The Quarterly Journal of Philosophical Investigations

نوع مقاله : مقاله علمی- پژوهشی

نویسنده

استادیار دانشگاه سمنان، سمنان. ایران

10.22034/jpiut.2021.48019.2985

چکیده

In philosophy, many reflections and categories were the result of intuition and thought experiments. Intuition is defined as direct, immediate, and non-inferential knowledge accompanied by a sense of certainty. The thought experiment has always been a source of new insights by imagining possible situations to demarcate concepts and revise common philosophical theories. Metaphysicians usually have consensus on the informativity of intuition, but in the analytical tradition, there are severe challenges in dealing with this type of knowledge. On the other hand, some contemporary philosophers believe that the thought experiment induce the unjustified and unacceptable results in the mind of audience. In this article, by referring to some aspects of Kripke's thought, we show that his use of intuition and thought experiments in his critique of radical physicalism is defensible. By distinguishing between fixing the referent of the mental state and the physical phenomenon, Kripke has been committed to the theory of property dualism, which is a critical approach to physicalism in the realm of philosophy of mind.

کلیدواژه‌ها

موضوعات

عنوان مقاله [English]

A Study on Philosophical Intuition and Thought Experiment: Kripke's Critical encounter with Reductive Physicalism

نویسنده [English]

  • Ali Sanaee

Assistant professor, Semnan University, Semnan, Iran.

چکیده [English]

In philosophy, many reflections and categories were the result of intuition and thought experiments. Intuition is defined as direct, immediate, and non-inferential knowledge accompanied by a sense of certainty. The thought experiment has always been a source of new insights by imagining possible situations to demarcate concepts and revise common philosophical theories. Metaphysicians usually have consensus on the informativity of intuition, but in the analytical tradition, there are severe challenges in dealing with this type of knowledge. On the other hand, some contemporary philosophers believe that the thought experiment induce the unjustified and unacceptable results in the mind of audience. In this article, by referring to some aspects of Kripke's thought, we show that his use of intuition and thought experiments in his critique of radical physicalism is defensible. By distinguishing between fixing the referent of the mental state and the physical phenomenon, Kripke has been committed to the theory of property dualism, which is a critical approach to physicalism in the realm of philosophy of mind.

کلیدواژه‌ها [English]

  • Philosophical intuition
  • Thought experiment
  • Analyticity
  • Kripke
  • Property dualism
  • Aristotle(1956) Posterior Analytics, Jonathan Barnes (trans.), second edition, translated with a commentary, Oxford University Press
  • Brendel, Elke (2004 (Intuition Pumps and the Proper use of Thought Experiments”, Dialectice, Vol.58, No.1, 89-108
  • Brown,J.R(1991)“Thought Experiments: Platonic Account”, in Horowitz, T./Massey, G.J(eds), Thought Experiments in Science And Philosophy, Rowman and Littlefield
  • Cooper, Rachel(2005) “Thought Experiments”, Metaphilosophy, Vol. 36, No. 3 ,328-347
  • Dennett, Daniel (2012) Intuition Pumps And Other Tools For Thinking, W.W Norton and Company
  • Fehigf,Yiftach & H, Wiltsche, Harald (2013) “The body, Thought experiments and phenomenology” in Melanie Frappier, Letitia Meynell, James Robert Brown(eds), Thought experiments in philosophy, Science and Arts, Routledge
  • Gutting, Gary (2009) What Philosophers Know, Cambridge University press
  • Hales, Steven.D (2000) “The Problem of Intuition”, American Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 37, N. 2, 135-147
  • Heil, John (1998) Philosophy of Mind: A Contemporary Introduction, Routledge
  • Ichikawa, Jonathan & Jarvis, Benjamin (2009) “Thought Experiment Intuitions and Truth in Fiction”, Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition, Vol. 142, N. 2, 221-246
  • Jackson, Frank (1986) “What Mary did not know”, The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 83, No. 5, 291-295
  • Juhl, C. & Loomis, E ( 2010) Analyticity, London & New York: Routledge
  • Kripke, Saul.A (2001) Naming and Necessity, Harvard university press
  • Laszlo,Ervin (1973) “The Ideal scientific theory: A thought experiment”, Philosophy of Science, Vol. 40, No. 1, 75-87
  • Madell,Geoffery (1988) Mind and Materialism, Edinburg: Edinburg University Press
  • Margolis, Eric, Laurence, Stephen ( 2003) “Should We Trust Our Intuitions? Deflationary Accounts Of The Analytic Data”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, New Series, Vol. 103, 299-323
  • Nagel,Thomas (1974) “What Is It like To Be a Bat”, The Philosophical Review ,Vol.83,No.4, 435-450
  • Putnam, Hilary (1975) “Meaning of Meaning” in Mind,Language And Reality; Philosophical Papers, volume 2, Cambridge university press
  • Quine, W. V. O ( 1960) Word and Object, MIT Press
  • Quine, W. V. O (1951) “Two Dogmas of Empiricism”, The Philosophical Review. 60 (1), 20–43
  • Sher, George (1977) “Kripke, Cartesian Intuitions and Materialism”, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 7, N. 2, 227-238
  • Tye,Michael (1995) Ten problem of consciousness: A representational theory of the phenomenal mind representation and mind, MIT press
CAPTCHA Image