نوع مقاله : مقاله علمی- پژوهشی
نویسنده
استادیار گروه فلسفه، دانشگاه تبریز
چکیده
کلیدواژهها
عنوان مقاله [English]
نویسنده [English]
Despite the often false impression that the analytic philosophy as an anti-metaphysical movement has nothing to do with metaphysics, there can be found good reasons to grant the metaphysical dispositions and theses of analytic philosophers, and thereby, to minimize the anti-metaphysical nature of analytic philosophy in its all phases. Since analytic philosophy is a historical movement which its main nature developed through several stages, it can be easily portrayed the very kinds of metaphysical dispositions within each one of its various stages. One of the most important stages of analytic philosophy there can be found within which a plenty of metaphysical dispositions is its early stage (viz. the stage of Logical Realism). Undoubtedly, one cannot say that analytic philosophy in this period was not committed to metaphysical theses about the plurality of entities, the ultimate nature of reality and the logical structure of the world. In this paper, then, after giving a relatively complete explanation of the logical realism, we claimed that although logical realists rejected the traditional speculative metaphysics of their predecessors, they also replaced it by the metaphysics of logic that pursues the metaphysical aims, this time, by logical means. So, we portrayed this kind of metaphysics as Bolzano’s Semantic Platonism, Frege’s and Russell’s Pluralistic Platonism, Russell’s Pluralistic Atomism, and Wittgenstein’s logical atomism.
کلیدواژهها [English]
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