The Quarterly Journal of Philosophical Investigations

نوع مقاله : مقاله علمی- پژوهشی

نویسندگان

1 کارشناسی ارشد فلسفه‌ هنر، دانشگاه هنر تهران

2 استادیار دانشگاه هنر تهران، گروه فلسفه هنر

چکیده

کانت دقیقه­ اولِ تحلیل امر زیبا در جزء اول کتابش را به بررسی حکم ذوقی از وجهه­ نظر کیفیت اختصاص می­دهد و می­گوید انسان برای آنکه چیزی را زیبا بنامد باید حکم کند که آن شئ متعلق رضایت یا عدم رضایتِ بی­طرفانه است. این «بی‌علاقگی1»، «بی‌طرفانه» یا «بی‌غرض» بودنِ حکم ذوقی، از سویی به دلیل اهمیتش و از سوی دیگر به دلیل ابهام آن، مورد توجه بسیاری از کسانی که بر روی زیبایی­شناسی ِکانت مطالعه کرده­اند قرار گرفته است. یکی از این افراد تئودور آدورنو است. در این نوشته سعی بر آن است که به بخش اول تحلیل کانت از امر زیبا در کتاب اول نقد قوه­ حکم2 نگاهِ نزدیکتر و تا حد امکان دقیق­تری بیاندازیم و در خلال آن به بعضی از مباحثاتی که در پی آن شکل گرفته است بپردازیم و به نقد­هایی که گاهاً از سوی منتقدین وارد شده است پاسخ دهیم. همچنین در دو بخش، آراء آدورنو در زمینه­ «بی‌علاقگیِ» حکم ذوقی و نتایج این رویکرد به زیبایی و هنر را بررسی خواهیم کرد؛ اینکه چگونه آدورنو بر مبنای فلسفه­ خود در ارتباط با هنر و زیبایی و با بهره­گیری از تفکر دیالکتیکیِ خود نوعی تغییر زاویه­ دید را در این مسئله به وجود می­آورد و سپس به نظریه­پردازی درباره­ آن اهتمام می­کند. در پایان تلاش خواهیم کرد به تعدادی از مسائلی که مطرح شده است با توجه به بخش­های دیگر نقد قوه­ حکم پاسخ گوییم تا در پرتو آنها نگاهی روشن­تر نسبت به موضع کانت بدست آوریم.

تازه های تحقیق

The Concept of "Interest": Kant & Adorno

Arman Shoja

Tehran University of Art

armanshojae@gmail.com

Amir Maziar

Tehran University of Art

maziar1356@gmail.com

Extended Abstract:

In the first moment of the analytic of the beautiful, in the first section of his book, Kant analyses judgment of taste (which he defines as judging something to be beautiful) concerning its quality. He writes: in order to call something beautiful, a human being must judge it as the object of impartial satisfaction or dissatisfaction. This "disinterestedness" or "impartiality" of the judgment of taste has attracted many scholars of Kant's aesthetics, on the one hand because of its importance for Kant's analysis and, on the other hand, because of its ambiguous character. One of the prominent figures who was attracted by this part of Kant's analysis is Theodor Adorno. In this paper, I have tried to get a closer look at the first section of Kant's third Critique, put forward the discussions which it gave rise to and finally answer some of the critiques. Also, I will investigate in more details Adorno's ideas on the "disinterestedness" of judgment of taste and the consequences of this approach to the concept of beauty and arts; I will argue that how Adorno- based on his philosophy in relation to art and the concept of beauty, and with the use of an dialectical way of thinking- gives us a new point of view to look at the subject and theorizes that. In the end, I will try to answer some of the critiques with regard to other sections of the third Critique in order to have a better understanding of Kant's position.

 

Keywords: Kant, Adorno, Interest, Disinterestedness, Judgment of Taste

Introduction

    In his Critique of the Power of Judgment, Kant tries to answer the following question: what conditions must be met if we are going to call an object "beautiful". Kant, in the first moment of his analysis, says: a judgment of taste MUST be "disinterested". This statement has given rise to many objections since the beginning starting with Nietzsche. Philosophers and Kant scholars have repeatedly asked: are we really disinterested in the existence of a beautiful object, its history, its relation to other objects, who made it and etc. The German philosopher Theodor Adorno asks a different question: are the works of art disinterested themselves? Are the impartial or even indifferent to what he calls "empirical reality"?

Kant & "Disinterestedness" of the Judgment of Taste

    What Kant means by "disinterestedness" is that when I call something beautiful, for instance a building or a flower, I should be indifferent to the existence of these objects and the only thing that matters is the mere representation of these objects and the satisfaction or dissatisfaction combined with it. Many scholars have criticized Kant on the account that we cannot be wholly indifferent to the existence of beautiful things and we care about the existence of works of art. Some people claim that purely imaginative representations are not capable of affording us the same pleasure as representations caused by real objects. But this is a misunderstanding of Kant. Kant does not say that there is no connection between being interested in the existence of the object and calling it beautiful; he only says that if we judge something to be beautiful on the basis of an interest, our judgment is not a PURE judgment of taste. On the other hand, this "disinterestedness" of the quality of aesthetic judgment is essential to Kant's analysis of the other features of it concerning its quantity, relation and modality.

Empirical & Intellectual Interest in the Beautiful

     Many philosophers, starting with Nietzsche, have questioned Kant's belief that there is no connection between calling a thing beautiful and being interested in its existence. But, in fact, Kant does NOT deny this connection. He only denies that "interest" operates as the determining ground of the judgment of taste; because if so, we cannot distinguish the beautiful from the agreeable and the good. In Sections 41 and 42 of his book, Kant argues that we can have empirical and intellectual interests in the beautiful. On the other hand Kant can be criticized for believing that calling an object beautiful is free from any moral, social or political judgments. It is arguable that our knowledge of the history of art and social and cultural contexts in which they are created and their moral and political messages affects our aesthetic pleasure and even aesthetic judgments.

Disinterested Observer

    Adorno, unlike thinkers like Nietzsche, believed that the concept of "disinterestedness" not only does not undervalue aesthetic objects but the same very concept allows us to value aesthetic objects in and of themselves and not for their instrumental uses or benefits. Adopting a historical approach, Adorno sees the separation of the aesthetic sphere from the instrumental inclination, which treats works of art as the mere objects of pleasure, as the inevitable route to their autonomy. For Adorno, Kant detached art from the dominant attitude which, influenced by instrumental rationality, intends to consume everything and made aesthetic sphere where the subject can still experience freedom and flee the dominance of instrumental rationality and adopt a different kind of relationship with the objects.

Interested Artwork

    Adorno's dialectical way of thinking causes him not to entirely put aside the concept of "interest". He criticizes Kant for being a formalist. He thinks that "disinterested satisfaction" reduces an aesthetic object to formal beauty which is empty of any content. But I should say that Kant, despite appearances, does not dismiss content or what he calls "spirit" of artworks which goes beyond mere formal features. Kant treats artworks as objects whose creation is always based on a pre-existing intention and because of that they are not neutral. But Adorno believes that artworks are not only not neutral but they criticize the status quo by their very existence. Works of art are not mere objects of pleasure, but they have what Adorno calls truth-content. On the other hand for Adorno, the most important thing about artworks is not their experience by a subject but themselves. And this is, form his point of view, what Kant does not give much attention to.

Conclusion

The concept of "disinterestedness" is essential to Kant's analysis of the aesthetic judgment. He uses this concept to, first, distinguish the beautiful from the agreeable and the good and second, to constitute the basis for his analysis of the other features of the judgment of taste. And I believe that most of Kant's critics have misunderstood him on this point including Adorno. But Adorno is right to some extent about Kant's treatment of artworks as mere forms. On the one hand Kant does not give much attention to cultural and historical aspects of artworks, and on the other hand to their relation with truth and falsehood. But Adorno believes that this is the most important thing that matters in aesthetics.

References

-Adorno, Theodor (2002), Aesthetic Theory, Trans and edit .Robert Hullot-Kentor, Continuum

-Berger, David (2009), Kant’s Aesthetic Theory, Continuum

-Kant, Immanuel (2001), Critique of the Power of Judgment, Trans and edit. Paul Guyer & Eric Matthews, Cambridge University Press

-Stark, Tracey (1998) “The Dignity of The Particular: Adorno on Kant’s Aesthetics”, Sagepublication

-Weitzman,Erica(2008) “No Fun: Aporias of Pleasure in Adorno’s Aesthetic Theory” 185-202,The German Quarterly

کلیدواژه‌ها

عنوان مقاله [English]

The Concept of "Interest": Kant & Adorno

نویسندگان [English]

  • Arman Shoja 1
  • Amir Maziar 2

1 M.A. of Philosophy of Art, Tehran University of Art

2 Assistant Professor, Tehran University of Art

چکیده [English]

In the first moment of the analytic of the beautiful, in the first section of his book, Kant analyses judgment of taste (which he defines as judging something to be beautiful) concerning its quality. He writes: in order to call something beautiful, a human being must judge it as the object of impartial satisfaction or dissatisfaction. This "disinterestedness" or "impartiality" of the judgment of taste has attracted many scholars of Kant's aesthetics, on the one hand because of its importance for Kant's analysis and, on the other hand, because of its ambiguous character. One of the prominent figures who was attracted by this part of Kant's analysis is Theodor Adorno. In this paper, I have tried to get a closer look at the first section of Kant's third Critique, put forward the discussions which it gave rise to and finally answer some of the critiques. Also, I will investigate in more details Adorno's ideas on the "disinterestedness" of judgment of taste and the consequences of this approach to the concept of beauty and arts; I will argue that how Adorno- based on his philosophy in relation to art and the concept of beauty, and with the use of an dialectical way of thinking- gives us a new point of view to look at the subject and theorizes that. In the end, I will try to answer some of the critiques with regard to other sections of the third Critique in order to have a better understanding of Kant's position.

کلیدواژه‌ها [English]

  • Kant
  • Adorno
  • interest
  • disinterestedness
  • judgment of taste
  • the beautiful
-      سوانه، پیر(1389)، مبانی ِ زیبایی شناسی، ترجمه‌ محمدرضا ابوالقاسمی، تهران، نشر ماهی
-      Adorno, Theodor (2002), Aesthetic Theory, Trans and edit .Robert Hullot-Kentor, Continuum 
-      Adorno, Theodor (1991), Notes to Literature, trans. Shierry Weber, New York: Colombia University Press  
-      Berger, David (2009), Kant’s Aesthetic Theory, Continuum
-      Bolanos, Paolo (2007) “The Critical Role of Art: Adorno between Utopia and Dystopia” 25-31, Journal of Kritike
-      Burnham, Douglas (2000), an introduction to Kant’s Critique of Judgment, Edinburg University Press
-      Helmut Wenzel, Christian (2005), an introduction to Kant’s Aesthetics, Blackwell Publishing
-      Hughes, Fiona (2010), Kant’s Critique of Aesthetic Judgment, Continuum-
-      Kant, Immanuel (2001), Critique of the Power of Judgment, Trans and edit. Paul Guyer & Eric Matthews, Cambridge University Press
-      Nietzsche, Friedrich (2006), On the Genealogy of Morality, trans. Carol Diethe, Cambridge University Press
-      Stark, Tracey (1998) “The Dignity of The Particular: Adorno on Kant’s Aesthetics”, Sagepublication
-     Weitzman, Erica (2008) “No Fun: Aporias of Pleasure in Adorno’s Aesthetic Theory” 185-202, The German Quarterly
-     Zuidervaart, Lambert (1991), “Adorno’s Aesthetic theory: The Redemption of Illusion”, MIT Press
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