Rene Descartes’s Cogito Argument Reconsidered

نوع مقاله : مقاله علمی- پژوهشی

نویسندگان

1 دانشجوی دکترای فلسفه، دانشگاه تهران، تهران، ایران

2 استاد گروه فلسفه، دانشگاه تهران، تهران، ایران

3 دانشیار گروه فلسفه دین، دانشگاه تهران، تهران، ایران.

چکیده

Asking from the truth of Cogito as the basis of knowledge, this paper tries to analyze all possible answers in Descartes’ philosophy. Inductively, four possible answers are open to consideration: either Cogito is true 1) based on argumentation, 2) because it is clear and distinct, 3) because of being innate, or, lastly, 4) because of intuition. All of these explanations either entail accepting some prior knowledge to Cogito or fall in a vicious circle. A proper way to explain Cogito’s truth is a new perspective to the meaning of intuition in Descartes’ philosophy. Through this perspective Cogito is a presential experience. Lack of any gap, separation, and disjunction in this presential experience is the reason for the truth of Cogito because this lack is the lack of error’s cause.

کلیدواژه‌ها

عنوان مقاله [English]

Rene Descartes’s Cogito Argument Reconsidered

نویسندگان [English]

  • Sajjad Amirkhani Shahraki 1
  • Ahad Faramarz Gharamaleki 2
  • Abdolrasoul Kashfi 3
1 PhD Candidate of Philosophy, University of Tehran, Tehran, Iran
2 Professor of Philosophy Department, University of Tehran, Tehran, Iran
3 Associate Professor of Philosophy of Religion Department, University of Tehran, Tehran, Iran
چکیده [English]

Asking from the truth of Cogito as the basis of knowledge, this paper tries to analyze all possible answers in Descartes’ philosophy. Inductively, four possible answers are open to consideration: either Cogito is true 1) based on argumentation, 2) because it is clear and distinct, 3) because of being innate, or, lastly, 4) because of intuition. All of these explanations either entail accepting some prior knowledge to Cogito or fall in a vicious circle. A proper way to explain Cogito’s truth is a new perspective to the meaning of intuition in Descartes’ philosophy. Through this perspective Cogito is a presential experience. Lack of any gap, separation, and disjunction in this presential experience is the reason for the truth of Cogito because this lack is the lack of error’s cause.

کلیدواژه‌ها [English]

  • Rene Descartes
  • Cogito Ergo sum
  • meditations
  • self-awareness
  • knowledge by presence

مراجع

Descartes, Rene. (1641). Meditation de Prima Philosophia, Paris, Leopold Cerf, Imprimeur-éditeur.
Descartes, Rene. (1985). Philosophical Writings, Vol. 1, translated by John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff and Dugald Murdoch, 1st edition, Cambridge University Press.
Descartes, Rene. (1984a). Philosophical Writings, Vol. 2, translated by John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff and Dugald Murdoch, 1st edition, Cambridge University Press.
Descartes, Rene. (1984b). Philosophical Writings, Vol. 3, translated by John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff and Dugald Murdoch, 1st edition, Cambridge University Press.
Descartes, Rene. (2008). Meditation on First Philosophy with Selections of Objections and Replies, translated by Michael Moriarty, Oxford.
Dretske, Fred. (2012). Doubt about Cogito, in Facet of Self-Consciousness, Grazer Philosophische Studien, vol 84, Edited by Katja Crone; Kristina Musholt; Anna Strasser, Amsterdam & New York.
Hintikka, Jaakko. (1962). Cogito, Ergo Sum; Inference or Performance? in The Philosophical Review, Vol. 71, No. 1.
Hintikka, Jaakko. (1974). Knowledge and Known; Historical Perspectives in Epistemology, D. Reidel Publishing Company.
Husserl, Edmund. (1982). Cartesian Meditations, translated by Dorion Cairns, seventh impression, Martinus Nijhoff publisher.
Nakhnikian, George. (1969). On the Logic of Cogito Propositions, in Noûs, Vol. 3, No. 2.
Rapaport, William J. (1976). On Cogito propositions, in Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the AnalyticTradition, Vol. 29, No. 1.
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مجله پژوهش های فلسفی
دوره 16، شماره 41 - شماره پیاپی 41
شماره انگلیسی (ویژه نامه فلسفه تعلیم و تربیت)
1401
صفحه 148-163

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