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برهان حفره، جوهرگرایی خمینه ای و واقع گرایی وجودی

نوع مقاله : مقاله علمی- پژوهشی

نویسنده

استادیار پژوهشکده مطالعات بنیادین علم و فناوری دانشگاه شهید بهشتی، تهران، ایران.

چکیده

برهان حفره، بعد از مقاله ارمن و نورتن(1987) به یکی از مباحث اصلی در فلسفه فضا-زمان تبدیل شده است که بر اساس آن نوع خاصی از جوهر‌‌گرایی (جوهرگرایی خمینه‌ای) قابل دفاع نخواهد بود؛ زیرا، به ناموجبیت رادیکال منجر می‌شود. در این مقاله، می‌کوشیم‌‌‌ نشان دهیم اولا، نامگذاری جوهرگرایی خمینه‌‌‌ای مناسب نیست؛ چون، همان‌طور که برخی از فلاسفه گفته‌‌‌‌اند، نقاط خمینه را نمی‌توان واجد این همانی مستقل دانست. ثانیا، می‌توان با تعهد واقع‌گرایی ساختاری وجودی تلقی مناسبی از جوهرگرایی خمینه‌‌‌ای ارائه کرد که بر اساس برهان حفره به ناموجبیت رادیکال منجر نمی‌شود؛ در نتیجه، برهان حفره در مورد آن کارگر نمی‌افتد.

کلیدواژه‌ها

موضوعات

عنوان مقاله [English]

The Hole Argument, Manifold Substantivalism, and Ontic Structural Realism

نویسنده [English]

  • Saeed Masoumi

Assistant Professor, Institute for Research in Science and Technology Studies, Shahid Beheshti University, Tehran, Iran

چکیده [English]

The hole argument has become one of the main issues in the philosophy of space-time after the article by Earman and Norton (1987), according to which a certain version of substantivalism (manifold substantivalism) cannot be defended because it brings about to a radical indeterminism. In this article, we try to show that, first, the naming of manifold substantivalism is not appropriate since as some philosophers have said, manifold points cannot be considered to have an independent identity. Second, with a commitment to ontic structural realism, it is possible to offer a proper understanding of manifold substantivalism, which according to the hole argument, does not lead to the radical indeterminism. As a result, the hole argument does not arise, simply. Thus, the last point is that the fact that structural realism is able to solve the problem of the hole argument can itself be seen as considerable evidence in favor of this philosophical position, and thus, the degree of its confirmation goes up.

کلیدواژه‌ها [English]

  • Substantivalism
  • The Hole Argument
  • Ontic Structural Realism
  • Spacetime
  • Relationalism
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