نوع مقاله : مقاله علمی- پژوهشی
نویسنده
دکترای فلسفه، دانشگاه علامه طباطبایی، تهران، ایران.
چکیده
کلیدواژهها
موضوعات
عنوان مقاله [English]
نویسنده [English]
In this essay, we try to address a fundamental issue in the philosophy of science, namely the conflict between realism and antirealism in Quine's philosophy. There seems to be an inner tension in his views on the question of the reality of unobservable entities or reference of theoretical terms. In order to refute his seemingly inconsistent position, we first begin with the concept of ontological commitment, which he formulated in contrast to the position of his teacher, Carnap. In the following, by expressing the thesis of "the inscrutability of reference" and "naturalized epistemology", we show that there seems to be a conflict between Quine's views. In the end, even with the acceptance of non-conflict, Quine's defense of realism is still not immune to criticism.
کلیدواژهها [English]
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