Journal of Philosophical Investigations

نوع مقاله : مقاله علمی- پژوهشی

نویسندگان

1 پژوهشگر پسادکتری فلسفه، دانشگاه اصفهان، اصفهان، ایران

2 دانشیار گروه فلسفه، دانشگاه اصفهان، اصفهان، ایران

10.22034/jpiut.2021.47243.2920

چکیده

بنابر تحلیل نظریه-مدلی تارسکی از مفهوم پیامد منطقی، جمله X نتیجه منطقی مجموعه جملات Γ است اگر و تنها اگر هر مدلی برای Γ مدلی نیز برای X باشد. اچمندی اما تحلیل تارسکی را نادرست دانسته و نقدهایی علیه آن مطرح می‌نماید. بر اساس این نقدها، تحلیل تارسکی 1) دچار خلطی مفهومی است و بر اساس خلط میان نشانه اعتبار استدلال و علت آن ارائه شده است؛ 2) ضروری‌بودن پیامد منطقی را به‌خوبی توضیح نمی‌دهد؛ 3) به مشکل افراط در ارزیابی اعتبار استدلال‌ها منجر می‌شود؛ 4) به مشکل تفریط در ارزیابی اعتبار استدلال‌ها منجر می‌شود. در مقاله حاضر با ارزیابی این نقدها و بررسی کارآیی برخی از پاسخ‌هایی که در دفاع از تحلیل تارسکی ارائه شده، تلاش می‌کنیم تا نشان دهیم که از میان نقدهای اچمندی، تنها مشکل تفریط در ارزیابی اعتبار استدلال‌ها پذیرفتنی نیست. بر اساس درک متعارف ما از مفهوم پیامد منطقی، اگر استدلالی معتبر باشد، صدق‌نگهدار بوده و به فرض صدق مقدماتش، نتیجه‌ای صادق خواهد داشت. اما نکته اخیر چیزی متفاوت از این است که پیامد منطقی را به صِرف صدق‌نگه‌دار بودن تحویل ببریم. وجود همین نقص باعث می‌شود که تحلیل تارسکی، تحلیلی قابل‌قبول از مفهوم پیامد منطقی نباشد.

کلیدواژه‌ها

موضوعات

عنوان مقاله [English]

Evaluating Etchemendy's Critiques of Tarski’s Analysis of Logical Consequence

نویسندگان [English]

  • Hamid Alaeinejad 1
  • Morteza Hajhosseini 2

1 Postdoc Researcher of Philosophy, University of Isfahan, Isfahan, Iran.

2 Associate Professor of Philosophy Department, University of Isfahan, Isfahan, Iran.

چکیده [English]

According to Tarski's model-theoretic analysis of logical consequence, the sentence X is a logical consequence of a set of sentences Γ if and only if any model for Γ is also a model for X. Etchemendy, however, does not accept the analysis and critiques it. According to Etchemendy, Tarski’s analysis 1- involves a conceptual mistake: confusing the symptoms of logical consequence with their cause; 2- cannot properly explain the necessity of logical consequence; 3- faces the problem of overgeneration; and 4- faces the problem of undergeneration. In the present article, by evaluating these critiques and examining the effectiveness of some of the answers presented in defense of Tarski's analysis, we try to show that among these critiques, only the problem of undergeneration is not acceptable. According to our common sense understanding, if an argument is valid, it is truth-preserving, and by assuming the truth of the premises, the conclusion will be true as well. But it does not mean that we can reduce the logical consequence relation to truth preservation. This flaw leads Tarski’s analysis to be an unacceptable analysis of logical consequence.

کلیدواژه‌ها [English]

  • Logical Consequence
  • Tarski
  • Etchemendy
  • Overgeneration Problem
  • Undergeneration Problem
  • Conceptual Mistake
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