A Pragmatic Solution to the Value Problem of Knowledge

نوع مقاله : مقاله علمی- پژوهشی

نویسندگان

1 Professor of Philosophy Department, Saint Louis University, USA

2 Doctoral Student in Philosophy, Saint Louis University, USA

چکیده

We value possessing knowledge more than true belief. Both someone with knowledge and someone with a true belief possess the correct answer to a question. Why is knowledge more valuable than true belief if both contain the correct answer? I examine the philosophy of American pragmatist John Dewey and then I offer a novel solution to this question often called the value problem of knowledge. I present and explicate (my interpretation of) Dewey’s pragmatic theory of inquiry. Dewey values competent inquiry and claims it is a knowledge-forming process, and I argue that it is competently conducting inquiry that explains why knowledge is more valuable than mere true belief. Knowledge is always the result of a process of competent inquiry (itself valuable) whereas belief can but need not be the result of inquiry. I end by considering and replying to reasonable objections to my pragmatic solution.

کلیدواژه‌ها

عنوان مقاله [English]

A Pragmatic Solution to the Value Problem of Knowledge

نویسندگان [English]

  • John Greco 1
  • Sahar Joakim 2
1 Professor of Philosophy Department, Saint Louis University, USA
2 Doctoral Student in Philosophy, Saint Louis University, USA
چکیده [English]

We value possessing knowledge more than true belief. Both someone with knowledge and someone with a true belief possess the correct answer to a question. Why is knowledge more valuable than true belief if both contain the correct answer? I examine the philosophy of American pragmatist John Dewey and then I offer a novel solution to this question often called the value problem of knowledge. I present and explicate (my interpretation of) Dewey’s pragmatic theory of inquiry. Dewey values competent inquiry and claims it is a knowledge-forming process, and I argue that it is competently conducting inquiry that explains why knowledge is more valuable than mere true belief. Knowledge is always the result of a process of competent inquiry (itself valuable) whereas belief can but need not be the result of inquiry. I end by considering and replying to reasonable objections to my pragmatic solution.

کلیدواژه‌ها [English]

  • Epistemology
  • Knowledge
  • the Value Problem
  • John Dewey
  • American Pragmatism

مراجع

  • Brown, Mattew J. (2012). “John Dewey’s Logic of Science.” The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science, Vol. 2, No. 2 (Fall 2012), pp. 258-306.
  • Browning, Douglas. (2002). “Designation, Characterization, and Theory in Dewey’s Logic.” In Dewey’s Logical Theory: New Studies and Interpretations, ed. F. Thomas Burke, D. Micah.
  • Dewey, John. (1938). Logic: The Theory of Inquiry. New York: Henry Holt and Company.
  • Gettier, Edmund. (1963). “Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?” Analysis, Volume 23, No. 6, (1963), pp 122-3.
  • James, William. (1907). Pragmatism: A New Name for Some Old Ways of Thinking, Longmans, Green, and Co.
  • Kvanvig, Jonathan. (2003). The Value of Knowledge and the Pursuit of Understanding, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
  • Peirce, C. S. (1992). The Essential Peirce: Selected Philosophical Writings, vol. 1. Ed. N. Houser and C. Kloesel. Indiana University Press.
  • Plato: Complete Works. (1997). Ed. Cooper & Hutchinson. Hackett Publishing.
  • Pritchard, Duncan and Turri, John (2014). "The Value of Knowledge", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL= <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/knowledge-value/>.
  • Riggs, Wayne. (2007). ‘The Value Turn in Epistemology’, in New Waves in Epistemology, eds. V. Hendricks and D. H. Pritchard, London: Palgrave Macmillan.
  • Staley, Kent. (2017). “Philosophy of Science.” Graduate Seminar at Saint Louis University.
  • Williamson, Timothy. (2000). Knowledge and Its Limits, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
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مجله پژوهش های فلسفی
دوره 11، شماره 21
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1396
صفحه 53-67

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