عنوان مقاله [English]
نویسنده [English]چکیده [English]
In Heidegger’s philosophy, the problem of “will” is crucially significant. Indeed, this problem can be traced from Being and Time to Heidegger’s later works. It seems that despite Heidegger’s criticism of subjectivism and representational thinking, which are different names for will, he couldn’t stay away from will absolutely until invoking the complicated term “Gelassenheit”. Prior to invoking this term, Heidegger’s philosophy is not utterly devoid of “will” and one might find it in decisions of Dasein (Being and Time) or as a transcendental will in 1928-1929 works which makes every will possible. After these two periods, Heidegger’s alliance with National Socialism leads his thought to developing a political voluntarism, in which every individual must sacrifice his will in favor of will of the Volk. After these three periods, Heidegger’s confrontation with Neitzsche leads him to turn away from the will. Nietzsche as a thinker in “the end of metaphysics” and whom his philosophy is the culmination of this issue, shows him that Being in modern epochs has been revealed as “will” and eventually as the technological “will to will”. If Nietzsche characterizes the problem for Heidegger, it was Eckhart that suggests him a starting point for the solution. This article attempts to elucidate these issues: what is the “domain of the will”, relation between Gelassenheit and action/passivity, relation between the will and “question of the Being”, and finally Heidegger’s relation to Eckhart’s Christian mysticism.