Journal of Philosophical Investigations

نوع مقاله : مقاله علمی- پژوهشی

نویسندگان

1 دانشیار گروه فلسفه علم، پژوهشگاه علوم انسانی و مطالعات فرهنگی، ایران.

2 دانشجوی دکتری فلسفه علم، پژوهشگاه علوم انسانی و مطالعات فرهنگی، ایران.

چکیده

Artifacts are ubiquitous and influential in our world, but their nature and existence are controversial. Several theories have been proposed to explain the ontology of artifacts. Drawing on Popper's theory of three worlds, this paper suggests a metaphysics for artifacts along the line of a critical rationalist (CR) approach. This theory distinguishes between three realms of reality: the physical world (World 1), the mental world (World 2), and the world of objective knowledge (World 3). The paper argues that artifacts have different ontological components that correspond to these three realms, and that each component is real and causal. The paper shows how this perspective can account for the intentional and functional aspects of artifacts, as well as their dependence on plans that influence different realms of reality. The paper explains how this pluralistic ontology, compared to the rival theories, enables one to explain the relevant ontological problems of artifacts. The paper also explores how this proposal can lead to a research program encompassing a broader range of technologies, such as social artifacts. In sum, the paper suggests that Popper's three worlds theory provides a rich and comprehensive framework for understanding the metaphysics of artifacts.

کلیدواژه‌ها

عنوان مقاله [English]

The Metaphysics of Artifacts: a critical rationalist approach

نویسندگان [English]

  • Alireza Mansouri 1
  • Emad Tayebi 2

1 Associate Professor of Philosophy of Science and Technology; Institute for Humanities and Cultural Studies; Iran

2 PhD Candidate of Philosophy of Science and Technology, Institute for Humanities and Cultural Studies; Iran

چکیده [English]

Artifacts are ubiquitous and influential in our world, but their nature and existence are controversial. Several theories have been proposed to explain the ontology of artifacts. Drawing on Popper's theory of three worlds, this paper suggests a metaphysics for artifacts along the line of a critical rationalist (CR) approach. This theory distinguishes between three realms of reality: the physical world (World 1), the mental world (World 2), and the world of objective knowledge (World 3). The paper argues that artifacts have different ontological components that correspond to these three realms, and that each component is real and causal. The paper shows how this perspective can account for the intentional and functional aspects of artifacts, as well as their dependence on plans that influence different realms of reality. The paper explains how this pluralistic ontology, compared to the rival theories, enables one to explain the relevant ontological problems of artifacts. The paper also explores how this proposal can lead to a research program encompassing a broader range of technologies, such as social artifacts. In sum, the paper suggests that Popper's three worlds theory provides a rich and comprehensive framework for understanding the metaphysics of artifacts.

کلیدواژه‌ها [English]

  • technical artifact
  • critical rationalism
  • metaphysics of artifact
  • ontology
  • philosophy of technology
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