تقریری از آرای جی. ئی. مور دربارۀ نقش "شهود" در تشکیل تصوّرات و تصدیقات اخلاقی

An Expression of G. E. Moore’s Views of the Role of “Intuition” in the Formation of Ethical Concepts and Judgments

AliAkbar Abdolabadi

Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Shahid Beheshti University, Email: a_abdolabadi@sbu.ac.ir

Abstract

One of the fundamental questions about Moore's ethical intuitionism is that what role the intuition plays in the formation of ethical concepts and judgments. In this paper, I have scrutinized Moore's answer by an analytic method, and by differentiating the two meanings of “Intuition” in his views, i.e. the intuition of the property of “Goodness”-which I have called “Intuition (I)”- and the intuition of the propositions containing the predicate “Good”-which I have called “Intuition (II)”-I have reached these results: 1) Intuition (I) influences on the formation of ethical concepts by the concept of “Goodness” as the cause of the ethical concepts; 2) Intuition (I) influences on the formation of ethical judgments by the simple concept of “Goodness”; 3) Intuition (II) influences on the formation of the complex ethical concepts by the simple predicate “Good”; 4) Intuition (II) , by virtue of the self-evidence and necessary truth of the propositions containing the predicate “Good”, influences on the formation of other propositions or judgments.

Key Words: intuition, ethical concepts, ethical judgments, the property of “Goodness”, the Predicate “Good”, G. E. Moore.

For Moore, every moral knowledge, conceptual or judgmental, is based on the knowledge we have of the simple and indefinable concept of “Goodness”. But this concept refers to the existence of the objective and, at the same time, non-natural property or quality of “Goodness” in some of the things and events of the world. For Moore, our knowledge of such property or quality is a kind of direct and immediate knowledge, i.e. intuitive knowledge. It is evident that when our knowledge of the concept of “Goodness” is based on our non-conceptual and intuitive knowledge of the property or quality of “Goodness”, all our other conceptual and judgmental moral knowledge, which issue from our knowledge of that concept, are based on our intuitive knowledge of that property or quality. Thus, it can be said that, for Moore, intuition no.1, which is the non-conceptual knowledge of the unique property or quality of “Goodness”, is the foundation of every conceptual or judgmental moral knowledge.

For Moore, We know the ethical truths in a “subject-predicate” form. In other words, we know the ethical truths in the form of some propositions called “ethical propositions”. One of the ethical truths is, of course, the “Goodness” of some of the things and events of the world, which always reveals itself in the form of the predicate “Good”. But Moore believes that the property of “Goodness” doesn’t reveal itself in the form of the predicate “Good” in one way. In other words, the way of denotation of that predicate on that property is not the same way. Thus, to have a clear idea and precise definition of the scope of the ethical propositions containing the predicate “Good” we must exactly recognize the ways of denotation of that predicate on the property of “Goodness”.

For Moore, the ethical propositions containing the predicate “Good” may denote on two different things. They denote either to “Good as means” or “value as means” or to “Good in itself” or “intrinsic value”. When we say that something is good as a means, we make a judgment of its causal relation to other things. In other words, in these cases, we both judge that something has a given effect and judge that its effect is good in itself. But finding causal judgments which are always true, is controversial. For judging that what consequences an action exactly has, is not possible. Therefore, we cannot talk of discovering the absolutely true universal laws in the realm of ethics.

For Moore, in ethical studies, only some of actions have been investigated. About those actions, it can be both asked that are they good in themselves and can be asked that how much they resulted in desirable consequences. Moore believes that in arguments related to ethical discussions, both of two mentioned questions have been concerned. In other words, in ethical arguments, it has been tried to prove both that some action is “good in itself” and that it is “good as a means”. For Moore, by judging that some action is the best action we can do, we, in fact, judge that the sum of the intrinsic value of that action with its consequences is more than each other possible action.

For Moore, Intuition no.1 plays a very important role in the formation of ethical propositions, including propositions about “intrinsic goodness” and propositions about “instrumental goodness”, through the concept of “Goodness”, which is the most fundamental ethical concept. But that concept reveals itself always in the form of the ethical propositions containing the predicate “Good”, which is the object of the Intuition no.2.

Moore believes that the concept of “Good” is the only fundamental ethical concept and the only simple, indefinable and irreducible value-predicate. In other words, the concept of “Good” is the only simple concept which all the other ethical predicates are defined in terms of it. For this reason, all the concepts which are the predicates of ethical propositions, are, in fact, the various expressions of the predicate “Good”. Therefore, the true referent of all the ethical predicates is, in fact, the concept of “Good”. From here we can conclude that the predicate “Good” which is the object of Intuition no.2, is the only foundation of other ethical predicates in our minds. Then, there is no doubt that the Intuition no.2 influences in the formation of the ethical concepts through the predicate “Good”.

But the influence of the Intuition no.2 in the formation of ethical knowledge is not confined to ethical concepts, but includes the ethical judgments. For Moore, as the concept of “Good” is the only conceptual foundation of ethics, the ethical propositions containing the predicate “Good” are the only judgmental foundation of ethics. It means that such ethical propositions, which are “the synthetic a priori propositions”, are the only foundations of the formation of other ethical propositions in our minds. In other words, in the last analysis, all the ethical propositions can and must be reduced to the ethical propositions containing the predicate “Good”. From here we can conclude that the Intuition no.2 influences in the formation of ethical judgments through the propositions containing the predicate “Good”. Thus, there is no doubt that the Intuition no.2 influences evidently both in the formation of ethical concepts and in the formation of ethical judgments.

Finally, from what we have said, we can conclude that Moore’s ethical intuitionism is not only a conceptual, but also a judgmental ethical intuitionism.          

Reference

-      Moore, George Edward; Principia Ethical (1993), edited by Thomas Baldwin; Second edition; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

-      Moore, George Edward; Ethics (1965); New York: Oxford University Press.