نوع مقاله : مقاله علمی- پژوهشی
نویسنده
استادیار فلسفه در مؤسسه پژوهشی حکمت و فلسفه ایران
چکیده
کلیدواژهها
موضوعات
عنوان مقاله [English]
نویسنده [English]
In his later works, Wittgenstein does not explicitly address morality; however, we may still hope to draw on his insights in the realm of ethics. Some philosophers, referring to On Certainty, have argued that there are moral certainties that function similarly to the epistemic certainties Wittgenstein discusses. I aim to demonstrate that, although moral propositions may serve a similar role, they differ in key ways from the certainties Wittgenstein examined. Specifically, moral language games are varied, and their certainties differ, all depending on epistemic certainties. These moral certainties are not rooted in intrinsic actions; and the propositions describing them are often general, sometimes vague, and may have exceptions. Resolving this vagueness and determining when exceptions apply open the door for disagreements and disputes. Additionally, despite epistemic certainties, there are alternatives to acting in accordance with moral certainties. These features distinguish moral certainties from the certainties Wittgenstein discusses by key differences.
کلیدواژهها [English]
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