Why AI Can Never Have a Soul: a philosophical inquiry into language and consciousness

نوع مقاله : مقاله علمی- پژوهشی

نویسندگان

1 استادیار، کالج تحصیلات تکمیلی دولتی A.P.B ، آگاستیامونی، رودراپرایاگ، اوتاراکند، هند.

2 پژوهشگر، دانشکده فلسفه و فرهنگ، دانشگاه SMVD، کاترا، جامو و کشمیر، هند.

چکیده

This paper examines the question of whether artificial intelligence (AI) could ever possess consciousness or soul. While rapid advances in machine learning, neural networks, and large language models have generated speculation about machine sentience, we argue that AI remains confined to the limits of language and computation, incapable of attaining the lived, experiential dimension that defines human subjectivity. Drawing upon both Western and Indian philosophical traditions, the paper explores the ontological and phenomenological nature of consciousness, the relation between language and experience, and the metaphysical concept of soul. Through engagement with Wittgenstein, Bhartṛhari, Descartes, Husserl, Nagel, Chalmers, and classical Indian systems such as Vedānta and Sāṅkhya, we demonstrate why AI cannot transcend simulation into embodiment. Critical responses to strong AI, functionalism, transhumanism, and emergentist theories are considered, yet all fail to address the irreducibility of subjectivity and the ontological distinctiveness of soul. The conclusion reaffirms that AI’s boundaries are linguistic and computational, whereas human consciousness transcends language through lived experience, making the notion of a soulful AI both metaphysically impossible and philosophically incoherent.

کلیدواژه‌ها

موضوعات

عنوان مقاله [English]

Why AI Can Never Have a Soul: a philosophical inquiry into language and consciousness

نویسندگان [English]

  • Satish Kumar Tiwari 1
  • Pooja Tomar 2
1 Assistant Professor, A.P.B. Government Post Graduate College, Agastyamuni, Rudraprayag, Uttarakhand, India.
2 Research Scholar, School of Philosophy & Culture, SMVD University, Katra, Jammu and Kashmir, India
چکیده [English]

This paper examines the question of whether artificial intelligence (AI) could ever possess consciousness or soul. While rapid advances in machine learning, neural networks, and large language models have generated speculation about machine sentience, we argue that AI remains confined to the limits of language and computation, incapable of attaining the lived, experiential dimension that defines human subjectivity. Drawing upon both Western and Indian philosophical traditions, the paper explores the ontological and phenomenological nature of consciousness, the relation between language and experience, and the metaphysical concept of soul. Through engagement with Wittgenstein, Bhartṛhari, Descartes, Husserl, Nagel, Chalmers, and classical Indian systems such as Vedānta and Sāṅkhya, we demonstrate why AI cannot transcend simulation into embodiment. Critical responses to strong AI, functionalism, transhumanism, and emergentist theories are considered, yet all fail to address the irreducibility of subjectivity and the ontological distinctiveness of soul. The conclusion reaffirms that AI’s boundaries are linguistic and computational, whereas human consciousness transcends language through lived experience, making the notion of a soulful AI both metaphysically impossible and philosophically incoherent.

کلیدواژه‌ها [English]

  • Artificial Intelligence
  • Consciousness
  • Soul
  • Language
  • Vedānta
  • Phenomenology

مراجع

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