نوع مقاله : مقاله علمی- پژوهشی
نویسنده
استادیار پژوهشکده مطالعات بنیادین علم و فناوری، دانشگاه شهید بهشتی، تهران، ایران.
چکیده
تعین ناقص یکی از مهمترین برهانها علیه واقعگرایی علمی است، بنابراین واقعگرایان برای داشتن موضعی معقول باید به نحو مناسبی به آن پاسخ دهند. تعین ناقص خود بر دو نوع است، تعین ناقص کلگرا و تعین ناقص تقابلی. در این مقاله، تعین ناقص تقابلی مورد بررسی قرار میگیرد. با ملاحظه پاسخهای مختلف واقعگرایان به این برهان مشخص خواهد شد که با وجود کارا بودن آنها در مواردی، موارد دیگری وجود خواهد داشت که این راهحلها پاسخ مناسبی نخواهد داشت؛ به طور مشخص، دو صورتبندی از مکانیک نیوتنی بررسی میشود که مورد مهمی از تعین ناقص است، اما گزینههای یاد شده قادر به توضیح آن نیست. استدلال میکنیم که گزینه مناسب واقعگرایی ساختاری وجودی است که قادر است این تعین ناقص را منحل کند. همچنین باید تاکید کنیم که واقعگرایی ساختاری وجودی، موضعی تجربی و پسینی است؛ به این معنی که باید صدق ادعای آن، مورد به مورد در موارد تعین ناقص بررسی شود.
کلیدواژهها
عنوان مقاله [English]
Underdetermination and Ontic Structural Realism
نویسنده [English]
- Saeed Masoumi
Assistant Professor, Institute for Science and Technology Studies of Shahid Beheshti University, Tehran, Iran.
چکیده [English]
One of the most important arguments against scientific realism is underdetermination, so realists should address the argument satisfactorily and give an appropriate response to it. Underdetermination divides into holist and contrastive forms; in this article, we will only deal with the contrastive form. By examining different responses, it will turn out that while they are successful in some cases, there are instances where responses are not satisfactory. Specifically, two formulations of Newtonian mechanics are examined and the examination reveals an important instance of underdetermination that cannot be accounted for by most responses. We argue that the appropriate option is ontic structural realism that can resolve the underdetermination. We also should emphasize that ontic structural realism is empirical and a posteriori, meaning that the truth of its claim must be examined on a case-by-case basis.
کلیدواژهها [English]
- Underdetermination
- Weak and Strong Underdetermination
- Semantic Realism
- Epistemic Realism
- Empirical Adequacy
- Epistemic Virtues
- Ontic Structural Realism
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