Journal of Philosophical Investigations

نوع مقاله : مقاله علمی- پژوهشی


1 دانشجوی کارشناسی ارشد فلسفه علم، دانشگاه صنعتی شریف، تهران، ایران

2 دانشیار گروه فلسفه علم، دانشگاه صنعتی شریف، تهران، ایران

3 دانش‌آموخته کارشناسی ارشد فلسفه علم، دانشگاه صنعتی شریف، تهران، ایران


واقع­گرایی علمی همواره با انتقادات مستمری از سوی پادواقع­گرایان روبه­رو بوده است. استدلال «بدیل­های تصور نشده» کایل استنفورد را می­توان نسخه متأخر و دردسرساز این چالش­ها دانست. در این مقاله ابتدا اجمالاً اشاره­ای به واقع­گرایی علمی و برهان­های مؤید آن خواهیم داشت. سپس اصلی­ترین چالش­هایی را که واقع­گرایی علمی با آن مواجه بوده است، برخواهیم شمرد. در ادامه نگاهی به استدلال استنفورد می­اندازیم و بررسی می­کنیم که چگونه برای واقع­گرایی چالش به وجود می­آورد و همچنین پاسخ­های واقع­گرایانه مطرح شده به چالش مذکور را توصیف خواهیم کرد. همچنین خواهیم کوشید از نگاه واقع­گرایی انتقادی روی بسکار توضیح دهیم که چگونه نگاه لایه­مند همزمان به جهان و نظریه­های علمی می­تواند ضمن ممکن دانستن دستیابی به شناخت واقعیت از خلال فعالیت علمی، اساس استدلال پادواقع گرایانه استنفورد را سست کند.



عنوان مقاله [English]

Evaluation of the Argument of "Unconceived Alternatives" from the Perspective of Bhaskar's Critical Realism

نویسندگان [English]

  • Amir Sharifipour 1
  • Mostafa Taqavi 2
  • Maryam Poustforush 3

1 M.A. Student of Philosophy of Science, Sharif University of Technology, Iran.

2 Associate Professor of Philosophy of Science Department, Sharif University of Technology, Iran

3 M.A. of Philosophy of Science, Sharif University of Technology, Iran

چکیده [English]

Scientific realism has always faced continuous criticisms from scientific anti-realists. Kyle Stanford's "unconceived alternatives" argument can be seen as a late and troublesome version of these challenges. In this paper, we will first briefly mention scientific realism and its supporting arguments, including the "no-miracle" argument and the "slippery slope" argument. Then we will list the main challenges that scientific realism has faced. Arguments such as "pessimistic meta-induction" and "underdetermination of scientific theories" are raised against scientific realism. In the following, we will take a look at Stanford's argument and examine how it creates a challenge for realism by combining historical and philosophical arguments, and we will also describe the realist answers raised to the said challenge. We will also try to explain from Roy Bhaskar's critical realism point of view how the Stratified view of the world and scientific theories, makes it possible to achieve knowledge of reality through scientific activity and also can weaken the basis of Stanford's anti-realist argument.

کلیدواژه‌ها [English]

  • unconceived alternatives
  • Kyle Stanford
  • underdetermination
  • pessimistic meta-induction
  • Roy Bhaskar
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