عنوان مقاله [English]
Philosophy of language and its problems are among the most important and challengeable topics in contemporary philosophical thought. Discussion about the sense of a sentence is one of these important debates. Gottlob Frege explains the sense of a term as the form of the representation of its reference. He calls the sense of a sentence a “thought” and believes that the reference of a sentence is determined by its truth value.
In this article, at first, we develop a new approach to the notion of thought. To reach this aim, some of Frege’s logical and epistemological presuppositions and also the properties of thought from his point of view will be examined. Then, on the basis of a vague relation that Frege supposes between a thought and its owner his view is criticized. Finally, we will criticize Frege’s opinion about true essence and the inessential properties of thoughts. It will be shown that Frege’s interpretation of these notions is incomplete and makes the notion of thought problematic.