Journal of Philosophical Investigations
The Elusiveness of the Content of Perception
The Elusiveness of the Content of Perception

Roberto Pereira

مقالات آماده انتشار، پذیرفته شده، انتشار آنلاین از تاریخ 07 مهر 1403

https://doi.org/10.22034/jpiut.2024.63302.3858

چکیده
  In this paper, I take for granted the view of a long tradition tracing back to Kant that the content of perception is nonconceptual, nonpropositional, and iconic. However, I challenge the idea that this content is either an existentially quantified proposition (the existential view), an object-involving proposition (the particularist view), both (the pluralist ...  بیشتر
The Self in Prereflexive Self-Consciousness Self-concernment without Self-reference
The Self in Prereflexive Self-Consciousness Self-concernment without Self-reference

Roberto Pereira؛ Victor Barcellos

مقالات آماده انتشار، پذیرفته شده، انتشار آنلاین از تاریخ 13 اسفند 1403

https://doi.org/10.22034/jpiut.2025.65607.3994

چکیده
  This paper aims to explain the phenomenological concept of prereflexive self-consciousness in positive and constructive terms, using minimal analytical tools. The first step in this direction is the adoption of an adverbial theory of self-consciousness, inspired by the adverbial theory of perception. The adverbial theory of perception replaces the controversial ...  بیشتر
Consciousness and Cognition in Kant's First Critique
Consciousness and Cognition in Kant's First Critique

Roberto Pereira

دوره 18، شماره 47 ، مرداد 1403، ، صفحه 139-160

https://doi.org/10.22034/jpiut.2024.61729.3770

چکیده
  This paper has the ambitious aim to clarify the putative different meanings of "consciousness" in Kant's Critique, particularly focusing on the concept of apperception. Often misinterpreted merely as the potential for self-attributions of experiences and mental states—technically, as the individual's ability to knowingly refer to himself—such readings ...  بیشتر
Capacitism as a New Solution to Mary's puzzle
Capacitism as a New Solution to Mary's puzzle

Roberto Horácio de Sá Pereira

دوره 14، شماره 32 ، آذر 1399، ، صفحه 252-263

https://doi.org/10.22034/jpiut.2020.11564

چکیده
  In this paper, I argue for a new solution to Mary’s puzzle in Jackson’s famous knowledge argument. We are told that imprisoned Mary knows all facts or truths about color and color vision. On her release, she learns something new according to B-type of materialism and according to property dualism. I argue that this cognitive improvement can only be ...  بیشتر