Journal of Philosophical Investigations

نوع مقاله : مقاله علمی- پژوهشی


1 استادیار گروه حقوق، دانشگاه شهید باهنر کرمان، ایران

2 دانشیار گروه حقوق، دانشگاه تهران، ایران.


قانون دلیل و راهنمای رفتار انسان است، ازاین‌رو یک‌ رویه اجتماعی هنجاری می‌باشد؛ اما یک هنجار بایستی واجد چه شرایطی باشد که به آن بگوییم قانون و نسبت آن با اخلاق چیست؟ آیا معیار قانون بودن، منشأ آن است یا محتوای آن؟ در پاسخ، مکتب حقوق طبیعی و اثبات‌گرایی حقوقی دو نظریه رقیب دیرین هستند. مکتب حقوق طبیعی که توصیه‌ای و باید انگار است بر محتوا اما اثبات‌گرایی که توصیفی و توضیحی است بر منبع قانون تأکید دارد. البته محتوا نزد حقوق طبیعی ابتدا مبتنی بر دین بود؛ اما امروزه متوجه حقوق بشر فردی به‌عنوان موضوع و قرارداد اجتماعی به‌عنوان فرایند شده است. فضای مفهومی اثبات‌گرایی حقوقی از ترکیب دو تز واقعیت اجتماعی و تفکیک‌پذیری شکل گرفته و نظریه تفکیک منکر هرگونه ارتباط مفهومی و محتوایی بین قانون و اخلاق است. ولی دورکین با نقد نظریه تفکیک، اثبات‌گرایی را به دو اردوگاه متخاصم نرم و سخت تقسیم نمود و اثبات‌گرایی نرم نظریه تفکیک را به میزانی کنار گذاشت؛ اما آیا اثبات‌گرایی نرم با ادعای اقتدار قانون و کارکرد هدایتی آن سازگار است؟ آیا اخلاق کشفی یا ابداعی مؤلفه وجودی و ضروری قانون است یا سنجه ارزیابی آن؟ در این مقاله پرسش‌های مذکور مورد واکاوی قرار می‌گیرد تا از این رهگذر موضع اثبات‌گرایی حقوقی سخت و نرم کشف گردد.



عنوان مقاله [English]

The Problem of Morality in Soft and Hard Legal Positivism

نویسندگان [English]

  • Ataollah Salehi 1
  • Mahdi Balavi 2

1 Assistant Professor of Law Department, Shahid Bahonar University of Kerman, Iran

2 Associate Professor of Law Department, University of Tehran, Iran

چکیده [English]

The law is the reason and guide for human behavior; therefore, it is a normative social practice. But what conditions should a norm have to be called a law and what is its relationship with morality? Is the criterion of being a law, its origin or its content? In response, the school of natural law and legal positivism are two long-standing competing theories. The school of natural law, which is a recommendatory and prescriptive, emphasizes the content, but the positivism, which is descriptive and explanatory, emphasizes the source of the law. Of course, at first, the school of natural law looked for content in religion, but today, individual human rights as the subject and social contract as the process has noticed. The conceptual space of legal positivism is formed by the combination of two theses of social reality and separability, and the separation theory denies any conceptual and content relationship between law and morality. but, Dworkin, by criticizing the separation theory, divided positivism into two opposing camps, soft and hard, and the soft positivism abandoned the separation theory to some extent. But is soft legal positivism compatible with the claim of the authority of the law and its guiding function? Is discovered or invented morality an essential and existential part of the law or is it a criterion for its evaluation? In this article, the mentioned questions are analyzed in order to discover the position of hard and soft legal positivism.

کلیدواژه‌ها [English]

  • law
  • moral
  • social reality
  • soft legal positivism
  • hard legal positivism
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