Journal of Philosophical Investigations

نوع مقاله : مقاله علمی- پژوهشی

نویسنده

Professor at Devine Word Seminary in Manila & Ph.D. Candidate of Philosophy, De La Salle University, Philippine

چکیده

We are... So, to reframe the inquiry: who are we on a metaphysical level? Which aspects of ourselves are the most universally representative of who we are? How do we fare in the face of the passage of time? For decades, philosophers have debated the concept of diachronic personal identity, which focuses on the question of what keeps us alive. An intricate debate has developed between those who hold the body view (animalism) and those who hold the psychological view (memory) on the question of who we are. The two groups will eventually become so firmly set in their views that they will be unable to compromise. Hylomorphic animalism, or the view that humans are rational animals, living bodies made of prime matter and a rational soul, is an alternative answer to this divisive question that I propose in this study, following in the footsteps of Aristotle and Aquinas. We only survive if matter and rational souls do.

کلیدواژه‌ها

موضوعات

عنوان مقاله [English]

Beyond the Bodily View and Psychological View of Human Beings: Human Beings are Rational Animals

نویسنده [English]

  • Khanh Trinh

Professor at Devine Word Seminary in Manila & Ph.D. Candidate of Philosophy, De La Salle University, Philippine

چکیده [English]

We are... So, to reframe the inquiry: who are we on a metaphysical level? Which aspects of ourselves are the most universally representative of who we are? How do we fare in the face of the passage of time? For decades, philosophers have debated the concept of diachronic personal identity, which focuses on the question of what keeps us alive. An intricate debate has developed between those who hold the body view (animalism) and those who hold the psychological view (memory) on the question of who we are. The two groups will eventually become so firmly set in their views that they will be unable to compromise. Hylomorphic animalism, or the view that humans are rational animals, living bodies made of prime matter and a rational soul, is an alternative answer to this divisive question that I propose in this study, following in the footsteps of Aristotle and Aquinas. We only survive if matter and rational souls do.

کلیدواژه‌ها [English]

  • animalism
  • psychological view
  • hylomorphism
  • persistence
  • identity
Aquinas, De Principiis Naturae (De PN).
Aquinas, Sentencia libri De anima Commmentary on Aristotle's De Anima.
Aquinas, Super I Epistolam B. Pauli ad Corinthios lectura.
Aquinas, T. (1998). On Being and Essence: Select Writing, (R. McInerny, Trans.). Penguin.
Aquinas. (1993). Selected Philosophical Writings, edited by T. McDermont, Oxford: OUP.
Aquinas. De Anima.
Aquinas. De Potentia.
Aquinas. De unitate intelectus (De UI).
Aquinas. Questiones Disputatae De Anima (Q. De Anima).
Aquinas. Summa contra gentile (SCG).
Aquinas. Summa Theologiae (ST).
Aristotle.  (2014). The Complete Works of Aristotle: The Revised Oxford Translation, ed. Jonathan Barnes.
Aveling, F. (1909). Form. In The Catholic Encyclopedia. Robert Appleton Company. Retrieved July 15, 2023. http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/06137b.html
Blatti, S. (2012). A new argument for animalism. Analysis, 72(4), 685–690. https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/ans102
Bollingen Series
Brower, J. E. (2014). Aquinas's Ontology of the Material World: Change, Hylomorphism, and Material, Objects. Oxford University Press.
Brown, C. M. (2005). Aquinas and the Ship of Theseus: Solving Puzzles about Material Objects.      Continuum.
Edwards, S. (1979). Saint Thomas Aquinas on 'The Same Man.' The Southwestern Journal of           Philosophy, 10(1), 89–97. https://doi.org/10.5840/swjphil19791018
Kretzmann, N., & Stump, E. (1993). The Cambridge companion to Aquinas. In Cambridge University Press.
Oderberg, D. S. (2005). Hylemorphic Dualism. In E. F. Paul & F. D. Miller (Eds.), Personal identity (pp. 70–99). Cambridge University Press.
Olson, E. T. (2003). An Argument for Animalism. In J. Martin & J. Barresi (Eds.), Personal Identity. Blackwell.
Olson, E. T. (1999). The Human Animal: Personal Identity Without Psychology. Oxford University Press.
Olson, E. T. (2007). What Are We? A Study in Personal Ontology. Oxford University Press.
Parfit, D. (1984). Reasons and Persons. Oxford University Press.
Reid, T. (2002). On Mr. Locke's Account of Personal Identity. In K. Haakonssen (Ed.), Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man (Vol. 6). Edinburgh University Press.
Shoemaker, S. (1963). Self-knowledge and self-identity. Cornell University Press.
Shoemaker, S. (1984). Personal Identity: A Materialist's Account. In Personal Identity. Oxford Press.
Snowdon, P. F. (1990). Persons, Animals, and Ourselves. In C. Gill (Ed.), The Person and the Human Mind: Issues in Ancient and Modern Philosophy. Clarendon Press.
Toner, P. (2011). Hylemorphic Animalism. Philosophical Studies, 155, 65–81.
Williams, B. (1973). Personal Identity and Individuation. In Problems of the Self. Cambridge University Press.
CAPTCHA Image