model. For this reason, in &amp;amp;quot;Justice as Fairness&amp;amp;quot; instead of theoretical definitions of metaphysics, a surprising approach to liberalism can be seen in his thought. Now, in a democratic society, Rawls is concerned not only with the conflicting teachings of citizens, but also with adopting a correct understanding of justice. Religions, given their transcendental foundations, are the most problematic teachings in laying the foundation for Rawls&amp;amp;#039;s philosophical foundation. Can religions be part of public political debates in liberal political democracies? According to Rawls, based on the idea of ​​public reason, the voluntary involvement of citizens in issues of political justice requires the existence of a common reason, and in this narrow public space, according to Rawls, the place of religion is not only not comprehensive and extensive, but also selective and exclusive.</description>
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      <title>From Syllogism to Simulation: AI and the Transformation of Reasoning in Education</title>
      <link>https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_21676.html</link>
      <description>This paper examines how the growing use of artificial intelligence (AI) in education is reshaping not only how students learn, but also what it means to reason. Drawing on the tradition of syllogistic reasoning, from Aristotle’s logic to later diagrammatic developments, it highlights that reasoning has historically been understood as an active process of grasping why conclusions follow from given premises. In contrast, contemporary AI systems can produce answers that resemble reasoning, yet they do so without genuine understanding. Also, in this paper, we argue that this shift encourages a move from understanding-based reasoning to output-oriented reasoning, where the emphasis is placed on obtaining answers rather than engaging with the reasoning process itself. In this sense, AI does not simply assist reasoning but can begin to displace it, turning it into something externally performed rather than internally developed. While recognizing the advantages AI offers in terms of efficiency and access to information, the paper raises concerns about over-reliance, including the risk of superficial learning and a misplaced sense of competence. By engaging with debates in philosophy of mind and education, it ultimately calls for a more balanced approach, one that integrates AI thoughtfully while preserving the central role of human understanding in reasoning and learning.</description>
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      <title>The Philosophy of Artificial Intelligence from the Perspective of Scientific Realism:</title>
      <link>https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_21677.html</link>
      <description>The rapid expansion of artificial intelligence has generated one of the most significant philosophical debates of the twenty-first century. While advances in computational intelligence, machine learning, biotechnology, and digital infrastructures have expanded human capabilities across medicine, education, governance, communication, and scientific discovery, dominant philosophical interpretations of artificial intelligence remain deeply shaped by pessimistic, anti-technological, and often anti-empirical traditions. Phenomenological critiques emphasize technological alienation and ontological displacement; critical theorists focus on surveillance, disciplinary power, and informational inequality; postmodern analyses foreground biopolitical control, digital sovereignty, and the erosion of private autonomy. These interpretations have contributed to a widespread intellectual climate of technological anxiety in which artificial intelligence is frequently represented as a source of unemployment, algorithmic domination, social fragmentation, and civilizational decline.
This article challenges these interpretations through a science-realist and empiricist philosophical framework grounded in the intellectual traditions of Francis Bacon, David Hume, John Stuart Mill, John Dewey, and Bertrand Russell. Employing a qualitative philosophical-analytical method, the study critically examines dominant critiques of technology in the works of Martin Heidegger, Michel Foucault, Jürgen Habermas, Manuel Castells, Giorgio Agamben, and Yuval Noah Harari, and contrasts them with the empirical achievements of contemporary science and technological innovation.
The findings demonstrate that artificial intelligence should not be understood primarily as a mechanism of domination or civilizational risk, but as an extension of human cognitive capacity, experimental rationality, and institutional adaptation. The study argues that AI contributes to global scientific cooperation, women’s empowerment, transnational citizenship, biomedical innovation, democratic participation, and post-industrial human development. It concludes that the twenty-first century represents not the decline of humanity, but the expansion of human agency through science, technology, and evidence-based global governance.</description>
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      <title>Artificial Intelligence and the Transformation of Human Autonomy: An Analysis of Free Will and Moral Responsibility in Data-Driven Decision-Making</title>
      <link>https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_21681.html</link>
      <description>The proliferation of Artificial Intelligence (AI) systems in daily life has raised fundamental questions regarding the boundaries of human autonomy and the meaning of free will. This paper demonstrates that intelligent systems, by imperceptibly shaping preferences and rearranging the horizon of choice, transform and redefine the form and scope of the experience of human autonomy. Employing an analytical-critical approach and utilizing the framework of AI ethics, this study examines three key axes: (1) the relationship between algorithmic prediction and the conditions for the possibility of human choice; (2) the ethical consequences and the redefinition of responsibility distribution in algorithmically guided environments; and (3) the necessity of developing responsible design principles and regulatory frameworks to preserve human decision-making independence. The theoretical contribution of the paper lies in utilizing a network approach to agency and responsibility, which facilitates a more precise analysis of the &amp;amp;quot;responsibility gap&amp;amp;quot; and a redefinition of the roles of humans and machines in complex decision-making processes. The results indicate that human autonomy undergoes a structural transformation in the age of AI; humans remain responsible, yet significant segments of the decision-making chain—from data collection to algorithmic recommendation—lie outside their direct control.</description>
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      <title>Promising or Dead End? How Two Epistemologies of Perception Determine the Trajectory of AI Abstract</title>
      <link>https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_21682.html</link>
      <description>This study investigates the ontological and epistemological relationship between artificial intelligence (AI) and human sensory perception, interrogating whether AI can theoretically surpass or achieve parity with human perceptual capacities at the foundational stage of cognition. Employing an analytical-comparative methodology, the research contrasts two distinct epistemological paradigms: Al-Farabi’s theory of the “Common Sense” (al-ḥiss al-mushtarik) and Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of the “Lived Body” (le corps vécu), with a focused analysis on how each framework accounts for the integration of the five sensory modalities. The findings reveal that Al-Farabi’s stage-based model of perception, which unifies discrete sensory inputs through a central cognitive faculty, structurally parallels the layered data-processing architectures of contemporary AI systems. Merleau-Ponty, however, rejects the notion of raw sensory data, framing perception as a pre-reflective, holistic, and embodied engagement with the world that resists algorithmic decomposition. Consequently, the study argues that the theoretical and practical trajectory of AI is epistemologically contingent: Al-Farabi’s model opens a viable horizon for AI development and potential perceptual convergence with humans, whereas Merleau-Ponty’s emphasis on bodily intentionality and lived experience establishes ontological boundaries for disembodied systems, ultimately constraining AI to functional simulation rather than genuine perceptual cognition.
Rather than merely describing two paradigms, this article argues that empirical evidence from developmental psychology and 4E cognition—specifically the “kitten experiment”—actively corroborates Merleau-Ponty’s embodied model, thereby shifting the burden of proof onto any computational paradigm that claims perceptual parity for AI.</description>
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      <title>From Cybernetic Capitalism to Digital Supercapitalism: AI, Data, and the New Political Economy of Computational Power</title>
      <link>https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_21685.html</link>
      <description>The contemporary transformation of capitalism under digital conditions requires a conceptual vocabulary capable of distinguishing its historical phases, operational mechanisms, and geopolitical consequences. This paper proposes a three-stage theoretical framework: cybernetic capitalism, algorithmic capitalism, and digital supercapitalism. These concepts do not function as interchangeable descriptors of a generalized digital economy; rather, they represent historically successive yet overlapping formations in the evolution of informational capitalism. Cybernetic capitalism identifies the transition from industrial production to knowledge-based systems structured by feedback, control, and communication—exemplified by early computing, systems engineering, and organizational cybernetics from the mid-twentieth century. Algorithmic capitalism marks the intensification of this logic through autonomous computational systems capable of real-time prediction, optimization, and governance, as seen in platform economies, high-frequency trading, and data-driven management. Digital supercapitalism names the most recent phase, characterized by planetary-scale data extraction, artificial intelligence infrastructure, and the concentration of computational power in trillion-dollar technology corporations and sovereign AI states. Unlike prior phases, digital supercapitalism generates new forms of value capture through foundation models, cloud empires, and geopolitical rivalries over semiconductor supply chains and compute sovereignty. Together, these concepts illuminate the changing political economy of knowledge, labor, and technological power in the age of AI, offering a critical lens for analyzing contemporary monopolies, labor precarity, and the reconfiguration of state–market relations under accelerating automation.</description>
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      <title>“Anthropological Challenges in the Age of Artificial Intelligence: A Critical Analysis through Transcendent Philosophy and Heidegger”</title>
      <link>https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_21700.html</link>
      <description>In the contemporary lifeworld, the emergence and dominance of Artificial Intelligence (AI) constitute more than a merely instrumental transformation; they confront humanity’s ontological foundations and anthropological ends with fundamental and challenging questions. The central problem of the present study is to examine the possibility of “existential reductionism” in the age of AI—an outlook in which the transcendent dimensions of the human being and the non-quantifiable, non-algorithmic aspects of personhood are liable to be reduced to computational data and second-order algorithms. Employing a descriptive–analytical method and a comparative–critical approach, this research investigates the tension between “technological anthropology” and “sapiential/philosophical anthropology.”

The study’s theoretical framework is organized around two axes: first, Ṣadrā’s Transcendent Philosophy (al-Ḥikmah al-Muta‘āliyah), with emphasis on the principles of substantial motion (al-ḥarakah al-jawhariyyah), intensification of being (ishtidād al-wujūd), and the immateriality of the soul (tajarrud al-nafs); and second, Martin Heidegger’s existential philosophy, focusing on the concepts of Dasein, Gestell (Enframing), and the relation between truth and technology. The findings suggest that, from the perspective of Transcendent Philosophy, AI—lacking “the simplicity of reality” (basīṭ al-ḥaqīqah) and deprived of “presential knowledge” (al-‘ilm al-ḥuḍūrī)—remains only at the level of an accident (‘araḍ) and is incapable of attaining the rank of imaginal and intellectual immateriality (tajarrud khayālī wa ‘aqlī). From Heidegger’s standpoint, AI represents the ultimate emblem of Enframing, which, by turning human beings and the world into a standing-reserve (Bestand), deprives Dasein of the possibility of authenticity and the experience of being-toward-death.

Finally, by critically assessing claims about the ontological parity of human beings and machines, this paper concludes that a viable response to potential anthropological challenges lies not in the negation of technology, but in a return to “existential self-awareness” and a rearticulation of the human–technology relation on the basis of practical wisdom and spiritual reflection, so as to prevent the human station of Divine vicegerency (khilāfah) from being dissolved into mere technological instrumentality.</description>
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      <title>Subverting the Self: Philosophical Inquiry and Literary Form in Judith Butler&amp;#039;s Theory of Performativity</title>
      <link>https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_21701.html</link>
      <description>This article examines the relationship between philosophical argument and literary form in Judith Butler’s theory of performativity, arguing that Butler’s critique of gender identity operates not only at the level of conceptual analysis but also through the rhetorical and stylistic structure of her writing. Focusing primarily on Butler’s major works, including Gender Trouble and Bodies That Matter, the study analyzes how concepts such as performativity, subject formation, and agency are articulated through strategies of citation, repetition, metaphor, and textual displacement. Rather than treating Butler’s prose as a secondary stylistic feature, the article argues that her writing actively participates in the destabilization of essentialist understandings of gender and identity. Drawing on philosophical and literary analysis, and engaging discussions on the relation between literature and philosophy associated with thinkers such as Richard Rorty, the article demonstrates that Butler’s texts blur the distinction between theoretical discourse and performative enactment. The study further argues that Butler’s critique of the heterosexual matrix and fixed identity categories depends upon a form of writing that resists conceptual closure and stable meaning. By emphasizing the interaction between rhetorical form and philosophical content, this article seeks to move beyond descriptive accounts of Butler’s theories and offers a more focused interpretation of how textual practice itself becomes part of Butler’s politics of subversion and resignification.</description>
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      <title>Locke and personal identity</title>
      <link>https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_21702.html</link>
      <description>In the last decade of the seventeenth century, John Locke addressed the problem of personal identity. By criticizing traditional views, Locke tried to define the notion of a person and to determine its criterion; according to him, it is a reflective or secondary consciousness that lies behind every perception.
After the publication of his work, many books and articles were presented in criticizing or defending this theory; among the various criticisms, the most important is that Locke commits a contradiction and a logical circle.
Defenders of Locke have tried in various ways to respond to these criticisms. In this essay, after presenting John Locke’s criterion for personal identity, we will present his arguments, the most important criticisms, and the attempts made to answer them.
Then, by focusing on two main criticisms, we aim to show that even if Locke’s defenders are successful in repelling these objections, Locke still fails to defend his own position.
In the end, we will offer two new criticisms and show that even if we suppose that Locke’s defenders have been successful in answering the previous problems, their answers do not suffice to address these new criticisms.</description>
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      <title>Language of Silence: Heidegger, Blanchot, and Linguistic Withdrawal in the Opening Scene of Ballyturk</title>
      <link>https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_21728.html</link>
      <description>By drawing on a Heideggerian-Blanchotian account of silence, withdrawal, and non-phenomenality in Enda Walsh’s experimental Irish play, Ballyturk (2014), the politics of encounter is recast in terms of linguistic excess, narrative opacity, and existential stasis. Instead of interpreting the endlessness of the play’s speech, narrative fragmentation, and theatrical enclosure as emblematic of a failed communication or an attenuation to the absurdity of human psychology, there is a site where language is read as dramatizing itself at its limit point. Further buttressing this interpretation and following a Heideggerian conception of silence (Schweigen) as an originary mode of disclosure as well as a radical account of silence in Blanchot’s the natural (neuter), according to which language runs up against its own impossibility in that horizon, one would approach the play less in terms of an expression than withdrawal. The central question, therefore, concerns how, in situations where language speaks without saying, a dramatic text proposes an unpronounced presence cleft from meaning. Under the influence of Martin Heidegger and Maurice Blanchot, the analysis reinvents structural conditions of meaning rather than their rejection, from which the play offers a reprieve as suspension during which signification is allowed only by virtue of withdrawal, suspension, or non-coincidence.</description>
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      <title>An Explanation of the Paradigmatic discontinuity between Classical and Modern Natural Law: According to Aquinas and Grotius</title>
      <link>https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_21759.html</link>
      <description>Providing a conceptual account of the paradigmatic relationship between the natural law theories of Aquinas and Grotius within the framework of comparative moral philosophy is contentious on two grounds. First, some thinkers claim that natural law constitutes only a subsidiary element within Aquinas’s moral philosophy; accordingly, a comparative inquiry at the level of two complete theories is deemed methodologically untenable. Second, others argue that both Grotius and Aquinas belong to the tradition of classical ethics, and that no meaningful paradigmatic distinction can therefore be drawn between them. The present study challenge both claims and undertakes a comparative analysis of the principal components of these two theories. It argues that the paradigmatic rupture between them can be analyzed from two standpoints: (1) Fundamental/Radical Rupture: according to which discontinuity appears only in two components, namely practical reason and obligation; and (2) Hypothetical Rupture: if our perspective is the totality of Aquinas’s conceptual system, then, in addition to the previous components, there is also a rupture between the two in naturalism and in the definition of natural law. However, if we limit our interpretation to one of the levels of explanation in Aquinas’s works, namely practical reason, then no rupture exists between them in the latter two components. Beyond establishing the discursive rupture between these two theories, the central paradigmatic conclusion is that the articulation of the components of such a rupture is perspective-dependent and Hypothetical. Therefore, limiting their difference to the two components of practical reason and obligation does not contradict their rupture across the four aforementioned components, since each claim is grounded in a distinct perspective —whether the entire conceptual system or merely one explanatory level.</description>
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      <title>Giambattista Vico&amp;#039;s Conception of Imagination and Its Educational Implications</title>
      <link>https://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_21760.html</link>
      <description>In the dominant philosophical tradition, imagination has generally been regarded as subordinate and ancillary to reason. This article examines the concept of imagination in the philosophy of Giambattista Vico and demonstrates that, in his thought, imagination is not a secondary faculty but rather the foundational basis for the possibility of thought, knowledge, and truth. Criticizing Cartesian rationalism, Vico considers imagination a fundamental element of human nature and a necessary condition for learning, self-knowledge, and social life. The present study shows that, according to Vico’s principle that “truth is made” (verum factum), knowledge is not the mere accumulation of abstract concepts but the product of human creative activity manifested in language, myth, metaphor, and narrative. From this perspective, poetry, history, literature, and rhetoric acquire a central role in contemporary moral and intellectual education. Vico presents imaginary forms as the primary origin of human thought and culture. In his view, metaphor, myth, and poetic language are not merely ornamental or literary devices; rather, they constitute primary cognitive mechanisms that enable the understanding of the world and self-knowledge. Analysis of the interconnection between imagination and rhetoric in Vico’s thought reveals that effective education requires the integration of reason and imagination, as well as attention to the emotional, symbolic, and linguistic dimensions of human experience. The article argues that the exclusion of imagination from the educational process reduces education to the mere transmission of information, whereas the true aim of education is the transformation of character and the cultivation of sound judgment and wisdom. Ultimately, this study emphasizes the necessity of rethinking contemporary educational systems in light of Vico’s imagination-centered and humanistic approach.</description>
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