نوع مقاله : مقاله علمی- پژوهشی
نویسندگان
1 دانشگاه شهید مطهری، گروه فلسفه و کلام
2 استاد تمام فلسفه اخلاق، دپارتمان فلسفه اخلاق، دانشگاه قم
3 استاد تمام حقوق، دانشکده حقوق، دانشگاه شهید بهشتی
چکیده
کلیدواژهها
موضوعات
عنوان مقاله [English]
نویسندگان [English]
Providing a conceptual account of the paradigmatic relationship between the natural law theories of Aquinas and Grotius within the framework of comparative moral philosophy is contentious on two grounds. First, some thinkers claim that natural law constitutes only a subsidiary element within Aquinas’s moral philosophy; accordingly, a comparative inquiry at the level of two complete theories is deemed methodologically untenable. Second, others argue that both Grotius and Aquinas belong to the tradition of classical ethics, and that no meaningful paradigmatic distinction can therefore be drawn between them. The present study challenge both claims and undertakes a comparative analysis of the principal components of these two theories. It argues that the paradigmatic rupture between them can be analyzed from two standpoints: (1) Fundamental/Radical Rupture: according to which discontinuity appears only in two components, namely practical reason and obligation; and (2) Hypothetical Rupture: if our perspective is the totality of Aquinas’s conceptual system, then, in addition to the previous components, there is also a rupture between the two in naturalism and in the definition of natural law. However, if we limit our interpretation to one of the levels of explanation in Aquinas’s works, namely practical reason, then no rupture exists between them in the latter two components. Beyond establishing the discursive rupture between these two theories, the central paradigmatic conclusion is that the articulation of the components of such a rupture is perspective-dependent and Hypothetical. Therefore, limiting their difference to the two components of practical reason and obligation does not contradict their rupture across the four aforementioned components, since each claim is grounded in a distinct perspective —whether the entire conceptual system or merely one explanatory level.
کلیدواژهها [English]
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