Responsibility-Internalism Collapses: Conceptual, Normative, and Relational Challenges

نوع مقاله : مقاله علمی- پژوهشی

نویسندگان

1 دانشجوی دکتری فلسفه اخلاق دانشگاه قم، قم، ایران.

2 دانشیار گروه اخلاق، دانشگاه قم، قم، ایران.

چکیده

Moral responsibility is a fundamental component of ethics, shaping our understanding of accountability, blame, and praise. Responsibility-internalism, which holds that moral responsibility is grounded in some internal mental states, such as beliefs, desires, and intentions, represents a novel yet radical departure from traditional frameworks that focus on the outcome, circumstances, and interpersonal relationships to draw the moral line. While this theory presents a simple, self-contained picture of moral responsibility, it faces serious theoretical problems that challenge its coherence and practical utility. It specifically cannot adequately explain cases of negligence, culpable ignorance, and the relational aspects of moral responsibility that are central to human interactions. This paper offers a critical-analytic examination of responsibility-internalism and its theoretical and practical shortcomings. It examines positions that would incorporate both internalist assumptions, emphasizing the control agents possess over their actions, and externalist and interpersonal factors, aiming to offer a more complete and nuanced conception of moral liability. Some of the paper is devoted to discussing case studies in which the limitations of responsibility-internalism relative to its alternatives are illustrated. And it concludes that although responsibility-internalism offers a novel take and a new tool in the discussions of moral responsibility, such an internalist approach ultimately fails to provide a full and usable theory of moral responsibility.

کلیدواژه‌ها

موضوعات

عنوان مقاله [English]

Responsibility-Internalism Collapses: Conceptual, Normative, and Relational Challenges

نویسندگان [English]

  • Elahe Sadeqian 1
  • Ahmad Fazeli 2
1 PhD Candidate in Moral Philosophy, University of Qom, Qom, Iran
2 Associate Professor of Ethics Department, University of Qom, Qom, Iran.
چکیده [English]

Moral responsibility is a fundamental component of ethics, shaping our understanding of accountability, blame, and praise. Responsibility-internalism, which holds that moral responsibility is grounded in some internal mental states, such as beliefs, desires, and intentions, represents a novel yet radical departure from traditional frameworks that focus on the outcome, circumstances, and interpersonal relationships to draw the moral line. While this theory presents a simple, self-contained picture of moral responsibility, it faces serious theoretical problems that challenge its coherence and practical utility. It specifically cannot adequately explain cases of negligence, culpable ignorance, and the relational aspects of moral responsibility that are central to human interactions. This paper offers a critical-analytic examination of responsibility-internalism and its theoretical and practical shortcomings. It examines positions that would incorporate both internalist assumptions, emphasizing the control agents possess over their actions, and externalist and interpersonal factors, aiming to offer a more complete and nuanced conception of moral liability. Some of the paper is devoted to discussing case studies in which the limitations of responsibility-internalism relative to its alternatives are illustrated. And it concludes that although responsibility-internalism offers a novel take and a new tool in the discussions of moral responsibility, such an internalist approach ultimately fails to provide a full and usable theory of moral responsibility.

کلیدواژه‌ها [English]

  • Moral Responsibility
  • Responsibility-Internalism
  • Circularity
  • Desert
  • Responsibility-Transfer
  • Relational Challenges

مراجع

Fischer, J. M. (1994). The Metaphysics of Free Will. Blackwell.
Fischer, J. M. (2023). My way: Essays on moral responsibility. Oxford University Press.
Fischer, J. M. (2012). Deep control: Essays on free will and value. Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:osobl/9780199742981.001.0001
Fischer, J. M. & Ravizza, M. (1998). Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility. Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511814594
Kershnar, S. (2015). Responsibility and Foundationalism. Philosophia, 43 (2), 381–402.
Kershnar, S. (2018). Total Collapse: The Case Against Responsibility and Morality. Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-76950-9
Kershnar, S. (2022). Desert Collapses. Routledge.
Kershnar, S. (2023). Proportionality collapses: The search for an adequate equation for proportionality. In M. C. Altman (Ed.), The Palgrave handbook on the philosophy of punishment, 397-418. Springer Nature. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-11874-6_18
Kershnar, S. (2024). Responsibility Collapses: Why Moral Responsibility is Impossible. Routledge.
Levy, N. (2011). Hard Luck: How Luck Undermines Free Will & Moral Responsibility. Oxford University Press.
McKenna, M. (2012). Conversation and Responsibility. Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199740031.003.0005
McKenna, M. (2013). Directed blame and conversation. In J. Coates & N. Tognazzini (Eds.), Blame: Its nature and norms (119–140). Oxford University Press.
McKenna, M. (2024). Responsibility and Desert. Oxford University Press.
Pereboom, D. (2014). Free Will, Agency, and Meaning in Life. Oxford University Press.
Smith, H. M. (1983). Culpable ignorance. The Philosophical Review, 92, 543–571.
Strawson, G. (1994). The Impossibility of Moral Responsibility. Philosophical Studies, 75, 5–24.
Strawson, P. F. (2003). Freedom and resentment. In G. Watson (Ed.), Free will, 72–93. Oxford University Press. (Original work published 1962)
Vargas, M. (2013). Building Better Beings: A Theory of Moral Responsibility. Oxford University Press.
van Roojen, M. (2013). Motivational internalism. In H. LaFollette (Ed.), The International Encyclopedia of Ethics, 2693–2706. Blackwell. https://doi.org/10.1002/9781444367072.wbiee512
Zimmerman, M. J. (1988). An essay on moral responsibility. Rowman & Littlefield.
Zimmerman, M. J. (2008). Living with Uncertainty: The Moral Significance of Ignorance. Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511481505
Zimmerman, M. J. (2020). Willful ignorance and moral responsibility. In M. Timmons (Ed.), Oxford studies in normative ethics, 10, 56-80. Oxford University Press.
Zimmerman, M. J. (2022). Ignorance and Moral Responsibility. Oxford University Press.
ارسال نظر در مورد این مقاله
CAPTCHA Image
مجله پژوهش های فلسفی
دوره 20، شماره 54 - شماره پیاپی 54
مقالات
شماره 54 بهار 1405
بهمن 1404
صفحه 427-438

فایل ها

هم رسانی

ارجاع به این مقاله

آمار