Artificial General Intelligence (AGI) and the Soul-Womb Analogy: Philosophical Limits of Machine Consciousness in the Yoga Sūtra and the Bhagavad Gītā

نوع مقاله : مقاله علمی- پژوهشی

نویسنده

استادیار، دانشگاه نوآوری گیانمانجاری، باونگر، گجرات، هند.

چکیده

Contemporary discourse on Artificial General Intelligence (AGI) increasingly raises questions about machine consciousness, self-awareness, and the possibility of a soul. Although AI systems now exhibit learning, adaptation, and self-modeling, the philosophical status of these capacities remains contested. This paper examines whether AGI can possess a soul by drawing on the distinction between prakṛti and puruṣa in the Yoga Sūtra and the Bhagavad Gītā. Within these traditions, cognition and adaptive behavior belong to prakṛti and are functional operations rather than true intelligence, whereas consciousness (puruṣa or ātman) is the witnessing principle irreducible to material or computational processes. Adopting a comparative methodology, the study place’s Indian philosophy in dialogue with contemporary philosophy of mind. The soul-womb analogy serves strictly as philosophical illustration, highlighting the difference between creating enabling conditions and generating consciousness itself. Just as a womb provides conditions for embodiment without producing the soul, artificial systems may reproduce cognition without giving rise to conscious subjectivity. The paper argues that AGI, however sophisticated, cannot possess a soul as defined by these texts. It cautions against anthropomorphising artificial systems and reaffirms that moral responsibility remains grounded in human agents, who alone embody both cognition and conscious awareness.

چکیده تصویری

Artificial General Intelligence (AGI) and the Soul-Womb Analogy: Philosophical Limits of Machine Consciousness in the Yoga Sūtra and the Bhagavad Gītā

کلیدواژه‌ها

موضوعات

عنوان مقاله [English]

Artificial General Intelligence (AGI) and the Soul-Womb Analogy: Philosophical Limits of Machine Consciousness in the Yoga Sūtra and the Bhagavad Gītā

نویسنده [English]

  • Dhananjay Trivedi
Assistant Professor, Gyanmanjari Innovative University, Bhavnagar, Gujarat, India
چکیده [English]

Contemporary discourse on Artificial General Intelligence (AGI) increasingly raises questions about machine consciousness, self-awareness, and the possibility of a soul. Although AI systems now exhibit learning, adaptation, and self-modeling, the philosophical status of these capacities remains contested. This paper examines whether AGI can possess a soul by drawing on the distinction between prakṛti and puruṣa in the Yoga Sūtra and the Bhagavad Gītā. Within these traditions, cognition and adaptive behavior belong to prakṛti and are functional operations rather than true intelligence, whereas consciousness (puruṣa or ātman) is the witnessing principle irreducible to material or computational processes. Adopting a comparative methodology, the study place’s Indian philosophy in dialogue with contemporary philosophy of mind. The soul-womb analogy serves strictly as philosophical illustration, highlighting the difference between creating enabling conditions and generating consciousness itself. Just as a womb provides conditions for embodiment without producing the soul, artificial systems may reproduce cognition without giving rise to conscious subjectivity. The paper argues that AGI, however sophisticated, cannot possess a soul as defined by these texts. It cautions against anthropomorphising artificial systems and reaffirms that moral responsibility remains grounded in human agents, who alone embody both cognition and conscious awareness.

کلیدواژه‌ها [English]

  • Artificial General Intelligence (AGI)
  • Consciousness
  • Soul (ātman)
  • Prakṛti-Puruṣa
  • Yoga Sūtra
  • Bhagavad Gītā
  • Soul-Womb Analogy
  • Philosophy of Mind
  • AI Ethics
  • Yoga

مراجع

Baars, B. J. (1988). A cognitive theory of consciousness. Cambridge University Press.
Bryant, E. F. (2009). The Yoga Sūtras of Patañjali: A new edition, translation, and commentary. North Point Press.
Chalmers, D. J. (1996). The conscious mind: In search of a fundamental theory. Oxford University Press.
Clark, A. (2013). Whatever next? Predictive brains, situated agents, and the future of cognitive science. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 36(3), 181–204.
Dasgupta, S. (1975). A history of Indian philosophy (Vol. 1). Motilal Banarsidass. (Original work published 1922)
Dasgupta, S. N. (1920). The study of Patañjali. University of Calcutta.
Dehaene, S. (2014). Consciousness and the brain: Deciphering how the brain codes our thoughts. Viking Press.
Deutsch, E. (1969). Advaita Vedānta: A philosophical reconstruction. University of Hawaii Press.
Feuerstein, G. (1996). The philosophy of classical yoga. Inner Traditions.
Floridi, L., & Cowls, J. (2019). A unified framework of five principles for AI in society. Harvard Data Science Review, 1(1).
Goff, P. (2019). Galileo's error: Foundations for a new science of consciousness. Pantheon Books.
Larson, G. J. (2001). Classical Sāṃkhya: An interpretation of its history and meaning. Motilal Banarsidass.
Nagel, T. (1974). What is it like to be a bat? The Philosophical Review, 83(4), 435–450. https://doi.org/10.2307/2183914
O’Brien-Kop, K. (2023). The hard problem of “pure” consciousness: Sāṃkhya dualist ontology. Religious Studies, 59, 1–17. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0034412523000410
Radhakrishnan, S. (1948). The Bhagavadgītā: With an introductory essay, Sanskrit text, English translation and notes. George Allen & Unwin.
Rama Prasada. (2019). The Yoga Darśana of Patañjali with the Sāṅkhya Pravacana commentary of Vyāsa and the gloss of Vācaspati Miśra. Dev Publishers.
Rao, K. R. (2011). Consciousness studies: Cross-cultural perspectives. National Institute of Advanced Studies.
Searle, J. R. (1980). Minds, brains, and programs. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 3(3), 417–457. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00005756
Shastri, V. P. (2018). Yoga Vijñāna Pradīpikā. Satyam Publication House.
Tononi, G. (2008). Consciousness as integrated information: A provisional manifesto. Biological Bulletin, 215(3), 216–242. https://doi.org/10.2307/25470707
Tononi, G. (2012). Integrated information theory of consciousness: An updated account. Archives Italiennes de Biologie, 150(2–3), 56–64.
Torrance, S. (2005). Artificial agents and the expansion of the ethical circle. AI & Society, 19(4), 399–414.
Turing, A. M. (1950). Computing machinery and intelligence. Mind, 59(236), 433–460. https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/LIX.236.433
ارسال نظر در مورد این مقاله
CAPTCHA Image
مجله پژوهش های فلسفی
دوره 20، شماره 56 - شماره پیاپی 56
مقالات
شماره 56 پاییز 1405
مهر 1405
صفحه 231-246

فایل ها

هم رسانی

ارجاع به این مقاله

آمار