Promising or Dead End? How Two Epistemologies of Perception Determine the Trajectory of AI Abstract

نوع مقاله : مقاله علمی- پژوهشی

نویسنده

دانشیار گروه فلسفه و حکمت اسلامی، دانشگاه تهران، تهران، ایران.

چکیده

This study examines the ontological and epistemological relationship between artificial intelligence (AI) and human sensory perception, asking whether AI can theoretically match or surpass human perceptual capacities at the foundational stage of cognition. Using an analytical-comparative method, it contrasts Al-Farabi''s theory of the "Common Sense" (al-ḥiss al-mushtarik) with Merleau-Ponty''s phenomenology of the "Lived Body" (le corps vécu), focusing on how each integrates the five senses. The findings show that Al-Farabi''s stage-based model structurally parallels the layered data-processing architectures of contemporary AI, whereas Merleau-Ponty rejects raw sensory data, framing perception as pre-reflective, holistic, and embodied, and thus resistant to algorithmic decomposition. The study argues that AI''s trajectory is epistemologically contingent: Al-Farabi''s model opens a horizon for AI development and potential perceptual convergence with humans, while Merleau-Ponty''s emphasis on bodily intentionality sets ontological limits for disembodied systems, constraining AI to functional simulation rather than genuine perceptual cognition. Finally, the article argues that evidence from developmental psychology and 4E cognition—especially the "kitten experiment"—corroborates Merleau-Ponty''s embodied model, shifting the burden of proof onto any computational paradigm claiming perceptual parity for AI.

چکیده تصویری

Promising or Dead End? How Two Epistemologies of Perception Determine the Trajectory of AI Abstract

کلیدواژه‌ها

موضوعات

عنوان مقاله [English]

Promising or Dead End? How Two Epistemologies of Perception Determine the Trajectory of AI Abstract

نویسنده [English]

  • Nadia Maftouni
Associate Professor of Philosophy and Islamic Theology Department, University of Tehran, Tehran, Iran
چکیده [English]

This study examines the ontological and epistemological relationship between artificial intelligence (AI) and human sensory perception, asking whether AI can theoretically match or surpass human perceptual capacities at the foundational stage of cognition. Using an analytical-comparative method, it contrasts Al-Farabi''s theory of the "Common Sense" (al-ḥiss al-mushtarik) with Merleau-Ponty''s phenomenology of the "Lived Body" (le corps vécu), focusing on how each integrates the five senses. The findings show that Al-Farabi''s stage-based model structurally parallels the layered data-processing architectures of contemporary AI, whereas Merleau-Ponty rejects raw sensory data, framing perception as pre-reflective, holistic, and embodied, and thus resistant to algorithmic decomposition. The study argues that AI''s trajectory is epistemologically contingent: Al-Farabi''s model opens a horizon for AI development and potential perceptual convergence with humans, while Merleau-Ponty''s emphasis on bodily intentionality sets ontological limits for disembodied systems, constraining AI to functional simulation rather than genuine perceptual cognition. Finally, the article argues that evidence from developmental psychology and 4E cognition—especially the "kitten experiment"—corroborates Merleau-Ponty''s embodied model, shifting the burden of proof onto any computational paradigm claiming perceptual parity for AI.

کلیدواژه‌ها [English]

  • 4E Cognition (Embodied
  • Embedded
  • Enacted
  • Extended)
  • Epistemology of Perception
  • Phenomenology
  • Farabi
  • Merleau-Ponty

مراجع

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al-Fārābī, A. N. (2003). Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam (M. Ḥ. Dīnparvar, Ed.). Ḥikmat Publications.
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دوره 20، شماره 56 - شماره پیاپی 56
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