نوع مقاله : مقاله علمی- پژوهشی
نویسنده
استادیار گروه فلسفه، دانشگاه اصفهان
چکیده
I criticise bi-conditional formulation of the norm of the normativity of belief thesis which holds that truth is both the necessary and sufficient condition for the permissibility of belief formation. I argue that the part which holds that truth is the sufficient condition for the permissibility of belief formation is redundant. The argument follows from clarifying the key ideas at stake in the normativity of belief thesis, namely, that false belief is a defect and that the normativity thesis is supposed to distinguish the concept of belief from the concepts of other cognitive attitudes and the slogan that belief aims at truth.
کلیدواژهها
عنوان مقاله [English]
On the logic of permissibility of belief
نویسنده [English]
- Seyed Ali Kalantari
Assistant Professor, University of Isfahan
چکیده [English]
I criticise bi-conditional formulation of the norm of the normativity of belief thesis which holds that truth is both the necessary and sufficient condition for the permissibility of belief formation. I argue that the part which holds that truth is the sufficient condition for the permissibility of belief formation is redundant. The argument follows from clarifying the key ideas at stake in the normativity of belief thesis, namely, that false belief is a defect and that the normativity thesis is supposed to distinguish the concept of belief from the concepts of other cognitive attitudes and the slogan that belief aims at truth.
کلیدواژهها [English]
- belief
- normativity
- prohibitive
- prescriptive
- constitutive
- norm
- permissible
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