“It’s a Human Thing. You Wouldn’t Understand”: Computing Machinery and Affective Intelligence

نوع مقاله : مقاله علمی- پژوهشی

نویسنده

استاد گروه فلسفه، دانشگاه کلرادو، کلرادو، آمریکا.

چکیده

The strong thesis of artificial intelligence, aka strong AI, is that the mechanical powers of digital computing systems or digital technology more generally, can equal or exceed the achievements of rational human mindedness or human intelligence. In a recent book, Digital Technology for Humans, I’ve argued that not only is it not the case that The Turing Test is a sufficient condition for having rational human mindedness or human intelligence, but also that the very idea of artificial intelligence itself is nothing but a myth, since all digital computing systems, and all digital technology more generally, cannot, not even in principle, be intelligent in the sense in which rational human minded animals are intelligent, even when we also fully allow for our finitude, fallibility, and thoroughgoing normative imperfection. In this essay, however, I want to argue more specifically that our essentially embodied innate mental capacity for affective intelligence necessarily transcends the mechanical powers of any and all actual or really possible digital computing systems or digital technology more generally, even when we also fully allow for our finitude, fallibility, and thoroughgoing normative imperfection. By “affective intelligence,” I mean intelligence that flows from our essentially embodied innate mental capacity for caring (i.e., desiring, emoting, and feeling).

چکیده تصویری

“It’s a Human Thing. You Wouldn’t Understand”: Computing Machinery and Affective Intelligence

کلیدواژه‌ها

موضوعات

عنوان مقاله [English]

“It’s a Human Thing. You Wouldn’t Understand”: Computing Machinery and Affective Intelligence

نویسنده [English]

  • Robert Hanna
Professor, Department of Philosophy, University of Colorado, Colorado, USA.
چکیده [English]

The strong thesis of artificial intelligence, aka strong AI, is that the mechanical powers of digital computing systems or digital technology more generally, can equal or exceed the achievements of rational human mindedness or human intelligence. In a recent book, Digital Technology for Humans, I’ve argued that not only is it not the case that The Turing Test is a sufficient condition for having rational human mindedness or human intelligence, but also that the very idea of artificial intelligence itself is nothing but a myth, since all digital computing systems, and all digital technology more generally, cannot, not even in principle, be intelligent in the sense in which rational human minded animals are intelligent, even when we also fully allow for our finitude, fallibility, and thoroughgoing normative imperfection. In this essay, however, I want to argue more specifically that our essentially embodied innate mental capacity for affective intelligence necessarily transcends the mechanical powers of any and all actual or really possible digital computing systems or digital technology more generally, even when we also fully allow for our finitude, fallibility, and thoroughgoing normative imperfection. By “affective intelligence,” I mean intelligence that flows from our essentially embodied innate mental capacity for caring (i.e., desiring, emoting, and feeling).

کلیدواژه‌ها [English]

  • Artificial intelligence
  • AI
  • digital technology
  • Turing Test
  • Affective intelligence
  • Immanuel Kant
  • Authenticity

مراجع

Budick, S. (2010). Kant and Milton. Harvard University Press.
The Contemporary Kantian Philosophy Project. (2023). The 6th annual workshop of The Contemporary Kantian Philosophy Project: "Kant and the primacy of sensibility," Washington University in St Louis, USA, 19–20 May 2023. https://www.academia.edu/41703363/The_6th_Annual_Workshop_of_The_Contemporary_Kantian_Philosophy_Project_Kant_and_the_Primacy_of_Sensibility_Washington_University_in_St_Louis_USA_19_20_MAY_2023_May_2023_version_including_names_of_participants_titles_and_abstracts_
Frankfurt, H. (1988a). The importance of what we care about. Cambridge University Press.
Frankfurt, H. (1988b). Freedom of the will and the concept of a person. In The importance of what we care about (pp. 11–25). Cambridge University Press.
Frankfurt, H. (1988c). The importance of what we care about. In The importance of what we care about (pp. 80–94). Cambridge University Press.
Frankfurt, H. (1988d). On bullshit. In The importance of what we care about (pp. 117–133). Cambridge University Press.
Frankfurt, H. (1988e). Identification and wholeheartedness. In The importance of what we care about (pp. 159–176). Cambridge University Press.
Frankfurt, H. (2004). The reasons of love. Princeton University Press.
Hanna, R. (2006). Kant, science, and human nature (The Rational Human Condition, Vol. 5). Clarendon/Oxford University Press. https://www.academia.edu/21558510/Kant_Science_and_Human_Nature
Hanna, R. (2015). Cognition, content, and the a priori: A study in the philosophy of mind and knowledge (The Rational Human Condition, Vol. 5). Oxford University Press. https://www.academia.edu/35801833/The_Rational_Human_Condition_5_Cognition_Content_and_the_A_Priori_A_Study_in_the_Philosophy_of_Mind_and_Knowledge_OUP_2015_
Hanna, R. (2018a). Deep freedom and real persons: A study in metaphysics (The Rational Human Condition, Vol. 2). Nova Science. https://www.academia.edu/35801857/The_Rational_Human_Condition_2_Deep_Freedom_and_Real_Persons_A_Study_in_Metaphysics_Nova_Science_2018_
Hanna, R. (2018b). Kantian ethics and human existence: A study in moral philosophy (The Rational Human Condition, Vol. 3). Nova Science. https://www.academia.edu/36359647/The_Rational_Human_Condition_3_Kantian_Ethics_and_Human_Existence_A_Study_in_Moral_Philosophy_Nova_Science_2018_
Hanna, R. (2022). G.E. Moore's open question argument against the naturalistic fallacy revised, updated, and redefended [Unpublished manuscript]. https://www.academia.edu/74336725/G_E_Moores_Open_Question_Argument_Against_The_Naturalistic_Fallacy_Revised_Updated_and_Redefended_March_2022_version_
Hanna, R. (2023a). In defence of dignity. Borderless Philosophy, 6, 77–98. https://www.cckp.space/single-post/bp6-2023-robert-hanna-in-defence-of-dignity-77-98
Hanna, R. (2023b). Dignity, not identity [Unpublished manuscript]. https://www.academia.edu/96684801/Dignity_Not_Identity_February_2023_version_
Hanna, R. (2023c). Frederick Douglass, Kant, and human dignity: A three-step argument that Kant's moral philosophy isn't racist [Unpublished manuscript]. https://www.academia.edu/97518662/Frederick_Douglass_Kant_and_Human_Dignity_A_Three_Step_Argument_That_Kant_s_Moral_Philosophy_Isn_t_Racist_May_2023_version_
Hanna, R. (2024). The myth of AI, existential threat, why the myth persists, and what is to be done about it. Borderless Philosophy, 7, 35–61. https://www.cckp.space/single-post/bp-7-2024-robert-hanna-the-myth-of-ai-existential-threat-why-the-myth-persists-and-what-is-to
Hanna, R. (2025). Digital technology for humans: The myth of AI, human dignity, and neo-Luddism. De Gruyter Brill.
Hanna, R., & Maiese, M. (2009). Embodied minds in action. Oxford University Press.
Heidegger, M. (1962). Being and time (J. Macquarrie & E. Robinson, Trans.). Blackwell.
Hume, D. (1978). A treatise of human nature (2nd ed.). Clarendon/Oxford University Press.
Kant, I. (1998). Critique of pure reason (P. Guyer & A. W. Wood, Trans. & Eds.). Cambridge University Press.
Kierkegaard, S. (2000). The essential Kierkegaard (H. Hong & E. Hong, Trans.). Princeton University Press.
Labbé, A. (2022, November 23). Emotion AI: Why it's the future of digital health. Forbes. https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbestechcouncil/2022/11/23/emotion-ai-why-its-the-future-of-digital-health/
MacFarquhar, L. (2016). Strangers drowning: Impossible idealism, drastic choices, and the urge to help. Penguin.
Moore, G. E. (1903). Principia ethica. Cambridge University Press.
Oppy, G., & Dowe, D. (2021). The Turing test. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy (Winter ed.). https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2021/entries/turing-test/
Parfit, D. (2011). On what matters (Vol. 1). Oxford University Press.
Pascal, B. (1955). Pensées (A. J. Krailsheimer, Trans.). Penguin.
Picard, R. W. (2008). Toward machines with emotional intelligence. In G. Matthews, M. Zeidner, & R. D. Roberts (Eds.), The science of emotional intelligence: Knowns and unknowns (pp. 396–416). Oxford University Press. https://academic.oup.com/book/6088/chapter-abstract/149548563
Rilke, R. M. (1989). Archaic torso of Apollo (S. Mitchell, Trans.). In Selected poetry of Rainer Maria Rilke (pp. 60–61). Vintage Books.
Sarasohn, J. (1993). Science on trial: The whistleblower, the accused, and the Nobel laureate. St. Martin's.
Schapiro, T. (2009). The nature of inclination. Ethics, 119, 229–256.
Solnit, R. (2009). A paradise built in hell: The extraordinary communities that arise in disaster. Penguin.
Somers, M. (2019, March 8). Emotion AI, explained. MIT Management, Sloane School.
Turing, A. (1950). Computing machinery and intelligence. Mind, 59, 433–460.
Wikipedia. (2026). LaMDA. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/LaMDA
ارسال نظر در مورد این مقاله
CAPTCHA Image
مجله پژوهش های فلسفی
دوره 20، شماره 56 - شماره پیاپی 56
مقالات
شماره 56 پاییز 1405
مهر 1405
صفحه 29-56

فایل ها

هم رسانی

ارجاع به این مقاله

آمار